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Chapter Eleven

DURING the last days of the Congress and soon afterward there appeared a number of protests, meant more or less seriously. Each was opposed to one or more articles of the Peace, not against the Peace as a whole. 1 Duke Charles III of Mantua ( 1637-65) protested against the clause confirming the Treaty of Chierasco that gave part of Montferrat, a part of his duchy, to the Duke of Savoy. 2 Duke Charles of Lorraine ( 164575), through his representative, protested against the Peace because he had been excluded from it and because his lands were still held by the French, a situation that persisted until the latter, under Louis XIV, incorporated the duchy in 1670. 3 The reader recalls that the French and the Swedes had insisted that the emperor sign a peace that did not include the Spanish Hapsburgs. 4 The Spanish king, Philip IV ( 1621-65), protested because the Peace of Münster had been signed without regard to Spain or the Burgundian Circle of the Empire, meaning the Spanish Netherlands or Belgium, which Spain still controlled. 5

1 Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIV, Part I, 100.
2 Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte vom westphälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Grossen, 1648-1740, Vol. I, p. 6; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 100.
3 Londorp, Acta publica, VI, 425-27; Erdmannsdörffer, op. cit., I, 6; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 100; Lavisse, Histoire de France depuis les origins, VII, Part I, 73; Part II, 301.
4 Odhner, Die Politik Schwedens, pp. 280-82. See also chap. vii, §5.
5 Dumont, Corps universelle diplomatique, VI, Part I, 464-67; Londorp, op. cit., VI, 425-29; Erdmannsdörffer, op. cit., I, 6; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 100.

The Archbishop of Salzburg, through his representative, Dr. Krebs, submitted a protest against the Peace, October 12-22, 1648, because its terms were prejudicial to the interests of the church. 6 Adam Adami, the historian of the Congress, submitted two protests against the Peace, one in the name of the prelates and one in the name of the abbey of Corvey, whose interest in both cases he had persistently but futilely represented during the negotiations. 7 Count Palatine Wolfgang Wilhelm, Duke of Neuburg and Jülich-Berg ( 1609-53), protested September 1, 1648, against the transfer of the electorate to the House of Bavaria. 8 He, being the nearest male relation in the Palatine-Zweibrücken line and also a Catholic, had objected, as early as 1623, to the electoral title of the Palatinate being bestowed by Emperor Ferdinand II on Maximilian of Bavaria. 9 But his protest was fruitless in both cases. None of the protests here mentioned had any effect at the time or later. They are of far less importance than those of the nuncio and the pope, which are an inseparable part of the story of the secularization of politics.

As early as October 5, 1644, Innocent X had sent the nuncio, Fabio Chigi, a brief giving him full authority to protest at whatever time and in whatever form he found it advisable against any agreement that was injurious to the interests of the Catholic church. 10 In conformity with such instructions he submitted a protest in December, 1645, against every injury that might be sustained by the church directly or indirectly through

10 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 861, contains breve, as does Müller, Das Friedenswerk der Kirche, I, 171-72; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 95; Fischer, Beiträge, pp. 64-65.
6 Zauner, Chronik von Salzburg, VIII, 217-18, 248-50, contains the protest; Widmann , Geschichte Salburgs, II, 297-98; Adami, Relatio historica, 564; Adami, Arcana Pacis, p. 415.
7 Israel, Adam Adami, p. 81.
8 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, VI, 229-39; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 649.
9 Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns, I, 552-55; Breitenbach, "Wolfgang Wilhelm", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XLIV, 95, 98-99.

the actions of the Congress. 11 As a pattern he used a similar writing in which Cardinal Otto Truchsess von Waldburg, Bishop of Augsburg ( 1543-73), had protested, on March 23, 1555, against religious concessions made by the Peace of Augsburg to the Protestants in the German Empire. 12 For almost two years Chigi remained silent, awaiting developments in the Congress. When by the latter half of 1647 the negotiations had gone counter to the wishes of the church, in part because the new Archbishop of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, was favoring peace policies in opposition to those favored by his predecessor, Anselm Kasimir, the nuncio concluded that he would give up his attitude of silence and protest emphatically in letters and breves against all actions that were prejudicial to the interests of the Catholic church. On November 24, 1647, he wrote a letter of protest to the dean of the chapter at Augsburg; on November 25, 1647, he wrote to Emperor Ferdinand III himself; on the same day he addressed a letter to Count von Trauttmannsdorff and to the elector Maximilian of Bavaria; and on November 29, to the imperial plenipotentiaries, to the elector of Mainz, the elector of Cologne, and to the representatives of the Catholic states. 13

In his letters to the representatives of the Catholic states Chigi earnestly summoned his faithful instruments to do their utmost for the welfare of the Catholic cause, even to the point of sustaining injury to themselves. Their well-being, he said, was so intimately associated with the cause of the Catholic religion that it would sustain injury precisely when they diverged from the interests of the church ever so slightly. In closing, he safeguarded himself against an eventual reproach that he had ever said anything in his protests that could have been an offense against the holy fathers, the councils and popes, and as-

11 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 77.
12 Ibid., p. 77, also VI, 564; Braun, Geschichte der Bischöfe von Augsburg, III, 433-34, contains the protest of Truchsess. See chap. iii.
13 Fischer, op. cit., pp. 60-61, cites Chigi's letters in the Vatican archives.

sures his Catholic friends that he will implore God to sustain them in their deliberations. 14 1

Many of the Catholic princes regarded the nuncio's letters as a comfort; others ignored them. The imperial representatives, after waiting a long time to reply, deplored that, owing to circumstances shaped by others, presumably the elector of Bavaria, a compromise peace was necessary; but no response of consequence ever followed the sending and receipt of these letters. 15 The nuncio continued in various ways to labor against a peace injurious to church interests. 16 But the ultimate outcome did not prevent the conclusion of a peace that was quite out of harmony with the objectives for which he had been active.

Between October, 1648, and February, 1649, he issued three protests. The first was issued October 14, 1648, before the negotiations had been concluded; it was especially aimed at the negotiations taking place at Osnabrück, where the imperial party was negotiating with the Swedes and their Protestant allies to the detriment of the church. This protest was immediately made known to the Director ( Directorium) and Chancery of Mainz, and was registered in the acts of the Empire. It was directed against every injury that could arise to religion and the Holy See. 17

The second solemn protest was issued October 26, 1648, two days after the signing of the Peace of Münster and the Peace of Osnabrück by the respective plenipotentiaries at the two Westphalian towns. Before making public this second protest Chigi celebrated mass in the audience chamber of the monastery in Münster where he had lived during his stay at the Congress; the protest was destined for the Congress and was signed in the presence of a notary public and many other witnesses. 18 This second protest was directed against all those parts or clauses of the Peace of Westphalia ( Münster-Osnabrück) that were preju-

14 Ibid., p. 61.
15 Ibid., pp. 61-62, 78.
16 Ibid., pp. 62-64.
17 Garampi, Raggualio della Paca di Vestfalia, p. 8.
18 Ibid., p. 8.

dicial to the interests of the Catholic church. 19 Chigi, in his reports to Rome on October 16 and 30, 1648, states the considerations actuating him in issuing his protests. His first protest was against the disadvantages that the church suffered according to the terms of the Peace of Osnabrück as shaped by the Catholic princes under the leadership of Mainz and Bavaria. He sent a copy of his protest to Rome and expressed the intention of submitting a further protest if the treaties in question were ultimately ratified, as it seemed they would be. In sending a copy of his second protest to the papal court he said that such a protest was the only means that could be applied in dealing with these people in order to prevent injury to the church and preserve its rights.

At least such action "would to some extent be a comfort to His Holiness because otherwise he cannot rejoice in his heart over this Peace." 20 In Chigi's letter of October 30, 1648, he states that the plenipotentiaries of the Catholic princes had no difficulty in receiving copies of the second protest from him. He immediately sent this protest, together with the breve of October 4, 1644, which authorized him to make protests, to the Directory of Mainz. But from his later correspondence nothing appears from which one could conclude that he had received any kind of communication that acknowledged or confirmed the insertion of the protest in the imperial acts. 21 Through these protests Chigi merely manifested the same spirit that had actuated him when at various times he had withdrawn from the negotiations in order not to give any validity or tacit sanction to them by his presence. By this action he made certain that the Catholic princes and Contarini, the Venetian mediator, were fully

19 Du Mont, op. cit., VI, Part I, 462-63, contains both protests, as do the following: Conring, Pro pace perpetua, pp. 116-20; Conring, Opera, II, 565-66; the protest of October 26, 1648, is in Londorp, op. cit., VI, 423; and Brom, Archivalia en Italië, III, 448-49; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 95-96; Bougeant, Histoire des guerres, VI, 412-13; Hanser, Deutschland nach dem dreissigjährigen Kriege, p. 79.
20 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 96, n. 1.
21 Garampi, op. cit., p. 8.

aware of his attitude of constant protest and his refusal to affix his signature to the Peace documents. 22

The ratification of the Treaties of Peace had been completed by February 8, 1649. 23 On February 9, 1649, Chigi issued a third and final protest with the same formalities that were observed in the two former cases. Beyond this he added another special protest in hopes of preserving the right of free collation (bestowing of benefices) which the Holy See possessed concerning the bishoprics and benefices of the dioceses of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and the benefices within them, which had been ceded to France by the Empire in the Treaty of Münster. 24

In all these protesting activities during and after the Congress of Westphalia, Chigi had full approval of Innocent X; all his protests were sanctioned also by all the cardinals. 25 The course he took at the Congress also met with complete approval at the papal court. Most of his actions were based on very general instructions sent him in a breve of October 5, 1644, by Innocent X; 26 for the intricate details of his work he had to depend on his own judgment and experience. 27 Although he must be regarded as having stood for the principles of the extreme Catholics, 28 and although he naturally was not exactly an impartial mediator when laboring to prevent the moderate Catholics and Protestants from making arrangements that would injure church interests, 29 he was able, because of his personality and tact, to re-

22 Hanser, op. cit., p. 79; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 96.
23 Meiern, op. cit., VI, 854-65.
24 Garampi, op. cit., p. 10; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 97; Reumont, "Fabio ChigiPapst Alexander VII--in Deutschland, 1639-1651", Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins, VIII, 9.
25 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 96-97.
26 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 861-62; Reumont, "Fabio Chigi", Zeitschrift des Aach. Gesch., VIII, 9.
27 Reumont, "Fabio Chigi", Zeitschrift des Aach. Gesch., VIII, 9.
28 Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, p. 104.
29 Meiern, op. cit., II, 138; IV, 861-62; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 52-53.

main on good terms with all his colleagues. 30 As a reward for his services Innocent X appointed him secretary of state in 1651, and created him cardinal in February, 1652; 31 and when in February, 1655, he became pope, with the title of Alexander VII, many Protestants in Germany and France welcomed his election. 32

Although the pope and his cardinals thoroughly approved his nuncio's actions in Münster, Innocent X took no hasty action of his own. It was not until January, 1649, that a meeting of cardinals, under the presidency of the pope, decided that Chigi's protests were to be solemnly confirmed by a bull; but Chigi was instructed January 9, 1649, to remain silent concerning such a plan; he observed this advice when presenting his third protest, February 9, 1649, when the Peace treaties were ratified. 33 The papacy feared to publish a bull of protest against the Peace because such action was fraught with great danger as long as the Swedish troops were still on German soil. The imperial representative in Rome, Savelli, made imploring excuses for the emperor, who was in great distress owing to the great strength of the occupying Swedish army; he also called attention to the military weakness of the German Catholics. If the pope were to suspend the publication of the proposed bull, it would be an advantage to the emperor in his hereditary lands; this must be regarded as offsetting the loss of the bishoprics in north Germany, which could be held by the Catholics only by waging constant war. Savelli believed that the pope would gradually become reconciled to the Peace Treaty. Savelli also stated that the responsibility for the terms of the Treaty so unfavorable to

30 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 861; Reumont, "Fabio Chigi", Zeitschrift des Aach. Gesch., VIII, 11; Meaux, La réforme et la politique française, II, 596-97.
31 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 313; Richard, "Origines et développements", Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, XI, Part I, 736.
32 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 313.
33 Ibid., pp. 96-97.

the church was to be attributed to Bavaria, which forced the emperor to yield, and also to the elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schönborn. 34

Such considerations caused the papacy to delay until after the Swedish and imperial representatives had completed the negotiations at Nürnberg in June, 1650, for the withdrawal of the Swedish troops. 35 By August 20, 1650, Innocent X commanded that his protest Zelo Domus Dei, against the injurious terms of the Peace, be sent to all nuncios, wherever they may be, so that they might make known the decision of the Holy See. 36 But the protest was not issued as originally planned in the form of a solemn bull, but by means of a simple breve. Officially the papal protest was not a bull, as most writers have stated, 37 but merely a breve, or brief, which is a briefer, less solemn, simpler, and less important papal decree than a bull. 38 The papal Curia declined at this time to sanction Chigi's proposal that he issue a fourth protest. 39 It is interesting to note that the breve was antedated November 26, 1648. 40 This was probably done to give the appearance that the papacy had not been negligent in waiting more than a year and eight months to protest against so injurious a peace. It is curious that Garampi, in his "Report concerning the Peace of Westphalia and the Various Protests That Were Issued by the Holy See against the Same," placed his account of the protest of Innocent X chronologically where it naturally would belong, in the year 1648, but in this single instance omits giving the year. 41 In giving all other dates in his

34 Ibid., p. 99.
35 Meiern, Acta pacis executionis publica, II, 347-51; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 94.
36 Brom, op. cit., III, 462-63; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 99.
37 Meiern, Acta pacis executionis publica, II, 781; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 161; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 688; Hanser, op. cit., p. 79; Philipps Kirchenrecht, III, 476; Philippson, in Pflugkh-Harttung, Weltgeschichte, Neuzeit, 1650-1815, p. 101; Seppelt , Papstgeschichte, II, 154; Hergenröther, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte, III, 744.
38 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 99, n. 5; Catholic Encyclopedia, III, 56. Since the decree of Leo XIII of December 29, 1878, the chief difference between bulls and breves has been removed ( Meyers, Lexikon, III [ 1925], 867).
39 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 99.
40 Ibid., p. 99.
41 Garampi, op. cit., p. 7.

report he meticulously gives the year. Whether in this case his omission was accidental or intentional must remain conjectural, but it seems to have been intentional. Professor Ludwig Andreas Veit is guilty of the same omission. 42

The breve Zelo Domus Dei 43 was the papal protest not against the whole Peace of Westphalia but merely against those articles that were prejudicial to the interests of the Roman Catholic church. The specific points against which he protested were:

(1) That "very great prejudices had been caused to the Roman Catholic religion, to the inferior churches, and to the ecclesiastical order, as also to their jurisdictions, immunities, franchises, liberties, exemptions, privileges, affairs, possessions, and rights"; (2) that "to the heretics and their successors have been abandoned in perpetuity the ecclesiastical properties that they have formerly occupied"; (3) that "those heretics, to whom the term 'Confession of Augsburg' is applied, are allowed the free exercise of their heresy in many places, and that they are given sites on which to build churches"; (4) that "they [the heretics] are admitted with the Catholics to public charges and offices, and to some archbishoprics, bishoprics, and other ecclesiastical dignities and benefices, and to the participation in the first expectancies that the Apostolic See has granted to the said Ferdinand, king of the Romans, emperor-elect"; (5) that "annates, the rights of the pallium, confirmation, the papal months, and similar rights of reservation in the ecclesiastical possessions of the said Confession of Augsburg have been abolished; to the same secular power is attributed the confirmations of the elections or the application for dispensations of the pretended archbishops, bishops, or prelates of the same Confession"; (6) "that many archbishoprics, bishoprics, monasteries, provostships, bailliages, commanderies, canonries, and other benefices and properties of the church have been given to heretical princes as perpetual fiefs, under the title of secular dignities, with suppression of the ecclesiastical domination"; (7) "that it is ordered that against this Peace or any of its articles there must not be alleged, heard, or admitted any canonical or civil laws, general or special, decrees, dispensations, absolutions, or other exemptions"; (8) that "the number of seven electors of the Empire, formerly decreed by apostolic author-

42 Veit, Kirchengeschichte, IV, Part I, 12.
43 Bullarium Romanum ( Taurinensis ed.), XV, 603-6; Conring, Consultatio Catholica, pp. 108-20; Conring, Opera, II, 563-65; Londorp, op. cit., VI, 423-25; Meiern, Acta Pacis Executionis, II, 781-84; Müller, op. cit., I, 176-80; in French, Le Clerc, Négociations secrètes, IV, 510-11; also, though less accurate, Du Mont, op. cit., VI, Part I, 46364; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 99-100; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 161; Hergenröther, Katholische Kirche und christlicher Staat, pp. 703-9; Menzel, Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen, VIII, 240-41.

ity, has been agumented without our consent and that of the said Holy See, and an eighth electorate has been erected in favor of Charles Louis, Count Palatine of the Rhine, a heretic"; (9) that "there have been ordained many other things that would be shameful to report, very prejudicial and harmful to the orthodox religion, to the said Roman See, to the inferior churches, and others above-named." 44

The pope reiterates the contents of Chigi's protest, and states that "each transaction or agreement made concerning ecclesiastical things without the authority of the said See is null, and without force and validity"; that all articles contained in these treaties "that in any manner whatsoever, harm or cause the least prejudice, or that can be said, understood, pretended, or estimated to be able to harm or having harmed in any manner the Catholic religion," and all that pertains to the Catholic church and religion, "have been by law, are, and shall be perpetually null, vain, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, condemned, reproved, frivolous, without force and effect, and that no one is bound to observe them or any of them although they be fortified by an oath"; ". . . . and for all that for the sake of the greatest possible precaution, . . . . we condemn, reprove, break, annul, and deprive of all force and effect the said articles and all the other things prejudicial to the above as has been said, and protest against and declare their nullity before God; and wherever it is also necessary we restore, replace, and reinstate in full powers the affairs of the church to that condition in which they were before the said transactions. This protest shall remain valid for all time to come in spite of all agreements, laws, decrees, and publications to the contrary, and shall be binding on all. All ordinary judges and all officers of the church and all others in authority must acknowledge this breve and judge in accordance with it, notwithstanding all ecclesiastical laws of any sort or all secular laws of any kind."

In this breve the pope protested against, and declared null, all that had been done by the Congress of Münster and Osnabrück concerning religious affairs. All things harmful to the church that had been done since the Reformation or at any

44 The enumeration is the author's.

other time were undone. All persons were commanded to observe this breve; it was to hold notwithstanding any ecclesiastical laws, and was declared superior to all secular laws. This statement declared religious matters to be solely in the hands of the church; it was a reiteration of the papal theory, as opposed to the new theory, that the state was sovereign and could control not only politics but religious and ecclesiastical affairs.

The question of the validity, at least of one aspect of the protest (i.e., point 8, concerning the origin of the college of seven electors), was the subject of archival research in Rome at the time. It was conducted by an expert in church history, Felice Contelori, Urban VIII's custodian of the Vatican Library; under Innocent X he had fallen into disfavor, but the many important papal matters requiring archival research necessitated his reappointment. 45 His researches indicated that, according to the viewpoint of the papal court, the founding of the imperial college of electors, composed of seven men, dated back to the time of Gregory in the year 1002; 46 but this date falls within the pontificate of Sylvester II (999-1003), which may be somewhat illuminating as to the accuracy of both the papal archivist and the views of the papal court. Contelori concludes that the electoral college of seven men had been established by the pope and therefore is an institution based on ecclesiastical, and not secular, law. 47 This idea was embodied in the papal protest of August 20, 1650; the wording of the breve ( Zelo Domus Dei) was executed by various unnamed papal diplomats, and this was the occasion of very serious differences among them. 48 It is needless here to indicate that this official view of the papal court is quite

45 Beltrani, "Felice Contelori e i suio studi negli Archivi vel Vaticano", Archivio della Società Romana di Storia Patria, II, 165-208 (especially, pp. 165, 166, 190, 191), 257-80; III, 1-47 (especially pp. 19, 20, 23-25, 27-28); Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part II, 914-15; XIV, Part I, 258-79.
46 Beltrani, op. cit., III, 27, 28; based on manuscript volume, XXXIII, 138 v. Bibliografica, n.o. in Biblioteca Barberini.
47 Ibid., p. 29.
48 Ibid., p. 30.

out of harmony with the accepted historical view of the origin of the college of electors held in Germany at the time or since, namely, that it was of purely secular origin. 49

It was inevitable that the pope should issue a protest against those articles of the Peace of Westphalia that caused such great injury to the Catholic church. The Peace confirmed the Peace of Passau ( 1552) and the Peace of Augsburg ( 1555), which had never been accepted by the church; it also provided that January 1, 1624, should be the normal date for determining the possession of ecclesiastical lands by the German states. This arrangement placed into the hands of the Protestants the control of the greater part of the free imperial cities; in five such cities authority was shared equally by the Catholics and Protestants. The Catholic church had saved the archbishoprics of Mainz, Trier, Cologne, and Salzburg and about twenty bishoprics, and less than ten abbeys exercising sovereign rights. The Catholic church had lost two archbishoprics, thirteen bishoprics, six abbeys, besides a great number of mediate church lands. Aside from these material losses, two heretical religions were legalized. 50 The protest was also justified, at least on the basis of fear, inasmuch as it was now not impossible for the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire to be a Protestant. During the war the success of Frederick V, the elector palatine, might have had that eventuation; Gustavus Adolphus had harbored thoughts of his becoming emperor through the creation of a Swedish, a ninth, electorate; in April, 1647, the French feared the possibil-

49 Quidde, Die Entstehung des Kurfürstencollegiums, p. 110; Lindner, Die deutschen Königswahlen und die Entstehung des Kurfürstentums, p. 214; Maurenbrecher, Geschichte der deutschen Königswahlen vom zehnten bis dreizehnten Jahrhundert, pp. 243-44; Meister, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichle von den Anfängen bis 15. Jahrhundert, pp. 99, 160-63; Wunderlich, "Die neueren Ansichten über die deutsche Königswahl und der Ursprung des Kurfürstenkollegiums", in Ebering, Historische Studien, Heft 114, especially pp. 98, 148, 216-22; Vigener, "Kaiser Karl IV", in Meister der Politik, II, 15-18; Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, I, 382; Schäfer, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 377; Seppelt, op cit., II, 30.
50 Pastor, op cit., XIV, Part I, 94-95; Hergenröther, Katholische Kirche und christlicher Staat, p. 709.

ity of a Protestant emperor. 51 Actually at a later time, in 1657, when the successor of Ferdinand III was to be elected, the elector of the Palatinate demanded the election of a Protestant emperor. 52 Throughout the seventeenth century such an idea had been held in Protestant ranks; for if there were Protestant electors there could be a Protestant emperor. 53 Under the circumstances the head of the church would have been guilty of neglect of his high duties if he had not followed up the protests of his nuncio with a solemn protest of his own. 54 Practically it merely meant a papal censure and condemnation of the Peace. 55

Ultimately, even the non-Catholics accepted the view that the pope could not act differently. The German historian Menzel says that the pope wished "merely to content himself by doing what his position as head of the church required, what the head of no other institution in a similar circumstance would dare to neglect, without laying himself open to the criticism of neglect of duty." 56

But surely the pope must have known that it was impossible to overthrow the power of Protestantism, that his political policy had failed, and that his protest must therefore be without effect. 57 The protest was not made therefore with any immediate results in view; it was made rather in harmony with the lofty conception of the Roman Catholic church. "This protest is no mere formality, as one is inclined to consider it, but a possible

51 Gunter, "Das evangelische Kaisertum", Historisches Jahrbuch, XXXVII, 379; Meiern, Acta Pacis Westphalicae, IV, 499-500.
52 Gunter, "Das evangelische Kaisertum", Historisches Jahrbuch, op cit., XXXVII, 379.
53 Ibid., p. 380; Pastor, op cit., XIV, Part I, 101.
54 Pastor, op cit., XIV, Part I, 101.
55 Hergenröther, Handbuch, III, 744.
56 Menzel, op cit., VIII, 244; see also Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie in der zweiten Hälfte des siebzehnten jahrhunderts", Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken (herausgegeben vom Koenigl. Preussischen Institut in Rom), XI, 321.
57 Ranke, Die römischen Päpste ( 1873 ed.), II, 373; Malet, Histoire diplomatique de l'Europe aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, I, 161-62.

loophole left for the Catholics to recover the lost properties and rights of their church." 58 A recent liberal Catholic view is as follows: "This protest was, however, the expression of a feeling that cherishes the communion of religious values more highly than all the other wordly interests of humanity"; 59 in other words, it was an expression of the spiritual, and not temporal, objectives of the church.

No power ever was known to have appealed to the pope in order to test the validity of the Peace of Westphalia or any part thereof. 60 According to the papal breve, no one was bound to observe the provisions of the Treaty that were injurious to the church "although they be fortified by an oath." The pope was acting in harmony with canon law, whereby he could grant a dispensation against fulfilling an oath if the obligation of observing such prevents the realization of a greater good. 61 But no power made use of the papal protest and appealed to the pope. If such powers as Austria, Bavaria, and the ecclesiastical princes had taken advantage of the papal protest and refused to abide by the terms of the Treaty, the war would have been resumed or the entire Treaty in its fundamental aspects would have had to be revised. 62 But the Catholic powers, as already observed, had for practical, secular reasons agreed to the insertion of a clause that nullified all protests against the Peace--above all, those of the pope. It is an interesting commentary that, of all the German prelates, the Archbishop of Trier was the first, and also the last, to publish the protest of Innocent X. 63 Politics had been secularized even among the ecclesiastical princes.

58 Koch, Geschichte des deutschen Reiches, II, 526.
59 Ehrhard, Der Katholizismus und das zwanzigste Jahrhundert, p. 172.
60 Hergenröther, Katholische Kirche und christlicher Slaat, p. 709; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 415.
61 Perathoner, Das kirchliche Gesetzbuch, p. 465.
62 Döllinger, Kirche und Kirchen, p. 62; Hergenröther, Katholische Kirche und christlicher Staat, p. 709.
63 Baur Philipp von Sötern, Kurfürst zu Trier, I, 291; Pastor, op cit., XIV, Part I, 101.

Chapter Twelve

IT IS interesting to conjecture what the outcome might have been if Innocent X had accepted the inevitable and realized that church unity and the Protestant lands were gone, if not forever, at least for a long time to come. Urban VIII and Innocent X might have been shrewder politicians if they had abandoned the Catholic cause in those lands in which Protestantism had been a success since the early sixteenth century anyway, and had recognized the loss of church lands that could in no case be regained. If they had been willing to adopt such a policy, they could have co-operated harmoniously with the Catholic secular rulers, and the nuncio could have exerted a much greater political influence as a mediator among the Catholic representatives of the Congress. The papal Curia would not have accustomed the Catholic princes to act without the guidance of the church when disposing of church affairs. Moreover, it would have been possible to exact more ameliorating concessions for the Catholics in Protestant lands.

It had been regarded as regrettable that the Catholics under the leadership of Rome did not at Münster consolidate their power by entering with the papacy a convention that would have been equal, or even superior, to the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück in importance. 1

Innocent X might have anticipated that protesting against the Peace of Wesphalia would be futile, for the opposition of Paul IV to the Peace of Augsburg had not prevented the Cath-

1 Meaux, La réforme et la politique française, II, 679.

olic princes from confirming it in 1566 with the consent of the legate Commendone and on the advice of Petrus Canisius. 2 The protest of Innocent X was even less efficacious; anticipation of the protest did not delay for an instant the ratification of the Peace of Westphalia. The popes were sadly accustoming themselves to speaking without being heard by, or receiving any deference from, the Catholic princes; 3 the popes should have been binding these rulers to papal interests, instead of making it difficult for them to co-operate with the papacy owing to divergent interests.

It is interesting to recall that Henry IV of France ( 15891610) had arranged in his "Grand Design," according to the testimony of his Protestant minister Sully, to have the Roman pontiffs recognized as the arbiters of Europe, even including the Protestant powers. The pope was to be president of the Christian republic. If the Peace of Westphalia did not make provision for such an arrangement, it was, above all, to the detriment of the papacy. 4 We may not agree with Meaux, who, writing in 1889, had not had his optimism concerning a League of Nations tempered by the experience of the world since 1920.

But, if the papacy had taken a practical view of existing conditions and would not have had to defend its time-honored theory of world religious unity under hierarchical control, some sort of a compromise arrangement might have been made that would have been to the advantage of the papacy and the church.

But postulating an attitude of this character on the part of the papacy is taking too much for granted. We must also recall that part of the fault of making European arrangements that were detrimental to the papacy rested, above all, with Cardinal Richelieu and especially Cardinal Mazarin, who stressed a European settlement to the advantage of Louis XIV. Both these cardinals had demanded from the pope a compliant attitude difficult to maintain. Richelieu had imperiously demanded certain fundamental objectives, which, if attained, would lead to

2 See chap. iii.
3 Meaux, op cit., II, 679-80.
4 Ibid., p. 680.

French dominance over the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs. 5 Mazarin, on the other hand, stressed minor matters, especially securing a cardinalate for his brother. His method of pursuing this object antagonized the pope to such an extent as to make impossible a harmonious co-operation to the advantage of general European Catholic interests. Moreover, Mazarin neglected to manipulate the settlement at Münster in a manner that would have advantaged the interests of the Catholic religion as well as the national honor and interest of France. 6 Mazarin was merely playing the game of secularizing politics. State interests were uppermost in his mind. The church was merely a tool for state purposes.

