The Papacy and World-Affairs

Professor of History in the University of Colorado



THE secularization of politics may be said to have taken place when at the Congress of Westphalia the Catholic and Protestant princes agreed to disregard the protest of the pope against the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which were, after a long period of turmoil and confusion, to become the fundamental law of Europe. The event called the "secularization of politics" had been a long time in preparation. There had been many individual princes and groups of secular rulers who had flouted papal secular authority in previous centuries, especially during the Reformation. But it was not until the close of the Thirty Years' War that there was a concerted effort in both Catholic and Protestant camps to disregard papal authority in the political affairs of Europe, an authority that had been potently and effectively exercised through much of the medieval period.

But it took the papacy a long time to accept the changed situation. It repeatedly protested, without effect, against all those international treaties and other actions of the secular rulers that injured the interests and claimed legal rights of the church. Its protests were most frequent and vehement after 1860 and 1870, when, through the action of the Italian kingdom, the papacy lost the Papal States, which, according to papal theory, were essential in order to give the pontiff full freedom from secular interference when administering the spiritual affairs of the world.

However, the papacy terminated this attitude of protest when, in 1929, it signed the Lateran Accord with Mussolini and agreed not to participate in the settlement of international disputes of the states of the world unless it were invited to do so by the harmonious action of the states concerned. This marked the secularization of politics in its final aspects, when the papacy itself, after three centuries of protest, recognized the fact that it could no longer exercise any authority in international relations.

To the superficial observer the secularization of politics may seem to imply a defeat for the papacy. But, on the contrary, it was a blessing in disguise, for it freed the papacy from those secular objectives and activities that undermined or paralyzed its leadership in religion and morals, which were its original and true fields of action. The evidence in chapter xix will show that Catholic as well as non-Catholic students of the question agree that the papacy is a more effective spiritual, ethical, and social agent since it has been extruded from politics than during the eight or nine centuries when it not merely was a potent political authority but was, in harmony with the ideals of medieval unity, also the head of a state that can be called at least a "projected totalitarian state." Under papal leadership the medieval church was an attempted totalitarian state, an authoritarian state, in which secular and political affairs were to be subordinated to the spiritual objectives of the Civitas Dei, whose goal was preparation of all mortals for life in the next world.

But the European states, which were relatively weak after the disintegration of the Roman Empire and during the feudal period, gradually became assertive in their own secular sphere, and ultimately took over the direction of religious matters when there was a conflict of authority or objective. The national spirit of early modern times, which gave a psychological basis for the development of the state as a dominant institution, has led not merely to the secularization of politics but to the secularization of religion, in this day of the totalitarian or authoritarian states of central and eastern Europe. This is a recent development that has brought new problems not merely to the papacy and the Roman Catholic church, but to the Christian church in all its branches. To the student of contemporary affairs the story of the secularization of politics will afford a historical background that explains the development of the state and its contemporary actions that mean the secularization of religion.

The author knows of no work, in any language, that coordinates and unifies this long story concerning a significant aspect of the relations of church and state. He is aware, however, that in his efforts to control so large a field, covering fifteen centuries, he may easily have made mistakes in judgment and failed to use all the available sources of information. But it is his hope that as a survey of a hitherto neglected field this treatise may find a grateful reception both among specialists and the reading public. It is, however, not merely a survey. In the chapters dealing with the Peace of Westphalia and the secularization of politics (chaps. iv-xvi) an effort has been made to deal with the subject exhaustively, on the basis of the original sources. In the other chapters original sources have been used when possible, but in many cases only secondary sources could be utilized.

The author wishes to express his grateful acknowledgment of the many kindnesses conferred on him by the officers and staff of the libraries of the following universities in this country: Cornell, Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Colorado, Chicago, Illinois, Wisconsin, Kansas, Missouri; also of the Denver Public Library. His further appreciation is also gladly expressed of the special courtesies granted him by the officers and attendants of the following foreign libraries: the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, the Bayerisches Geheimes Staatsarchiv, the Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, all of Munich, Bavaria; Munich University Library; the Nationalbibliothek in Vienna; the Vatican Library; the Bibliothèque nationale; and the Library of the British Museum.

The author also wishes to express his obligations and gratitude to Dr. George Lincoln Burr, professor emeritus of history, in Cornell University, who, as a stimulating guide in graduate work, suggested this field of historical investigation; to the late Dr. James Field Willard, of the University of Colorado, and Dr. John Brown Mason, of Colorado Woman's College, who have read the entire manuscript; to Dr. Earl Swisher, of the University of Colorado, who has assisted the author in tracing certain references. Naturally these persons are not to be held responsi- ble for the opinions and conclusions expressed in this work. Appreciation is also due to Dr. Konrad Meyer, of Munich, whose linguistic ability was invaluable to the author in getting control of the seventeenth-century Latin works on the controversial literature (chaps. xiv-xvi).

Special gratitude and appreciation are expressed to the Social Science Research Council, whose generous grant-in-aid for the year 1932-33 made easier for the author his studies in European libraries.



1. The Church and Politics in the Middle Ages


15. " " " Part2



Chapter One

UNDER the Roman Empire the popes had no temporal powers. But when the Roman Empire had disintegrated and its place had been taken by a number of rude, barbarous kingdoms, the Roman Catholic church not only became independent of the states in religious affairs but dominated secular affairs as well. At times, under such rulers as Charlemagne ( 768-814), Otto the Great ( 936-73), and Henry III ( 1039-56), the civil power controlled the church to some extent; but in general, under the weak political system of feudalism, the wellorganized, unified, and centralized church, with the pope at its head, was not only independent in ecclesiastical affairs but also controlled civil affairs. The church interfered in secular affairs on the basis of its theory of the relation of church and state, which was formulated in substance by Augustine ( 354-430) and given wider and more definite application by such popes as Gregory VII ( 1073-85), Innocent III ( 1198-1216), Boniface VIII ( 1294-1303), and others. 1

1 Nys, "Le droit international et la papauté," Revue de droit international, X ( 1878), 505-14; Jarrige, La condition internationale du Saint-Siège avant et après les accords du Lateran, pp. 30-41; Dunning, History of Political Theories, Ancient and Medieval, pp. 131-51; Chénon, Histoire des rapports de l'église et de l'état du Ier au XXème siècle, pp. 40-92; Bluntschli, Die rechtliche Unverantwortlichkeit und V erantwortlichkeit des römischen Papstes, pp. 22-25; Nys, Les origins du droit international, pp. 13-33; Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, pp. 64-68, 94, 103-9, 133-39, 150-52, 159-66, 218-20; Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 2, 9-11; Murray, History of Political Science, pp. 37-47; Hauck, Der Gedanke der päpstlichen Weltherrschaft bis auf Bonifaz VIII; Bernheim, Mittelalterliche Zeitanschauungen in ihrem Einfluss auf Politik und Geschichtsschreibung,

According to the theory of the relation of church and state that was actually applied in western Europe from about the eleventh century to the Reformation, the supreme function of life on earth was preparation for life in the next world. Society was a unit, the Civitas Dei, a divine state, dominated by the church. There was no separation of church and state. The state was merely one aspect of society; it was not something external to the church; it had no interests opposed to or pitted against those of the church. Whatever affected the church favorably or adversely had a like effect on the state. The spiritual and temporal powers were two aspects of the same social organization, the City of God, as described by Augustine, elaborated by Thomas Aquinas ( 1225-74), and expressed in legal form by various popes in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 2

It was just as natural in medieval times to regard church and state as two aspects of the same organization as it is for us in a modern state to regard the legislative, executive, and judicial functions as three different aspects of the same governing state. 3

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries a number of popes issued decrees affirming their rights as final authority over secular affairs. 4 These decrees asserted that in political affairs the


Part I, pp. 4-5, 10-62, 110-233; Luchaire, Innocent III, la papauté et l'empire, pp. 1115; Luchaire, Innocent III, Rome et l'Italie, pp. 31-32; R. W. and A. J. Carlyle, History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, I, 164-75; II, 143-52; III, 9-10, 92-105 (misjudges the influence of Augustine, see Bernheim, op. cit., pp. 10-11); Dempf, Sacrum Imperium, Part II, chaps. iii, v, viii; Dempf, Die Hauptform mittelalterlicher Weltanschauung, pp. 61-77; Schramm, Kaiser, Rom und Renovatio, I, 238-50.
2 Gierke, op. cit., pp. 11-18; Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, pp. 4-5; Bartlet and Carlyle, Christianity in History, pp. 400-419; Dunning, op. cit., pp. 156-58, 205-7; Chénon, op. cit., pp. 41-42; Schnabel, Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert, I, 8-18; Bernheim, op. cit., I, 119, 213-14; Andreas, Deutschland vor der Reformation, pp. 17-18; E. F. Jacob, in Crump and Jacob, The Legacy of the Middle Ages, pp. 510-17; Wright, Medieval Internationalism, pp. 18-19.
3 Jarrige, op. cit., p. 40, n. 19; Crump and Jacob, op. cit., p. 516.
4 See appendix at end of this chapter concerning these decrees.

papacy was superior to all sovereigns, just as the sun is superior to the moon, the spirit to the flesh, gold to lead. The papacy had control over both swords, the temporal and spiritual; it used the temporal sword by making use of the intermediary power of the kings and princes, who were servants of the papacy. These wide claims were asserted not in a spirit of papal selfseeking but as a consequence of the medieval interpretation of the purpose and organization of world-society according to the divine will. 5 Although the popes never fully or continuously exercised these wide claims, they were the bases of the following asserted papal rights, rights that the pope exercised with effectiveness in political and civil affairs until the decline of the papacy in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, though some of the incidents cited took place after the close of the Middle Ages.