But the fault lay also with the popes themselves. In the coming decades and centuries the papacy had to carry on negotiations with the dissident states, and even to make use of them for its own defense; for example, the papacy was dependent on the military efforts of Protestant England and Prussia to relieve it from the humiliating fate imposed on it by Napoleon. 7 To revert once more to the seventeenth century, these Protestant states were already at that time more than half of the states of Europe; they were necessary for the equilibrium of Europe. In the face of this manifest necessity, why was the papacy so disinclined to recognize this? Why did it follow a policy that shunted itself off to the obscure edge of affairs where it had little power to exert any influence? 8 However, this was a critical epoch demanding as head of papal affairs a more capable, more imaginative, and more sagacious man than Innocent X. The European crisis required a man of the caliber of Gregory VII or Innocent III. Such a man, through a powerful personality, might have achieved a position of statesmanlike conciliation for the papacy. The papacy need-

5 Ibid., pp. 490-509.
6 Ibid., p. 680.
7 Ibid., pp. 680-81; for the foreign relations of the papacy from 1648 to 1815 see: Hergenröther, Handbuch, IV, 6-16, 297-362; Schmidlin, Papstgeschichte der neuesten Zeit, I, 1-144; Veit, Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Individualismus, IV, Part I, 1-243, 32364; Part II, pp. 4-48; Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIV, Part I, 7-8.
8 Meaux, op. cit., II, 680-81.

ed such a man then and in the ensuing century and a quarter, a period filled with the rivalries and wars of states with great personalities as rulers--Louis XIV, William of Orange, Maria Theresa, Joseph II, Frederick II, Peter the Great, and Catherine the Great. It was a period of great ministers, generals, statesmen, and men of letters and philosophical thought. But the papacy withdrew into the shadows, into obscurity, from which it did not stand out until after the French Revolution. 9

The political humiliation of the papacy did not liberate souls, it turned them over to the secular power. In the Protestant states the prince became the religious head; in the Catholic states, the church, which the prince had not instituted, existed nevertheless by virtue of the sovereign's will. That was why he strove to subject it. The Catholic nations had to submit to a régime in ecclesiastical affairs that was similar to state control of church affairs in the Protestant states; this régime was not in harmony with Catholic theory either, and rendered the Catholic religion sterile.

After 1648 the Catholic church continued to decline in Germany. It still had many church lands left. The college of imperial cities was dominantly Protestant, but in the two other colleges the Catholics had a majority, that is, in the college of princes and the college of electors. By virtue of this last, the election of the emperor was in Catholic hands; and until the Empire was destroyed by Napoleon in 1806, there were only Catholic emperors. Nevertheless, after 1648 the Catholic church was inactive in German affairs; it took no part in the great War of Liberation ( 1813-14) and the movement for national resurrection and national unification in the nineteenth century. Was this because of its decline in patrimony? Its income was still the most affluent in Europe. The Catholic church in Germany was in the control of the state; under Joseph II 1765-90) of Austria the system of Josephism was perfected, and Bavaria adopted it. The ecclesiastical states of Germany scorned the pope and his spiritual jurisdiction until their de-

9 Ibid., pp. 681-82; Hegenröther, op. cit., IV, 2-4.

struction as temporal rulers by Napoleon in 1803. These facts explain, in large part, why the German Catholic church was struck with paralysis after 1648. 10

In France, the liberty of conscience granted under Henry IV, and preserved by Richelieu, was annihilated by Louis XIV in 1685, when the Edict of Nantes was revoked. Then France became religiously sterile; and the French church declined, like the papacy, and remained in such a state until the Revolution. 11

If the papacy had taken a more statesmanlike stand in 1648, the church itself, although giving up some of its claims, might well have had a more cheering and fruitful history. But the papacy did not alter its policy to meet changed circumstances. It continued its unyielding attitude after 1648, futilely protesting against all subsequent treaties that infringed on its historic rights and asserting its claims to determine the dividing line between religion and politics, between spiritual and secular affairs. 12 But finally, in 1929, even Pius XI entered the Lateran Accord with Mussolini; the pope gave up all his former claimed rights in international politics by stating that the papacy "wishes to remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between states and to international congresses held for such objects, unless the contending parties make concordant appeal to its peaceful mission." 13 It is interesting, but fruitless, to conjecture what might have been the outcome if in 1648 there had been ruling a pope who could, with clarity of vision, foresee that by the twentieth century the Vatican would be occupied by a pontiff who realized that the future sphere of activity of the Roman Catholic church and the papacy lay, not in the field of politics, but in spiritual and social leadership.

10 Meaux, op. cit., II, 682-83; Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 67-74, 196-99, 400-402; Seppelt, Papstgeschichte, II, 153-90.
11 Meaux, op. cit., II, 683-84.
12 See chaps. xvii and xviii.
13 See chap. xviii.

Chapter Thirteen

VARIOUS measures were taken to make the Treaty absolutely secure against protests. The Swedish plenipotentiaries endeavored to give weight to the clause against protests by including in the Treaty as their allies all the princes of Europe; it was a bit ironical that, besides Spain, only the pope and his agelong infidel enemy, the sultan, were not signatories of the Treaty. 1 Even the kings of England and Poland, and the Grand Duke of Moscow, who had had no part in the war and had not participated in the negotiation at Münster and Osnabrück, were included as signatories of the Treaty. The English Parliament had in May, 1646, communicated with the queen of Sweden to urge her to keep the rights of the elector of the Palatinate intact; 2 the elector Frederick V ( 1610-20) of the Palatinate had been the son-in-law of James I ( 1603-25) of England, and now England pressed Sweden to safeguard the interests of the son, Charles Louis ( 1648-80). After the spring of 1646 the English king was always included as the ally of the Swedes in both the Swedish and imperial peace projects and in the joint peace projects; 3 in September, 1648, the same arrangement was incorporated in the French-imperial peace project. 4

King Wladislaus IV ( 1632-48) of Poland sent his ministerresident, Matthias of Krakau, to Münster, in June, 1646, to

1 Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Suecicum, Art. XVII, par. 10, 11; Walther, Universal-Register, p. xlix; Hanser, Deutschland nach dem dreissigjährigen Kriege, p. 79.
2 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, IV, 18.
3 Ibid., III, 73; IV, 589, 835; V, 467, 937; VI, 6, 111, 171, 394.
4 Ibid., VI, 553.

protect Poland's interests in connection with the cession of Pomerania to the Swedes; Poland had interests in Pomerania since it was contiguous to her own lands. 5 After April, 1646, Poland was always included as Sweden's ally in the peace projects. 6

Ever since May 18, 1595, when the Grand Duke of Moscow had made the Treaty of Teusin with Sweden concerning the rights of the Baltic Sea Lapps, 7 he continued diplomatic relations with Sweden, though not without warlike interruptions. 8 After May, 1647, the Grand Duke was always included as the ally of Sweden in the Swedish-imperial peace projects at the Congress. 9

It was important that all these signatory powers be given the protection of the Treaty. Each of the Protestant powers of Europe, and, to a less degree, the Catholic princes, had dealt with religious questions in a more or less sovereign way. They had in some cases, as in France, granted heretics the right to worship. Furthermore, the Catholic sovereigns had in the past participated in the secularization of church lands by signing such treaties as the Peace of Passau ( 1552) and the Peace of Augsburg ( 1555). The Peace of Wesphalia was even more offending and injurious to Catholic interests. Moreover, if the pope could release Catholic princes from observing treaties made with heretics, then all powers might suffer, for the whole structure of public law in Europe might be seriously shattered. Therefore the Treaty was made to include all the powers, except Spain, the pope, and the sultan.


On December 17, 1648, the deputies of the Empire assembled and, among other things, discussed means of executing the

5 Ibid., III, 775.
6 Ibid., pp. 62, 73; IV, 589, 835; V, 139, 467, 937; VI, 6, 111, 171, 394, 553.
7 Ibid., I, 163-64; Geijer, Geschichte Schwedens, II, 293; Bain, Scandinavia, 135.
8 Bain, op. cit., pp. 179-81; Bain, Slavonic Europe, pp. 189-90; Geijer, op. cit., II, 93-98.
9 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 589; V, 467, 938; VI, 6, 111, 171.

Peace and providing for the observance of its terms. The ambassador of the elector of Bavaria suggested that some measures should be taken to prevent the printing, distribution, and sale of such things as the Burgundian Protest and similar protests. 10 The chancellor of the elector of Mainz remarked that

many infamous libels and slanderous writings against the Peace were being scattered, as for example, a protestation under name of Burgundian, was publicly sold here, in which were contained many things which our most gracious and merciful masters could not tolerate if brought before them. Such writings served no other purpose than to arouse ill will and distrust among the Estates. Moreover, because these protests are in all cases forbidden in the Instrumentum pacis, therefore, we beg that the imperial power again prohibit the booksellers and printers from printing them under heavy penalty and from selling them if brought from other places. The copies should be confiscated, and other severe and unremitting punishments should be administered. 11

To these remarks the imperial plenipotentiary, Volmar, replied that

the Emperor had already issued an order prohibiting the distribution of the pamphlets; but he would issue an imperial decree [placet] which would be made public and would earnestly prohibit and forbid such distribution, since neither His Imperial Majesty nor they [the princes] took any pleasure in such libels. 12

On June 27, 1650, at the Congress of Nürnberg, which had met to execute the terms of the treaties, the Emperor issued a "Patent," or proclamation, informing all princes, officers, and subjects in the Empire that a Peace with Sweden had been signed; and in order to prevent new misunderstandings and disorders, nothing was to be said or done contrary to the Peace, "whether by disputations, sermons, or other contraventions," on pain of punishment. 13

At the Diet of Regensburg ( 1653-54) both the Peace of Osnabrück and the Peace of Münster were incorporated, word for

10 Ibid., VI, 738, 739.
11 Ibid., pp. 739, 740.
12 Ibid., p. 741.
13 Meiern, Acta pacis executionis publica, II, 436, 437; also Meiern, Acta comitalia Ratisbonensia publica, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 71-72, par. 6; pp. 77 - 78, par. 34; Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIV, Part I, 101, n. 4, wrongly cites Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, VI794.

word, in the degree of the Imperial Diet (Reichsabschied, or Reichstag-recess) and declared fundamental laws of the Empire. 14

The breve of Innocent X was reissued at least twice after 1648. We have observed that the breve, although dated November 26, 1648, was not released for distribution until August 20, 1650; the nuncios of each country were to be the agencies for making known the contents. By September 7, 1650, in accordance with papal instructions the breve was printed in Vienna by order of Camillus Melzio Melzius, Archbishop of Capua, apostolic nuncio at the imperial court; he had orders to have it affixed to all church doors throughout Austria. 15 According to Conring, the breve was solemnly issued at Rome, January 3, 1651. 16

Emperor Ferdinand III, in spite of his ecclesiastical piety, suppressed and forbade the distribution of the protest with great vigor; he did so without first remonstrating with the pope or appealing to him in any way. 17 The Württemberg ambassador at the Congress of Nürnberg stated in October, 1650, that the bull (breve) of September 7, 1650, had actually been posted in Vienna but had been torn down at the express command of the emperor. 18 A Vienna printer, who had printed the breve, was imprisoned and forced to pay a fine of 2,000 thalers. 19 Although

14 Abschied der Röm. Kayserl. "Majestät und gemeiner Stände auf dem Reichstag zu Regensburg", Meiern, Acta comitalia Ratisbonensia publica, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 4-69.
15 Meiern, Acta pacis executionis publica, II, 780-84; on page 784 "Melzio" is misprinted "Mettii." Page 780 gives the impression that the breve was printed a second time, September 7, 1650; since the papal authorization of its publication had not occurred before August 20, 1650, this must have been the first printing.
16 Conring, Opera, II, 563-65. This date is given by several secondary works: Charvériat, Histoire de la guerre de trente ans, II, 628; Kaemmel, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 683; Stacke, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 281. Garampi, Raggualio della Paca di Vestfalia, does not cite a publication at this time.
17 Grauert, Christina Königinn von Schweden, I, 252.
18 Meiern, Acta pacis executionis publica, II, 781.
19 Hanser, op. cit., pp. 80-81; Philipps, Kirchenrecht, III, Part I, 477; Hergenröther, Handbuch, Kirchengeschichte, III, 745; Menzel, Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen, VIII,

the printing and posting of the breve was forbidden in the Empire, the emperor permitted it to be posted in his hereditary possessions; 20 but this did not alter the situation. When later, at the Reichstag of Regensburg ( 1653-54), the Peace of Westphalia was solemnly ratified by the Empire, as just observed, 21 Monsignor Scipio Delci, Archbishop of Pisa and apostolic nuncio in Vienna, "did not neglect to go there [ Vienna] personally; and on May 17, 1654, he presented a new solemn protest, and this was then registered in the chancery of Mainz"; 22 but here again there were no results.

However, it can safely be said that, although Ferdinand III undoubtedly executed the terms of the Treaty in Vienna and in the Empire, he was probably not wholly resigned to the policy that he was forced by circumstances to adopt. The Venetian ambassador at Vienna in the summer of 1650, in discussing the peace negotiations and subsequent events, stated that, when the nuncio handed the protest to the Emperor, he received it with no evil will, 23 probably feeling that it was well to have it, so that, if in the future a favorable opportunity arose and he wished to break his oath, he could do so. 24 But the fact is that the emperor issued his patent and punished at least one offender, the printer of the breve; and as far as we know, neither the emperor nor any other power has made use of the protest of the pope against any part of the Peace of Westphalia.

244; Laurent, Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanité, IX, 247; Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitraum der Gründung des preussischen Königtums, I, 67.
20 Hurst, History of the Christian Church, II, 556; Kaemmel, op. cit., I, 683.
21 Meiern, Acta comitalia Ratisbonensia publica, Vol. II, Appendix, pp. 71-72, par. 6; pp. pp. 77 - 78, par. 34.
22 Garampi, op. cit., p. 10; Londorp, Acta publica, VII, 717-18; Meiern, Acta comitalia Ratisbonensia publica does not contain the protest.
23 Fiedler, Die Relationen, XXVI, 375; "che non mal volontieri la riceve," also cited by Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 104, n. 4, but he gives the wrong page (395) in Fiedler.
24 Ward, in Cambridge Modern History, IV, 415, Hergenröther, Katholische Kirche und christlicher Staat, p. 709.

Chapter Fourteen


A MODERN author, Egon Friedell, closes his discussion of the Thirty Years' War as follows:

That purpose of secularizing all human activities and relations, which we have recognized as the essence of the Reformation, also seizes the Catholic world. Whereas in the sixteenth century denominational convictions and emotions still had such absolute sway in the souls of the people as to crowd out all national, social, and patriotic feelings and considerations, the very reverse now comes to pass: all of Europe is completely actuated by politics, is secularized, rationalized. The Middle Age has ended. 1

The Peace of Westphalia signified the secularization of politics. During the war there had begun an intense literary controversy, which became even more violent during the peace negotiations, and lasted for some years thereafter. The main point at issue was the lawfulness and possible permanence of a peace that was to be made with heretics and did injury to Catholic interests. Such a discussion was inevitable; it is an invariable accompaniment of all movements bringing fundamental changes in the organization and practice of human society. 2 It was a contest between the constitutional lawyers, theologians, and publicists of the seventeenth century, who represented three groups of opinions: (1) the irreconcilable Catholics, (2)

1 Friedell, Kulturgeschichte der Neuzeit, II, 14; Friedell, A Cultural History of the Modern Age, II, 15.
2 Ritter, "Das römische Kirchenrecht und der westfälische Friede", Historische Zeitschrift, CI, 254-55.

the moderate Catholics, and (3) the Protestants, whose respective ideas will be considered in the next section.

In this contest the Roman Catholic church still claimed to have final authority in human affairs; it was defending its position against the claims of the state, which had, since the fourteenth century, increasingly asserted its own authority or claim to determine the scope of its own affairs and attend to them without any ecclesiastical interference. The claims of the church as supreme authority in most human affairs had been recognized for many centuries. But the Protestant Reformation gave increasing impetus to the state to assert its absolute and final authority in church and other affairs. The conflict dated back more than a century, and the bitterness with which it was carried on before and during the negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück is an indication of the supreme importance of the struggle. The fight had not yet been won. The Protestants were contending for a principle that they had advocated for several generations; there was nothing particularly new in their viewpoint. Neither was there anything new in the viewpoint expressed in the writings of the irreconcilable Catholics. The greatest ingenuity was manifested in the arguments of the moderate Catholics, representing the interests of the Catholic princes that had to find some legal bases that would justify the concessions detrimental to Catholicism that were being demanded by the victorious powers--France, Sweden, and their German Protestant allies. 3

To the alert, informed people of the time the struggle that was being waged between the old and the new ideas was quite as important and significant as the similar struggles that have taken, and are taking, place in modern times concerning the rights of the crown as opposed to those of parliament; the rights of the intrenched upper classes in eighteenth-century France as opposed to the democratic or revolutionary rights of the nation; the rights of capitalistic society as opposed to the claims of the collectivists; the rights of individual nations as opposed to the

3 Ibid., p. 256; see also chap. xvi, below.

general interests of the world and humanity as expressed in the League of Nations, the World Court, and the disarmament movement. In other words, this battle of these seventeenthcentury pamphleteers was the literary aspect of a tremendous struggle to change the trend of modern history, to make possible the secularization of politics.

In the literary conflict three distinct groups of disputants or pamphleteers were noticeable: (a) There were, first, the "irreconcilables" or the extreme Catholics, who steadfastly insisted on maintaining all the rights of the Catholic church intact. They opposed the signing and denied the legality of any treaty that injured the historic claims and rights of the church in any respect, and were willing to have the Thirty Years' War go on indefinitely rather than make any concessions, whether permanent or even temporary. (b) The moderate Catholics held some ideas in common with the extreme or irreconcilable Catholics, but felt that, in the face of the existing situation produced by the prolonged and devastating war, which had ceased to be religious, some sort of conciliatory attitude must be taken to make possible the establishment of a much needed peace. (c) The Protestant writers were defending the rights of the secular rulers, Catholic as well as Protestant, to regulate church affairs regardless of the interests of the Catholic church. These writers pointed out historic precedents that justified the conclusion of a permanent peace such as was being negotiated at Münster and Osnabrück.

Most of these writers were scholastic in their thinking; they already had their conclusions to start with, and sought arguments to substantiate them. They were controversialists, advocates, such as we in American and European life have become familiar with during the World War and in post-war controversies concerning the League of Nations, the Soviets, reparations, debt-cancellation. The writings of Heinrich Wangnereck, chief of the irreconcilables, were in many ways determinative for all subsequent writings: those of the other irreconcilables, such as Adam Adami; those of the moderate Catholics, such as Vervaux and Caramuel; those of the Protestants, such as Conring and Dorsche. Wangnereck's arrangement of topics was followed by each of the others in approving or attacking his views. Some of the writings that we shall consider were manuscripts, manifolded by copyists for distribution; a still greater number were printed, in some cases to the extent of hundreds of copies. 4 The circle of readers might be a very small group, e.g., the members of the extreme or moderate Catholics assembled to confer at Münster.

3. ON WHAT THE EXTREMIST AND MODERATE CATHOLICS AGREED AND DISAGREED Both the irreconcilable and moderate Catholics agreed as to fundamental principles, but they differed sharply in the application of those principles to the practical problems incident to terminating the Thirty Years' War and drawing up the peace terms. During the war and during the peace negotiations the Protestants had demanded two things: (1) freedom of worship, i.e., the right to believe, teach, and preach their doctrines, hold religious services, and formulate their own church organizations and regulations; (2) the right to share all the endowments and properties of the church, that is, all the funded incomes for church offices and the actual lands of monasteries, bishops, and archbishops.

With reference to the first demand of the Protestants the two Catholic groups were agreed. The heretics should not be tolerated; they should be exterminated by the constant co-operation of the ecclesiastical and secular goverments. But the extremists stressed especially the subordination of the state to the church. The co-operation desired did not rest on the equal rights of the two powers but on the duty of the state authority to conduct its legislative and executive actions in accordance with the orders of the ecclesiastical authority on pain of excommunication and

4 Steinberger, Die Jesuiten, p. 196.

removal from office. The extremists, to find a basis for this teaching, appealed to the medieval law concerning heretics and to the eternal moral law that forbids giving aid to or co-operating with sinners. Heresy being the most serious offense in the eyes of God, the state must not give aid to sinners by tolerating heresy. It was the duty of the secular ruler to exterminate heresy. But the moderates, like Caramuel, maintained that there was no positive divine command whereby the princes were compelled to persecute a definite religious belief.

Concerning the demand of the Protestants that they be given some of the ecclesiastical lands, the extreme Catholics asserted that in conformity with divine law the church alone was responsible for the control and disposal of these lands; the secular rulers had no authority whatever in the matter. But this theoretical statement could not be applied in the face of an existing situation determined by the superior force of arms of the German Protestants, the Swedes, and their Catholic ally, France. The Catholic princes were confronted now, in the years 1647-48, with the same conditions that had led to the ceding of church lands to the heretics by the Peace of Augsburg ( 1555) and the Peace of Prague ( 1635). 5

All the important considerations in this great literary debate centered around the legitimacy of the Peace of Augsburg, which was a fundamental step in the long development toward the secularization of politics. We have seen in an earlier chapter that the final attitude of the papacy had been in favor of accepting the Peace of Augsburg provisionally and for an indefinite time. At the Diet of Augsburg in 1566 the Jesuit Petrus Canisius, supported by two other Jesuits, had expressed an opinion at the request of the papal legate Commendone; this opinion was that the Peace of Augsburg was not in conflict with the decrees of the Council of Trent, and that, although the pope

5 Ritter, "Das römische Kirchenrecht", Historische Zeitschrift, CI, 258-61.

did not sanction this Peace, he permitted the Catholics in the Augsburg Reichstag to confirm and observe it so long as they did not have power to do otherwise. 6 So the Catholics did not regard the Peace of Augsburg as final; they had agreed to it only under compulsion; it was to be tolerated only as long as necessary. Naturally the Protestants condemned such an attitude; but they, as well as the Catholics, violated the Peace of Augsburg, and this was one of the fundamental causes of the Thirty Years' War. 7 Once the war had started, the whole question as to the validity of the Peace of Augsburg was opened again. At every attempt at drawing up a peace--in the Edict of Restitution, 1629, in the Peace of Prague, 1635, at the Diet of Ratisbon ( Regensburg), 1640-41, and finally at the Congress of Westphalia, 1645-48--the validity of the Peace of Augsburg was questioned by the extreme Catholics and defended by the Protestants, who after 1647, for opportunist reasons, had the support of the moderate Catholics. 8

5. THE FORERUNNERS OF WANGNERECK: LAYMANN AND FORER In this chapter and the two following chapters of this treatise we shall center our attention mainly on the literary productions during and after the Westphalian negotiations; but a brief consideration of some of the fundamental works appearing previously will be of interest, since their content was closely related to the ideas defended and attacked in the later works. We shall first consider the Pacis Compositio, which appeared in 1629.

In that year Emperor Ferdinand II ( 1619-47) had issued the Edict of Restitution. It declared: (1) that all ecclesiastical properties seized by the Protestants since 1552 were to be restored to the Catholics, (2) that the holding of ecclesiastical

6 Braunsberger, Beati Petri Canisii S.J. Epistolae et Acta, V, 229-55, letters 1314-18. See also chap. iii, above.
7 Duhr, Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge, II, Part I, 1-13; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 109, 110.
8 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 111-13, 252-53, 397; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 46091; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 10-13, 28-37, 76-168.

offices by Protestants in these lands was illegal, (3) that Catholic rulers might expel all Protestant subjects that do not give up their heresy. 9 This Edict caused great jubilation among the Catholics but great alarm and fear among the Protestants. 10 This fear was accentuated by the appearance, also in 1629, of the Pacis Compositio. 11 This book was written by Jesuits in Dillingen, the chief of whom was Father Paul Laymann ( 15751635), professor of canon law in the University of Dillingen. He was assisted by Father Laurenz Forer and probably others. Forer was confessor of Heinrich V von Knöringen, Bishop of Augsburg ( 1598-1646). The Bishop had fostered the writing of the book, 12 and its purpose was to correct the false ideas of the Catholics concerning the Peace of Augsburg and to present the facts to the advantage of the church. It was a legal justification of the practical measure taken by Ferdinand II in issuing the Edict of Restitution. Laymann, who especially possessed great legal knowledge and lucid style, defended the legality of the Edict of Restitution and refuted all arguments against it. 13 Forer, who had held positions at the universities of Ingolstadt and Dillingen, was the author of a mass of controversial writings against the Lutherans; these works were incisive and incontrovertible, and therefore greatly feared. 14 The book asserted that the Peace of Augsburg did not have the nature of a constitution but was a pragmatic sanction or temporary arrangement, 15 and that the princes were not permitted to tolerate heresy or

10 Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 461.
11 For full title see Bibliography under Laymann and Forer; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 11, n. 5. A second edition, greatly enlarged, also 1629; German edition, 1630. Backer and Sommervogel, Bibliothèque des écrivains de la compagnie de Jésus, IV, 1590.
12 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
13 Ibid., p. 11; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 464.
14 Dudik, "Correspondenz Kaisers Ferdinand II, und seiner erlauchten Familie mit P. Martinus Becanus und P. Wilhelm Lamormaini, kaiserlichen Beichtvätern S.J.", Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, LIV, 249.
15 Laymann and Forer, Pacis Compositio (German ed., 1630), pp. 100-117.
9 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 111; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 460-61; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 425-26; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 340-45.

enter agreements tolerating heresy, 16 arguments affirmed and denied often in works subsequently discussed.

The Catholics welcomed this book of clarifying and assuring statements, since it was a veritable arsenal of legal weapons against the Peace of Augsburg. For many decades there had been no such powerful attack on this Peace. But the Protestants took great offense at this book. 17 They showed their irritation by writing at least eight literary counterattacks, some of which appeared in more than one edition. 18 But the "Dillingen Book," as the Protestants called it, 19 remained so powerful in its influence that at the Reichstag of Regensburg (Ratisbon) in April, 1641, they demanded that it be stamped out. 20 And during the Congress of Westphalia the Swedes called it a peaceodious (fried-hässigen) book. Another evidence of the bitter 21 feeling connected with the authorship and appearance of this Dillingen Book is the reputed statement of Gustavus Adolphus that he "would like to see three L's suspended from the gallows: Lamormaini, Laymann, and Laurentius." 22 The last two, Father Paul Laymann and Father Laurenz Forer, were authors of the Pacis Compositio; and Lamormaini was the very influential Jesuit confessor of Emperor Ferdinand II ( 161937), who had the reputation of being "master of the imperial will" and the real director of the imperial policy. 23

Forer did not confine his literary efforts to the co-authorship of the Pacis Compositio, but in the years 1634-36 he presented four

16 Ibid., pp. 118-26.
17 Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 464; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 11-12, 29.
18 Backer and Sommervogel, op. cit., IV, 1590, No. 27; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 12, n. 1.
19 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, II, 97, 571.
20 Londorp, Acta publica, V, 206.
21 Meiern, op. cit., I, 821; see also II, 560; IV, 74.
22 B. Dudik, "Correspondenz Kaisers", Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, LIV, 248; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 35, n. 2.
23 Dudik, "Correspondenz Kaisers", Archiv für österreichische Geschichte, pp. 228-55; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 3, 15, 16; Stieve, "Lamormaini", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XVII, 572.

written opinions to the counsels of Emperor Ferdinand II ( 1619-37) and of Maximilian of Bavaria. These manuscripts, which were never printed, are found in the Bavarian state archives. 24 Two of these documents were certainly written by Forer himself; the third may have been written by him; the fourth expressed opinions coinciding with his own. The significance of these manuscripts lies less in their content than in the comments that Forer made in his own handwriting on the front and back of these writings; these comments throw some light on the circumstances explaining secularization of politics in the seventeenth century. 1. One of these manuscripts, dated 1635, was copied by another hand on the basis of Forer's original draft, which is also preserved in the same folder. Its title is a query, "Is it permitted permanently to promise the heretics permission to engage in public worship?" Forer naturally answers this negatively, 25 and adds a note: "I have offered this memorandum to many imperialists and Bavarian counselors, but it did not please."
2. A second pamphlet bears the title, "Does there exist the extreme necessity of extending a guaranty to heresy?" 26 Here again Forer answers "no," and adds in his own hand: "Written in 1636 and offered to the imperial and Bavarian counselors; they did not thank me."
3. A third manuscript, which may have been written by Forer, is entitled: "Reasons why it should not have been denied, and should not be denied now, that the Swedish war is a religious war." 27 To this is added a note in Forer's hand: "In the year 1635, I have communicated to the Bavarians and the imperialists, but sang to deaf [ears]."

24 Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, München, Jesuitica in genere, fasc. 25, No. 370.
25 Forer, An liceat promittere haereticus, etc. For full title see Bibliography, manuscripts section, under Forer.
26 Forer, An sit extrema necessitas, etc. For full title see Bibliography, manuscripts section, under Forer.
27 Forer, Causae ob quas nec debuerit, etc. For full title see Bibliography, manuscripts section, under Forer.

The last manuscript, by an unindentified author, 28 is a discussion pertinent to the situation of the day but bespeaking Forer's own opinion. In his own hand Forer added two comments: "Exhortation to the father confessor of the emperor, P. Lamormaini, in the year 1634. For this he expressed to me no great thanks"; and "N.B. What is herein advised against, was granted even more freely and ruinously in the Peace of Münster, and the emperor burdened his conscience to an extreme." 29 The first and fourth of these pamphlets are extreme Catholic arguments against permanently granting religious freedom; 30 the third advocated the elimination of all heretics from the imperial armies. 31 To us the main significance lies in Forer's having presented these pamphlets while counseling against making any concessions in the religious sphere but getting no sympathetic response in the two main Catholic courts of Germany, in Munich and Vienna. The explanation of this lies in the fact that during the second half of the Thirty Years' War the conviction grew in Catholic ranks that, in order to oppose the foreign foes of Germany, that is, France and Sweden, a combination of the Protestants and Catholics was urgently necessary; and in order to secure Protestant co-operation the Catholics had to make great concessions in religious matters to the Protestants. 32 In other words, politics had to be secularized for national considerations.

28 Theodori Montani, Iurisconsulti et Theolog: Discursus de Manifesto Caesari, dato 30, Aug. 1634.
29 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 26, n. 1, lists these four pamphlets in a different sequence and gives the title of only the fourth in the sequence presented here. The comments of Forer are given in Latin.
30 Ibid., p. 25, n. 4.
31 Ibid., p. 26, n. 3.
32 Ibid., p.27.