The pope could judge and verify the powers of the sovereigns; he could confirm their legitimacy, arbitrate concerning opposing claims (Venerabilem, Ausculta fili). 6 He could depose temporal sovereigns when they were disobedient to papal orders by excommunicating them and releasing their subjects from their oaths of fidelity (Ad apostolicae); thus the right of co-ordinate resistance and revolution not only existed for the church but was bestowed on the people by the church. 7

The pope and his vast church organization had full charge of all civil and criminal cases involving ecclesiasts, except those concerned with feudal affairs. Papal and church jurisdiction was, in civil affairs, exercised also over widows, orphans, crusaders, and students in universities. The students could utilize the civil courts, but that was rarely done because the justice ad-


5 Bernheim, op. cit., chap. iii, but especially pp. 213-24, 232-33; Luchaire, Innocent III, la papauté et l'empire, pp. 11-15.
6 Bompard, Le pape et le droit de gens, p. 4; Chénon, op. cit., p. 91; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire générale, II, 289; Nys, Les origins du droit international, pp. 22-23; Hauck, Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, IV, 686-87; Hauck, Der Gedanke der päpstlichen Weltherrschaft, pp. 27-28, 31-41; Bernheim, op. cit., I, 230-31.
7 Bompard, op. cit., p. 4; Chénon, Histoire des rapports, p. 91; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 289; Nys, Les origins, pp. 23-24; Hauck, Kirchengeschichte Deutschlands, IV, 687; Bernheim, op. cit., I, 194, 220-21; Hauck, Der Gedanke der päpstlichen Weltherrschaft, pp. 19-20, 28-29.

ministered in the ecclesiastical courts was superior to that of the lay courts. 8

The pope could promulgate civil laws applicable in all states in the domain of private law--embracing such matters as betrothals; marriage; the relations of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward; the making of wills, especially with reference to the matter of legacies to the church. In many countries the church had jurisdiction (sometimes merely concurrent and greatly limited) in the making and execution of contracts, since entering a contract was accompanied by taking an oath, which was a religious act. In so far as the secular state took cognizance of these various arrangements, either actively or tacitly, these parts of canon law were an integral part of civil law in each state. 9 The pope could establish special jurisdictions to interpret and apply those laws emanating from Rome. In each state there was a hierarchy of judicial officials, culminating in the pope. He had final jurisdiction in all Christendom. All persons having received Christian baptism were under papal jurisdiction. Even so late as August 7, 1873, Pope Pius IX ventured to affirm in a letter to the German emperor William I that the pope possesses a spiritual authority over the whole of Christendom, not merely over Catholic Christendom, and that all who have received Christian baptism in any form whatsoever are under his jurisdiction. This claim was rejected in the answer of the German emperor of September 3, 1873, with great vigor. The medieval secular princes were enjoined, under pain of excommunication, not to interfere with ecclesiastical juris-

8 Chénon, Histoire des rapports, pp. 93-94; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 256; Poncet, Les privilèges des clercs au moyen âge, pp. 81-147; Esmein, Cours élémentaire d'histoire du droit français, pp. 320-29; Schröder, Lehrbuch der deutschen Rechtsgeschichte, pp. 596-99; Jastrow and Winter, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Hohenstaufen, I, 86, 102-4. For English practice see Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, I, 130-31.
9 Jarrige, op. cit., p. 47; Bompard, op. cit., pp. 4-5, 8; Chénon, Histoire des rapports, pp. 94-95; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 256-57; Esmein, op. cit., pp. 325-29; Schröder, op. cit., pp. 597-99. For English practice see Pollock and Maitland , op. cit., I, 124-35; II, 197-202; Smith, Church and State in the Middle Ages, pp. 57-100.

diction in their own lands; they were not to interfere in appeals to the papal court at Rome. 10

On the basis of the wide temporal claims asserted by such popes as Gregory VII, Innocent III, and Boniface VIII the papacy aimed to attach all Christian states to the Holy See by means of a feudal bond. By the time of Innocent III the pope had become a sort of spiritual emperor of the world; just as he ruled the church, he aimed to control the secular world as a fief of Peter. The individual states were to be kept in subordination without destroying their independence. 11 With such objectives in mind Innocent III and other popes created or recognized kingdoms, decided disputes between pretenders, transferred the lands of heretical rulers to princes of the true faith, interfered in the internal affairs of kingdoms, became feudal overlord of many princes in central and western Europe.

The popes were appealed to, to decide between pretenders to the throne, as was Alexander III ( 1159-81) in the case of Poland and as was Innocent III in the case of Hungary and Norway. 12 Innocent III regarded the kingdom of Hungary as having originated by papal action, and the coronation oath of the king recognized the duty of obedience to the Holy See. 13 In Languedoc, during the Albigensian crusade, the legates of Innocent III transferred to the conquerors the seignories of the van-


10 Mirbt, Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums und des romischen Katholizismus, pp. 469-71; Bompard, op. cit., p. 5; Bluntschli, op. cit., pp. 8-9; Nys, Les origins, p. 140; Hauck, Der Gedanke der päpstlichen Weltherrschaft, pp. 39-40; Kaiser, Deutsche Geschichte im Ausgang des Mittelalters, II, 350-53; Poncet, op. cit., pp. 13-18; Smith, op. cit., pp. 45-52; Luchaire, Social France at the Time of Philip Augustus, pp. 142-206.
11 Hergenröther, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte, II, 348; Ficker and Hermelink, Das Mittelalter, pp. 126-27, in Vol. II of Krüger, Handbuch der Kirchengeschichte; Bernheim, op. cit., I, 217-24.
12 Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 289; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 28-29, 454; Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales du Saint-Siège, pp. 68-72.
13 Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales du Sainte-Siège, pp. 63-64, 66-67, 6872; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 464, 555; Flick, The Rise of the Medieval Church, p. 555; Haller, Gregor VII und Innozenz III, in Marks and Müller, Meister der Politik, I, 551-52.