Chapter Fifteen

THE most important of all the writers on the extreme Catholic side was Heinrich Wangnereck; he was the outstand174 ing defender of the strictly legalistic Catholic view of granting no compromise to the heretics. He was a native of Munich, a member of the Society of Jesus since 1611. He had spent most of his life as a teacher of various subjects in the German university at Dillingen, on the Danube; and after 1642, with a few years of interruption, until his death he was academic chancellor of the Jesuit Academy at Dillingen. 1 In 1645 he was given charge of the Jesuit mission in the imperial free city of Lindau am Bodensee, an overwhelmingly Protestant city. And it was at these two places, Dillingen and Lindau, where he lived and wrote during the stirring times of the literary warfare described in these chapters. 2 He was a disputative person, with a penchant for polemics against Protestantism, which he deeply hated as heresy. He was an impractical doctrinaire; he would overstate his arguments with such excessive ardor that his Jesuit superiors carefully avoided appointing him to offices through which he might gain political influence. On the other hand, his energy and determination qualified him especially to carry on the difficult task of legalistic propaganda. 3

1 Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, p. 13.
2 Ibid., p. 14.
3 Ibid.

The writings of Wangnereck which are concerned with the subject of this treatise were produced in the years 1640-48, under four titles, although a fifth is possible but not probable. In 1640 he wrote a work Quaestio ardua. 4 It was to be a theological basis for refusing all concessions to the Protestants, including the demanded amnesty. 5 Since the Edict of Restitution of 1629 the war had gone against the emperor and the Catholics. The Peace of Prague ( 1635) had been a compromise satisfying no one; after another half-decade of war the emperor was appealed to by the college of electors, meeting at Nürnberg ( 1640), and the Reichstag, meeting at Regensburg ( 1640-41), to procure a new settlement. It was clear that the emperor would need to cede to France and Sweden lands of his own or church lands. 6 It was under these circumstances that the indefatigable Bishop Heinrich V of Augsburg urged Wangnereck to write against ceding to the heretics any church lands or rights of toleration. 7 The pamphlet appeared anonymously and only in manuscript copies, since it was the object of Bishop Heinrich and of Wangnereck to have it circulate only among Catholic extremists. 8 To meet new conditions with reference to the theological aspects of the negotiations at Münster a revision of the Quaestio ardua appeared toward the end of the year 1646 under the title Judicium theologicum. 9 This pamphlet was in form and content far superior to the ordinary theological tracts of the time. 10 It was regarded as excellent propaganda material; and therefore Wangnereck's supporters, with the encouragement of the elector Anselm Kasimir of Mainz, concluded that it would

10 Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIV, Part I, 83-84.
4 Ibid., p. 168. See Bibliography, manuscripts section, for fuller title.
5 Steinberger, p. 30; Duhr, Geschichte der Jesuiten in der Ländern deutscher Zunge, II, Part I, 472.
6 Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 615-16; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 252-55, 384.
7 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 30; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 473.
8 Steinberger, op., cit., pp. 31, 169.
9 Full title in bibliography; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 63, n. 2.

be wise to publish the revised pamphlet under the new title. It was published without Wangnereck's knowledge, and under the pseudonym "Ernestus de Eusebiis" and with a fictitious place of publication. 11 In the years 1647 and 1648 it was repeatedly reprinted without change in different printing shops. 12 It soon became evident after the first appearance of Judicium theologicum that "Ernestus de Eusebiis" was a pseudonym; and the authorship was attributed to various persons, including the nuncio Chigi, who later became Pope Alexander VII. 13 It was not until 1663 that it became definitely known to those not in the restricted circle of extreme Catholics that the author was Wangnereck; this fact was made public by Hermann Conring. 14

In June or July, 1647, Wangnereck may have published a third pamphlet, Vehiculum Judicii theologici, without date or place of publication. This was an answer to an attack on the Judicium theologicum that had been published in March, 1647, by Caramel y Lobkowitz, the father confessor of Emperor Ferdinand III. 15 Steinberger holds, however, that Wangnereck's authorship of the Vehiculum is not to be regarded as probable. Moreover, the form and content of this pamphlet is of no consequence; it is a restatement or amplification of the Judicium theologicum. 16

In the second half of August, 1647, Wangnereck published an additional pamphlet entitled Ponderatio, or less frequently known as Instrumenti pacis. 17 This appeared under the pseudonym "Theophilus Generosus Genuinus Germanus," but it is

11 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 69-71; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 83; Ritter, "Das römische Kirchenrecht", Historische Zeitschrift, CI, 261; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 474.
12 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 63, n. 2; p. 71, n. 5.
13 Ibid., pp. 64-66.
14 Conring, Opera, II, 470, n. (a); Steinberger, op. cit., p. 66; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 474.
15 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 78-81, 85.
16 Ibid., p. 85; Ritter, "Das römische Kirchenrecht", Historische Zeitschrift, CI, 257-58.
17 Both of these shorter titles are a part of the full title, which is found in the Bibliography.

clear by now that its author was Wangnereck. 18 In the Ponderatio Wangnereck, in order to give no trace of the identity of the authorship of this work and the Judicium theologicum, used the mask of pseudonymity in the Ponderaiio and alluded to "Ernestus de Eusebiis" as a third person, a literary trick that was very successful. 19

In the Ponderatio Wangnereck gave citations from Judicium theologicum to show that the peace terms as formulated were in defiance of the fundamental principles of the Catholic church. 20 He also opposed granting toleration to Calvinists. 21 The Ponderatio had no appreciable influence on the trend of the peace negotiations; however, the extreme Catholics could use it to show the moderate Catholics how the peace project, as sanctioned by the emperor, was in conflict with the strictly legal principles of the Roman Catholic church. But Emperor Ferdinand III had already, as a consequence of the theological opinions presented to him by Caramuel and his other spiritual advisers, given his sanction to the fundamentals of the peace project. Maximilian of Bavaria had also thrown his great influence in favor of the Peace, after his theologians, especially Vervaux , had advised him that the extreme conditions of the time required concessions to the Protestants at Catholic expense. Moreover, Maximilian's conscience had been quieted by the attitude of his advisers that one does not need to keep his promised word with heretics, an attitude that is objectionable to us moderns. 22

In the early weeks of the year 1648 Wangnereck replied to Vervaux Notae in Judicium theologicum by a pamphlet entitled Responsum theologicum. 23 It was printed anonymously early in 1648 by the Catholic extremists but with Wangnereck's consent. 24 The aim of the extremists was to have the tract read only by Catholics, therefore it was printed privately. Although it soon became widely known in all German Catholic circles, it

18 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 89-90, 176.
19 Ibid., p. 90.
20 Ibid., p. 90.
21 Ibid., p. 90.
22 Ibid., pp 90, 91, n. 4; pp. 196-97.
23 Full title in Bibliography.
24 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 112, 113, 177.

did not become known in the Protestant circles for a considerable time. Even Maximilian of Bavaria did not know of it until November, 1648; perhaps, because it was so critical of his policy, it was designedly kept from reaching the elector's hands. 25 Here again Wangnereck resorted to anonymity to protect himself against the wrath of the elector of Bavaria; and once more, as in the Ponderatio, he referred to "Ernestus de Eusebiis" as a disinterested third person. 26 In the Responsum theologicum he called Vervaux, the author of the Notae, "Irenicus" because of his pacific ideas; he himself scorned all such pacifists and questioned Vervaux's honesty. 27 A far worse offense was his attack on Maximilian of Bavaria for having signed the Treaty of Ulm with Sweden and France in March, 1647; this attack led to serious consequences for Wangnereck, as we shall see later. 28

In this brief treatment we cannot state all the ideas presented by Wangnereck in his 31 Judicium theologicum, which contains all the ideas of his other works. He is very repetitious, but he is always clear-cut. Naturally he is opposed to the secularization of politics, that is, the power of the secular princes to determine the sphere of their power, even to the point of regulating church affairs and disposing of church lands. In stating his opposition he breathes the spirit and reasserts the arguments of the political theories of Innocent III and Boniface VIII. He is the seventeenth-century advocate par excellence of absolute papal power in all matters of religion and church rights. He wishes no yielding, not the slightest compromise, no matter how long the war need be continued to safeguard all the rights of the church. In Section IV, Point IV, of his Judicium theologicum, 29 he asserts that the emperor and the princes of the Empire usurped a power that was not in their province when they regulated religious affairs in the Peace of Münster, or Westphalia. His specific criticisms can be grouped in three statements.

25 Ibid., pp. 113-14, 139, n. 1.
26 Ibid., p. 115.
27 Ibid., pp. 115 -16.
28 Ibid., pp. 116-17, 141-60.
29 Conring, op. cit., II, 500-501.

a) The princes granted heretics the right to worship. --This cannot be granted in any degree, even under pressure of necessity; that belongs solely to Peter and his successors, whose duty it is to drive off the wolves (heretics) that interfere with the pasturing of the sheep of Christ.

b) The princes abrogated church jurisdiction when they decided that certain bishoprics and other ecclesiastical offices shall cease to exist and that Catholic lands and subjects be turned over to lay princes. The Peace of Westphalia, like the Peace of Augsburg, is null and void in this respect.

c) The princes proposed to renounce, annul, or suspend all ecclesiastical rights or decrees that were at variance with the terms of the Peace of Augsburg and the Peace of Westphalia. --This referred to the clause against protests, which we have already considered, and, if applied, would mean that the church would forever forfeit its rights concerning heresy, its lost lands, churches, and ceded subjects. Wangnereck did not know the expression "secularization of politics," but he attacked its implication and its supporters. He had no patience with those advocating a peace that would he prejudicial to the interests of the Catholic church but advantageous to the secular princes. He scorned the policy of Emperor Ferdinand III, who sacrificed the lands and jurisdiction of the church in order to secure a peace that safeguarded his own Hapsburg possessions. Wangnereck opposed Maximilian of Bavaria because he was willing to grant an armistice to heretics and was working for a stable peace with the heretics in order to make sure that his newly acquired electoral dignity and territory, the Upper Palatinate, would remain unshaken in his possession. Wangnereck scorned those ecclesiastical princes like John Philipp von Schönborn, Archbishop of Mainz, who, being weary of war and desirous of peace, sacrificed the interests of mother church to the advantage of heretics. He contemned ecclesiasts like Caramuel and Vervaux, who advised their masters Ferdinand III and Maximilian, respectively, that under the pressure of circumstances a peace with heretics could be signed, even with prejudice to the church. Against

Caramuel and his like he wrote his Ponderatio; against Vervaux he composed his Responsum theologicum. A peace with heretics was anathema to him. Heretics were to be tolerated, not by secular authority, but solely by papal authority--and that merely as the church tolerated Jews, usurers, and prostitutes. 30

It was natural that the extravagant, irreconcilable views of Wangnereck should find ready support among the Catholic extremists. In form and content his pamphlets were far superior to the ordinary theological opinions appearing in print, and were therefore well suited for propaganda purposes. The extreme Catholics, headed by Anselm Kasimir, elector of Mainz, and Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, had had his works printed; the copies of the Judicium theologicum found a ready sale and did much to add to the ranks of the extreme Catholics many persons who had previously been friendly to the idea of a conciliatory peace. 31 Although the writings of Wangnereck did not alter the outcome of the peace negotiations, they had the effect of binding the extreme Catholics together, giving them a gauge whereby they could judge the concessions that the emperor and the other moderate Catholics were willing to make to the Protestants. 32

It was quite to be expected that Pope Innocent X, who had instructed the nuncio Chigi to protest against any peace terms prejudicial to Catholic interests, 33 should commend Wangnereck for his spirited, orthodox writings and interfere on his behalf when Caraffa, the general of the Jesuit Order, disciplined him at the urgent demand of Maximilian of Bavaria. 34 However much Chigi favored the contents of Wangnereck's writings and wished them to be known to all good Catholics, he, as well as others, was surprised and disappointed when, in 1646, the

30 Fudicium theologicum, sec. II, point 9, par. III; Conring, op. cit., II, 513.
31 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 69-73, 196.
32 Ibid., pp. 90-91.
33 See above, chaps. iv and xi.
34 See section 6 below. Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 75, 146-59, 164, 203-4.

Judicium theologicum was published, for he felt that the Swedes and other Protestants would use these weapons against the Catholics; and subsequent events proved that this judgment was quite correct. 35 But Chigi stood by Wangnereck when he later incurred the wrath of Maximilian of Bavaria and secured Pope Innocent's relieving interference on behalf of the courageous polemist. 36 Count Pefiaranda, the Spanish ambassador at Münster, regarded the printing of the Judicium theologicum as being important enough to send copies to the court of Madrid. 37

It is quite easy to understand the hearty support that was given Wangnereck by the so-called "triumvirate"-- Count Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, Adam Adami, prior to Murrhardt, and Johann von Leuchselring (Leuxelring). Concerning the first two and other ecclesiastical princes, a modern authority has said they "were contending less for the faith than for their secular possessions." 38 If the proposed peace terms were to be executed, Wartenberg would lose to the Swedes his bishoprics of Minden and Verden; and his bishopric of Osnabrück would be held alternately by a Catholic and a Protestant. During the war he had been driven from all these possessions by the Swedes; at the Peace Congress, being without lands himself, he represented Archbishop Ferdinand of Cologne. However, he was so insistent and persistent in defending Catholic rights that, as Trauttmannsdorff affirmed, he very appreciably checked the progress of the negotiations. But it must be said to his credit that he was more insistent in defending papal interests than his own; in fact, this was true to such a degree that the elector Ferdinand of Cologne found it necessary to deprive him temporarily of his right to vote when the matter of granting the electorate to Bavaria was decided in October, 1647; this action was taken by the elector Ferdinand through the influence of his

35 Steinberger, op. cit., pp 73-75, 196; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 84.
36 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 133-37, 151-54.
37 Letters of Pe¤aranda, Coleccion de documentos ineditos, LXXXIII, 95; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 73, 196-97.
38 Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 436-37.

brother, Maximilian of Bavaria. 39 Adami, prior of Murrhardt, and the persons he represented would also sustain losses of church territory and offices if the proposed peace were executed. At Münster, Adami represented the abbots, the heads of the collegiate churches, and the imperial prelates in the Swabian circle; he gladly adhered to the ideas of Wangnereck in the vain hope of preventing these various lands of his own and his constituents from being ceded permanently to the Duke of Württemberg. 40 Adami had himself written a pamphlet entitled Anti- Caramuel, 41 under the pseudonym Humanus Erdeman Oecomontano; it was written in the spirit of Wangnereck against making any concessions, and he published it when only half completed, having learned that Wangnereck was also contemplating a refutation of Caramuel. 42 Leuchselring represented at Münster the Catholic interests of Augsburg; he was an ardent person, devoted to the Catholic cause. When he, Wartenberg, and Adami, were derisively called "triumvirs," he scornfully called all other Catholics "trimmers" ( Lavierer). 43 Being an ardent Catholic, he could not agree to granting Protestants a status of parity with Catholics in his city of Augsburg; Wangnereck's arguments were the best preventive of such concessions.

The Catholic extremists, who, as has been observed, gladly based their contentions on Wangnereck's writings, proved to be very annoying to the Protestants and to the moderate Catholics. The printing and the distribution of the "poisonous" Judiciumtheologicum

39 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, IV, 777; F. Philippi, in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XLI, 190-91; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 58, 61, 71-72, 113, 143.
40 Israel, Adam Adami und seine Arcana Pacis Westphalicae, pp. 29-30, 117, 118; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 64 ; Ritter, "Das römische Kirchenrecht", Historische Zeitschrift, CI, 264 -65.
41 Full title in Bibliography, under Adami.
42 Israel, op. cit., pp. 113-17; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 127-29.
43 Vogel, Der Kampf auf dem westfälischen Friedenskongress um die Einführung der Parität in der Stadt Augsburg, p. 12; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 64; Odhner, Die Politik Schwedens, p. 112; Israel, op. cit., p. 66.

theologicum with its "erroneous, highly injurious principles" released a great storm among the Protestants. 44 They resented especially the cocksure way in which "Ernestus" rejected all the claims of the evangelical powers. From the Catholic, strictly legal, standpoint he was undoubtedly on firm ground in stating that the Protestants had no right to church lands acquired during the Thirty Years' War. But he was especially offensive in attacking the legality and permanence of the Peace of Augsburg, which had been sanctioned in 1566, at least for the time being, by Peter Canisius ( 1521-97), the first German Jesuit, founder of the Jesuit Order in Germany, and one of the most eminent and effective promoters of the Catholic Reformation in Germany. 45 By declaring that the Peace of Augsburg, after having been in effect more than ninety years, was invalid, Wangnereck gave the Protestants a point of attack more advantageous than any that they themselves could formulate. Therefore, some of them demanded that the pamphlet Judicium theologicum be burned by the common hangman. 46

The Swedes complained that "no more poisonous writing than the Judicum theologicium, especially in reference to this question (of religious difficulties), could have been issued by the devil himself, because it undermines all fundamentals of the Peace of Augsburg that have not been entirely nullified by it." The Swedes were especially embittered by the extravagant statement in the same sentence that "the Catholics will not come to a permanent agreement with the Protestants concerning church lands, and can tolerate the Protestants only in the sense that Jews, usurers, and prostitutes are endured." 47

In a long session of the Protestant and imperial negotiations

44 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 654; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 76.
45 Braunsberger, Petric Canisii Epistolae, V, 229-55; Braunsberger, Petrus Canisius, ein Lebensbild, pp. 162-65; Metzler, Der Heilige Petrus Canisius und die Neuerer seiner Zeit, p. 34; Drews, Petrus Canisius, der erste deutsche Jesuit, pp. 121-23; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 76; Baumgarten, in Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, II, 1796; Benrath, in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie, III, 709. See also above, chap iii.
46 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 76.
47 Judicium theologicum, sec. II, point IX, par. III; Conring, op. cit., II, 513; Meiern op. cit., IV, 34; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 76-77.

at Osnabrück devoted to a consideration of ecclesiastical differences ( February 16, 1647), 48 the Saxe-Altenburg representative, Wolfgang Konrad von Thumbshirn, urged that an inquisition be instituted against the author of the "malicious pamphlet" ( Judicium theologicum); 49 and one of the most irreconcilable Protestants, Heinrich Langenbeck, the representative of Brunswick-Lüneburg-Celle, complained that the Judicium theologicum was "worse than the 'Dillingen Book,'" and "even annuls the Peace of Augsburg." 50

Not only were the Protestants fearful of the nullifying influence of Wangnereck's writings, but the moderate Catholics manifested the same concern. They saw clearly that a spirit of conciliation and a willingness to yield to the demands of the Protestants, who were still in control of superior forces, were absolute essentials if peace were ever to be achieved. At the same session of February 16, 1647, Count Trauttmannsdorff, the conciliatory imperial ambassador, in responding to the remarks of von Thumbshirn and Langenbeck, called the "Judicium theologicum a bacchanalian work" (the writing of a drunken man). 51 According to another account, 52 Trauttmannsdorff is said to have remarked that this work is made up of "scholastic stupidities." On another occasion, in June, 1647, when the disturbing influence of all of Wangnereck's writings was being discussed by Trauttmannsdorff before the assembled Catholic representatives at Münster, he urged them not to delay the conclusion of peace, and to keep in mind the thwarting influence of "all kinds of scholastic disputations," whereby he undoubtedly meant the various works of Wangnereck. 53 Later, in September,

48 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 56-77.
49 Ibid., p. 73; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 77.
50 Meiern, Acta pacis, IV, 74; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 11, 29, 77.
51 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 74; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 77.
52 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 77, n. 7. Benedict Carpzov, Discussio brevis, fol. 2b (which I have not seen).
53 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 622-23; Pfanner, Historia pacis, p. 455; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 91-92.

1647, when a group of moderate Catholics (from Bavaria, Salzburg, Bamberg, Würzburg, Mainz, and Cologne) were endeavoring to consolidate the peace prospects created by Bavaria's giving up her armistice with Sweden and again allying with the emperor, Volmar, who had succeeded Trauttmannsdorff as imperial representative at the Congress, said that the Judicium theologicum, the Vehiculum, and Ponderatio, were chiefly raillery [cavillationes] and foolish dreams." 54 The ideas of Trauttmannsdorff and Volmar were in harmony with those of the imperial court at Vienna, where there was a readiness to make great concessions to the Protestants; 55 above all, at the Vienna court there had been an ill temper owing to the assertion of "Ernestus de Eusebiis" that the emperor and the imperial states had no right to dipose of the ecclesiastical lands through such a peace treaty. 56 The father confessor of Empress Maria, the Capuchin Father Quiroga, in expressing an opinion concerning the Judicium theologicum, said of Wangnereck, "according to my judgment he is not a theologian and not a politician [politicus]." 57 At this date, the year 1647, it was not known who "Ernestus de Eusebiis" was.

The person that was responsible for taking definite action against Wangnereck was Maximilian of Bavaria. His Jesuit theologian, Johann Vervaux, had persuaded him that he and Emperor Ferdinand III might sign a peace prejudicial to Catholic interests because necessity demanded it, but that, if better times should ultimately return, the concessions made to the heretics need no longer be observed. 58 Inasmuch as Maximilian held such equivocal views, and since he was leader of the moderate Catholics, who earnestly wished peace, he found the writ-

54 Sattler, Geschichte des Herzogthums Würtenberg (sic), VIII, 205; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 77; Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 474.
55 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 24-25, 36-37, 39-40, 58-59, 77.
56 Judicium theologicum, sec. III, point V; sec. IV, point IV; Conring, op. cit., II, 496, 500-501; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 77, n. 10; p. 78.
57 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 78, n. 4.
58 Ibid., p. 91, n. 4, quotes letters of Chigi to the papal secretary of state, dated Münsterberg, October 4 and November 15, 1647; see also ibid., pp. 196, 197.

ings of this unknown "Ernestus de Eusebiis" a block to successful peace negotiations. 59 When in January, 1648, Maximilian learned through Vervaux that it was Wangnereck, head of the Jesuit mission at Lindau, who was producing these peace-blocking writings, 60 he decided to take action. On January 3, 1648, he wrote a letter to Caraffa, the general of the Society of Jesus. After having called attention to the injuries that were threatened to the general welfare and to the Society of Jesus by writings of the type of the Judicium theologicum, he asked the general to take steps to hold Wangnereck in check. 61 Caraffa was in a dilemma. He himself was an opportunist and acted as a moderate Catholic; 62 he undoubtedly agreed with his predecessor, Vitelleschi, general of the Order from 1615 to 1645, who, after reading Wangnereck Quaestio ardua, commended its author for his erudite work but requested that for the good of the Order the pamphlet remain unpublished. 63 Maximilian was a generous patron of the Jesuit Order; not to heed his urgent request that Wangnereck's pen be made inactive might lead to unpleasant consequences. On the other hand, Caraffa did not wish to offend his immediate superior, Pope Innocent X, and Chigi, who did not wish Wangnereck's useful political activities curtailed. 64 So Caraffa instructed Keppler, the provincial of Upper Germany, to deprive Wangnereck of his office, send him elsewhere, and keep him from writing any more pamphlets. 65 But papal influence forced Caraffa to revoke his orders; and moreover, because Innocent X was displeased with Vervaux Notae in Judicium theologicum, Caraffa had to demand an accounting from Vervaux, who soon assured the Jesuit general that he would refrain from further polemical writing; this statement was sent by Caraffa to the papal Curia. 66

59 Ibid., p. 132.
60 Ibid., p. 132, n. 4; p. 133.
61 Ibid., pp. 133, 198 (contains Maximilian's letter to Caraffa).
62 Ibid., pp. 99-100; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 84, n. 4, and 85.
63 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 32, 195
64 Ibid., pp. 136-38.
65 Ibid., pp. 134-35; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 84.
66 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 136-38.

Maximilian, being a good politician, bowed to the papal rebuff. But when in November, 1648, he finally became aware of Wangnereck Responsum theologicum, perhaps nine months after its publication, 67 he was deeply hurt. 68 Wangnereck was still permitted to write, whereas Vervaux's pen had been stopped. Wangnereck's new treatise assailed Vervaux's opinions and accused him of bad faith; but what was still worse, it attacked Maximilian's peaceful policies, especially the signing of the Treaty of Ulm in March, 1647, with France and Sweden, and the conciliatory policy that Maximilian and the other moderate Catholics had been following ever since. 69 Maximilian felt that quick action must be taken. The treaties of Mänster and Osnabräck had been signed October 24, 1648; the circulation of such polemical works as the Responsum theologicum would undermine the confidence necessary to execute the treaties. The Congress of Mänster was still in session; and on November 18, 1648, Maximilian wrote to Johann Philipp von Schänborn, Archbishop of Mainz, expressing his feeling that the whole situation should be presented not merely to the plenipotentiaries of the emperor and the moderate Catholic states but also to the Protestants. The Protestants should be assured of the willingness of the Catholic states to treat the Responsum theologicum in harmony with the provisions of that article of both treaties of Mänster and Osnabräck, which punishes, as a breach of the Peace, every attack on the finally achieved work of conciliation. 70 The elector Johann Philipp von Schänborn in his answer of November 20, 1648, stated that he was in fundamental agreement with Maximilian, and went a step further in declaring that the Responsum theologicum contained "just those hos-

67 Ibid., pp. 112-13, 138-39.
68 Ibid., p. 115.
69 Ibid., pp. 115-16, 138-40, 200-201.
70 Ibid., pp. 141-43. "Peace of Mänster", par. 114, in Walther, Universal-Register, p. lxxxv; "Peace of Osnabräck", Art. XVII, par. 4, in Walther, ibid., p. xliii. "Those that act contrary to this transaction or common peace through counsel of deed, or resist the execution and restitution . . . . , whether they be ecclesiastical or secular, should be subject to the imperial laws regulating a breach of peace," which means, should be placed under the ban ( Gundling, Vollständiger Discours äber den westphalischen Frieden, p. 586).

tile dogmas and presuppositions that are repugnant to the principles of our faith and religion," a viewpoint that was held against him by the ultra-Catholics for a long time afterward. This was what Johann Philipp thought in theory. But in practice he held that the decision should be postponed until a full clarity of view had been attained, inasmuch as Bishop Franz Wilhelm von Osnabräck and others of the extreme Catholic princes were involved in the matter; as a consequence, Maximilian finally declared himself in agreement with the policy of playing a waiting game, as his Mainz colleague desired. 71

In Maximilian's letter to Johann Philipp he shows himself more as an experienced practical politician who does not wish, by rigid theory, to jeopardize anew the work of many years of costly labor. But on November 19, 1648, in a letter of complaint which he addressed to Caraffa, the general of the Society of Jesus, he shows, above all, what deep wounds his pride had suffered. In words of bitterness and irritation, and with the greatest emphasis, he demands an exemplary punishment for the Lindau superior, "this exceedingly bold person." His words seem like an ultimatum; if this outrageous insult were not effaced in good time, Maximilan's treatment of the Order would be in accordance with its deserts. A list of the offending passages in the Responsum theologicum (a compilation of Vervaux) accompanied the letter. 72 Caraffa, realizing that Maximilian was in dead earnest, and fearing similar protests from John Philipp von Schänborn and the emperor, visualized that the Responsum theologicum might be publicly burned in one or more places by the common hangman and a copy suspended from the gallows, the worst treatment that could be given any literary production. 73 To avoid such injury to the reputation of the Society of Jesus and to Wangnereck, Caraffa had Wangnereck imprisoned temporarily, deprived him of his active and passive vote in the Society, and forced him to beg Maximilian's pardon for the offense inflicted. 74 Wangnereck pacified Maximilian by

71 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 143.
72 Ibid., pp. 143-45, 200-201.
73 Ibid., p. 145.
74 Ibid., p. 146, n. 4, and p. 202.

affirming that the offensive part of the Responsum theologicum had been inserted by an unknown hand; 75 but his short incarceration terminated abruptly in February, 1649, through the interference of Innocent X and Chigi. 76 Wangnereck never completed the writing of his so-called Apologeticum, although 210 pages had been written; moreover, its publication never took place, having been prevented by a higher authority. 77 However, he planned a visit to Rome, which could, in the mind of Maximilian, be quite as dangerous, for he would be able to influence the papacy to take action against the Peace of Westphalia; and in response to Maximilian's request, the new general of the Society of Jesus, Francesco Piccolomini ( 1582-1651), who had succeeded Caraffa in December, 1649, although kindly disposed toward Wangnereck, postponed his mission to the papal Curia. 78 The year 1650 was still a time of uncertainty with reference to the stability of the Peace; it was not until June, 1650, that the arrangements were completed at Närnberg for the full execution of the terms of the Westphalian settlement. 79 But that action did not clearly settle the question of the moral admissibility of the Peace. Pope Innocent X on August 20, 1650, ordered that his protest Zelo Domus Dei be issued against the Peace by all the nuncios. 80 Under the circumstances it is easy to understand why Maximilian was still worried, when in the first half of the year 1651 Wangnereck succeeded in getting to Rome in an official capacity and discussed, with Cardinal Capponi, means of strengthening the Catholic church in Germany; such action meant undermining the treaties of peace. It is also known that Wangnereck spoke unfavorably of his antagonist Caramuel to the members of the papal court. 81

This discussion shows clearly how both the Protestants and the moderate Catholics feared the influence of the ardent and intemperate Wangnereck in combating the peace terms that only long wearisome negotiations had made possible. The mod-

75 Ibid., pp. 149-50.
76 Ibid., pp. 151-54.
77 Ibid., pp. 130, 155-57, 182.
78 Ibid., pp. 159-60.
79 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 415.
80 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 99.
81 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 164-65.

erate Catholics, who made the ultimate signing of peace possible, he regarded as his main enemies. Of them he says: "What is said of them can be taught, but it is only academic wisdom; practical counsels and theologians are now needed." 82 He surely regarded himself as one of the practical theologians; but the verdict of history has gone against him. The changes of time required concessions to the new principles of government. He did not understand the new principle of state and national sovereignty. He was of German birth, had lived all his life in Germany, but had no German feeling; as his opponent Caramuel asserted, "he has no consideration for the distress of Germany, which he does not love." 83 The German Jesuit historian, Bernhard Duhr, writing in the twentieth century, and commenting on the Responsum theologicum, remarks that one can see

what confusion and harm must result from adhering to medieval viewpoints in completely changed conditions. When only the Catholic religion existed, such fundamental principles could be defended; but as soon as the force of circumstances had helped the non-Catholic confessions to secure great and permanent possessions, it was no longer possible to adhere to these views if one did not wish to proclaim a general war and place into the hands of the other confessions weapons with which to fight the Catholics. If, according to the views of Wangnereck, the Catholics may not conclude a permanent peace with the Protestants, the Protestants must expect that the Catholics could break every peace as soon as they secured power enough to feel justified in repressing the Protestants with the prospects of success. 84

82 Judicium theologicum, sec. II, point X; Conring, op. cit., II, 495.
83 Caramuel, Sacri Romani Imperii Pax ( 1648 ed.), p. 97, No. 99.
84 Duhr, op. cit., II, Part I, 482.

Chapter Sixteen

THE best known of Wangnereck's writings was the Judicium theologicum; it also did the cause of peace the most injury. It was the task of the moderate Catholic writers to weaken or, if possible, to destroy the influence of this work. The first moderate Catholic writers to attack the extremist ideas was the Spanish Johann Caramuel y Lobkowitz ( 1606-83), originally a member of the Cistercian Order, later a Benedictine. He was an ambitious person and had received many offices and much recognition for his services to the Roman Catholic church, including the important position of suffragan bishop (Weihbischof) of Mainz. Since 1645 he had been an agent of Philipp IV of Spain at the court of Vienna, where he became court preacher and court counselor in 1646. His services were so satisfactory that the emperor bestowed two rich Benedictine abbeys on him--Montserrat-Emaus in Prague, and another in Vienna. Although Caramuel was an ardent opponent of heresy and a strong supporter of the Roman Catholic church, he used his great learning and independence of thought in answering the Judicium theologicum in such a way as to justify Ferdinand III and Maximilian of Bavaria in concluding a peace that involved the toleration of heretics and the cession of church lands. 1

1 Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, pp. 17, 77-84, 105, n. 1; Stieve, in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, III, 780; Kaulen, in Wetzer and Welte, Encyclopädie,

Caramuel's work appeared in the early months of 1648 under the title Sacri Romani Imperii Pax licita demonstrata, 2 i.e., "The Peace of the Holy Roman Empire Presented as Legal." This work had been ready to print as early as the spring of 1647 but did not appear, owing to the opposition of Anselm Kasimir, electoral archbishop of Mainz, and the nuncio Fabio Chigi. 3 But after the death of Anselm in October, 1647, it was possible to have the work published in the spring of 1648. At first it appeared anonymously and without place of publication, but later in the year it appeared in a second edition with additions; a third edition appeared in 1649, somewhat revised. In the second and third editions his name was affixed, as was the place of publication, Frankfurt. 4 Copies soon reached the courts of the princes and were circulated at Mänster and Osnabräck. Since the purpose of the work was to create a sentiment for peace in opposition to the influence of the Judicium theologicum, it naturally offended the nuncio and the extreme Catholics, who called Caramuel, along with Vervaux, a "half-heretic," reserving the label "absolute heretic" for the Protestant Dorscheus. 5 But Conring, a Protestant writing with a specific purpose, commended the work. 6

In the Pax licita 7 Caramuel maintains that the proposed Peace of Westphalia is not a usurpation of authority that is not granted the emperor and the other princes. Existing circumstances compel the princes to make concessions to heresy and cede church lands to heretics, just as similar circumstances had led to the signing of the Peace of Augsburg, which was also a

II, 1934; Paquot, Mémoires pour servir ... l'histoire littéraire des dix-sept provinces des Pays-Bas, II, 175-85; Tabaraud, in Michaud, Biographie universelle, VI, 651-53.
2 A second and third edition appeared in the course of the year 1648. Steinberger, op. cit., p. 82, n. 4, and p. 84.
3 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 79-80.
4 Ibid., pp. 80-84, 129.
5 Ibid., pp. 82-84, 105. For Dorcheus, see below, next section.
6 Conring, Opera, VI, 620: "Commendo quoque, Caramuelis librum, de pace licita, numquam hie liber iterum execudetur."
7 Caramuel, pp. 209-21, Nos. 332-35; citations are to the third and enlarged edition of the year 1648. See the second title under Caramuel in the Bibliography.

compromise peace. He affirms that, since the power of the Protestants is so very great, and will not grow less, to refuse to make the concessions demanded now may easily result in even greater losses to the Catholics later. He asserts that, since Catholic subjects have the right to migrate from Protestant lands to Catholic lands, the Peace of Augsburg and the Peace of Westphalia actually liberated Catholics from heresy, instead of turning them over to heresy, as "Eusebiis" wrongly affirms. He asserts that the emperor is acting wisely when inserting the clause in the Treaty whereby he renounces all right of disregarding the promises of the Treaty. If he refused to insert this clause, the Protestants, who wish a lasting peace, would not sign a treaty at all. He affirms that the church lands are a constituent part of the German sovereign dominion and belong to the princes. The emperor may turn over to the heretics some church lands that he cannot protect; by so doing he is protecting the church against probably greater losses. Finally, the emperor needs no papal authority to dispose of church lands; he acts on the basis of divine and natural laws, and now especially he needs no permission of any kind when he is granting what he cannot prevent.

Caramuel's treatise was not a logical or consistent argument in all its parts; but it was essentially what Ferdinand III desired, the argument of a devout Catholic which supported a policy of concessions to heretics at the expense of the church in order to secure peace. Furthermore (although not stated by Caramuel), it implied a policy of protecting the Hapsburgs against the eventuality of ceding their own personal possessions to the victorous enemies. 8

Another moderate Catholic writer, who was even more modern in his viewpoint, was Johannes Vervaux ( 1585-1661), who had come to the Bavarian court in 1631 as father confessor of the electress Elisabeth; since 1635 he acted in the same capacity for Maximilian. 9 In spite of the statutes of the Jesuit Order to the contrary, he engaged in a widely ramified political activity in

8 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 78-79.
9 Ibid., p. 20.

the service of his prince, 10 whose full confidence he possessed. Maximilian gave him the right freely to express his opinions on a wide range of subjects, but Vervaux kept in mind the sensitive princely pride of his ruler and was cautious not to give advice contrary to the elector's views. But we must remember that whatever Vervaux did and wrote was a matter of conviction and that he and Maximilian were kindred spirits. 11 Vervaux, having been born in Lorraine, found it easy to advise Maximilian to adopt a policy enabling him to co-operate politically with France, even though France were the ally of Sweden and the German Protestants. 12 Maximilian had used Vervaux in the preliminary and final negotiations resulting in the signing of the Treaty of Ulm in March, 1647, by Bavaria, France, and Sweden. 13 That treaty being signed, Vervaux, as spiritual counselor of Maximilian, advocated that it be used as a stepping-stone to a general peace. 14 When it became necessary for Maximilian to break the armistice with Sweden in September, 1647, Vervaux advised that he continue the alliance with France. 15 His whole policy was entirely in accord with that of his master; he wished to enable Maximilian to secure terms of peace favorable to Bavaria with the aid of France, Sweden, and the Protestants, and to induce the Catholic princes, especially Emperor Ferdinand III, to make compromises toward peaceful ends. This policy is reflected in his writings, and as a consequence the extreme Catholics regarded him as injuring real Catholic interests. 16

Vervaux's part in the literary conflict of the Westphalian Peace era falls in the second half of the year 1647 and consists of two pamphlets written at the request of Maximilian and appearing under the common title Notae in Consilium theologicum, and having the special titles (1) Notae Communes seu primae and (2) Notae particulares seu secundae bezw. [beziehungsweise]Arcana

10 Ibid., pp. 20-21.
11 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
12 Ibid., pp. 21-22.
13 Ibid., pp. 25, 40-48.
14 Ibid., pp. 93-94, 97-98.
15 Ibid., pp. 98-99.
16 Ibid., pp. 99-100, 104, 118, 119; Pfälf, "Ein Beitrag, etc.", Stimmen aus MariaLaach, Katholische Blätter, LVI, 528-34.

Arcana. 17 This work appeared in the garb of a theological opinion; it was never printed except when the Notae Communes were incorporated in the Responsum theologicum to enable Wangnereck to combat them. 18 This writing of Vervaux was prepared to enable Maximilian to have a clear view of the peace-hindering work of Wangnereck and also to distribute copies to the Catholic plenipotentiaries whom Maximilian wished to influence in favor of an early peace. The pamphlet was distributed secretly only to Catholics, but probably through the indiscretion of a Catholic diplomat it was not wholly unknown in the Protestant camp. 19 Although it did not cause the extreme Catholics to change their attitude, it was a factor in giving the moderate Catholics a program with which to oppose the unconciliatory views of Wangnereck. 20 The copy used by the author was among the Westphalian Peace papers of the Austrian plenipotentiary, Dr. Johann Crane, and is today found in the Vienna archives. 21 The title of this particular copy reads Notae in Consilium [=Judicium] Theologicum Ernesti de Eusebiis super Quaestione an Pax Qualem desiderant Protestantes sit secundam se illicita. It is written by at least four, possibly five, different copyists, who probably worked in shifts under pressure to combat the antipeace activities of Wangnereck through his writings. The Notae appeared anonymously; that Vervaux is the author has been learned from the reports of the nuncio Chigi to the papal secretary of state Panciroli. 22

To us the significance of the Notae lies in about three of the sentence headings, which Vervaux amplifies, usually briefly; these headings are quite modern, when contrasted with the medieval views of Wangnereck, which the Notae were supposed to combat.

Nota V says: "The heretics are infamous on the basis of divine law; to deny that the Protestants are infamous is not a

17 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 67, 101-2, 111, 173. 18 Ibid., p. 112. 19 Ibid., pp. 102-4, 173-74. 20 Ibid., pp. 103-4, 120. 21 Cod. Vindob. 15154, fol. 659a-74a; see Steinberger, op. cit., p. 173. 22 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 173-74.

direct co-operation with heresy." 23 Nota VIII: "To defend nonCatholics is nothing evil in itself." 24 But a modern person cannot agree with Vervaux when he says in Nota IV, paragraph 3, that "the peace that is guaranteed the heretics is not permanent or absolute, but is a peace that can become only transitory." 25 Although this sentence is "reprehensible" (verwerflich) as Steinberger says, it undoubtedly contributed much toward easing the conscience of the pious Maximilian, who in this case of extreme necessity had to make a peace that did great injury to the Catholic church but could, when conditions changed advantageously in the future, be abrogated. 26 However we may judge Vervaux's Notae, they were a factor in securing the co-operation of Maximilian and other Catholic princes in negotiating a peace that produced the secularization of politics. On the other hand, they offended the nuncio Chigi, especially on account of the sentence that the emperor in the face of necessity could take for granted the consent of the Holy See to the ceding of ecclesiastical lands. 27

During the critical negotiations at Mänster and Osnabräck there appeared many pamphlets by Protestants, who attacked the extreme views of Wangnereck and aimed to bring about an early and permanent peace. We shall content ourselves with discussion of the writings of only two of these Protestant controversialists: Johann Georg Dorsche ( 1597-1659) and Hermann Conring ( 1606-81).

In the years 1647 and 1648 appeared four treatises by Dorsche (Dorscheus), a Lutheran preacher and polemical writer on theology, of Strassburg, who combated with equal bitterness both Catholics and Calvinists. 28 He was especially ardent in attack-

23 Responsum theologicum, pp. 37-38.
24 Ibid., p. 68.
25 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
26 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 91 and n. 4.
27 Responsum theologicum, pp. 99, 103, 115-16, 156; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 104, n. 6.
28 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 105; Holtzmann and Krause, "Dorsche", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, V, 363.

ing the writings of Ernestus de Eusebiis," and was the only one among the Protestant writers that did not try to protect himself by resorting to anonymity or pseudonymity. 29 The most important of his four treatises, for our purposes, is entitled: Anticrisis theologica, opposita Judico theologico Ernest de Eusebiis . . . . super Quaestione: An pax qualem desiderant Protestantes sit secundum se illicita? 30 This treatise and three others on the subject (all similar in content), must have been in completed form in manuscript at the end of the year 1647. 31 The papal nuncio Chigi thought he discovered that Dorsche's publications corresponded in thought and even language with Vervaux's Notae. Chigi held that in Dorsche's work Catholic interests were being injured by a Protestant who was applying Catholic doctrines, that is, those of the moderate Catholics, of whom Chigi disapproved. 32 The writings of Dorsche seem to have had a certain influence; at least the nuncio Chigi in his report of March 6, 1648, speaks of the writings of Dorsche and urged Wangnereck to answer him briefly, an action that was left, however, to another hand, Father Melchior Cornaeus. 33

Dorsche appeals to historic precedent to refute the assertion of Ernestus de Eusebiis that the secular powers were usurping a power they did not possess in negotiating the Treaty of Westphalia. He builds up an argument favoring the secularization of politics, showing that in past times the secular rulers had the right to deal with ecclesiastical affairs. Charles V and Ferdinand I were supported by good ecclesiastical opinion in believing that, as emperors, they had the right to call church councils to regulate matters of religion; moreover, they were acting within their rights when signing the Peace of Augsburg. The German ecclesiastical princes had sustained this view. Dorsche commented further that thus far there had been no absolutely

29 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 108.
30 Haag, La France protestante, V, 463; Backer and Sommervogel, Bibliothèque des écrivains, VIII, 983.
31 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 108.
32 Ibid., p. 109.
33 Ibid., p. 102, n. 3, and p. 109.

clear opinion as to who had final authority over church lands. Certainly such authority could not be based on canon law. It was fully as correct to assume that secular rulers had jurisdiction in 1647 and 1648 over church lands because the existing distressed conditions granted the emperor and the imperial states a certain authority over church matters. According to the ideas of Pope Innocent III the emperor and the imperial states were not under obligation to ask papal advice in all affairs. Just as under certain circumstances a tax may be levied on ecclesiasts without the sanction of the pope, just so a cession of church lands might take place. 34

There is no evidence that Dorsche influenced Catholics to accept his views, but he gave a theological and philosophical justification to the Protestant princes in insisting on the execution of their program.

Of all the Protestant treatises written against the Judicium theologicum, the most significant was that of Hermann Conring ( 1606-81), the most learned polyhistor of the seventeenth century. 35 He was not only an evangelical theologian of wide reputation, but he held successively chairs of natural philosophy, of medicine, and of politics at the University of Helmstedt, in Brunswick-Lüneburg, where he remained from 1620 until his death in 1681. He was also a physician of wide experience, a counselor to the queen of Sweden, to the Duke of Brunswick, and to the king of Denmark. His literary activity embraced many fields of human knowledge; he wrote important works on medicine, anatomy, political economy, theology, and jurisprudence; he is called the founder of the history of German law. 36 He also played a determinative part in the era of literary controversy here considered. He held that the broad religious and political claims of the pope were not substantiated in the original sources of ecclesiastical history and the works of the church fathers; he rejected

34 Dorsche, Anticrisis theologica, pp. 42-56.
35 Henke, in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie, IV, 267.
36 Stobbe, Hermann Conring, der Begründer der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, pp. 7-8; H. Bresslau, Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, IV, 446-51.

the infallibility of the Church and the Pope and the vicegerency (Staathalterschaft) of the pope; he thought papal intervention or meddling (Einmischung) in state affairs threatened the freedom of the German Empire. 37 He wrote a work entitled Pro pace perpetua Protestantibus danda Consultatio Catholica: Auctore Irenaes Eubolo, Theologo Austriaco. 38 In the Preface of the 1657 edition of this work he states that before he had written the Consultatio Catholica he had read all the important controversial literature on the subject, the Judicium theologicum of "Ernestus de Eusebiis," the Vehiculum Judicii theologici, the Responsum theologicum, the Instrumenti Pacis Ponderatio, and others of this kind. 39

The Consultatio Catholica is regarded quite generally as having contributed greatly to the promotion of the conclusion of the Peace of Westphalia. 40 The great influence of the work is accounted for by the fact that he resorted to a literary trick; in the first place the title of the book indicated supposedly that it was written by a Catholic, as did the use of the term "heretic" in alluding to the Protestants; in the second place, the pseudonym indicated that the author was an Austrian theologian, and therefore a Catholic. This latter device was used by Conring especially in consideration of the yielding spirit that had already been manifested concerning the Protestant demands in the peace negotiations by the Vienna court, supported by the opinion of its theologians. Actually the "Austrian theologian" was not a Catholic at all, much less a Catholic theologian. In the Preface to the 1657 edition of the Consultatio Catholica Conring apologizes for the use of this trick because he knew that any treatise coming frankly from the pen of a Protestant would have no influence on the Catholics, whom he was, above all, anxious

37 Stobbe, op. cit., pp. 32-33.
38 Conring, op. cit., II, 472-90.
39 Ibid., p. 470. This is Conring's statement in 1657; the last two works mentioned appeared, however, in 1648 after Conring had published the Consultatio Catholica.
40 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 123-25; J. P. Niceron, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire des hommes illustrés dans la république des lettres, XIX, 260; Backer and Sommervogel, op. cit., VIII, 983, quotes Niceron; V. Placius, Theatrum anonymorum et pseudonymorum, pseud. No. 966.

to persuade to accept a conciliatory and permanent peace. 41 No matter how capable the arguments presented by a Protestant, they would be lost on individuals of Catholic sympathies. A Protestant might just as well save his energies. So to Conring the end justfied the deceitful means.

The writing of the Consultatio Catholica occurred in the last week of 1647 in strict secrecy. At first it was circulated only in manuscript copies in Münster and Osnabrück, among all groups favoring peace. Later, in 1648, it was published through Jacob Lampadius, the representative of Brunswick-Lüneburg, who was a friend of Conring. Conring asserted that Lampadius had arranged for the publication of the treatise without knowing who the real author was. 42 Steinberger doubts the possibility of this; he thinks that Conring, like many Catholic writers, such as Wangnereck, Caramuel, Vervaux, and Cornaeus, wrote at the order of someone in authority, presumably the Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg. 43 Another historian, Grauert, asserts that Conring was commissioned by Ferdinand III to refute the protest of Innocent X, in order to prove to the Roman court that its protest would be fruitless. 44

In the introduction to the Consultatio Catholica it was stated that, although there was a difference of opinion among many respected Catholic rulers concerning the establishment of a permanent peace with heretics, and although some very important Catholic theologians declared that such a peace was not permitted, he himself, Ireneus Eubolus, the Austrian theologian, felt that the best interests of Germany, and especially of the Catholic church, were dependent solely on the early conclusion of a conciliatory peace. 45 He opposed Wangnereck's general idea that the secular rulers were usurping power when they dealt with matters of heresy and church property. 46 He offered a new

41 Opera, II, 470-71; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 123.
42 Opera, II, 470; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 124.
43 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 124.
44 Grauert, Christina, Königinn von Schweden, I, 252, cites Conring, op. cit., II, 531 ff.
45 Conring, op. cit., II, 473.
46 Ibid., pp. 483-84.

political justification for the acts of the emperor and the imperial princes, and showed them how they might have peace, preserve their secular interests, and still remain good Catholics. He stressed the supreme interests of the state, asserted the divineright-of-kings theory, affirmed that the emperor and princes had legal authority to determine everything necessary for the existence of civil society, and that this authority was given them by God. Wangnereck did the princes an injustice when he asserted that they "were usurping a jurisdiction that did not belong to them," for the German church must, under all circumstances, recognize these rulers as princes and judges constituted for the church by God. Whoever rejected that, sinned against majesty (committed lèse majesté).

The princes, in establishing the proposed peace, were not exceeding the limits of their authority. They were assuming no power over spiritual affairs; such matters were left wholly in the hands of the ecclesiasts. The civil rulers, as protectors of the civil rights of all subjects, were, in drawing up the Treaty, merely using their legal rights to protect heretics and the Catholic church against injustice, which power must rest solely in secular hands, otherwise that power cannot function successfully.

Since that was a time of confusion and distress, there was great public need for the princes to take measures that limited ecclesiastical jurisdiction concerning temporal affairs; but there would be no suspension of the spiritual jurisdiction of the bishops. The bishops were now being deprived merely of secular jurisdiction, which had been granted them by the arbitrary laws of the princes in former centuries. The princes were now under the stress of circumstances, merely resuming their powers in these secular respects.

If, as Ernestus de Eusebiis contended, the lands of the German church were subject to the church and the pope as supreme administrator, the emperor and the imperial states had no actual control over these lands. This would be a nullification of the entire German system of government, and was therefore scandalous. (Such a statement was an appeal to the spirit of political independence of the secular powers.)

The ecclesiastical princes, when they lost control over heretics and church properties, were giving up merely civil rights, not spiritual or divine powers. These civil powers had originally been granted by the secular powers, which through the Treaty were merely resuming their original authority over secular affairs. He clinchingly added, "When discussing this point we should always remember the words of the Savior, 'Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's.'"

The rights of the church and religion rested on divine law. The bishops, besides being spiritual rulers, had also been secular princes, and as such had sovereign rights in the Holy Roman Empire; and they, like secular princes, could take secular measures concerning the church, but they were acting solely on the basis of princely law.

In view of these facts, papal consent to the proposed Peace was not necessary; the emperor and the princes, secular and ecclesiastical, had authority to make disposition of the purely temporal matters in question. 47

Conring, a Protestant, writing under the mask of a Catholic, hoped to contribute to the conclusion and permanence of the Peace by persuading the moderate Catholics to regard the expediency of signing and observing the proposed compromise treaty terms. To accept his arguments, as the princes did in practice, meant that politics was secularized, that the secular authority determined what was secular and took measures to assert its authority. If, because of confused conditions, the state found it necessary to resume jurisdiction over affairs that had for a long time been looked after by ecclesiastics, the state was not usurping authority. It was merely making arrangements for the welfare of civil life and signing a peace providing for such resumption of its own authority.

In the mind of Conring the conclusion of the Peace was not necessarily a guaranty of its being observed, in the face of the

47 Ibid., p. 484.

papal protest made public in August, 1650. 48 In 1657 he published an argument against the breve (bull, as he calls it) Zelo Domus Dei of Innocent X. This argument was entitled Animadversio in Bullam Innocenti X. 49 In this work of eleven chapters he wrote more boldly than when he was writing with a pseudonym. He asserted that "a person, even if he is a Roman Catholic, is permitted, without prejudice to his faith, not to observe papal bulls, much more to reject them, because they are burdened with faults," "that the declaration of Innocent was unnecessary," "quite unusual," "without any precedent," "not useful even to the Roman Curia itself, whether for the present or the future," "is injurious to the Roman Catholic church itself and to the Catholic parts of Germany." 50 After condemning further aspects of the papal protest Conring added in the final chapter that "all that have any relations with Rome have the right with a clear conscience and, according to moral law, are obliged not to observe the bull of Innocent X." 51 In other words, the papacy, in protesting against the Peace of Westphalia, was interfering in affairs that were wholly in the hands of the secular rulers. In making the assertions in these two treatises Conring showed himself the most precise and advanced of all the political theorists. 52 He stated the theory of secularization of politics as it was put into practice in the middle of the seventeenth century and subsequently.

In summary it should be pointed out that Wangnereck was stating the political ideals of a vanishing age in which papal supremacy had been asserted and enforced in all religious affairs and in many secular affairs as well. Standing for the legal prin-

48 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 99.
49 Full title in Bibliography. Conring, op. cit., II, 517-66.
50 Conring, op. cit., II, chaps. i-iv, 517-33.
51 Ibid., II, 561-63.
52 Schröckh, Christliche Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation, III, 403, states: " Conrings Schrift . . . . gehört unter die vorzüglichern."

ciples of that age, he could not modify those principles to meet the needs of a new era in which secular interests were dominant. His support came from those having a vested interest in conditions as they had been for half a millennium. But his theories could not cope with the new theories more in harmony with the new conditions. Such ideas were offered by Caramuel and Vervaux; they made it possible for their sovereigns and moderate Catholic allies to feel that, as good Catholics, they were actually promoting the best interests of the church if they abandoned the rigid theories of the Middle Ages and adopted a more conciliatory, more adjustable, theory that would meet a situation that might be only temporary.

But Conring, the Protestant, writing as a Catholic, went further than either of them. He stated in a precise way that the state has authority in all affairs affecting the church except purely spiritual affairs, which has come to be the modern theory and practice. The state, which has supreme interests, must, in the face of a great public need, exercise ecclesiastical jurisdiction of a temporal kind, such as protecting the interests of both the Catholics and the heretics. The state has interests superior to those of doctrinal differences. He applied the theories of politics that existed before the times of Gregory VII and Innocent III. He once more widened the scope of politics, and also justified its secularization.

The main purpose of this treatise has been to trace the secularization of politics in practice. This section is to present, with less detail, the parallel secularization of political theory, or the secularization of politics in theory.

As James Bryce has said: "The Middle Ages were essentially unpolitical." 53 But this does not mean that there were no medieval political theorists. There were many--Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Dante, Marsiglio of Padua--to mention only the most outstanding. These and other medieval thinkers could not get

53 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, p. 91.

away from the idea that human society had a divine purpose, that one of its main functions was to promote or protect religion and morals, and that the head of the state was responsible to the Supreme Being. The political theorists held this view regardless of whether they believed in a universal state with the pope as head (all kings and princes being responsible to God through the pope) or held the divine-right-of-kings theory, which maintained that the secular rulers were responsible directly to God, not indirectly through the pope. Whether papalists or regalists, these theorists "believed firmly in the divine nature of the state; they looked upon the ruler as God's representative and servant, but only so far as he really in fact carried out the divine purpose of righteousness and justice." 54

Beginning with Machiavelli ( 1469-1527), there appeared a number of theorists who did not regard politics as a branch of theology but who, following the theories of antiquity, regarded the state as an end in itself, with objectives that must be pursued regardless of theology or ecclesiastical demands. To consider the theories of all these thinkers would go beyond the convenient limits of this treatise. We shall need to content ourselves with a brief statement of the ideas of Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Grotius, with incidental references to others holding fundamentally similar views.

Niccolò Machiavelli was the first political theorist of modern times to be entirely secular in his methods and theories. The source of his political inspiration was antiquity, in which politics had been wholly secular. He took all his illustrations from classical antiquity, drawing little or nothing from medieval times, or canon law, or the history of the Christian nations. He dealt in a practical way with the problems and objectives of the secular ruler and the ways in which he should exercise power. Principles of religion and morality were relegated to a subordinate place in both theory and practice. He rejected the medieval idea of the

54 Carlyle, History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, III, 181-83; Pollock, History of the Science of Politics, pp. 33-42; Murray, The History of Political Science, pp. 131-71; Allen, A History of Political Thought, pp. 1-444.

divine nature of the state; he ignored the conception that the secular ruler was God's representative and servant. 55 To be sure, as a student of the theory and practice of government, he regarded religion as a potent social force, a restraining agency, and therefore an aid in governing a state. He recognized that established religious ceremonies must be held in veneration by the ruler. 56 But such considerations were merely those of expediency. The secular authority, whether a monarch or the council of a republic, was to exercise full power in its own right, with no dependence on any religious authority. The principles of government were to be based on experience, and should be of such nature as to insure the supporting good will of the subjects or citizens. There was to be no dependence on papal or ecclesiastical sanction. 57 Machiavelli ignored the medieval attitude and boldly condemned the popes (1) for having advanced their own material interests, and those of their relatives, under cover of advancing church interests; (2) for having used questionable means in securing political advantages in Rome and Italy; (3) for neglecting the administration of religion, thus causing a decline in religious interest and a loss of papal influence in religious affairs; and (4) for having forsaken their chief interest, religion, and having tried to dominate politics in Italy, with the unfortunate result of keeping Italy divided and of preventing her union under either a prince or a republic, a development that would have precluded the domination of Italy by foreigners. 58 In his Prince Machiavelli lays down, on the basis of experience, the principles of action that must be followed by a prince if he is to succeed as a ruler. In ignoring all considerations of religion and morality (except as expedients) he produced a book that was "the most

55 Kojouharoff, "Niccolò Machiavelli", National University Law Review, X, No. 2, 38-39, 53; Morley, Miscellanies, IV, 50.
56 Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, Book I, chaps. xi and xii.
57 Ibid., chap. x.
58 Ibid., chap. xii; Florentine History, pp. 29-31; Kojouharoff, "Niccolò Machiavelli", National University Law Review, X, No. 2, pp. 38-39.

direct, concentrated, and unflinching contribution ever made to the secularization of politics." 59

The greatest English disciple of Machiavelli was Thomas Hobbes ( 1588-1679). He was more systematic than Machiavelli and much more clear-cut and specific in developing the modern idea of secular sovereignty. 60 In a forceful style he advocated the principles of absolute sovereignty, probably being influenced in holding these views as a consequence of the Civil War and revolution that he witnessed in England. This revolution had ecclesiastical, as well as political, aspects; and he became convinced that religion as well as politics must be in the power of one person, the king. 61 He does not deal with continental or international affairs at all. He makes no reference to the problems arising out of the Thirty Years' War and the difficulties of negotiating peace, which led Conring to formulate the most significant arguments in favor of the secularization of political theory. 62 Hobbes's arguments and discussions are concerned with the powers of the sovereign, the British king.

In the Leviathan he maintained that the sovereign is absolute, not responsible to anyone--is judge of all that is necessary for the peace and defense of his subjects. The sovereign himself, or through his appointed officials, is judge of all opinions and doctrines, this being necessary to peace, to prevent discord and civil war. The sovereign has the right to decide all controversy. 63

59 Morley, op. cit., IV, 50.
60 Jean Bodin ( 1530-96) may be regarded as having contributed to the development of the secularization of political theory in so far as he founded the doctrine of the sovereignty of the secular state. But inasmuch as his doctrines are confused, incoherent, and inconsistent, and since he avoided any awkward considerations of papal influence in politics, we shall omit a discussion of his ideas in this treatise. For a justification of this decision the reader is referred to J. W. Allen, "Jean Bodin", in Hearnshaw (ed.), The Social and Political Ideas of Some of the Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, pp. 42-62; Hearnshaw, Bodin and the Genesis of the Doctrine of Sovereignty, in R. W. Seton-Watson (ed.), Tudor Studies, pp. 109-32; Shepard, "Sovereignty at the Crossroads, a Study of Bodin", Political Science Quarterly, XIV, 580-603.
61 Fritz, article "Hobbes" in Wetzer and Welteop. cit., VI, 45.
62 See chap. xvi, sec. 2.
63 Leviathan, pp. 159-84; Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society, pp. 78-79.