quished heretics. 14 In England the same pope on August 24, 1215, forbade the observance of the Great Charter, which King John had been forced to sign by his nobles, 15 Many kings and princes voluntarily offered to the pope their crowns and lands in order to receive them back as papal fiefs, thus strengthening their claims in a time of political uncertainty. The first example of this seems to be that of Countess Mathilda of Tuscany, who, sometime in the years 1077-80, did homage for all her holdings to Pope Gregory VII. 16 In 1088 Count Pierre de Substantion received from Urban II ( 1088-99), with the title of fief, the county of Maguelonne ( Montpellier), which he had previously offered to Gregory VII. 17 When the count of Barcelona recovered Tarragona from the Moors, he offered his con- quest and also his inheritance to Urban II, and received both back as fiefs. 18 In 1179 Alexander III ( 1159-81) created the kingdom of Portugal and gave it to Duke Alfonso; he and later kings regarded themselves as vassals of the pope and continued to pay him tribute. 19 Poland, which in the eleventh century had paid financial tribute to the papacy, was in the twelfth century declared to be a fief of the papacy by Leszek the Wise ( 11941227), who sought papal protection against the emperor of the

14 Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 289; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 24-28; Luchaire, Innocent III et la croisade des Albigeois, chap. iv, especially pp. 143, 145, 189-91.
15 Mirbt, op. cit., p. 181, bull Etsi carissimus in; Roger of Wendover, Flowers of History, II, 330-34; Bompard, op. cit., p. 5; Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales du Sainte-Siège, pp. 241-45; Adams, History of England from the Norman Conquest to the Death of John, pp. 441; Davis, England under the Normans and Angevins, p. 383; Lingard, History of England, II, 363-65.
16 Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 289; Cambridge Medieval History, V, 104, cites A. Overmann, Gräfin Mathilde von Tuscien, pp. 143-44, which has not been accessible to the writer.
17 Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, II, 290; Georges Goyau, "Montpellier", Catholic Encyclopedia, X, 545.
18 Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 555; R. R. Amado, "Tarragona", Catholic Encyclopedia, XIV, 460.
19 Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 634; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, II, 289; Mariejol , in Lavisse and Rambaud, ibid., p. 669; Neher, article "Portugal" in Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, X, 208; Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales, pp. 5-27.

Holy Roman Empire. The overlordship of the papacy was used by the Polish kings as a means of realizing the international ambitions of the Polish dynasty. 20 In 1204 Peter II ( 1196-1213) of Aragon transformed all his realm into an apostolic fief and came personally to Rome to be crowned by the pope. 21 Johannitza ( Kalojan, 1197-1207), the prince or tsar of Bulgaria, recognized himself as vassal of the Holy See, in hopes of being more successful in overcoming his enemies within his state and resisting the claims of the Byzantine emperor. 22 It is quite clear that, according to papal theory, and to a great extent in practice, " Rome was the source of royal power and regal rights." 23 Even distant Armenia sought protective connection with Rome in the early years of the pontificate of Innocent III, and for a number of years recognized the suzerainty of Rome. 24 In 1213 John Lackland agreed to pay to the pope a tribute of 1,000 marks and to do him homage as suzerain for the crown of England. 25

It was the pope and his officials who claimed the right to supervise the diplomacy and international relations of the medieval states. Religion was the only bond uniting the medieval peoples of central and western Europe; it permeated all their

20 Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 415; Kaindl, Polen, p. 19; Zivier, Polen, pp. 28-29; Phillips, Poland, p. 23.
21 Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales, pp. 50-58; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 290; Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 633; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 411, 555; Haller, op. cit., I, 551.
22 Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 290; Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 510; Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales, pp. 94-106; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 30, 31; Haller, op. cit., I, 551-52; Zöpffel-Mirbt, article "Innocent III"," in Herzog- Hauck , Realencyklopädie, IX, 118.
23 Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales, p. 106; Jastrow and Winter, op. cit., II, 239-40.
24 Haller, op. cit., I, 552; Petermann-Gelzer, article "Armenien"," in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie, II, 81; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 16; Flick, Decline of the Medieval Church, I, 6.
25 Roger of Wendover, op. cit., II, 268-70; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., II, 290; Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 488; Cambirdge Medieval History, VI, 237, 555; Haller, op. cit., I, 546-47; Zöpffel-Mirbt, in Herzog-Hauck, op. cit., IX, 118-19; Bompard, op. cit., p. 8; Barry, The Papal Monarchy, p. 322; Luchaire, Innocent III, les royautés vassales, chap. iv, especially pp. 224-25.