Since the sovereign has "the right of judging what doctrines are fit for peace," therefore he is himself pastor of the people and no one may lawfully teach religion to the people except by permission and authority of the sovereign. All pastors derive their right of teaching and preaching from the sovereign. 64 The pastors execute their charges by authority of the civil sovereign; but the king, and every other sovereign, receives his authority directly from God and is therefore the supreme pastor. The sovereign has the right to perform all manner of pastoral functions, to preach, baptize, administer the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, to consecrate religious edifices, to "sit in judgment and hear all manner of cases." 65 The sovereigns may make any laws that they deem fit for the government of their subjects, for all civil and ecclesiastical affairs, because "both State and Church are the same men." Sovereigns "may, as many Christian kings now do, commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope, but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and exerciseth that charge in another's dominion jure civili, in the right of the civil sovereign; not jure divino, in God's right; and may therefore be discharged of that office, when the sovereign, for the good of his subjects, shall think it necessary." 66 "The civil sovereign appoints the judges, and appoints the Canonical Scriptures; for it is he that maketh them laws. He has supreme power in all cases," civil and ecclesiastical. "These rights are incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies." 67 These citations show that Hobbes, in stating the theory of the absolute sovereignty of the civil power over secular and spiritual affairs, is more precise than Machiavelli in expounding the theory of the secularization of politics. Through his writings the secularization of political theory may be regarded as having been achieved in England. Subsequent

64 Leviathan, pp. 537-39.
65 Ibid., pp. 540-41.
66 Ibid., p. 546.
67 Ibid., pp. 546-47. For illuminating comment on Hobbes as a political theorist see: Laird, Hobbes, pp. 225-36, 273-317; Catlin, Thomas Hobbes as Philosopher, Publicist and Man of Letters, pp. 49-50; Tönnies, Thomas Hobbes: Leben und Lehre, pp. 236-70, especially pp. 256-59; Stephen, Hobbes, pp. 220-36; Dewey, "Motivation of Hobbes's Political Philosophy", in Studies in the History of Ideas, I, 88-115.

outstanding political theorists in Great Britain accepted the ideas of Hobbes in advocating the idea of absolute sovereignty, the exercise of secular authority free from ecclesiastical influence. To be sure, Jeremy Bentham ( 1748-1832) hardly referred to Hobbes; but Bentham's followers, James Mill ( 1773-1836), George Grote ( 1794-1871), and John Austin ( 1790-1859) very definitely showed the influence of Hobbes. 68

On the Continent a contemporary of both Hobbes and Conring, Hugo Grotius ( 1583-1645), also contributed in a determinative way to the secularization of political theory. His ideas were different from those of Hobbes but were similar to those of Conring inasmuch as he affirmed that both state and international law must be free from the influence of the papacy and theology. 69 Later writers, especially Rousseau ( 1712-78) followed along the same groove in holding that sovereignty resided only in the body politic and had no legal limitations from whatever source. 70

So, by the middle of the seventeenth century, as a consequence and a concomitant of the Thirty Years' War and the Civil War in England, through the writings of Conring, Grotius, and Hobbes the secularization of political theory may be said to have been achieved. 71

68 Robertson, Hobbes, pp. 232-33; Morley, "Life of James Mill", Fortnightly Review, O.S., XXXVII, 500; Halévy, article "James Mill", Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, X, 480-81; Dewey, "Austin's Theory of Sovereignty", Political Science Quarterly, IX, 31-94; Tönnies, op. cit., pp. 269-70; Laird, op. cit., pp. 272-317.
69 Grotius, Freedom of the Seas, pp. 15-17; Lee, "Hugo Grotius", Proceedings of the British Academy, XVI, 57; D. J. Hill, "Introduction to Grotius", The Rights of War and Peace, p. 9; Hearnshaw, "Grotius", in Social and Political Ideas of Some of the Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, pp. 141, 143.
70 F. W. Coker, article "Sovereignty", in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, XIV, 267; Morley, "Life of James Mill", Fortnightly Review, XXXVII, 500.
71 For a suggestive treatment of the philosophical aspects of the modern problem of sovereignty see Schmitt, "Soziologie des Souveränitätsbegriffes und politische Theologie", in Hauptprobleme der Soziologie, Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber, II, 3-35.

Chapter Seventeen

THE pope was defeated in 1648; but his high claims remained the same until 1929, when Pius XI ( 1922-----) signed the significant Lateran Accord with Mussolini. After the middle of the seventeenth century the pope repeatedly took occasion to protest whenever the states of Europe reaffirmed the terms of the Peace of Westphalia or in other ways violated the claimed ecclesiastical or secular rights and authority of the papacy or the Catholic church. But all such protests were without effect.

At the close of Louis XIV's war with Holland ( 1672-79), which involved much of Europe and caused Catholic Austria and Spain to combat Catholic France as allies of Protestant Holland, France and the Empire signed the Peace of Nymwegen, February 5, 1679. The papal nuncio, Bevillacqua, who had been empowered to act as mediator by Innocent XI ( 167689), 1 was a mediator only in a restricted way. The Protestant powers were not willing to accept Bevillacqua as a papal mediator but were willing to recognize him as a royal representative, that is, as a representative of the temporal head of the Papal States. It took considerable negotiating on the part of Austria to overcome the unwillingness of the Dutch government to provide the nuncio with a pass, because that government did not

1 Londorp, Acta publica, X, 524-25.

wish, in an official document, to mention the name of the pope. Much preliminary negotiation was also necessary to provide a Catholic chapel so that the nuncio and his suite could worship in the Protestant Netherlands, and that other Catholics could have easy access to the nuncio's headquarters. 2 Bevillacqua had received instructions from the papal court "to be careful not to communicate with the heretics, this being forbidden by the Holy See. And if by chance it were possible to achieve anything for the benefit of the church, [he should] make use of the Catholic ambassadors." 3 In this last task he was unsuccessful; and as mediator he rendered little, if any, service and did not sign the peace terms. 4 Both the nuncio and the papacy were, however, naturally in touch with the negotiations that were being carried on; and for our purpose the significant phase of the diplomatic proceedings is that in the second article of the Peace of Nymwegen, signed by France and the Empire on February 5, 1679, the terms of the Peace of Münster were reaffirmed. 5 In anticipation of such an eventuation the papal court considered the feasibility of issuing a new protest against the Peace of Westphalia and finally decided that it could not be avoided. 6 Consequently on October 8, 1678, copies of two protests were sent to Bevillacqua, along with a note that a renewal of the protest was inescapable. 7

Bevillacqua, in pursuance of his instructions, issued a concise declaration of a general character on October 30, 1678, which showed that the papal attitude toward the Peace of Münster

2 Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIV, Part II, 709-10; Quaranta, "Un legato del papa al congresso di Nimego", Nuova Antologia, settima serie, CCCXXVIII, 462.
3 Quaranta, "Un legato del papa", Nuova Antologia, CCCXXVIII, 457; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 714.
4 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 715-16, 721; Martin, Histoire de France, XIII, 542, 543, n. 2.
5 Londorp, op. cit., X, 692; Du Mont, Corps universelle, VII, Part I, 377; Actes et mémoires des négociations de la paix de Nimegue ( 3d ed.), III, 408 (in French III, 424).
6 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723.
7 Bojani, Innocent XI. Sa correspondance avec ses nonces, I, 370. Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723, n. 7, states that these were copies of the protests of Chigi, and cites the Vatican Archives.

had not changed. He declared that he did not wish that any of his past or future actions as mediator at this peace conference should be interpreted as indicating that he on his part was trying to meddle in the affairs of the Protestant princes or that he was in any way giving his direct or indirect sanction to the terms of the Peace of Münster. He also requested that the Catholic representatives register this protest in their acts. 8 He had also been instructed to protest especially against the Spanish treaty with Holland because it transferred Catholic territories into heretic hands, 9 and also against the treaty between the Empire and Sweden, even if this were merely a confirmation of the Peace of Münster, thereby continuing the injuries sustained by the Catholic religion. 10 He was further instructed that in this case a general declaration in the sense of the protest of the nuncio at Münster would suffice, 11 and the protest or declaration of October 30, 1678, met this aspect of his instructions.

When finally the Peace of Nymwegen between France and the Empire had been signed, February 5, 1679, Bevillacqua issued a longer protest against the Peace of Westphalia and against the Peace of Nymwegen in so far as it confirmed the Peace of Westphalia. He explained that, inasmuch as the fundamental characteristics of the Peace of Westphalia were the bases of the Peace of Nymwegen, he had absented himself from the signing of the Peace, since he did not wish, through his presence, to appear to be giving his sanction to the Peace of Westphalia. Furthermore, to avoid giving the impression that by his silence he was sanctioning that Peace he wished solemnly to declare that in harmony with instructions sent from the papal court in the form of a breve of May 14, 1678, he reaffirmed the protests issued by the nuncio Chigi on October 26, 1648, and by Inno-

10 Bojani, op. cit., I, 370; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723.
11 Bojani, op. cit., I, 370.
8 Actes et mémoires des négociations de la paix de Nimegue, III, 92 (Italian), 93 (French); Du Mont, op. cit., VII, Part I, 374; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723.
9 Bojani, op. cit., I, 370-71; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723.

cent X on November 26, 1648. The date of the Latin protest (in the Latin form) is February 19, 1679. 12

It is only fair for us to keep in mind that at this period there was no desire on the part of the papacy, the Curia, or the nuncio to hinder the conclusion of peace in any way. In a letter written February 25, 1679, to Cardinal Buonvisi (the nuncio at Vienna) the papal secretary of state, Cardinal Cibo, stated that the pope was content with a protest against the Peace of Nymwegen because it represented a renewal of the Peace of Westphalia; he wished nothing further, for he rejoiced over the conclusion of this terrible war and hoped that the Catholic princes could soon unite in repelling the barbarism that was threatening Catholicism in so many places, especially in Hungary and in Poland. The secretary stated further that Buonvisi, keeping this papal attitude in mind, should encourage the emperor to ratify the Peace of Nymwegen in case its terms were acceptable to him. 13 This was a situation quite different from that of 1648, when the nuncio and the extreme Catholics were given papal support in their opposition to the conclusion of a peace that was injurious to church interests. Now there was to be no thwarting of a peace that was merely reaffirming the previous injuries done the church. 14

The pontificate of Clement XI ( 1700-1721), an ambitious, zealous protector of church interests, was filled with quarrels of various sorts with the sovereigns of Europe. 15 On a number of occasions he issued futile protests. On January 18, 1701, the elector Frederick III of Brandenburg, after long preliminary

12 Actes et mémoires des négociations de la paix de Nimegue, III, 498-500 (Latin), 5013 (French); Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723.
13 Trenta, Memorie per servire all storia politica del Cardinale Francesco Buonvisi, I, 368-69; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part II, 723, n. 7.
14 Du Mont, op. cit., VII, Part I, 374.
15 Pastor, op. cit., XV, 10; Hergenröther, Handbuch, IV, 10-11; Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, III, 492; Ziekursch, Papst Klemens' XI. Protest gegen die preussische Königswürde, Festgabe Karl Theodor von Heigel, p. 367; Landau, Rom, Wien, Neapel während des spanischen Erbfolgekrieges, pp. 56-61.

negotiations and with the consent of Emperor Leopold I, 16 crowned himself and his consort as king and queen in Prussia; and in order to demonstrate the independence of the Prussian kingdom of every ecclesiastical authority, it was arranged that the act of anointing should take place after the coronation by a Lutheran and a reformed bishop appointed by the elector especially for the occasion. 17

This action was offensive to the papacy because the elector had assumed the title and insignia of kingship, the disposal of which was, according to papal theory, wholly in the hands of the pope. For the first time in the history of the Christian states a kingdom had been created without there having been requested or secured the sanction of the papacy, the oldest organized power in European Christianity. 18 This procedure was also offensive because a Catholic emperor, Leopold I ( 16581705), had consented to the assumption of this title by a heretic prince; he had done this in return for the good will and military aid in the approaching contest centering around the Spanish Succession. 19 A further injury was sustained by the Catholic Teutonic Order, which, although it had not administered the land in question since 1525, had not relinquished its claim to the lands that Frederick was now aiming to rule as a kingdom. 20

Into the motives that may have actuated Clement XI subse-


16 Preussischer Kron Tractat mit Kaiser Leopold I. von 1700, in Rousset, Supplément au corps diplomatique, Vol. II, Part I, p. 463; Klüber, Europäisches Völkerrecht, I, 169; Gfrörer, Geschichte des achtzehnten Jahrhunderts, I, 63-67.
17 Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", Quellen und Forschungen, XI, 350; Lehmann, Preussen und die katholische Kirche seit 1640, I, 378-79; Waddington, L'acquisition de la couronne royale de Prusse par les Hohenzollern, pp. 16-347; Reboulet, Histoire de Clement XI. Pape, I, 72; Lafitau, La vie de Clement XI, I, 76; Zwiedeneck- Südenhorst , Deutsche Geschichte, II, 365-68; Stettiner, Zur Geschichte des preussichen Königstitels und der Königsberger Krönung, pp. 80-96; Gfrörer, op. cit., I, 67-70.
18 Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", Quellen und Forschungen, XI, 354; Stenzel, Geschichte des preussischen Staates, III, 111; Buder, Leben und Thaten des klugen und berühmten Papst Clementis des Eilften, I, 175-78.
19 Waddington, op. cit., pp. 141-45; Reboulet, op. cit., p. 73; Gfrörer, op. cit., I, 66.
20 Reboulet, op. cit., p. 73; Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 140-41.

quently, we need not enter here. 21 The significant fact is that by April 16, 1701, Clement XI had addressed breves to all of the Catholic powers (the emperor, France, Poland, Venice, Bavaria, the Swiss Catholic cantons, the Catholic archbishops and bishops), solemnly warning them not to honor the Margrave Frederick of Brandenburg with his newly assumed title, because he was attempting to establish a kingdom on the property of the Teutonic Order, which had not relinquished its claim, and also because the rights of creating kings belonged only to the pope. In his breves he usually quoted the passage from Hosea: "You have ruled, but not through me, and you have become king, and I have not recognized you," this indicating how conscious Clement XI was of being divine vicegerent (Statthalter). 22 On April 18, 1701, in a secret consistory Clement XI informed his cardinals of the actions he had taken and the reasons therefor. 23 Clement had made a mistake in issuing his protest, for it remained without force in the greater part of the world and strengthened the position of Prussia among the Protestant powers. 24 By 1703 most of the states of Europe, even including the ecclesiastical princes of Germany, had recognized the title, although the Archbishop of Salzburg waited till 1704 and the Archbishop of Cologne delayed until 1714. Before the death of Frederick I in 1713 all the Italian states had recognized his new title; Portugal had recognized it in 1704. France and


21 Lehmann, Preussen und die katholische Kirche seit 1640, I, 379; Ziekursch, Festgabe Karl Theodor von Heigel, pp. 361-77; Friedensburg, "Die römische Kurie und die Annahme der preussischen Königswürde durch Kurfürst Friedrich III von Brandenburg", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXVII, 407-31; Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", Quellen und Forschungen, XI, 340; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 16, n. 2.
22 Clementis XI, Opera omnia, Vol. II, Epistolae et brevia selectoria, pp. 43-50; Buder, op. cit., I, 179-92 (in Latin and German); Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", I, 107-8; Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", Quellen und Forschungen, XI, 354-55; Waddington, op. cit., pp. 348-49, 447-48; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 16; Lehmann, op. cit., I, 379-80; Stettiner, op. cit., p. 49; Schröckh, Christliche Kirchengeschichte seit der Reformation, VI, 361-62.
23 Clementis XI, Opera omnia, Vol. I, Orationes, pp. 3-6; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 16; Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", Quellen und Forschungen, pp. 355-56; Buder, op. cit., I, 194-96.
24 Waddington, op. cit., pp. 356-57; Lehmann, op. cit., I, 383; Stenzel, op. cit., III, 111-12.

Spain waited until the close of the War of the Spanish Succession; Poland ceased resisting the change in 1764; the Teutonic Order expressed its dissent the last time in 1792. 25

Until 1787 the intransigence of papal attitude was expressed by referring to the Prussian king in the official publication, the Roman Staatskalender, as the "Margrave of Brandenburg," for the pope had never even recognized the Protestant electors. 26 But in 1787 a significant change took place. In connection with the movement called "Febronianism," the Catholic church in Germany had had a vexing dissension as to the relative power of the archbishops and the two papal nuncios, one of them newly appointed in Munich and the other, the nuncio of Cologne, whose office had been recently revived. The four archbishops of Mainz, Trier, Cologne, and Salzburg had sent representatives to Ems to draw up the famous "Punctation of Ems" ( 1786). In this document the archbishops resisted the infringement of their metropolitan rights that would follow if the papal nuncios were to assert complete control of German ecclesiastical affairs. In the controversy that followed, Emperor Joseph II inclined somewhat against the nuncios, whereas the king of Prussia took an attitude against the "Punctation." This pleased Pius VI ( 1775-99); and, to strengthen this Hohenzollern friendliness, he considered favorably certain approaches that had been made by the Prussian king through an agent at the papal court, Abbé Ciofani, and in 1787 ordered the insertion of the title "king of Prussia" in the Roman calendar, thus abandoning the intransigent attitude that the papacy had observed for eightysix years and withdrawing its protest. 27 On April 5, 1788, Pius

25 Erdmannsdörffer, op. cit., II, 141; Lehmann, op. cit., I, 383-84; Stettiner, op. cit., pp. 51-53; Waddington, op. cit., pp. 357-82.
26 Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 11.
27 Biester, "Nimmt der Papst Behauptungen zurück?" Berlinische Monatsschrift, VIII ( 1786), 111-21, especially p. 116; Biester, "Von dem nunmehr auch im römischen Staatskalender befindlichen preussischen Königstitel", Berlinische Monatsschrift, IX ( 1787), 299-302, especially p. 301; Stettiner, op. cit., pp. 71-73; Waddington, op. cit., pp. 357-58; Hiltebrandt, "Preussen und die römische Kurie", Quellen und Forschungen, XI, 359; Ehrhard, Der Katholizismus und das zwanzigste Jahrhundert, pp. 192-93; Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 202-3; Ott, "Congress of Ems", Catholic Encyclopedia, V, 410.

VI wrote the first letter that a pope ever wrote to a "king of Prussia." 28

In 1709 and 1710 Clement XI expressed his condemnation of the Treaty of Altranstädt (signed September 24, 1706; ratified January, 1707). The circumstances explaining this papal action are as follows: Charles XII ( 1697-1718) of Sweden had invaded Saxony and forced Frederick Augustus II ( 1694-1733), the Strong, the elector of Saxony, to sign this treaty. The elector had in 1697 embraced Catholicism in order to become king of Poland in addition to being elector of Saxony. 29 In signing the Treaty of Altranstädt, Augustus II gave up the Polish throne (which was to be given to the Swedish candidate, Stanislaus Lesczinski)--and, what is more important, the elector and his successors were to maintain the Lutheran religion inviolate in Saxony in accordance with the Treaty of Westphalia. Augustus promised that no religious changes would be made, that Catholics would not be permitted to erect schools, academies, colleges, and monasteries, and that no churches would be conceded to the Catholics. 30 When the papal Curia heard of this Treaty, the pope doubted for a long time that the elector, a recent convert to Catholicism, had signed this agreement with a free will; such doubt was cleared up when the elector's representative, Baron de Schenk, appeared at the papal court in 1707 to explain that the responsibility lay with the Saxon negotiators. 31

After Charles XII had later been defeated by Russia at Poltava in July, 1709, Augustus could once more assume his title of king of Poland. In September 21, 1709, Clement did his part

28 Comte de Hertzberg, Recueil des deductions, II, 473-75; Stettiner, op. cit., pp. 72-73.
29 Erdmannsdörffer, op. cit., II, 81.
30 Du Mont, op. cit., VIII, Part I, 204-6, par. XIX; Theatrum Europaeum, XVII, 139-43; Erdmannsdörffer, op. cit., II, 243, Böttiger, Geschichte des Kurstaates und Königreiches Sachsen, II, 338-39.
31 Alexandre, Ad historiam ecclesiasticam supplementum, II, 76, 77.

to enable Augustus to break his agreement concerning religious affairs. He sent a breve condemning the Treaty of Altranstädt because it sanctioned arrangements in the Peace of Westphalia, which the pope had long ago condemned. 32 Augustus, on April 2, 1710, sent an apologetic letter to Clement in which he expressed his devotion to the pope and asserted that the responsibility of the negotiations at Altranstädt was not his, but his negotiators'. However, Saxon religious conditions remained unaltered.

Clement XI also protested against the Convention of Altranstädt signed September 12, 1707, under duress by Emperor Joseph I ( 1705-11) with Charles XII of Sweden, who, after remaining in Saxony, was threatening to become involved in war with the emperor, an entanglement that Joseph wished to avoid in view of the European military situation produced by the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-14). So Joseph bought the good will of Charles by signing a peace that obligated the emperor to tolerate the Protestants in Silesia as they had been tolerated previous to 1648. All innovations to the advantage of the Catholics since that date were to be canceled. Protestants were to have the right to worship, build schools and churches, hold consistories, and fill public office. 33

In some authorities it is recorded that Clement XI sent Joseph a breve on September 10, 1707, for the purpose of dissuading him from signing such a treaty. 34 But there is strong doubt as to its genuineness because there is no record of it in the Epistolae of Clement XI; neither can the original be found in the Vienna archives or the papal secret archives. 35 Wherever

32 Clementis XI, Opera, Vol. II, Epistolae, pp. 645-48; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 36, n. 3.
33 Du Mont, op. cit., VIII, Part I, 221-25; Theatrum Europaeum, XVIII, 91-93; Grünhagen, Geschichte Schlesiens, II, 403-6; Buder, op. cit., I, 1097-1100; Zwiedeneck- Südenhorst , op. cit., II, 469-70; Menzel, Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen von der Reformation bis zur Bundes-Acte, IX, 447-48; Immich, Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems, p. 213; Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Stuart, XII, 440.
34 Buder, op. cit., I, 1097-1100, which has a German translation of the breve; Krones, Geschichte Österreichs, IV, 85.
35 Klopp, op. cit., XII, 442, n. 2; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 36, n. 3. Landau, op. cit., p. 281, however, states that the letter was in Clement's own hand and was handed to the original may be, or whatever its contents may have been, Joseph I answered Clement with an apologetic letter explaining that he had, on the advice of theological counsel, chosen a lesser evil to ward off a greater when he signed this treaty making concessions to Protestants in his own hereditary lands. He closed with an expression of regret for what had happened, and promised to permit no further injury to Catholic interests, and would even attempt to repair the injury done the church. 36

As a small phase of the War of the Spanish Succession, Joseph I had other difficulties, of a political nature, with Clement XI incident to occupying Parma and Piacenza, two small duchies in northern Italy over which the pope had suzerainty. When those difficulties had been terminated, Joseph, in order to pacify the pope, issued a decree against the apostasy of Catholics to the Protestant faith in Silesia, an occurrence that was annoyingly frequent. 37 But this was not adequate or satisfactory to Clement, for in a breve of June 4, 1712, to Charles VI ( 1711-40), successor of Joseph I, he condemned once more the Convention of Altranstädt. Expressing his sorrow over the injury done the Catholic cause through the tolerance of heretics in Silesia, he rejected the Convention, declared it null and void, and admonished the emperor to do his utmost to make it ineffective. 38 But this breve remained without force. 39

In 1709 (February 16) Clement XI, in a letter to his nuncio at Cologne, expressed his disapproval of a treaty drawn up January 16, 1709, between the free imperial city of Cologne (not the electorate) and the king of Prussia, whereby the Prussian am-

Joseph by the nuncio in Vienna; that the original is in the K[önigliche] K[aiserliche] Staatsarchiv, Abteilung Romana; and that doubt as to its authenticity is without foundation. Die europäische Fama, LXXIII, 80-81.
36 Klopp, op. cit., XII, 442-44 ( Joseph's letter in German), 551-53 (in Latin); Landau, op. cit., pp. 281-82; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 36.
37 Menzel, op. cit., XI, 461; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 36, n. 3.
38 Clementis XI, Opera, Vol II, Epistolae, pp. 1689-92; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 36, n. 3.
39 Krones, op. cit., IV, 85.

bassador was allowed freedom of worship in his residence at Cologne. 40 This agreement had been the outcome of riotous demonstrations in 1708 against the Prussian representative at Cologne, Herr von Diest, whose house had been stoned by Catholic students as a protest against the practice of a heretical religion in the city. In retaliation the king of Prussia ordered the detention of some Cologne ships in his territories and the arrest and detention of citizens of Cologne. After an ineffective royal appeal to the emperor, and an intervention by Protestant princes, an agreement was reached whereby the city of Cologne granted certain rights of free exercise of the evangelical faith in the residence of the ambassador within the city of Cologne. 41 Against this treaty the apostolic nuncio in Cologne protested January 23, 1709; 42 and Clement XI, in caustic words concerning this offense against the Catholic religion, approved his action by sending him a breve, February 16, 1709. 43 It was only a formal and ineffective protest. Catholic historians ordinarily do not mention the incident.

After all the powers had signed the Peace of Baden, which closed the War of the Spanish Succession, Clement XI, in a consistory held January 21, 1715, protested against all those parts of the Peace of Utrecht (August 13, 1713), the Peace of Rastadt (March 7, 174), and the Peace of Baden (September 7, 1714) that were prejudicial to the interests of the Catholic church. Article III of the Peace of Baden stated that the treaties of Westphalia, Nymwegen, and Ryswick were adopted as a basis and foundation of the Peace. 44 So in this respect the papal protest was merely a new protest against the terms of the Peace of

40 Clementis XI, Opera, Vol. II, Epistolae, pp. 586-89; Rousset, op. cit., II, Part II, 75; Buder, op. cit., II, 258-60.
41 Faber, Europäische Staats-Cantzley, XIV ( 1710), 208-14; Buder, op. cit., II, 245-49.
42 Faber, op. cit., pp. 242-50; Buder, op. cit., II, 250-57.
43 Clementis XI, Opera, Vol. II, Epistolae, pp. 586-89, Faber, op. cit., XIV, 250-53; Rousset, op. cit., II, Part II, 75; Buder, op. cit., II, 258-60.
44 Du Mont, op. cit., VIII, Part I, 437.

Westphalia. But Clement XI further protested because the Peace of Baden recognized a ninth electorate (which had been erected for the benefit of Hanover in 1692) 45 and because it recognized the kingship of Prussia, 46 granted certain Catholic territories to Protestant princes, 47 and disposed of Naples and Sicily as though the pope had no suzerain rights over these realms. 48 He further protested against the arrangements made in Switzerland to the advantage of the Protestants and the disadvantage of the Catholics. 49 Previously, at the wish of Clement XI, Passionei, the papal nuncio at the Congress of Baden, had formulated a protest against the Peace of Baden, which was, after the conclusion of the treaty, to be deposited in legal form with the magistrate of Baden; but this officer refused to have it rendered valid in law through notaries, and therefore Passionei went to Luzern and deposited it in its archives, where it still remains. 50

In the years 1706-7 Emperor Joseph had a dispute with Clement XI concerning papal suzerainty over the duchy of Parma and Piacenza, 51 but that matter was temporarily settled. During the Congress of Cambray ( 1723-24) the powers of Europe agreed that the duchy of Parma and Piacenza should, on the extinction of the male line, succeed to Don Carlos, one of the sons of the ambitious Spanish queen, Elisabeth Farnese ( 1714-66), who regarded herself as the heir of the House of

45 Ibid., p. 438, Art. XIII.
46 Ibid., p. 438, Art. XIX.
47 Ibid., p. 440, Art. XXIX.
48 Ibid., p. 403, Arts. V-IX of the Peace of Utrecht between Spain and Savoy; p. 440, Art. XXX, of the Peace of Baden.
49 Clementis XI, Opera, Vol. I, Orationes, pp. 111-18; Alexandre, op. cit., II, 82; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 79-80.
50 Lengefeld, Graf Domenico Passionei, p. 47; Galletti, Memorie . . . . del Cardinale Domenico Passionei, pp. 60-61; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 78-79.
51 Cambridge Modern History, VI, 586-87; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 34-36. See sec. 3 of this chapter.

Parma and Piacenza, which threatened to become extinct on the death of the reigning duke. 52 The pope had been undisputed suzerain over these territories for two centuries; and therefore in April, 1723, Innocent XIII ( 1721-24) sent Abbé Rota, the auditor (secretary of the Parisian nuncio, Bartolomeo Massei, to present to the Congress of Cambray a solemn protest against this disregard of his suzerain rights.

The protest stated that these rights had been secured in a peaceful manner and that Paul III had given this duchy as a fief to Peter Aloysius and the House of Farnese. As soon as the holder of a fief died, his first-born son was always sent on a solemn mission to the Holy See requesting a renewal of the investiture. All holders of this fief had annually faithfully paid the fees (Zinsen) as a permanent testimony of papal suzerainty over the duchy. 53 But this protest was not regarded, and in 1725 Emperor Charles VI granted the duchy as an eventual fief to Don Carlos of Spain in the event that Duke Anton of Parma (1697-1731) should die without male heirs. 54 Once more, in a consistory of the year 1726, Benedict XIII ( 1724-30) presented the cardinals with a statement of the situation, and declared his intention of having the papal nuncios continue to present at the Catholic courts papal opposition to such unjust infractions of papal rights, and declared that the papal Curia would publicly abominate such unjust treatment that was evidence of maliciousness and discord. 55 When in January, 1731, the old Duke of Parma died, Clement XII ( 1730-40) issued a breve ( June 20, 1731) by which he declared that by right of escheat the duchy reverted to papal possession. 56 ____________________
52 Erdmannsdörffer, op. cit., II, 371-73, 412; Reumont, Geschichte Toscanas, I, 47273; Cambridge Modern History, VI, 138-39. Immich, op. cit., pp. 247, 255, 259.
53 Rousset, op. cit., III, Part II, 175-78, especially p. 177; Pastor, op. cit., XV, 414-15.
54 Du Mont, op. cit., VIII, Part II, 121-22, peace between Charles VI and Philip V, signed at Vienna, June 7, 1725; Art. IV; Ranke, Päpste, III, 124.
55 Faber, op. cit., XLVII, 646-48.
56 Brosch, Geschichte des Kirchenstaates, II, 76-77; Cambridge Modern History, VI, 149-50; Armstrong, Elisabeth Farnese, pp. 253-56.

The papal commissioner, Monsignor Oddi-Spinola, who had been appointed to take possession of the escheated duchy, posted the papal brief on various church doors in Parma and elsewhere. But this was no longer a time when papal breves instilled respect in the emperor and kings. Austrian troops appeared in the duchy and tore down the breves from the church doors. 57 Clement XII now issued a protest breve, sending it to all European courts; but it remained without effect. A certain Count Borromeo Arese took possession of the duchy for Don Carlos with the sanction of Emperor Charles VI. Count Stampa, the commander of the Austrian troops that had moved into the duchy, declared the papal breves and protests null and invalid; he asserted that no one need be bound by them or value their contents. Emperor Charles VI received the oath of allegiance of the guardian of Don Carlos, who was still a minor, and formally bestowed possession of the duchy on the guardian in December, 1731. Representatives from all parts of the duchy swore allegiance to the young Don Carlos without showing the slightest consideration for the papal protests and admonitions. Monsignor Oddi-Spinola protested anew, from Bologna, against all these proceedings. The next year Don Carlos appeared personally and took possession of his duchy without being in the least concerned about the suzerainty of the pope. 58 At the close of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, Parma and Piacenza were transferred to the second son of Elisabeth Farnese, Don Philippe of Bourbon, Don Carlos having become the king of the two Sicilies in 1734; 59 on this occasion Pope Benedict XIV ( 1740-58) renewed the protest of his predecessors, but this also remained ineffective. 60

57 Brosch, op., cit., II, 77; Cambridge Modern History, VI, 150.
58 Brosch, op. cit., II, 77; Cambridge Modern History, VI, 150; Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 256-57.
59 Wenck, Codex juris gentium recentissima, II, 345-46, Art. VII; Krones, op. cit., IV, 239; Reumont, op. cit., II, 61; Cambridge Modern History, VI, 167, 239, 249-50; Armstrong, op. cit., p. 390.
60 Brosch, op. cit., II, 103.

When the elector of Bavaria was elected emperor as Charles VII ( 1742-45) at Frankfurt in January, 1742, the papal nuncio, Doria, issued two protests in the name of Benedict XIV ( 174058). The first protest, which was issued January 23, 1742, the day before the election, declared that, inasmuch as the Holy See had never sanctioned the admission of the non-Catholic Duke of Hanover as one of the imperial electors, his admission to and participation in the intended imperial election was invalid. 61

The second protest of the nuncio Dorio was issued January 24, 1742, the day of the election. In this protest he renewed the papal protest against the Peace of Westphalia, which the newly elected emperor was expected to observe but which Innocent X and all succeeding popes had rejected in so far as it injured church interests. He protested especially against Article XIV of the Peace, by which the elector palatine had been restored to the full possession of his rights as elector. In response to repeated papal requests the Catholic electors had promised to put an end to this situation; however, under the pretext of not wishing to disturb the electoral proceedings, nothing had been done. But the papacy hoped that in the present election this situation would be terminated. 62

The nuncio also stated that he was forced to issue such a protest in harmony with the protests of the Holy See and his nuncios as well as with the protest made at the Congress of Münster and those that had been issued at all subsequent elections of a new Roman king. 63 The use of the expression "Roman king" instead of emperor is significant, inasmuch as, according to papal theory, the Roman king was not recognized as emperor until crowned by the pope, a procedure that had not been observed since the coronation of Charles V at Bologna in 1530. Although this protest remained ineffective, it caused consider-

61 Faber, op. cit., LXXXIII, 132-37; Adelung, Pragmatische Staatsgeschichte Europas, III, Part I, 48, n. 5; Moser, Teutsches Staats-Recht, VIII, 405-7.
62 Faber, op. cit., LXXXIII, 135.
63 Ibid., pp. 135-36.

able discussion in the electoral college at its meeting almost a year later, December 10, 1742. The elector of Hanover complained because the elector of Mainz had accepted and registered this protest at all and had given the nuncio a confirmation of the registration thereof. He also requested that such protests should, in the future, not be accepted in any case. The elector of Mainz requested that the college regard this acceptance of the protest purely as a formality, a mere private acceptance. The electors of Saxony and Brandenburg thoroughly disapproved of the whole proceeding, whereas the representatives of the remaining or Catholic electors ( Treves, Cologne, Bavaria, and the Palatinate) declared that they had received no instructions on this point. 64

This discussion had evidently produced the results desired by the electors, for at the new imperial election of 1745 (when Francis I [ 1745-65] was elected) the nuncio was ignored to such an extent that he did not publicly assume the title of a nuncio and did not even appear at the coronation. 65 In this election the electoral college was divided; Francis I had not been elected unanimously. Benedict XIV claimed that he had the right to decide whether the election had been conducted legally or not. When the nuncio wished to present the customary protest against the confirmation of the Peace of Westphalia and the ninth electorate ( Hanover), the college of electors forbade all the notaries of the city of Frankfurt, on pain of punishment, to assist in the slightest the proposed registering of the nuncio's protest. Not being able to achieve his purpose, the nuncio left Frankfurt. 66

At the Congress of Vienna, which was quite indifferent to the affairs of the Catholic church, 67 the papacy once more lost many territorial rights and suffered a disregard of some of its historic

64 Ibid., XCIV, 1-11.
65 Adelung, op. cit., V, 94.
66 Ibid., p. 153.
67 Veit, Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Individualismus, Part II, p. 47; Cambridge Modern History, IX, 662-63. Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 357.

claims. France was allowed to retain Avignon and Venaissin, which had been in papal possession since the fourteenth century but which the French Republic incorporated as integral parts of France in 1791. 68 The Papal States, although restored to the pope, were decreased by the loss of Ferrara and of other small territories north of the Po River, which were given to Austria as ruler of Venetia. 69 It is certain that the size of the Papal States would have been reduced, even to a greater extent if Napoleon had not escaped from the island of Elba and re-established himself on the French throne. 70

The Congress sanctioned the final secularization of German ecclesiastical lands which had been accomplished by Napoleon in 1803, with the aid of such Catholic German states as Austria and Bavaria (in the face of energetic papal and ecclesiastical opposition), in order to indemnify the German princes that had been dispossessed of the left bank of the Rhine to the advantage of France in the Peace of Lunéville in 1801. 71 By this secularization the Catholic church lost lands in Germany with over 3,000,000 population and 21,000,000 gulden annual income. 72 The Congress also recognized the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, which had occurred in 1806. 73

Against these acts of the Congress of Vienna the experienced and capable Cardinal Hercules Consalvi, former papal secretary and now nuncio at the Congress, issued two protests on June 14, 1815; each protest was sent with an accompanying note of prot-

68 Veit, op. cit., Part II, p. 36; Cambridge Modern History, IX, 564, 576, 661; Nürnberger , Zur Kirchengeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts, I, Part I, 106; Mollat, La question romaine de Pie VI à Pie XI, pp. 41-43, 103, 105, 115, 121.
69 Veit, op. cit., Part II, p. 36; Cambridge Modern History, IX, 603, Nürnberger, op. cit., I, Part I, 106; Mollat, op. cit., p. 121.
70 Nys, "Le droit international et la papauté", Revue du droit international, X, 529.
71 Schmidlin, Papstgeschichte der neuesten Zeit, I, 206-14; König, Pius VII. Die Säkularisation und das Reichskonkordat, pp. 1-68; Doberl, "Die Säkularisation und die päpstliche Diplomatie (1798-1803)", Historisch-politische Blätter, LXIX, 760 ff.; Nürnberger, op. cit., I, Part I, 106-7; Veit, op. cit., Part II, pp. 16-21; Heigel, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 301-4, 421-48.
72 Yeit, op. cit., Part II, p. 19.
73 Heigel, op. cit., II, 663-72; Cambridge Modern History, IX, 269, 607-8.

estation to the representatives of each of the important negotiating powers. These protests and notes were similar in content and purport to the notes that he had repeatedly sent in October and November, 1814, to Prince Metternich and others for the purpose of stating the papal viewpoint concerning the intentions of the Congress. 74

In one of these notes Consalvi protested against the cession of Avignon and the Venaissin to France with the assertion that the papal signature to the Peace of Tolentino of February 19, 1797 (by which Pius recognized the cession of these papal lands to France), had been forced upon him after he had solemnly declared his neutrality, a procedure contrary to every human law, and that therefore such a treaty or pact that is the result of such an attack is null and void. The note also protested against the loss of Ferrara and Comacchio and lands north of the Po River, taken from the pope and given to the emperor of Austria and his successors as rulers of Venetia, which the Congress had also ceded to the Hapsburgs. 75 The second protest, issued the same day, was a protest against what had been done to the injury of the rights and interests of the Holy See and the German church through the secularization of church lands and the failure to re-establish the Holy Roman Empire, which had been "the center of political unity, consecrated by the august character of religion." 76 In his

74 Klüber, op. cit., IV, 314; VI, 427 n., 428 n., 430-33; Gams, Geschichte der Kirche Christi im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, II, 379; Ruck, Die römische Kurie und die deutsche Kirchenfrage auf dem Wiener Kongress, p. 166; van Duerm, Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec le Prince Clement de Metternich, pp. 45-54, 71; Cambridge Modern History, IX, 603; Schmidlin, op. cit., I, 142; Veit, op. cit., Part II, p. 42; Brück, Geschichte der katholischen Kirche im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, I, 293; Brosch, op. cit., II, 284.
75 Barbèri, Bullarii Romani continuatio, XIII, 399-404; Angeberg, Le congrès de Vienne et les traités de 1815, II, 1450-51, 1453-56, 1924-29; Klüber, op. cit., VI, 437-46; Roskovany, Monumenta catholica, II, 96-99; van Duerm, op. cit., pp. 71-79; Müller, Das Friedenswerk, I, 267-72; Schmidlin, op. cit., I, 144; Brück, op. cit., I, 293; Gams, op. cit., II, 379-81; Flassan, Der Wiener Kongress, II, 167; Mollat, op. cit., p. 121.
76 Barbèri, op. cit., XIII, 404-7; Klüber, op. cit., IV, 319-28; Angeberg, op. cit., II, 1451-53, 1922-24; Ruck, op. cit., pp. 166-68; Müller, op. cit., I, 272-74; Brück, op. cit., I, 293; Veit, op. cit., Part II, p. 42.

notes Consalvi stated that the pope, in taking an attitude of protestation against the further spoliation of the church, was following the example of "Innocent X after the Congress and the Peace of Westphalia in 1649 [sic], Clement XI after the Treaty of Altranstädt in 1707, and of Baden in 1714, and of Benedict XIV in 1744" (which should be 1742), just as their representatives in the said congresses protested against all innovations prejudicial to the church and to the rights of the Holy See contained in those treaties. 77 Subsequently, in an allocution delivered in a consistory of September 4, 1815, Pius VII ( 1800-1823) declared that he fully approved all the acts of Cardinal Consalvi and that these protests had the force of a papal bull. 78 The pope in his allocution of September 4, 1815, expressed his gratitude to the heretical Alexander I of Russia, King Frederick William III of Prussia, King Charles of Sweden, and the prince regent of England for their support in securing a restoration of the Papal States (except Ferrara) to the pope. 79

Through the final act of the Congress of Vienna the church lost more property and claimed rights than at any time since the signing of the Peace of Westphalia. The statesmen at Vienna were not disturbed by the threat of protest against the Treaty; they did not deem it necessary to plan any action to make the protests ineffective; they even complied with Consalvi's request that his protests be inserted in the protocol, it being clear that such action on the part of the nuncio was merely a formality.


77 Klüber, op. cit., IV, 325; VI, 441; Müller, op. cit., I, 270-71; Barberi, op. cit., XIII, 402, 405; Angeberg, op. cit., II, 1456, 1923, 1929.
78 Barbèri, op. cit., XIII, 394-99; Klüber, op. cit., IV, 312-18 (in German); Müller, op. cit., I, 281-84 (in German); Ruck, op. cit., pp. 77, 78, 168-70 (extracts); Meyer, Zur Geschichte der römisch-deutschen Frage, I, 491; Schmidlin, op. cit., I, 144; Veit, op. cit., Part II, pp. 42-43; Brück, op. cit., I, 293; Nürnberger, op. cit., I, Part I, 107; Gams, op. cit., II, 381; Flassan, op. cit., pp. 167-68.
79 Barbèri, op. cit., XIII, 396-97; Klüber, op. cit., IV, 315-16; Gams, op. cit., II, 382.

Chapter Eighteen

ONE of the British representatives at the Congress of Vienna, Lord Castlereagh, remarked that Cardinal Consalvi excelled all other members of the Congress in diplomatic success. 1 In spite of the fact that Consalvi could not prevent the legalization of the great territorial losses that the church had sustained during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era in France and Germany, Catholics nevertheless also regard him as having been diplomatically very successful in so far as he secured for the Holy See a restoration of the Papal States, which the pope had owned continuously since the eighth century and which had essentially retained the same boundaries since 1631, except for the period of the French Revolution and Napoleon. 2

These States were the last temporal possessions of the pope (until the Lateran Accord of 1929 restored them in part). From the standpoint of papal theory it was essential that the papacy, as head of an international or world ecclesiastical organization, should retain control of these lands so that the pope would be


1 Cardinal Wiseman, Recollections of the Last Four Popes, pp. 61, 113; Fischer, Cardinal Consalvi, p. 297; Allies, Life of Pope Pius the Seventh, p. 357.
2 Schmidlin, Papstgeschichte der neuesten Zeit, I, 144; Wunderlich, Das Pontificat Pius VII, pp. 37-39; J. F. Schaefer, in article "Consalvi", Catholic Encyclopedia, IV, 265; Franz Werner, in article "Consalvi", in Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, III, 953; MacCaffrey, History of the Catholic Church in the Nineteenth Century, I, 55, 209; Lulvès, "Der Lateran Vertrag zwischen dem Heiligen Stuhle und Italien", Preussische Jahrbücher, CCXVI ( 1929), 61; Goyau, "Un an de politique pontificale, Consalvi au congrès de Vienne", Revue des deux mondes, fifth period, XXXV ( 1906), 135-63.

able to function in the spiritual realm without being dependent on any secular ruler. 3

But papal temporal authority could not withstand for many decades the nationalist amalgamation of the separate political divisions of the Italian peninsula under the leadership of the House of Sardinia. In the year 1860 approximately threefourths of the Papal States (the Romagna, the Marches, Umbria) were incorporated into the new Kingdom of Italy; and on September 20, 1870, the last province, Rome, met the same fate. 4 From the great powers the pope could expect no effective aid in regaining his lands. When Austria, Russia, and Prussia met at an international congress in Warsaw in October, 1860, they adhered to the principle of non-intervention in Italian affairs. 5 In 1870 the powers also took no action, "fearing to burn their fingers." 6

In the years 1860-61 Pius IX ( 1846-78) issued an almost unbroken chain of protests against these spoliations, 7 although we shall mention only the most important, for in all of them there is a repetitiousness in content and a similarity in spirit. On January 19, 1860, he addressed an encyclical to all Catholic clergy, protesting against the absorption of the Romagna by the king of


3 Weber, article "Kirchenstaat", in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., VII, 679-80; Duchesne , Beginnings of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Popes, pp. 263-64; MacCaffrey, op. cit., I, 435; see also Ausset, La question vaticane, 1914- 1928, pp. 2-6; Gibbons, The Faith of Our Fathers, p. 144, but see also p. 58; McCarthy, Pope Leo XIII, pp. 244-45; Ellison, "The Pope's Temporal Sovereignty a Providential Fact", Catholic World, LXXIV, 557-66.
4 Mollat, La question romaine, pp. 291-326, 357-66; Jarrige, La condition internationale du Saint-Siège, pp. 80-90; Stern, Geschichte Europas seit den Verträgen von 1815, IX, 71-74, and X, 440-41.
5 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, I ( 1860), 228-33; Annual Register, 1860, [p. 235]; Mollat, op. cit., p. 326; Stern, op. cit., VIII, 455-56, and IX, 80.
6 Jarrige, op. cit., p. 92; Whitely, "The International Position of the Pope", North American Review, CLXXVII, 603; Barry, "Leo XIII, a Retrospect", Dublin Review, CXXXIII, 230; Ward, "Vatican and Quirinal", Fortnightly Review, LXXII, 463.
7 Schrader, Der Papst und die modernen Ideen, Heft 1, p. 117, n. 1.

Sardinia. 8 On March 26, 1860, in a breve, he excommunicated, without specifying individuals, all those that had engaged in an attack on the Papal States, and at the same time he sent a protest to all powers against the annexation of the Romagna to Sardinia. 9 On September 28, 1860, Pius IX addressed an allocution to his cardinals concerning the invasion of his States, whereby he had lost about three-fourths of his temporal possessions. He declared that this rebellious action of the House of Sardinia (Savoy) was a breach of all the solemn treaties guaranteeing the sovereign independence of the Holy See. He also implored all princes to send him the aid necessary to defend his independence. 10

After King Victor Emmanuel II ( 1861-78) took the title of king of Italy, February 18, 1861, Pius IX protested that such action was a usurpation of authority over papal territories; it was a spoliation of, and injury to, the sacred property of the church. He also said that the pope would never be able to recognize the title of king of Italy, which the king of Sardinia had arrogated to himself, 11 an adjustment that his successor, Pius XI ( 1922-----), was able to make in 1929, however, as we shall observe later. On September 30, 1861, Pius IX, in an allocution, expressed himself once more very violently against the king of Sardinia and his predatory acts. 12

Finally in 1870 the Franco-Prussian War made it feasible for the Kingdom of Italy to occupy the province of Rome and thus complete the unification of the peninsula (except, of course, for the lands demanded later by the Italian irredentists). On the same day that the royal Italian troops entered the papal capital,


10 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, I, 85-86; Schrader, op. cit., Heft 1, pp. 119-21.
11 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, II, ( 1861), 219.
12 Ibid., p. 222; Schrader, op. cit., Heft 3, pp. 160, 227.
8 Schulthess, Europäischer Geschichtskalender, I ( 1860), 7; Schrader, op. cit., Heft 1, pp. 118-19.
9 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, I, 28; Schrader, op. cit., Heft 1, pp. 106-4 (in Latin and German).

September 20, 1870, a protest was issued once more, Pius IX having ordered that the only defense to be used "should consist of a protest, which would be suitable to establish the act of violence." 13 The papal secretary of state, Cardinal Antonelli, carrying out the instructions of the pope, issued a protest to each of the representatives of the foreign states accredited to the papal court. He declared the action of the "king of Florence" (where the Italian capital had been since 1865) to be an unworthy and sacrilegious confiscation of the sacred lands of the church. The act was null and void and could not prejudice the rights of sovereignty and possession of His Holiness and his successors. 14

A little more than a month later, November 1, 1870, Pius IX addressed a protest to all Catholic clergy in which he confirmed the protest issued by the cardinal secretary of state in September. The pope declared that, in order not to be found remiss in the sacred duties of his high office, he protested against all usurpations of his temporal authority that had taken place recently or might take place in the future. All such usurpations he declared null and void. He asserted also that, because of such violence to his temporal authority, he was in a state of captivity, and therefore not in a position to perform the high duties of his office freely and without restraint. All persons that had participated in robbing him of his lands since 1860 he declared to be excommunicated. 15 Again, since he did not specify names, this excommunication appeared to be more formal than effective.

Pius IX also refused to accept the Law of Papal Guaranties of May 13, 1871, in which the Italian government declared the person of the pope to be sovereign and inviolable, guaranteed him an annual income of 3,225,000 francs to compensate him for


13 Löffler, Papstgeschichte von der französischen Revolution bis zur Gegenwart, p. 97; Mollat, op. cit., p. 364.
14 Acta Sancta Sedis, VI, 56-60; Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XI ( 1870), 433, gives September 21, 1870, as the date of sending the protest to all the representatives in question; Mollat, op. cit., pp. 365-66.
15 Pius IX, Acta, V, Part I, 263-77, especially pp. 273, 275; Acta Sancta Sedis, VI, 136-45; Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XI ( 1870), 434; Mirbt, Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums, p. 466.

the loss of the income from the Papal States, and left him in possession of the Vatican palace, the Lateran palace, and the villa of Castelgandolfo, with their dependencies, and assured him free communication with the Roman Catholic clergy of the world and unrestricted exercise of his spiritual authority. 16

In a breve of March 2, 1871, addressed to the papal vicargeneral, Cardinal Patrizi, Pius IX rejected the Law of Papal Guaranties. 17 On May 15, 1871, he issued an encyclical to all the bishops of the Catholic church, rejecting the Law again, demanding that the temporal power of the Holy See be returned to him, and admonishing the princes to put forth a united effort to achieve this purpose. 18 He once more rejected the Law in an allocution at the consistory of October 27, 1871. 19

In these several protests the pope made it clear that he could not accept the Law of Guaranties (1) because he could not accept the implication that he was dependent on another power, his position of spiritual leadership requiring that he be absolutely independent of any and all secular states; (2) because no guaranty by a secular state could secure for him the liberty and independence necessary to the exercise of his spiritual functions; (3) because this Law was not a treaty, or convention, but a unilateral arrangement, forced on him, and contained only rights granted by the state; (4) because the rights granted could be revoked by a mere vote of the Italian chambers; (5) because, although these rights were guaranteed by the conservative party in Italy, there was no guaranty that the parties of the left, such as the socialists, might not abolish it in the future; (6) because, to accept this Law would imply papal sanction of the loss of his temporal possessions, an attitude to which the pope could not accede; and (7) since this was only a one-sided


16 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XII ( 1871), 410-14; American Annual Encyclopaedia, XI ( 1871), 420; Albin, Les grands traités politiques, pp. 99-103; Mirbt, op. cit., pp. 466-68; Mollat, op. cit., pp. 366-67; Bompard, Le pape et le droit de gens, pp. 189222; MacCaffrey, op. cit., I, 433-35; Jarrige, op. cit., pp. 92-94; Ausset, op. cit., pp. 2835, 147-53.
17 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XII ( 1871), 420-21.
18 Ibid., pp. 422-23.
19 Ibid., pp. 424-25.

guaranty, the pope could not appeal to the other powers to defend the papal rights thus guaranteed, for those powers had had no connection in granting them. 20

This attitude of protest was maintained by all the popes down to 1929, 21 when the Lateran Accord was consummated between Pius XI and Mussolini. In this period ( 1870-1929) the papacy wished to have no legal connection with the Italian government. It wished to obliterate every appearance of subordination. 22 In 1878, after the death of Pius IX, the attitude of protest was carried to such an extreme that out of thirty-eight cardinals only eight voted to hold the conclave in Rome, whereas all the others thought that the election of the new pope should be held in some non-Italian place, Spain, Munich, and Malta being suggested. But on reconsideration the plan was regarded as unfeasible because, although the Italian government was willing to protect the cardinals in leaving Italy for the election, it would not promise to guarantee them a safe return to Rome. 23

Down to the year 1929 (when Pius XI and Mussolini entered the Lateran Accord) the papal attitude of protest was also manifested (1) in the way the popes regarded the Italian kingdom and Catholic participation in Italian elections and (2) in the problems arising out of the consistently asserted claims of the pope as temporal sovereign. These aspects of the subject will be considered in the next two sections of this chapter.


20 Based on the actual papal protests. See also Ward, "Vatican and Quirinal", Fortnightly Review, LXXI, 461-63.
21 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XXIII ( 1883), 427, 428, 429; O'Reilly, The Life of Pope Leo XIII, pp. 287, 291; Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, p. 332; Goetz, "Papst Leo XIII.", in Marks und Müller, Meister der Politik, III, 397-98; McCarthy, op. cit., pp. 244-45; encyclical of Benedict XV, "On Christian Reconciliation", New York Times, June 2, 1920, p. 17, and June 3, 1920, p. 14; Veit, Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Individualismus, IV, Part II, 143; Huddleston, "Vatican's New Place in World Politics", Current History, XIII, 208; Blind, "The Papacy and the New Italy, with Reminiscences of Garibaldi", Westminster Review, CLX, 263, 269; "Pope Leo XIII and His Successor", Quarterly Review, CXCVIII, 448.
22 Ogg, "The Pope and the Italian Nation", Chautauquan, XXXVIII, 18.
23 Cortesi, "The Vatican in the Twentieth Century", International Monthly, IV, 7677; Schmidlin, op. cit., II, 343.

Pius IX and his successors ( Leo XIII, Pius X, Benedict XV, and Pius XI) regarded themselves as prisoners in the Vatican palace. Pius IX, in spite of his financial distress, refused to accept the first annual payment that he was to receive from the Italian government (as provided in the Law of Papal Guaranties) in compensation for his loss of revenue from the Papal States. He, as well as his successors, avoided every act that might seem to imply giving papal consent to the spoliation perpetrated by the House of Savoy.

As early as February 29, 1868, Pius IX had, through the Non expedit, forbidden Catholics to participate in the elections of the Italian national state either as electors or as elected. 24 Once more the pope expressed himself on the point in a great audience of October 1, 1874, in which he declared that, by voting in the Italian national elections, Catholics were taking an oath to the new state and thus indirectly confirming and approving the annexation of the States of the Church. 25

The Catholic laity did not regard the papal attitude with anything like approving unanimity, and only in the ultraCatholic province of Bergamo (north-central Italy) was the papal injunction against voting observed at all. In other regions the Catholics voted in parliamentary elections in almost as great numbers as in local elections. 26 Leo XIII felt it necessary at various times to stress to Catholics the seriousness of observing the Non expedit ( 1886, 1895, 1902.) 27 Pius X, following the same policy, issued a statement, Motu proprio, December 18, 1903. 28 But by June 19, 1905, the same pope had greatly modi-

24 Benigni, "Non expedit", in Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 98-99.
25 Löffler, op. cit., p. 99; Benigni, article "Non expedit", in Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 99; also article "Giacomo Margotti", in Catholic Encyclopedia, IX, 657.
26 Ogg, "The Pope and the Italian Nation", Chautauquan, XXXVIII, 19.
27 Benigni, article "Non expedit", Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 99; Quarterly Review, CXCVIII, 449-55.
28 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XLIV ( 1903), 313-14; Benigni, article "Non expedit", Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 99.

fied his attitude. In an encyclical, Certum consilium, issued to the Italian bishops, he allowed them to suspend the rule and grant good Catholics the right to vote in national elections if thereby they would prevent the election of a "subversive candidate." 29 This papal pronouncement increased the participation of Catholics in the Italian elections and strengthened the parties of the right. But the Non expedit remained theoretically in force; the papacy admitted only partial repeal, 30 until in November, 1919, Benedict XV finally abolished it. 31


Although the pontiff had lost the territory over which he had ruled as sovereign of a temporal state, yet by general consent of the powers, including Italy, he was treated as a sovereign. He continued to exercise the right to send and receive diplomatic representatives; at certain courts the apostolic nuncio had precedence over other ambassadors. Even non-Catholic countries, such as Russia, Holland, and Prussia, maintained diplomats at the papal court. On special occasions Great Britain sent missions to the pope, as did the United States government in 1902, when it sent William Howard Taft to Rome to negotiate the purchase of the Catholic friars' lands in the Philippine Islands. A number of South American republics also had ministers accredited to the Vatican. After 1870 the pope still received royal honors, carried on negotiations with temporal sovereigns on equal terms, and remained a great factor in worldpolitics. 32

29 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XLV ( 1905), 234-35, 342; Benigni, article "Non expedit", Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 99; "Effect of the Passing of Pope Pius X", Current Opinion, LVII, 163, quotes London Post.
30 Mollat, op. cit., p. 407.
31 Sforza, op. cit., p. 142; Wood, "Three Pontificates", Dublin Review, CLXXVIII, 246-48; Meyers Lexikon ( Leipzig), VIII ( 1928), 1375.
32 Fenwick, "The Papacy in International Law", American Journal of International Law, VIII, 864-67; Whiteley, "The International Position of the Pope", North American Review, CLXXVII, 601-3; Nys, "Le droit international et la papauté", Revue du droit international, X, 502; James Murphy, "The Intellectual Activity of Leo XIII", Catholic World, LXXIII, 238, 244; Granvelle, "Foreign Policy of the Holy See": Part I,

The historic position of the papacy as a temporal authority was given recognition when in 1885 Germany and Spain selected Leo XIII as arbiter in a dispute concerning ownership of the Caroline Islands. 33 Again, in 1895, Haiti and Santo Domingo referred a boundary dispute to the same pope; though the terms of his decision do not seem to have been published. 34 In 1898, on the eve of the Spanish-American War, Leo XIII offered his friendly mediation to secure peace; Spain accepted the offer, but the United States rejected it. 35 On at least three other occasions Leo XIII or his agents acted as arbiters in international disputes. 36

In 1815, at the Congress of Vienna, the pope was represented for the last time in a great political international assembly. He was not invited to the Congress of Paris in 1856 or to the Conference of Berlin in 1878, although at both of these congresses the powers discussed the means of persuading Turkey to respect the rights of its Christian subjects. When, however, Tsar Nicholas II ( 1894-1917) of Russia invited all the governments of the world to send representatives to the first Hague Conference in 1899, and also invited Pope Leo XIII to participate, the Italian government, through its minister of foreign affairs, Admiral Canevaro, notified the governments of the tsar and of Queen Wilhelmina, who was to be host to the Conference, that the Holy See must be prevented from participating in all questions,


Leo XIII; Part II, Pius X, Contemporary Review, XCIX, 452-62, 517-32. For a list of the thirty-six nations maintaining diplomatic representatives at the Vatican court in 1933, see Williams, The Catholic Church in Action, p. 181.
33 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XXVI ( 1886), 128, 131, 153; Annual Register, 1885, p. 64; Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitration to Which the United States Has Been a Party, V, 5043-46; Jarrett, article "Papal Arbitration", in Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 455; Hergenröther, Handbuch, IV, 523; Darby, International Tribunals, p. 809; Müller, Das Friedenswerk der Kirche, I, 325-33.
34 Moore, op. cit., V, 5018; Darby, op. cit., p. 823; Jarrett, "Papal Arbitration", Catholic Encyclopedia, XI, 455; Müller, op. cit., I, 48.
35 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XXIX ( 1899), 303; Hoijer, La solution pacifique des litigés internationaux avant et depuis la société des nations, p. 40; Latané, America as a World Power, 1897-1907, pp. 23, 24.
36 Roemer and Ellis, The Catholic Church and Peace Efforts, pp. 51-53.

for fear that such representation would be an acknowledgment of the temporal rights and power of the Holy See. The Dutch government, in issuing the final invitations to the powers, omitted sending an invitation to the papacy. 37

Leo XIII, instead of protesting against the diplomatic slight that had been administered to him, conducted himself in such a way as to indicate that he was more pacifically minded than any of the powers assembled ostensibly in the interests of promoting peace. On April 11, 1899, in a discourse to the cardinals that was published in the press of the world, he commended the spirit of the Peace Conference and took it under his protection. When the Conference opened the second week in May, the Osservatore Romano, the official papal newspaper, at the instigation of the Vatican, published an article that was quite sympathetic with the Conference and contained no recriminations. In a letter to Queen Wilhelmina, in which the pontiff thanked her for her intention of inviting him to send representatives to the Conference, he expressed his hope that the movement might succeed in establishing a more peaceful era. He asserted that he as pontiff would do all in his power, under the abnormal conditions prevailing, to promote the cause of peace.