relations and was invoked to serve as a guaranty to international contracts. Many treaties between states were concluded under papal mediation, or, when possible, under the high mediation of a council of the church. The place where ambassadors met, or where important treaties were drawn up, or where an important convention was officially or publicly executed, must in the Middle Ages be a place consecrated to religion, whether it be a church, a chapel, a sacristy, an episcopal palace, the great hall of an abbey, or the lighted choir of a cathedral church. 26 As an innovation in this respect Philip IV ( 12851314) of France sometimes received important embassies in his royal residence, the Louvre. 27

Co-ordinate with papal influence in negotiating and executing treaties was the influence of churchmen in diplomatic negotiations, due partly to the fact that only churchmen (or at least few laymen) could read and write and keep records and partly to the fact that churchmen commanded great respect and influence in their respective communities. The more important an embassy, the higher the rank of ecclesiastical officials that accompanied it; at times all the diplomatic commissioners were clerics. In signing diplomatic documents bishops and clerics, as members of the first estate, had precedence over laymen. Every diplomatic deputation contained a priest with the special title of "chaplain"; it was his rôle to take charge of the religious ceremonies connected with the negotiation and conclusion of treaties. Ambassadorial interviews, the conclusion of treaties, and discussions between several crowned heads were usually placed under the patronage and supreme direction of a prelate, preferably the bishop of the diocese in which the interview or negotiations occurred. Although the prelate did not take part in the negotiations and his name was not mentioned directly in the protocol, his presence might be indicated in the other texts incident to the negotiations. 28

26 Funck-Bretano, "Le caractère religieux de la diplomatie du moyen âge"," Revue d'histoire diplomatique, I, 115-17.
27 Ibid., p. 116.
28 Ibid., pp. 117-18.

Once the diplomats had assembled, the negotiations were preceded by religious ceremonies or prayers. When the negotiations had been concluded and if the treaty was of great importance, the negotiators met in the choir of a church, richly decorated with flags and abundantly lighted. The bishops appeared in their pontifical garments. Mass was celebrated; all the negotiating officials were absolved from their sins in the name of the sovereign pontiff. In frequent cases the principal negotiators took communion; and, after touching the cross and the Gospels, each swore in the name of the prince he represented to observe faithfully the concluded treaty. The negotiators preferred to complete an important negotiation on a religious feast day. 29 The relations between two enemy crowns were re-established ordinarily under the mediation of the pope, who in this way naturally gave direction to the negotiations. Although Philip IV had been almost constantly in contest with the papacy, he did not neglect, in the course of his long and laborious discussions with the English king, to have recourse to pontifical legates. 30

Since treaties between sovereigns secured their validity by virtue of being negotiated in the shadow of the church, surrounded by sacred ceremonies and confirmed by an oath, a religious vow, the pope also claimed the right to annul such treaties or free one of the parties from observing his oath ( Novit ille). 31 The fact that the pope was an international figure, and not connected with the nations concerned, gave greater effectiveness to his claim. When, during the Hundred Years' War, Philip ( 1419-67), Duke of Burgundy, signed the solemn Treaty of Arras, September 21, 1435, and arranged under the direction of two papal legates to co-operate with Charles VII ( 1422-61) of France against the English, these two legates released Philip from the oath that he had taken in 1419 to support the Eng-

29 Ibid., p. 118.
30 Ibid., p. 125.
31 Mirbt, op. cit., pp. 117-18; Bompard, op. cit., pp. 5-6; Heffter, Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, p. 20; Nys, Les origins, pp. 215, 269-70; W. Ernest Beet, article "Oath"," in James Hastings, Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, IX, 435.

lish. 32 Although it cannot be proved that Clement VII ( 152334) expressly released Francis I ( 1515-47) of France from his oath to observe the Treaty of Madrid which he signed, under duress, with Charles V ( 1519-58) in 1525, 33 the pope did even better: he formed a league with the French king and Venice against the emperor, Charles V, in order to free Italy from imperial domination. 34 Clement VI ( 1342-52) wrote to the Bishop of Verceil that conventions concluded to the prejudice to the states of the Holy See were null, even when confirmed by an oath, since an oath must not be a bond of iniquity. 35 The same pope granted to the confessors of the kings of France the power to free them from all vows that they found inconvenient to keep. 36 Julius II ( 1503-13) permitted Ferdinand ( 1479-1516) the Catholic to violate the obligation that he owed to Louis XII ( 1498-1515) of France. Charles V begged the pope to release him from his oath to maintain the privileges that were enjoyed by the Spanish Cortes. 37 Papal annulments of treaties were actually so frequent that later the negotiators took the precaution of stipulating that it would not be possible to be freed from one's oath by Rome. 38 The most significant precaution taken by negotiators against papal annulment of oaths accompanying the signing of a treaty occurred in 1648, when the Catholic and

32 Nys, Les origins, pp. 267-69; Lavisse, Histoire de France depuis les origins jusqu'à la Révolution, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 78; C. W. Oman, Political History of England from the Accession of Richard II to the Death of Richard III, pp. 275-76, 321-23; Leonard V. D. Owen , The Connection between England and Burgundy during the First Half of the Fifteenth Century, pp. 55, 71-72; article "Philippe Bourgogne"," in Hoefer, Nouvelle biographie générale, XXXIX, 983.
33 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 430, n. 1; Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, Vol. IV, Part II, p. 208, n. 3; Bompard, op. cit., p. 6.
34 Nys, Les origins, pp. 215-16; Pastor, op. cit., Vol. IV, Part 2, pp. 208-11; Lavisse, op. cit., Vol. V, Part 2, pp. 48-51.
35 Nys, Les origins, p. 215.
36 Nys, Les origins, p. 215. For underlying political reasons for this policy see Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 286-90, 297-98; Wright, op. cit., p. 110.
37 Hume, Spain, Its Greatness and Decay, 1479-1788, p. 82; Klüber, Europäisches Völkerrecht, I, 250, n. b.
38 Bompard, op. cit., p. 6; Nys, Les origins, p. 271; Klüber, op. cit., I, 250-51.

Protestant princes that signed the Peace of Westphalia agreed that the treaty was to stand regardless of papal protests. 39

In medieval international relations, canon law and the decisions of the pope were the only authority. Sovereigns and their lay advisers did not, as yet, have any consciousness of their reciprocal relations as leaders and members of individual states in an international political society. The community of religious belief between states was the only bond of union. The Holy See was the sole superior power that had to be obeyed by the kings, princes, and Christian people. The popes were the judges of the law between sovereigns; they gave orders to terminate wars and to submit the disputes in question to the papal tribunal, as when Innocent III in 1199 ordered Philip Augustus ( 1180-1223) of France and Richard I ( 1189-99) of England to stop their wars and submit their difference to him. 40 During the Hundred Years' War the popes intervened frequently on behalf of the kings of France, and in the fifteenth century continually exhorted the kings of both England and France to terminate their horrible struggle. 41

The popes disposed of territories and settled disagreements resulting from the right of occupation and discovery. Alexander VI ( 1492-1503), by establishing the papal lines of demarcation of 1493 and 1494, partitioned the colonial world between the Portuguese and the Spanish. 42 Such a remarkable exercise of papal secular power had numerous precedents. Alexander II ( 1061-73) had blessed William the Conqueror's ( 1066-87) inva-

39 See below, chaps. iv-x.
40 Adams, op. cit., p. 385; Lavisse, op. cit., Vol. III, Part I, pp. 119-20; Bompard, op. cit., p. 6.
41 Lingard, op. cit., III, 114, 115, 128, 149-50, 161-62, 176, 183-84, 515; IV, 46-47; Cambridge Medieval History, VII, 345, 347, 357, 365, 579; Catholic Encyclopedia, II, 431; IV, 23; VI, 799; VIII, 19; XV, 217; Nys, Les origins, pp. 266-67; Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII, 1334-1342, pp. 26-69.
42 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 358; Pastor, op. cit., Vol. III, Part I, pp. 619-22; Abbott , The Expansion of Europe, I, 99-101; Bourne, Essays in Historical Criticism, pp. 193-217; also in Yale Review, I, 35-55; Supan, Die territoriale Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien, pp. 14-18; Nys, Les origins, pp. 370-72.

sion of England in 1066, though the English king rejected the idea of feudal dependency on the pope. 43 Adrian IV ( 1154-59) disposed of Ireland as though it belonged to him and gave Henry II ( 1154-89) of England permission to conquer it. This grant was later renewed by Alexander III ( 1159-81). 44 Some authorities state that in gratitude for help against Frederick Barbarossa ( 1155-90) Pope Alexander III ( 1159-81) invested Venice with the dominion of the sea by presenting to the doge a ring as a symbol of the union of Venice and the sea, and that the pope instituted the celebrated national Festival of the Wedding of the doge to the Adriatic Sea. 45 This, however, is merely a legend, developed undoubtedly to give added importance to the ring ceremony of the festival. This festival was celebrated long before the pontificate of Alexander III. 46 Nevertheless, the development of the legend is significant; its affirmation is in harmony with the current idea of papal power to bestow such authority. In 1264 Urban IV ( 1261-64) offered, as an incentive to King Ottokar II ( 1213-78) of Bohemia, full possession of all lands that he could conquer, through a crusade at the expense of the heathen Slavs on the Baltic Sea (Russians and Lithuanians), to the east of the lands of the Teutonic Order in Prussia. 47 In 1344 Clement VI ( 1342-52) bestowed on the Castilian prince Louis de la Cerda sovereignty over the Canary Islands,