This dignified papal attitude caused the pope to be widely admired. The pontifical calmness was quite in contrast to the agitation manifested by Italy and its representatives at the Conference, whose chief aim seemed to be, not to promote the cause of peace, but to prevent the pope from being recognized as a sovereign, an action that might once more open up the Roman question. But Leo XIII tried to allay the fears and suspicions of the Italian representatives by ordering his intelligent internuncio, Mgr Tarnassi, to absent himself from The Hague for several weeks. 38 Naturally, since Italy had manifested such uneasiness over papal participation in the first Hague Conference,


37 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XL ( 1899), 247; Goyau, "La conférence de la Haye et le Sainte-Siège", Revue des deux mondes, CLIV, 590-606, 608; "The Peace Conference, and What Might Have Been" (editorial), Catholic World, LXIX, 577-83.
38 Goyau, "La conference de la Haye", Revue des deux mondes, CLIV, 606, 608-9; Granvelle, "Foreign Policy of the Holy See", Contemporary Review, XCIX, 458-59.

no invitation was extended to the pope in 1907, when the second Hague Conference convened.

The situation of the papacy after the spoliation of 1860 and 1870 and the enactment of the Law of Papal Guaranties ( 1871) had never received any formal international ratification. Therefore the papacy held that, if a Catholic ruler were to enter Rome to pay an official visit to the Italian king in the Quirinal palace, such ruler would be giving his moral sanction to the spoliation of the pontiff. All Catholic sovereigns respected this papal attitude. In 1871, Pedro II ( 1831-89), emperor of Brazil, avoided embarrassment by meeting Victor Emmanuel II ( 1861-78) at a station outside of Rome. 39 Francis Joseph I ( 1848-1916) of Austria, although bound to Italy by the Triple Alliance, always refused to return the royal visit made in Vienna in 1873 by Victor Emmanuel II. King Carlos I ( 1889-1908) of Portugal, for a similar reason, abandoned his plans to visit his relatives in Rome. 40 In 1919 the president of Brazil came to Rome and was admitted to the papal presence only through the subterfuge that he had not yet taken formal possession of his office, and on the strict understanding that it should not constitute a precedent. 41

But the government of the French Republic did not manifest the same considerateness as did the monarchs of Austria and Spain, when in April, 1904, President Loubet made a return visit to the king of Italy. The foreign secretary of Leo XIII, Cardinal Rampolla, made a futile objection to carrying out the plan while it was still in the process of formulation, in 1903; and, once the visit had taken place, the successor of Leo XIII,


39 J. T. Smith, "The Prisoner of the Vatican", Munsey's Magazine, XXXIV, 409. After diligent search, corroboration of this incident could not be found anywhere in the sources available to me. Pedro II was in Europe in 1871 and 1877, "Eminent Persons", ( London Times), V, 158; 1871 was accepted as the probable date of this incident on the basis of Schmidlin, op. cit., II, 95.
40 Murphy, "Germany and Russia at the Vatican", Catholic World, LXXVII, 428; Klein, "Breaking and Renewing Diplomatic Relations between France and the Holy See", Catholic World, CXII, 580; Coolidge, Origins of the Triple Alliance, pp. 209-16; "Pope Leo XIII and His Successor", Quarterly Review, CXCVIII, 442-44.
41 New York Times, June 2, 1920, p. 17.

Pius X ( 1903-14), sent a confidential protest, dated April 28, 1904, to France and all the other states that had direct communication with his court. In this protest he pointed out that "through this official and festive visit to the king of Italy, taking place in one of the apostolic palaces [the Quirinal], the French president was publically sanctioning the spoliation of the pope." The papal organ, Osservatore Romano, commented that such a protest would not have been uttered if the interview had taken place in some other city of Italy, and that the pope did not imply by his action any protest against the rapprochement between France and Italy. 42 This protest, when it became public in a month, led to the withdrawal of the French ambassador to the Vatican. 43 The next year, in 1905, when France abrogated the Concordat of 1801 by unilateral action, 44 Pius X protested against this act on the ground that it was a violation of international law; but the protest was not heeded by France. 45 However, during the years 1920-21, the French government, needing the political support of the papacy in various European and world-questions, resumed diplomatic relations with the Vatican. 46 Since the World War all the great powers except the United States, and many lesser powers--thirty-six in all--have

42 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XLV ( 1905), 265-66; Annual Register, 1904, p. 9; " France and the Vatican" (editorial), New York Nation, LXXVIII, 406-7; "Chronique de la quinzaine", Revue des deux mondes, May 1, 1904, pp. 230-31; Klein, "Breaking and Renewing Diplomatic Relations", Catholic World, CXII, 580-81.
43 "France and the Vatican" (editorial), Nation, LXXVIII, 407; Klein, "Breaking and Renewing Diplomatic Relations", Catholic World, CXII, 581; Buell, "France and the Vatican", Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI, 48-49.
44 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XLVI ( 1906), 207-11, 213, 214, 215; Annual Register, 1905, [pp. 259, 263-64, 265, 268]; Klein, "Breaking and Renewing Diplomatic Relations", Catholic World, CXII, 585.
45 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, XLVI ( 1906), 234; Fenwick, "The New City of the Vatican", American Journal of International Law, XXIII, 373; Klein, "Breaking and Renewing Diplomatic Relations", Catholic World, CXII, 585.
46 Buell, "France and the Vatican", Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI, 30-50; Huddleston, "The Revival of the Vatican", Fortnightly Review, CXIV, 67-77; Huddleston , "Vatican's New Place in World Politics", Current History, XIII, 203-10; Wood, "Vatican Politics and Policies", Atlantic Monthly, CXXVIII, 398-400; Current History, XII, 363-64, and XIV, 694-97.

been maintaining diplomatic representatives at the Vatican; and France also felt the need of having her representative present there when questions of importance to France were being discussed. 47

Owing to the pleas of the Spanish and Belgian monarchs, Benedict XV issued an encyclical on May 20, 1920 ( On Christian Reconciliation), which relaxed the papal attitude concerning the visits of foreign Catholic monarchs to the court of the king of Italy. As a consequence the Quirinal was visited in April, 1922, by the monarchs of Belgium; in July, 1922, by the president of the Argentine Republic; and in November, 1923, by the monarchs of Spain. 48

During the World War ( 1914-18) Benedict XV ( 1914-22), who was "shepherd to peoples in both camps," endeavored assiduously to alleviate the evils of this titantic struggle. During each of the years 1914 and 1915 he made two appeals to the powers to compose their differences and seek peace. 49 On August 1, 1917, he offered his services as mediator to the belligerent powers. 50 The Central Powers answered the note. 51 The Allied governments ignored it except for the fact that President Wilson, who resented papal interference, answered


47 Literary Digest, LXVI ( September 25, 1920), 34; Williams, op. cit., p. 181; Jarrige, op. cit., p. 256.
48 Wood, "Three Pontificates, a Retrospect", Dublin Review, CLXXVIII, 247; New York Times, June 2, 1920, p. 14, and June 3, 1920, p. 17; Buell, "France and the Vatican", Political Science Quarterly, XXXVI, 48; Literary Digest, LXVI ( August 21, 1920), 24-25.
49 (November 1 and December 24, 1914), Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LV ( 1914), 741-43; Müller, op. cit., I, 422-25, 429-32; (January 22 and July 28, 1915), Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVI ( 1915), 1003-4, 1006-7; Müller, op. cit., I, 43336, 444-46; Pace, "Pope Benedict XV", Catholic World, CXIV, 725-27; Löffler, op. cit., pp. 187-89.
50 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVIII ( 1917), Part II, 538-42; Annual Register, 1917, [pp. 205-6, 207-8] ; Müller, op. cit., I, 464-68; Pace, "Pope Benedict XV", Catholic World, CXIV, 727-29; Löffler, op. cit., pp. 190-93; McMaster, The United States in the World War, I, 403-4.
51 Ludendorff's Own Story, II, 131-32; Bassett, Our War with Germany, pp. 312-13; Löffler, op. cit., pp. 193-94; Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, II, 814.

the note in such a way as to take all possibility of mediation out of the hands of the pope. 52

The refusal of Great Britain, France, and Italy to pay any attention to the note of Benedict XV is in part explained by the fact that, when Italy made arrangements to enter the war through signing the secret Treaty of London (April 26, 1915), Article 15 provided that "France, Great Britain and Russia shall support such opposition as Italy may make to any proposal in the direction of introducing a representative of the Holy See in any peace negotiations for the settlement of questions raised by the present war." 53 Moreover, under the circumstances it is not strange that, when the Italian government confiscated the Palazzo Venezia, the seat of the Austrian legation at the Holy See, the Quirinal should pay no attention to the protest of Benedict XV against the violation of personal immunity and "most sacred rights" to receive ambassadors as guaranteed to him by the Law of Guaranties. 54


The intransigent attitude maintained by the papacy since 1870 concerning the Kingdom of Italy, is, however, only one part of the truth. A reconciliation was desired by all the popes, since the time of Pius IX, if only it were possible to receive a recognition of papal rights in law as well as in fact. The popes had never been molested in the Vatican, and they all craved some sort of reconciliation. Leo XIII once said, "Let Italy take the first step and restore Rome to the Holy See; then the Holy See will relinquish its claims to its former possessions, and will

52 House, Intimate Papers, III, 156; Jusserand, communication to the editor of the American Historical Review, XXXVII, 817-19; McMaster, op. cit., I, 404-7; Bassett, op. cit., pp. 313-14; Seldes, The Vatican: Yesterday--Today--Tomorrow, pp. 262-68.
53 Temperly, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, V, 390-91; for slightly different phraseology, see Cocks, The Secret Treaties and Understandings, p. 40; also The New Europe, VI ( January 17, 1918), 27.
54 Europäischer Geschichtskalender, LVII ( 1916), Part II, 297, 305-6; Fenwick, "The New City of the Vatican", American Journal of International Law, XXIII, 372.

live in peace with the kingdom as with all other states." This remark was never made in public, but often in private. 55

Finally, after long negotiations, the Lateran Accord was consummated on February 11, 1929, between Pope Pius XI and Mussolini, as head of the Italian state, thus ending the irritating impasse that had existed between the Vatican and the Quirinal since September, 1870. Both parties were willing to make compromises. The pope recognized the Kingdom of Italy, thus removing from the Italian monarchy the stigma with which it had been regarded by non-Italian Catholics. The pope was willing to accept a cash sum and a stipulated amount of interest-bearing Italian bonds as compensation for his loss of income from the Papal States as they had existed in 1860.

The ultra-nationalist Fascist state, being in need of all the social and psychological support that it could secure, was willing to abrogate the unilateral Law of Guaranties and to make terms with the head of the great international Roman Catholic church, recognizing Roman Catholicism as the official religion of Italy and consenting to the giving of Catholic religious instruction in the schools of the nation. The pope was also given absolute sovereignty over a small state, with an area of about 110 acres, which Pius XI affirms is adequate to enable him to exercise his spiritual functions independently of a particular nation or group of nations. The pope now controls a "sort of spiritual District of Columbia," in which he has full authority.

The provision of the Lateran Accord that is far more pertinent to the subject of this treatise is the fact that in Article 24 the papacy has itself admitted the secularization of international politics, for the pope declares that the Holy See

wishes to remain and will remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations and to international congresses convoked for the settlement of such


55 Crispoliti, "From Leo XIII to Pius X", International Quarterly, IX, 165; McCarthy , op. cit., pp. 40-44; see also Vogüé, "Pope Leo XIII", Forum, XXII, 518-519; Crawford , "Leo the Thirteenth", Outlook, LXI, 774; Edinburgh Review, CXCVIII, 290.

disputes unless the contending parties make a concordant appeal to its mission of peace; nevertheless it reserves the right in every case to exercise its moral and spiritual power. 56

This means that the papacy has finally recognized that its political activity, as interpreted by Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII, has come to an end. That the real realm of its influence lies in spiritual, moral, and broadly social fields. That in international politics its attitude will be one of neutrality; that it will not seek to enter the League of Nations, and that it would refuse to enter it even if an invitation were extended by courtesy. 57

Thus in 1929 came to an end the long contest between the secular powers and the papacy. The head of the church at last relinquished his claims to be final authority in secular affairs. The counterclaims of the states that they should have full power to determine the sphere of politics, both national and international, had been recognized by the papacy. The pontiff had finally conceded that there is a sphere of human affairs in which he will take no part. Politics, national and international, had been secularized. The secularization of politics, which had in practice been established in 1648 by the Congress of Westphalia, but which had not been accepted as legal by the papacy, now, after almost three centuries of active and tacit protest, had at last been recognized by the papacy as a legalized situation in a solemnly sanctioned treaty. Politics was finally secularized in 1929, with the full and willing consent of the power that had for eight and a half centuries actively opposed it.

56 Text of the Treaty, Current History, XXX, 552-57; Lulvès, "er Lateran Vertrag", Preussische Jahrbücher, CCXVI, 69.
57 Fenwick, "The New City of the Vatican", American Journal of International Law, XXII, 373-74.

Chapter Nineteen

THE reader may well have gained the impression that in the final eventuation of the long struggle against the secularization of politics, the papacy and the Roman Catholic church had suffered a humiliating defeat. In the minds of Wangnereck and his supporters in the seventeenth century that was true; 1 but, in the adjustments of later centuries, Catholic thinkers themselves have been able to look upon the secularization of politics as a blessing in disguise for the church. The original purpose and activity of the Catholic church were not political, but spiritual and moral. The assumption of political power by the church and papacy was only a temporary development, although the exercise thereof endured for many centuries. The entry of the church into the sphere of politics had been made necessary by the political confusion incident to the decline and ruin of the Roman Empire and the political chaos of feudal times. When the national monarchies of western and central Europe had developed adequate governing strength to take over the political functions of the state in an ever increasing degree, and when the church, against its will, was eliminated as a political influence, it was all the more able to confine itself to its original scope of activity: spiritual, social, and ethical leadership.

In giving up its political rights and temporal authority the Catholic church has yielded nothing that is vital and funda-

1 See chap. xv.

mental. In losing control of the Papal States the Holy See has got rid of its characteristics of caesaropapism, under which its spiritual power was too often subordinated to the secular. The pontiff, in terminating his protesting attitude when entering the Lateran Accord of 1929, has freed himself from a situation that had had a profoundly noxious influence on the ecclesiastical, religious, and moral situation, not only in Italy but elsewhere as well. Actually, in being freed from his secular power, the pope exerts a greater moral influence than formerly. In support of such affirmations the following citations from Catholic authors are pertinent: H. A. Brann, in discussing the Relation of the Church to Human Progress," remarked, in 1889, The Church may not be strong in temporals; but she is spiritually stronger." 2 William Barry, a Catholic divine and professor of theology, in discussing the significance of the pontificate of Leo XIII, just after his death in 1903, expressed the opinion that "when all is said, the nineteenth century leaves the Church visibly stronger than she was a hundred years ago, not merely, or chiefly in relation to politics, but as a spiritual power." 3 Frederick William, Bishop of Northampton ( England), writing during the World War, in 1915, states the following: "Yet the Papacy, after all its vicissitudes, remains the supreme moral power in the world, with its dignity and obligations not lessened, perhaps even enhanced, by isolation from political entanglements." 4

Non-Catholic and secular publicists and editors write in a similar vein. Dr. James Brown Scott, editor of the American Journal of International Law, writing in 1911, said:

In the middle ages, the most powerful of emperors, barefoot and penitent, humbled himself before the Vicar of Christ; within the past generation, the man of "blood and iron" who had unified Germany torn by a thousand years of dissension and armed conflict, went, as it were, to Canossa; in our own day,

2 American Catholic Quarterly Review, XIV, 648.
3 Leo XIII, a Retrospect, Dublin Review, CXXXIII, 248.
4 The Neutrality of the Holy See, Dublin Review, CLVII, 139. For further similar Catholic statements see: John K. Cartwright, "Contributions of the Papacy to International Peace", Catholic Historical Review, N.S., VIII, 167-68; Barry, "Benedict XV: Pontiff of Peace", Dublin Review, CLXX, 165.

and in a higher sense, the world bows before the Pontiff [Pius X) true to his mission, armed only with the sword of the Spirit and the breastplate of righteousness. 5

The Italian, Salvatore Cortesi, in discussing papal affairs at the turn of the twentieth century, states that "several among the most enlightened" of the cardinals acknowledge that the loss of the last inch of territorial domain has marked the starting point of the present extended spiritual power of the Roman Church. All her troubles, all her weaknesses of the past, from Charlemagne to our day, arose especially from her desire to maintain and augment the temporal power. With the cessation of this effort, the Pope, while presenting himself to the faithful of Christendom as despoiled, persecuted, and a prisoner, is in reality richer, freer and stronger. Freer and stronger, because in the full exercise of his spiritual ministry he has never enjoyed so much independence as at present, when he cannot be coerced with threats against his territory; the most eloquent proof of this being the famous "Kulturkampf" in Germany, which country, in other times, would certainly have ended the matter by an appeal to arms. Richer, because, since the popes have voluntarily shut themselves up in the Vatican, the offerings of the faithful have reached proportions not dreamed of before. To come to an understanding with the Italian government would be financially disadvantageous. 6

James Gustavus Whiteley, discussing "The International Position of the Pope" in 1904, comments:

The loss of the temporal possessions has in some ways, however, added to the dignity and authority of the Pope. His power, relieved from temporal localization, has increased throughout Christendom. . . . . As Monsieur Revier remarks in his great work on International Law: "If the successor of Gregory and Innocent is not to-day the monarch of monarchs, the dispensor of crowns, the distributor of continents and oceans, he still personifies the greatest moral force of the world." 7

And again,

The Pope, although deprived of his temporal possessions, still receives royal honors, sends and receives ambassadors, treats with temporal sovereigns on


5 James Brown Scott, editorial, American Journal of International Law, V, 709.
6 Cortesi, "The Vatican in the Twentieth Century", International Monthly, IV, 7778; for a corroborative statement concerning the increased income and influence of the papacy, see Tuker, "The Papacy since the Events of 1870", Fortnightly Review, LXXXII, 665.
7 Whiteley, "The International Position of the Pope", North American Review, CLXXVII, 606.

even terms, and is one of the great factors in the world's politics. It may even be said that his authority has been purified and increased since he has ceased to be a petty prince of Italy. 8

The editor of the London Spectator, commenting in 1904 on the rumors as to the proposed policies of Pius X, the successor of Leo XIII, expressed the hope that the statement may prove well founded that Pius X may make his Pontificate memorable by the abandonment of a policy that is certain to impair the vigour of the Roman Church. If the history of Latin Christianity is considered impartially we believe it will be admitted that the temporal power has done nothing but harm to the Roman Church. . . . . Had the Vatican been wise enough to refuse or discard its triple crown, its influence over its spiritual subjects would have been infinitely greater than it was throughout the centuries in which it was battling and intriguing, first to establish temporal sovereignty, and next to maintain that sovereignty undiminished. When the kingdom of Italy finally deprived the Pope of his temporal sovereignty, though leaving him complete spiritual independence and personal independence, the Holy See obtained an opportunity to renew its influence over the hearts and minds rather than the bodies of men. Unfortunately the Vatican had too long been concerned with serving tables, and with petty affairs of police and urban administration, to be able at once to cast aside those toys and rise to the height of the occasion. 9

In the same year ( 1904) an Italian, discussing papal affairs as affected by the advent of Pius X, commented:

After the Popes sagaciously became and remained prisoners of the Vatican, they devoted themselves with calm and undisturbed mind to increasing the prestige of the Holy See, and succeeded in regaining for its spiritual ascendancy such a position as it had not enjoyed for ages. In consequence Italy now felt herself more restrained and bound in her relations with the Papacy when she saw how its increased splendor awoke in other nations an enlarged interest in the person and circumstances of the pontiff. 10

Count Carlo Sforza, in chronicling his recollections of Pius XI, in 1930, observes that "the Church only appeared again as one of the leading moral forces in the world after she had lost all temporal power, and she lived in a régime of common liberty." 11


10 Crispoliti, "From Leo XIII to Pius X", International Quarterly, IX, 163.
11 Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe, Portraits and Personal Impressions and Recollections, p. 336; also quoted in Current History, XXXI, 1084, in "The Pope's Attitude toward Liberalism."
8 Ibid., p. 603.
9 Editorial, The Spectator, XCII ( 1904), 951-52.

Washington Gladden, the eminent Congregationalist preacher, writing in 1903 in a symposium on the work and influence of Leo XIII, said that the great influence that the pope exerted, even among Protestants, was

greatly assisted by the fact that Leo XIII had no temporal power to wield, but was compelled to confine his entire administration to the spiritual field. It is this fact that has made him the most powerful of all the Popes; all civilized rulers, Protestant as well as Catholics, have treated him with a respect never accorded to any of his predecessors. 12

After contrasting the consequences of Pope Hildebrand's policy in general (and particularly with reference to the medieval German Empire) with the conciliatory policy of Leo XIII in terminating the Kulturkampf with William I and Bismarck, Dr. Gladden goes on to observe:

How much more complete and permanent is this victory won by weapons that are not carnal, than any that Hildebrand ever won? How much stronger does the Roman Catholic Church stand, today, by virtue of Leo's peaceful policy, in all the nations of the earth, than it stood when by the vast assumptions of the medieval Pope it had arrayed against it the national feeling of every Christian people!

The day will come, we may trust, when this lesson will be learned by Catholic theologians and Catholic rulers, and when it will be clearly understood that the power of the Christian Church must forever reside in its frank and complete abandonment of all pretensions to temporal power, in its fearless casting away of all carnal weapons, in its unhesitating and absolute trust in moral and spiritual forces. When that day shall come, the pontificate of Leo XIII will be pointed to as the one in which the true character of the Christian leadership of the world began to be clearly seen. 13


The spiritual and moral gains of the papacy were achieved not merely as a consequence of having been extruded from the political sphere but--and this is even more significant--through

12 Gladden, North American Review, CLXXVII, 354-55.
13 Ibid., pp. 355-56. For further similar and pertinent statements see: American Review of Reviews, LXV, 433; Independent, CVIII, 105; H. P. Fairchild, "What Does the Pope Want?" New Republic, LXV, 292; Ascoli, "The Roman Church and Political Action", Foreign Affairs, XIII, 449-50, 452; "Pope Leo XIII", Quarterly Review, CXCVIII, 287; Fawkes, "The Pontificate of Pius X", ibid., CCXXVII, 478.

the aggressive and courageous leadership of Leo XIII and his three successors ( Pius X, Benedict XV, and Pius XI) in attempting to reconstruct the social institutions of the modern world. This and the two following sections of this chapter will indicate the vigorous part that the papacy has played in fostering the rebuilding of the social order on sound ethical and Christian principles, in promoting the cause of universal peace, and, in recent years especially, in defending the right of the individual in safeguarding his conscience against the claims of the authoritarian or totalitarian state.

Leo XIII will long be remembered for imbuing the papacy with a change in attitude and motives. He felt that the church could not afford to carry on a policy of mere passivity. It could not be assuming an attitude of sullen resentment, of rancorous protest when the European continent was being altered fundamentally by great democratic forces. The papacy must engage in active leadership in the broad social sphere, which had been, and still was being, so significantly transformed by the Industrial Revolution. Since 1815 the liberal Catholic forces in many European lands had been carrying on only partially successful efforts to achieve needed social readjustments. It was Leo's hope to unite these forces under papal leadership, to animate them by a vivifying ideal that would enable the church to play its historic rôle as a potent social guide and force. Catholicism was to develop a social policy that was to dominate all other policies.

While still Bishop of Perugia he had, in his last three pastoral letters (of the years 1876, 1877, and 1878) expressed a challenging view concerning the relation of the Catholic church to the material and moral problems of the nineteenth century. As pope he issued many notable documents dealing with the broad social question. As a consequence he infused the papacy so fully with his objectives that it will probably not swerve from them for a long time. 14

14 Goetz, "Papst Leo XIII", in Marks and Müller, Meister der Politik, III, 386-95; Ward, "Leo XIII", Fortnightly Review, LXXX, 251-52; Vogüé, "Pope Leo XIII", Forum, XXII, 514-18; Schmidlin, Papstgeschichte, II, 365-73.