43 William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of England from the Earliest Period to the Reign of King Stephen, p. 273; Stenton, William the Conqueror and the Rule of the Normans, p. 161; Hodgkin, History of England from the Earliest Times to the Norman Conquest, pp. 475-76; Adams, op. cit., p. 49; James F. Loughlin, article "Alexander II"," in Catholic Encyclopedia, I, 286; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 554.
44 Roger of Wendover, op. cit., I, 523; Nys, Les origins, pp. 369-70; Bompard, op. cit., p. 7, n. 3; E. A. D'Alton, "Ireland"," Catholic Encyclopedia, VIII, 101; Arthur W. Clerigh , "Adrian IV"," ibid., I, 158-59; Curtis, History of Medieval Ireland, pp. 68-69; Dunlop, Ireland from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, p. 27.
45 Smith, The Seven Ages of Venice, p. 70; Brown, Venice, an Historical Sketch of the Republic, pp. 110-11; Nys, Les origins, pp. 379-80; A. J. Valentinelli (Neher), article "Venedig" in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., XII, 657-58.
46 A. J. Valentinelli (Neher), op. cit., XII, 657-58; see also H. Reuter, Geschichte Alexanders III., III, 328-29.
47 Lorenz, Geschichte König Ottokars II. von Böhmen und seine Zeit, p. 264; Bompard, op. cit., p. 7, n. 3, gives the date as 1260.

with the title of a prince of Fortunia, in consideration of an annual tribute, although Louis was not able actually to secure possession thereof in the face of the later activities of the Portuguese. 48 The Portuguese prince Henry the Navigator ( 13941460) demanded of Martin V ( 1417-31) the investiture of the Portuguese discoveries. Compliance with this request occurred under Eugene IV ( 1431-47), who in 1443 granted the Portuguese all the lands that were to be discovered from Cape Bojadore and Cape Non (in northwest Africa) to the mainland of India. This was confirmed by Nicholas V ( 1447-55) in 1454, on consideration that Christianity should be introduced in these lands. 49 In 1452 Nicholas V, by virtue of his apostolic authority, granted to Alphonso V ( 1438-81) of Portugal the right of attacking, subjugating, and reducing to perpetual servitude Saracens, the pagans, and the other infidel enemies of Christ; he permitted the king to seize and appropriate their property. 50

International jurisdiction was claimed also by church councils, which could judge an emperor; in 1245 Frederick II was called by Innocent IV before the Council of Lyons and deposed, which deposition was not, however, effective. 51 A council could also depose a heretical prince and dispose of his states; the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215 gave the lands of Raymond VI ( 1195-1223) of Toulouse to Simon de Montfort. 52

Besides possessing the Papal States in full sovereignty, the church possessed, and could collect the income from, ecclesiasti-

48 Nys, Les origins, p. 370; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 354-55; Pastor, op. cit., I, 95; Bourne, op. cit., p. 194, n. 1.
49 Nys, Les origins, p. 370; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 355; Pastor, op. cit., I, 632, n. 1.
50 Nys, Les origins, p. 370; Bourne, op. cit., pp. 194-95.
51 Bompard, op. cit., p. 7; Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 590-91; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 105, 108, 159, 356; Jastrow and Winter, op. cit., II, 522-23; Georges Goyau, op. cit., IX, 477.
52 Bompard, op. cit., p. 7; Hergenröther, op. cit., II, 558-59; Cambridge Medieval History, VI, 27, 126; Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 670.

cal lands in each Roman Catholic state. The church could collect tithes on the income from real property. It could raise taxes from the national clergy for crusading purposes. However, the effort of the papacy since the Third and Fourth Lateran Councils ( 1179, 1215) to secure the exemption of the clergy from state taxes, and culminating in the bull Clercis laicos of Boniface VIII in 1296, was not successful. 53


Thus, in the fields of public and private law and international relations in medieval times the papacy, although not unlimited, was dominant. Politics were an inseparable part of a unified theocracy. The papacy, although essentially a religious institution, was also a political power, having in each state a hierarchy of agents, with numerous privileges, enjoying considerable authority, having special tribunals, owning extensive property, claiming the right to raise taxes, the right to render justice in civil matters, of making laws directly applicable to the subjects of every prince.

This political power, all the more easily obeyed since it was based on a religious faith widely spread, was the preponderating influence that directed the temporal affairs of all European nations, in both internal and external matters. It was with this extensive power of the popes over politics that all sovereigns had to reckon; against it all had to struggle. 54


It is beyond the purpose of this treatise to discuss whether the dominance of the medieval church over the states was fortunate or not. It is true, as Laurent points out, 55 that from the standpoint of governing efficiency, and broad social and moral outlook, the church was superior to the secular states, whose power physical force, and whose lack of constructive ideals and leadership only accentuated the social disorder following the decline of the Roman Empire. The church, through its governing authority, exercised over medieval society a moral, civilizing, and stabilizing influence. But by its very nature this dominance was transitory. The church was carrying on an educative process; it was exercising a tutelage that must terminate when the peoples had reached their majority. The church did not understand it thus; it continued to claim absolute power by virtue of divine law. 56 Our discussion thus far has been concerned with papal claims and their application to the political life of medieval Europe. The remaining chapters of this treatise will show how, coincident with the internal decline of the church and the papacy, the secular states, becoming more conscious of their power, rejected the claims of the papacy to control their internal and external affairs, and put into practice the theory of secularized politics. We are dealing here with a long struggle, the papacy gradually declining in political power but continuing to assert its claims to political authority for many centuries--in fact, until the third decade of the twentieth century. On the other hand, during these half-dozen centuries the secular states effectively increase their control over politics. The states themselves determine the scope and objectives of politics. The states regulate their own internal affairs and even control religious matters when reasons of state require it, and the states regulate their own international life regardless of papal attitudes and protests.