Leo XIII was neither the first Catholic nor the first among his contemporaries to see the significance of the labor problem with a new viewpoint. But he was the first of those in authority over any of the great organizations of the world to take a definite stand concerning the social question, giving it a revolutionary tinge. He combined the Catholic and social movement as an indissoluble unit. As to viewpoint, he made Catholicism one of the most advanced social organizations in the world. 15

Throughout the long pontificate of Leo XIII he issued numerous encyclicals and other documents dealing with the social question. 16 In all of these he stressed the need for applying moral and religious forces to the solution of that question. His most significant encyclical was Rerum novarum ( May 15, 1891). In this extended document of more than thirteen thousand words he deals with the condition of the working classes and the duties of the church to these classes. 17

Into the details of this analysis of the misfortunes of the laborers we cannot go in this connection. Suffice it to say that he courageously points out that the present economic system has produced conditions that are "contrary to charity and justice," and that "a remedy for these conditions must be found quickly." He asserts that "men have been given over . . . . to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition." He mentions "rapacious usury" that is "still practiced by avaricious and grasping men." He declares "that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses a yoke little better than slavery itself." 18 He opposes socicalism

15 Goetz, article "Papst Leo XIII", in Marks and Müller, op. cit., III, 399-400; Veit, Die Kirche im Zeitalter des Individualismus, IV, Part II, 146-47.
16 Devas, "The Political Economy of Leo XIII", Dublin Review, CXXX, 294, and CXXXI, 132-52; Schmidlin, op. cit., II, 368-83; Löffler, Papstgeschichte, pp. 129-30; Veit, op. cit., IV, Part II, 146-47.
17 "Encyclical Letter of Pope Leo XIII" (in English), American Catholic Quarterly Review, XVI, 529-57. For discussion thereof see Keane, "The Encyclical Rerum Novarum", American Catholic Quarterly Review, XVI, 595-611; Baur and Rieder, Päpstliche Enzykliken und ibre Stellung zur Politik, pp. 44-50; Schmidlin, op. cit., II, 373-77; Seppelt, Papstgeschichte, pp. 133-34.
18 American Catholic Quarterly Review, XVI, 530.

as a proposed solution of society's ills, 19 and affirms that the social question cannot be solved "without the assistance of Religion and the Church," which through its leadership must bring about the co-operation of "the Rulers of the State, of employers of labor, of the wealthy, and of the working population themselves, for whom we plead." 20 He pronounces "irrational and false" "the idea that class is naturally hostile to class." 21 He declares that "it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power"; that it is a crime "to defraud any one of his wages that are his due." 22 He maintains that, if the ills of society are to be cured, the only remedy lies in "a return to the Christian life and Christian institutions." 23 As a consequence it should be the "first duty . . . . of the State to make sure that the laws and institutions, the general character of the administration of the Commonwealth, shall be such as to produce of themselves public well-being and private prosperity"; "the public administration must duly and solicitously provide for the welfare and comfort of the working people." 24 Therefore the state should protect the workers through regulations concerning the length of the working day, the labor of women and children, adequate conditions of labor, minimum wages, Sunday rest. 25 But not all responsibility rests with the state. Employers and employees should also each do their part by forming associations and organizations that would provide necessary relief and legal protection to those in need thereof. He urged the formation of a Catholic labor organization, to which he gave much attention. 26

Into an analysis of the faultlessness or feasibility of this social program we need not enter. The essential fact for us is that Leo XIII, through his courageous and penetrating statement, emphatically announced that the Catholic church was deeply in-

19 Ibid., pp. 534-35.
20 Ibid., p. 535.
21 Ibid. p., 536.
22 Ibid., p. 537.
23 Ibid., p. 541.
24 Ibid., p. 543.
25 Ibid., pp. 546-50.
26 Ibid., pp. 550-56.

terested in the welfare of the great mass of workers everywhere in the world. The document was at once called the "Workingman's Magna Charta" and the "Social Magna Charta of Catholicism," and its author was designated as the "Workingman's Pope." 27 Through the publication of this encyclical, the pope had proclaimed the idea that the Catholic church should once more become the social guide of the world, in non-Catholic as well as in Catholic nations. 28 He had formulated for the church a new social doctrine, better suited to modern society, a doctrine that would give the papacy new social and moral prestige. In Rerum novarum and his numerous other published documents on the social question, he had laid down the foundation principles for scientific and organized economic thinking and planning. He encouraged the formation of Catholic organizations for dealing with the problems of present society in a spirit of love and not material efficiency. 29 The pope was once more calling attention to the need of applying the historic principles of Christian ethics, such as had been applied in medieval and early modern times, when the papacy and church officers urged slave owners and feudal lords to give better treatment to their slaves and serfs. 30

Whereas, since 1815 the interests of the papacy had often seemed identified wholly with the thrones of Europe, 31 now the pope was proclaiming a doctrine that identified the interests of the church with those of the masses, who seemed increasingly helpless in the face of the relentless forces of the Industrial Revolution. Leo's dauntlessness and insight were all the more significant because, while he was proclaiming the most liberal social and labor program in the history of the church and "was


27 Barry, The Coming Age and the Catholic Church, p. 34; Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 14th ed.), XIII, 929; Quarterly Review, CXCVIII, 305; Schmidlin, op. cit., II, 377.
28 Crawford, "Leo the Thirteenth", Outlook, LXI, 773; Granvelle, "Foreign Policy of the Holy See", Contemporary Review, XCIX, 458, 460.
29 Goetz, article "Papst Leo XIII", in Marks and Müller, op. cit., III, 401.
30 Hergenröther, Handbuch, II, 190-91, and II, 612-17, 822-24; Allard, article "Slavery", Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV, 37-38; Ryan, article "Charity", ibid., III, 597-98.
31 Vogüé, "Pope Leo XIII", Forum, XXII, 518.

leading his hordes as a unit into the social battlefield," the governing authorities of the Protestant churches were warning their young ministers against discussing the social question. 32

It is true that in January, 1902, Leo XIII somewhat reversed his liberal policy, as expressed in Rerum novarum, when he issued the encyclical concerning "Christian Democracy in Italy," in which he condemned, as novelties, all such things as factory laws for children, old age pensions, minimum wages for agricultural laborers, the eight-hour day, trade guilds, and the encouragement of Sunday rest (because they approached socialism too freely) and counseled the popular Christian movement (Populari) in Italy to devote its energies to a restoration of the temporal power. 33

However, that swerving from the part of courageous papal leadership was more than offset when Pius XI issued his encyclical "Reconstruction of the Social Order," or Quadragesimo Anno, if we designate it by its Latin title. This document was issued May 15, 1931, in commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the publication of Rerum novarum by Leo XIII. In this document Pius wished once more to call to the attention of the Catholic church and of the world at large the characteristics and influence of his predecessor's noteworthy pronouncement, to clear away certain doubts that had arisen concerning it, and to expand and clarify its principles so as to fit modern economic and social conditions. Above all, he sought to assure the great mass of workers that the Catholic church is mindful of their distressing conditions and is seeking a solution of present problems through means other than those of violence and revolution. 34

Into the details of this significant document 35 of more than


32 Goetz, article "Papst Leo XIII," in Marks and Müller, op. cit., III, 401; see also Hutchinson, "Religion vs. the World We Live In", Forum, LXXXIX, 81.
33 Article "Leo XIII", Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 14th ed.), XIII, 929; Goetz, article "Papst Leo XIII," in Marks and Müller, op. cit., III, 401-2; Schmidlin, op. cit., II, 383.
34 Arnaldo Cortesi, New York Times, May 24, 1931, sec. I, pp. 1, 3; John A. Ryan, ibid., May 26, 1931, p. 6.
35 Authorized English translation, New York Times, May 24, 1931, sec. II, pp. 1-3.

twenty-thousand words we cannot enter here, but it is enough to point out that Pius XI is clear-cut in his denunciation of the evils of capitalism, in his recognition of the broad claims of the workers, and in his suggestions of remedies to be applied to the great social and economic problems of this age. Although he admits that the condition of the workingmen has greatly improved, "especially in the larger and more civilized states," he also points out that in eastern Asia and elsewhere "the number of dispossessed laboring masses" has "increased beyond measure" and that the immense army of hired rural laborers, whose condition is depressed in the extreme, "have no hope of ever obtaining a share in the land." He therefore demands the uplifting of the proletariat. 36 He points out the injustice of present-day distribution as evidenced by the "immense number of propertyless wage-earners on the one hand and the superabundant riches of the fortunate few on the other," 37 and urges that the laborers be "freed from that hand-to-mouth uncertainty which is the lot of the proletarian." 38

He condemns the immense economic power that is "concentrated in the hands of the few . . . . who are frequently not the owners but only the trustees and directors of invested funds, who administer them at their good pleasure" and "are able to govern credit and determine its allotment, . . . . thus grasping in their hands the very soul of production, so that no one dare breathe against their will." He asserts that "this accumulation of power is a natural result of limitless free competition," which is now replaced by economic dictatorship. He condemns "economic nationalism," "economic imperialism," and "international imperialism in financial affairs." 39 He also denounces the "frightful perils to which the morals of workers . . . . and the virtue of girls and women are exposed in the modern factories." 40 He regards our present industrial system as an agency for the


36 New York Times, May 24, 1931, sec. II, p. 1, col. 8, and p. 2, col. 2.
37 Ibid., p. 1, col. 8.
38 Ibid., p. 2, col. 1.
39 Ibid., col. 5.
40 Ibid., col. 8.

destruction and disintegration of human character. He asserts that the true Christian spirit cannot be fostered by a system in which man's one solicitude is to obtain his daily bread in any way he can, and so bodily labor, which was decreed by Providence for the good of man's body and soul . . . . has everywhere been changed into an instrument of strange perversion; for dead matter leaves the factory enobled and transformed, where men are corrupted and degraded. 41

He recognizes the right of labor to organize, 42 asserts the supremacy of human welfare over profits, 43 and implies the right of labor to participate in the management of industry. 44 He maintains that wages should be high enough to obviate any need for the labor of women and children and to make possible the accumulation of property by the worker. 45

Whereas his predecessor condemned socialism, Pius now condemns both socialism and communism (two opposing systems), 46 but affirms that the remedies for these evils lie in the application of the "principles of right reason and Christian social philosophy regarding capital and labor" and that "their mutual co-operation must be accepted in theory and reduced to practice." "Free competition . . . . and economic domination must be kept within just and definite limits" and "brought under effective control of the public authority" in such matters as the state can handle. "The public institutions of the Nations must be such as to make the whole of human society conform to the common good, i.e., to the standard of social justice." There must be "a return to Christian life and Christian institutions," for "Christianity alone can apply an efficacious remedy for the excessive solicitude for transitory things, which is the origin of all our vices." 47 He demands that, inasmuch as there are moral issues underlying these social and economic questions, they be brought within the supreme jurisdiction of the church, which


41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., cols. 1 and 3; p. 3, col. 4.
43 Ibid., p. 2, col. 8.
44 Ibid., col. 3.
45 Ibid., cols. 1 and 2; p. 3, col. 1.
46 Ibid., p. 2, cols. 5 and 6
47 Ibid., cols. 5, 7, and 8.

has the "God-given task of interposing her authority" in all those matters "that have a bearing on moral conduct." 48

It is hard to estimate the influence of these two papal encyclicals ( Rerum novarum and Quadragesimo Anno) in the field of recent social readjustments. Non-Catholics may regard as overstatements the affirmations of Pius XI when, in his own encyclical, he declares that Rerum novarum was responsible for the formulation and execution of many social laws that improved the conditions of wage-earners, women, and children. 49 One may also take with a grain of salt the affirmation of Arnaldo Cortesi that Rerum novarum was eventually adopted by legislation or at least practical usage, in almost all countries. . . . . It formed the basis of discussion by students of social questions all over the world until the principles it propounded had gradually gained general acceptance. 50

But some influence was probably exerted. For instance, the Weimar Assembly, of 1919, acted in harmony with the thought of Leo XIII when, through the influence of the Catholic representatives, it inserted Article 139 in the German constitution, which provided that "Sundays and legal holidays remain under the protection of law as days of rest and spiritual edification." 51 To cite an instance of more recent date, the Storm Group of the Eastern Marches (Ostmärkische Sturmscharen), a semi-military organization in Austria, headed by Chancellor Schuschnigg ( 1934------), favors a program of social justice such as was advocated by Pope Pius XI in Quadragesimo Anno. 52

It may seem to the reader that the author is stressing the social leadership of the papacy too fully or praising it too enthusiastically. The writer is quite aware that it has not been the


48 Ibid., p. 1, col. 6. See also Duthoit, "L'encyclique de Pie XI sur la question sociale", Revue des deux mondes, 8th period, IV, 156-74; Literary Digest, CIX ( May 30, 1931), 5-6.
49 New York Times, May 24, 1931, sec. II, p. 1, cols. 4-6.
50 Ibid., sec. I, p. 3, col. 1.
51 Baur and Rieder, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
52 Emil Lengyel, "Austria Reacts to Outside Pressure", New York Times, October 20, 1935, Part IV, p. 6, cols. 3-4.

dominant Catholic countries, like Italy, Spain, Portugal, and France, that have been in the vanguard in alleviating the condition of the workers by establishing social-insurance reforms. That honor goes to Protestant Germany, Great Britain, and Scandinavia, though Protestant America has lagged behind all of them. It is also clear that in such Catholic countries as Spain, Austria, and Mexico the most active opponents of radical social reforms have been the Catholic clerical groups, collaborating with the conservative political parties. It is also obvious that in recent decades individual Protestant denominations, and the Protestant churches of the United States, working as the Federal Council of Churches in Christ of America, have been more active and more advanced (or radical) than the Catholic church in promoting social and economic reforms. Moreover, in the minds of many liberal and radical reform advocates the vigorous official opposition of the Catholic church to the birthcontrol movement brands the church as a permanently conservative social influence.

It is not the purpose of the author to attempt to evaluate the conflicting views concerning such contentious matters, but the significant fact remains that in promulgating a social program Leo XIII and Pius XI caused the papacy to become one of the most active agencies working for the reform of present society, and that such leadership, whether markedly or only moderately successful, could not have been undertaken with any prospect of success if the papacy had still been intent on playing a part in national and international politics, instead of stressing religious, moral, and social leadership.

Throughout medieval and modern times the papacy had been a constant advocate of peace and had frequently acted as arbiter and mediator between nations to preserve or restore peace. 53


53 Roemer and Ellis, The Catholic Church and Peace Efforts; Beales, The History of Peace, pp. 25, 187-88, 241, 244.

But since 1870 the pope has been able to exert an even greater and more forceful influence because, having been deprived of all temporal possessions, he had a "relatively free position as a neutral, since he could not be accused of territorial ambitions with his temporal domains gone." 54 Leo XIII, or his representatives, acted as arbiter in at least five international disputes. 55 In his allocution of February, 1889, he strongly condemned resort to aggressive wars to settle disputes between nations. 56 In spite of not being allowed to accept the invitation of the tsar to attend the first Hague Conference, his actions and public pronouncements showed that he was more sincere in desiring genuine disarmament and peace achievements than the representatives of the secular powers. 57

Pius X ( 1903-14) on March 27, 1905, in an address to the college of cardinals, and on other occasions as well, condemned the strident nationalism and policy of "Might makes right" which was pursued in such an accentuated manner by the nations of Europe. 58 In 1906 he sent a message to the Universal Peace Congress, favoring the peaceful arbitration of international disputes. 59 On a number of occasions his representatives acted as arbiters between South American states. 60 In one of his last utterances, in 1914, he appealed to the nations to cease their folly and arbitrate their differences. 61 But his peace efforts had no restraining influence on the forces and system producing the catastrophe of 1914. However, the world will long rememshy;


54 Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 51.
55 Müller, Das Friedenswerk der Kirche, I, 47, 48, 325-33; Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
56 Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 52; MacLean, The Permanent Peace Program of Pope Benedict XV, p. 14.
57 See above, chap. xviii, sec. 4.
58 Müller, op. cit., pp. 377-78, 392-93; American Journal of International Law, V (Supplement), 214-16; editorial, American Journal of International Law, V, 707-9; Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 54.
59 Müller, op. cit., pp. 345-46; Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 54.
60 Müller, op. cit., pp. 48, 49, 379; Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 54.
61 Müller, op. cit., p. 419; Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 54.

ber one of the last acts of the pontiff, namely, his refusal of the request of the Austrian emperor, Francis Joseph, to bless his cause by responding, "I do not bless war: I bless peace." 62

We have already discussed the unsuccessful appeals made by Pope Benedict XV ( 1914-22) to persuade the belligerent powers to settle their differences through peaceful means. 63 Undaunted by his failure in this respect, he demonstrated his sincerity as a humanitarian by using the full forces of the papal and church organization to alleviate the horrors of war through negotiating the exchange of disabled prisoners and civilians of the occupied territories, the hospitalization of the sick in neutral countries (especially the tuberculous in Switzerland), the exchange of letters between the prisoners of war and their families, the securing of a day of rest on Sunday for prisoners, the securing of truces to bury the dead, the identification and marking of the graves of those that had fallen in the Dardanelles campaign. He was instrumental in making possible the provisioning of the inhabitants of devastated regions like Poland and Belgium and in repatriating the prisoners after the war. "The Pope had come to be looked on as the only neutral securely and permanently disinterested." 64 Toward the close of the war, and during the peace negotiations, he tried--fruitlessly, to be sure--to secure a just and stable peace, free from punitive and vengeful aspects. 65


62 McKenna, "Peace, the Keystone of the Papacy", Catholic World, CXXXIII, 518; MacLean, op. cit., p. 9.
63 See above, chap. xviii, sec. 4. See also Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., pp. 54-56; Barry and Wood, "Benedict XV: Pontiff of Peace", Dublin Review, CLXX, 185; Appeals for Peace of Pope Benedict XV and Pope Pius XI (pamphlet, Catholic Association for International Peace), pp. 3-7; MacLean, op. cit., pp. 6-8; McKenna, "Peace, the Keystone of the Papacy", Catholic World, CXXXIII, 518-19; Literary Digest, LXXII ( February 4, 1922), 30-31; Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 808-10.
64 Müller, op. cit., pp. 421-22, 425-28, 432, 437-40, 446-49, 454-55; Cartwright, "Contributions of the Papacy to International Peace", Catholic Historical Review, VIII, 165-66; Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., pp. 55-56, MacLean, op. cit., pp. 9-10; Hayes, "Pope Benedict the Fifteenth", Forum, LXVIII, 259-60; Poynter, "Pope Benedict XV, the Popes Benedict, and the Papacy", Fortnightly Review, CXVII, 472-73; Wood, "Benedict XV: Pontiff of Peace", Dublin Review, CLXX, 190.
65 MacLean, op. cit., pp. 24-30; Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 809-10; Barry, "Benedict XV: Pontiff of Peace", Dublin Review, CLXX, 176.

Consistent with previous papal practice, Benedict XV frequently advocated the establishment of a league of nations that would settle all international disputes without resort to war. 66

The failure of papal peace efforts during the World War was not a reflection on the papacy and its occupant. Protestants, as well as Catholics, recognized that Benedict had assiduously served the cause of humanity and had maintained the papacy and the church as a great moral authority in the world. Mankind's verdict will be in harmony with that of Lord Curzon, who described the pope as being a "firm advocate of the moral brotherhood of mankind." Even the Turkish nation set its flag at half-mast when he died, and later erected in Constantinople a magnificent monument to him, whom they designated as "The Benefactor of Humanity, the Pope of Peace." 67

In Pius XI ( 1922-----) Benedict XV has had a worthy successor as a fearless advocate of peace. His courage in making papal peace activities possible was shown when in 1929 he signed the Lateran Accord with Mussolini, thus showing that on the basis of good will a knotty, difficult question of long standing could be amicably settled. 68 By some he has been called "the greatest worker in the cause of peace." He has repeatedly spoken out fearlessly for the "re-establishment of an enduring world peace and a reign of concord among nations." 69 In a message to the cardinals, Christmas Day, 1930, he asserted that securing "peace is made difficult . . . . because the spirit of peace does not possess the intelligence and hearts of men"; because "of an unequal distribution of privileges and burdens, of rights and duties, of participation in their fruits which can only


66 MacLean, op. cit., pp. 16-20; Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 809.
67 MacLean, op. cit., p. 4; Barry, "Benedict XV: Pontiff of Peace", Dublin Review, CLXX, 176-77; Catholic Encyclopedia, XVII (supplement), 96; New York Times, January 30, 1922, Part V, cols. 2, 3.
68 Ryan, "Pius XI", Commonweal, XV, 623-25; McKenna, "Peace, the Keystone of the Papacy", Catholic World, CXXXIII, 519-20; Haider, "The Vatican and Italian Fascism", Catholic World, CXXXVII, 401-2; Wellhoff, "Persons and Personages", Living Age, CCCXLV, 144.
69 Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

be produced by their friendly collaboration"; because "there reigns a hard, egotistical nationalism, which is the same as saying hatred and envy"; because there is "competition and antagonism in the place of willing co-operation"; and finally, because there is "ambition for hegemony and mastery in the place of respect for all rights, even those of the weak and small." In conclusion he declared, "We will not, we cannot believe in the reality of these threats [of war in 1930] for we cannot believe that any civilized state could become so monstrously homicidal, and almost certainly suicidal." 70 Similar moral and humanitarian utterances may be found in his numerous allocutions, radio broadcasts, and other public pronouncements. 71

Pius XI has been criticized as being remiss in his duties as moral leader, inasmuch as he has not condemned the aggression of Italy in Ethiopia, in harmony with the action taken by the great majority of nations represented at Geneva. 72 Whatever papal action may be taken, it must be remembered: (1) that the papacy is bound by the Lateran Accord of 1929 "to remain . . . . extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations . . . . unless the contending parties make concordant appeal to its mission of peace"; and (2) that Pius and his predecessors have, by previous pronouncements, deprecated all wars in general.

Because of the persistent and consistent advocacy of a peace program by Pius XI it is not surprising to find that Mr. Victor J. Dowling, a Catholic, and a former presiding justice of the appellate division of the supreme court of New York, made this remark in a baccalaureate address in June, 1931: "What the world needs is respect for some central authority which would


70 New York Times, December 25, 1930, p. 1, col. 3; December 28, 1930, p. 11, col. 1, which contains the full text.
71 Ibid., 1932: February 16, p. 1, col. 2; February 29, p. 1, col. 5; March 2, p. 12, col. 7; April 4, p. 12, cols. 1, 2; 1933: March 14, p. 1, col. 1, and p. 11, col. 1; June 10, p. 3, col. 4; December 20, p. 15, col. 6; December 24, p. 1, col. 4, and p. 2, col. 5; 1934: November 1, p. 6, col. 3; December 25, p. 1, col. 7; 1935: March 27, p. 12, col. 3; September 8, p. 1, col. 6; Register ( Denver, Colorado), September 15, 1935; Commonweal, XXI, 663-64, and XXII, 469.
72 Springfield ( Massachusetts) Weekly Republican, October 24, 1935, editorial, "Pope's Move for Peace [of October 17]".

be free from suspicion. The Pope might be the arbitrator between nations." 73 More remarkable is the suggestion of a Protestant (Congregational) pastor, the Rev. John M. Phillips, of Hartford, Connecticut, that Christians, of every denomination, and Jews, appeal to Pope Pius XI to lead a world-movement against war, to end war through a religious truce similar to those of medieval times. 74 Without entering into comments about the inaccuracies of the reference to the medieval Truce of God, or the difficulties in carrying out the suggestion, 75 the significant point is the assertion by a Protestant minister that "the Pope's position of authority makes him the most distinguished social leader of the day." 76

In conclusion we can be safe in saying that, if the time ever comes when the utter futility, wastefulness, barbarity, and immorality of the war system will lead the nations to substitute a system of international co-operation for common purposes, it will be recognized by the scholars of that age that the papacy was, along with many others, one of the consistently moral influences working for this progressive social reform. And such a service can be rendered because, in the words of James Brown Scott, the papacy has "neither army nor navy nor territory. It has only a conscience and law under the control of a moral and spiritual conception." 77


In recent decades, everywhere in the world, there has been a great increase in the claims of the state on the lives and destinies


73 New York Times, June 9, 1931) p. 24, col. 1. The address was delivered before the College of New Rochelle.
74 Ibid., January 29, 1935, p. 6, col. 5.
75 "The Truce of God" (editorial), Christian Century, LII, 168-69.
76 New York Times, January 29, 1935, p. 6, col. 5.
77 Scott, "The Progress of International Law during the Last Twenty-five Years", Proceedings of the Society of International Law, 1931, p. 23; also cited in Roemer and Ellis, op. cit., p. 58, which wrongly gives the date of the Proceedings as 1932.
78 For the ideas and phraseology of most of this section the author is indebted to Tillich, "The Totalitarian State and the Claims of the Church", Social Research, I, 405-

of individuals and all organizations within the state. This has gone so far that in some states, as in Russia, Italy, and Germany, attempts are being made to regulate the whole realm of human activity and thought. The same tendency is under way elsewhere, although it has not as yet been pursued to the same degree.

Wherever the authoritarian state has been established, there has been a sacrifice of democratic practices and institutions, a denial of all liberal rights, including freedom of thought and religion. In each of the three states mentioned above ( Russia, Italy, Germany) there is a militant nationalism, dominated by the leaders of a party, which aims to unify and amalgamate the whole nation in the pursuit of common ideals. The authoritarian state itself is to give all the needed spiritual satisfaction. There is not to be any competing spiritual life. The concept of a dual sovereignty, shared by the church and the state, is no longer acceptable. The communists in Russia regard Christianity as a rival and unwholesome method of human social salvation, which has been controlled and interpreted by the bourgeois class and its instruments. The social goal of Christianity, social justice, has never been, and can never be, achieved. Therefore the Christian religion must be stamped out in order that communism may be unhampered in achieving its own social goal. To the Fascists in Italy the state is supreme; the nation must be absolutely devoted to the welfare of the state; between the state and the church there must not be any conflict in ideals, demands, or loyalties, so far as the members of the nation are con-

33; Dawson, "Religion and the Totalitarian State", Criterion, XIV, 1-16; Beaven, "The Meaning for Religions of the Trend toward Nationalism", Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CLXXIV, 65-75. For additional treatment of this topic see: "Twilight of the Gods" (editorial), Living Age, CCCXLV, 132-41; "Relations of Church and State Must Be Studied" (editorial), Christian Century, L, 868; "The Church and Christian Totalitarianism" (editorial), ibid., LI, 214-16; Sarolea, "The Political Backgrounds of the German Kulturkampf", Contemporary Review, CXLVII, 406-15; "Pie XI et Hitler", Mercure de France, CCXLIX, 257-67; "Le catholicisme et la politique mondiale", Revue des deux mondes, 8th period, XXV, 272301; Ascoli, "The Roman Church and Political Action", Foreign Affairs, XIII, 483-98; Hutchinson, "Religion and the World We Live In", Forum, LXXXIX, 81-87; "The Policy of Pius XI", Round Table, December, 1934, pp. 44-59; Mason, Hitler's First Foes.

cerned. In Germany the National Socialists are developing a new form of paganism based on racial and political considerations. Religion will be national in characteristics and aims and will be fully under the control of the authoritarian or totalitarian state.

In all three of these authoritarian states there is no room for a spiritual life, a communion with a Supreme God, through whom the spiritual life of all is unified and amalgamated to a common purpose. The state must have unconditional sway over all phases of human thought and action; it claims absolute authority in the totality of life. Even in the United States there is an increasing tendency to assert the supremacy of the state over the conscience of the individual; by a Supreme Court decision ( 1931), Professor Douglas Macintosh, of Yale Divinity School, was denied American citizenship because he refused to agree to bear arms if he felt that a given war were unjustified. 79 So the present state, in many countries, tends to claim authority over the totality of life. But the Christian church, in its Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, and Protestant branches, also is based on the absolute character of its teaching. All the Christian churches have claims in common. They claim that man has a religious nature, which is divinely instituted and which requires some form of communion with God. These churches assert also that spiritual life must not be interfered with by any secular power. So long as the Christian churches are churches, they will cling to this claim. They must keep alive the idea that once humanity had an original unity, that unity will and must ultimately be reachieved, and that the church is an agency in achieving this objective. So there is an evident clash of authority between the authoritarian (or totalitarian) state on the one


79 "Majority Opinion of the Supreme Court", Christian Century, XLIX, 89-92; "Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Holmes, Brandeis and Stone Concurring", ibid., pp. 92-94; Morrison, "The End of the Macintosh Case", ibid., XLVIII, 1302-3; Charles P. Howland, "Congress in Regimentals", ibid., XLIX, 8486; Ross, "Conscience and the State, The Roman Catholic View", ibid., XLIX, 86-87; Ross, "Catholics and the Constitution", Commonweal, XV, 119-21, 242-43; "Conscience versus Citizenship", Literary Digest, CIX ( June 6, 1931), 7; "Conscience versus Congress", ibid., CXII ( February 20, 1932), 20-21.

hand and the Christian church on the other. If the various branches of the church submit to the totalitarian-state idea, they will be allowing themselves to have other gods besides the one God.

With all of these European centralized states, and with others as well ( Spain and Mexico), the papacy has had difficulties; but the breach seems widest at the present writing ( November, 1935) in Germany. No one can accurately foresee the outcome, but it is one of the vexed questions the ultimate solution of which will have a bearing on the prestige and influence of the papacy. If the Catholic church and the papacy are to retain their original aim and beliefs, they cannot compromise with the totalitarian or authoritarian state, whose claims and objectives leave no room for loyalty to any other organization claiming absolute authority in one phase of life's activities.

All of the problems touched upon in the last three sections of this chapter, along with many others that might be mentioned, are a part of a complexity of interrelated world-wide problems, the solution of which may be centuries in the future. But if these problems are ever solved, it seems probable that the papacy, whose constructive social leadership is exerted not merely among the more than three hundred million members of the Catholic church, will be one of the factors contributing to the successful solution. And we may well be justified in concluding that if the papacy plays a part (1) in securing more equitable social and economic conditions for the great mass of workers, (2) in substituting peaceful methods of international co-operation for the present system of anarchy and war, and (3) in effectively safeguarding the consciences of individuals against the claims of the authoritarian state, such an achievement will be attributable, in part, to the broadening moral and spiritual leadership of the popes, which was made possible through the long process known as the "secularization of politics."

Chapter Twenty


IN THIS treatise we have surveyed a millennium and half of history--about one-fifth of recorded human history. We began with a consideration of the City of God of Augustine, the medieval version of the totalitarian state. When this ideal had been put into practice, it was the aim of the papacy to have no differentiation between church and state. The church, through its guiding and dominating head, the papacy, was to exercise control over every important phase of human political, social, and cultural affairs. Kings and princes were vassals of the pope and were to shape their policies in harmony with his demands, though this ideal was never achieved, owing to vigorous and prolonged resistance on the part of some of the lay powers. 1

But when, after the thirteenth century, the papacy declined in personnel and objectives, the developing states asserted their independence of the papacy in politics and even began to control religious affairs. This tendency, observable for several centuries, was given a pronounced impetus by the Protestant Reformation, and resulted finally, at the close of the Thirty Years' War, in the effective collaboration of both Catholic and Protestant princes of Europe in secularizing politics absolutely. The princes did this by agreeing to ignore the protest of the pope against the Treaty of Westphalia. For a long time the pope refused to recognize the changed situation, persistently protesting whenever, through state and international action, his historic


1 See chap. i.

rights and interests, and those of the church, were affected adversely. This remained the situation, with diminishing acuteness, however, until in 1929, when, through the Lateran Accord, the papacy agreed to

remain extraneous to all temporal disputes between nations and to international Congresses convoked for the settlement of such disputes unless the contending parties make a concordant appeal to its mission of peace; nevertheless it reserves the right in every case to exercise its moral and spiritual power.

That Accord marked the end of papal antagonism to the secularization of politics. The pope agreed to remain out of international politics, except when invited to participate; but he would not yield his right and duty to moral and spiritual leadership in the world, and, as has been observed in the preceding chapter, since 1878 he has been increasingly active in broad constructive social leadership.

The state, freed from the restrictions imposed on it through the papacy (the medieval attempted totalitarian state), has in modern times, and especially in the last half-century, increased its activities and claims to authority everywhere in the world. In several countries of Europe there have been formed totalitarian states, and there are tendencies elsewhere in that direction. All ideas and activities, all pursuits and ideals, must yield if in conflict with the claims and actions of the sovereign, absolute state. The educational system, the agencies of research, art, literature, the theater, the cinema, and the press, are all coerced into the service of the all-powerful state. Freedom of conscience no longer exists in the totalitarian state. The old conflict between the state and the church, now so clear-cut in Germany, Russia, Italy, Spain, and Mexico, "is smouldering in every part of Christendom, no less in America than elsewhere." 2

We have surveyed fifteen centuries of the relation of church and state. We have adduced evidence that Catholic, as well as

2 The Church and Christian Totalitarianism, Christian Century, LI, 214.

non-Catholic, authorities accept the view that the divorce of the papacy from interference in politics was an inevitable and constructive trend, enabling the papacy to give up its temporary political leadership, so that it could once more, and with greater advantage and success, stress its original purpose--religious, ethical, and social leadership. But today, under the rule of the totalitarian state, the freedom that is necessary for the healthy existence of religion is being imperiled once again. The present policies of the authoritarian state are a menace, not merely to spiritual life, but to all other cultural and scientific, social and educational, activities of human society. If state authoritarianism is not checked or thwarted, our cherished Western civilization faces a serious alteration or even breakdown. Unrestricted power of compulsion, as exercised by the state in many countries today, is probably setting the stage for a new, and perhaps a long, struggle between church and state. This contest will affect not merely religion and religious institutions. It will fundamentally affect all other cultural, educational, scientific, and research pursuits, which thrive only in an atmosphere free from coercion and restriction. Those who follow this conflict at present and in the years to come will find much of interest in the historic background that is disclosed in the movement called the "secularization of politics."

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