The most important papal decrees are the following:

1. By Innocent III ( 1198-1216): "Solitae" ( 1200); "Venerabilem" ( 1202); "Novite ille" ( 1204); the bull "Etsi carissimus in" ( August 24, 1215), which annulled the Great Charter.

2. By Innocent IV ( 1243-54): "Ad apostolicae" ( 1245).

56 Laurent, op. cit.

3. By Boniface VIII ( 1294-1303): "Clericis laicos" ( 1296); "Ausculta fili" ( 1301); "Unam sanctam" ( 1302).
4. By Benedict XI ( 1303-4): "Quod olim" ( 1304).
5. By Clement V ( 1305-14): "Meruit" ( 1306); "Romani pontificis" ( 1311); "Pastoralis" ( 1311).
6. By John XXII ( 1316-34): "Si futrum" ( 1316); "De consuetudine" ( 1322).
7. Most important of all, the bull "In coena domini", found as early as the pontificate of Honorius III ( 1216-27) and Gregory IX ( 1227-49), published annually after the pontificate of Urban V ( 1362-70) until its publication was discontinued by Clement XIV ( 1769-74) in 1770, and finally abrogated by Pius IX ( 1846-78) in the constitution "Apostolicae Sedis" ( 1869). 57

57 See the following: Nys, "Le droit international et la papauté"," Revue de droit international, X, 510-13; Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, II, 206-17; Bompard, op. cit., p. 4; Mirbt, op. cit., pp. 175-78, 183, 196-97, 208-9, 210, 211, 211-12, 455-56; in Catholic Encyclopedia, VII, 718, article "In coena domini"," by John Prior; VIII, 14, article "Innocent III"," by Michael Ott; I, 127-28, article "Ad apostolicae"," by M. Riordan; IV, 50, article "Clericis laicos"," by J. F. Laughlin; II, 112, 666, articles "Ausculta fili"," by M. Riordan, and "Boniface VIII"," by Thomas Oestreich; XV, 12627, article "Unam sanctam"," by J. P. Kirsch; Wright, op. cit., pp. 18-50.

Chapter Two

T HE papacy could keep control of politics only so long as it remained strong and the European monarchies remained weak. Papal control of secular affairs in the late Middle Ages had often been resented by the monarchs and their supporters; there had been frequent clashes over opposing claims to authority. When, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the papacy degenerated spiritually and morally, the states were aggressively active in asserting their independence of the church in political affairs, and even assumed control of religious affairs as well. During the Babylonian captivity of the church, the Great Schism, and the era of church councils the papacy declined spiritually and morally; this circumstance gave the aggressive secular rulers an opportunity to assert their independence of the papacy in political affairs and also to assume increasing control of religious matters.

During the Babylonian captivity ( 1309-77) the papacy was not at Rome but at Avignon, on the southeastern border of France in the Rhone Valley. The French kings dominated and directed papal policy. This roused nationalist opposition in other Roman Catholic countries and undermined the universal, international position of the papacy. Numerous criticisms were directed against the popes, owing to the extravagance and luxury of their court, the increase in papal financial exactions, and papal efforts to further personal and family interests. The theologians at the courts of the secular powers criticized the church and its broad claims; the princes rejected papal claims to authority to judge secular matters and increasingly exercised state jurisdiction over ecclesiastical affairs. 1

This decline in papal influence was intensified when an attempt was made to take the papacy back to Rome and keep it there. This led to the Great Schism ( 1378-1417), when for a time there were two popes, a Roman pope and a French pope at Avignon. An effort to heal the Schism by the General Church Council (Synod) of Pisa ( 1409) resulted in the creation of a third pope, a conciliar pope being added to the other two. It was not until 1417 that a second council, meeting at Constance ( 1414-18), healed the Schism and once more united Roman Catholic Christendom.

But the Schism had done irreparable damage. It ruined the unity of Roman Christendom. Some nations adhered to one pope; some to the other. The laity, already overburdened, now had two papal courts to maintain. Neither the Roman pope nor the anti-pope conducted himself in an exemplary manner, giving offense by various policies and acts. Each pope, to procure needed revenues, imposed crushing burdens on the churches of the lands obedient to him, or resorted to the sale of church offices. In many dioceses there was doubt as to which of the two bishops (appointed by the two opposing popes) was the legal incumbent. Everywhere could be heard not only complaints from the people against this situation but doubts, and even denials, that the papacy was a divine institution. Learned doctors of law at the University of Paris (such as Heinrich von Langenstein, vice-chancellor, and Jean Charles Gerson) and Cardinal Francesco Zabarella expressed the opinion that only a general council, which is superior to a pope, could heal the Schism or reform the church. This doctrine was maintained also

1 Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, I, 67-119; Hergenröther, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte, III, 1-50, 61-64; Seppelt, Papstgeschichte, II, 9-36; Chénon, Histoire des rapports, pp. 113-17; Flick, Decline of the Medieval Church, I, 59-245; Hergenröther, article "Avignon", in Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, I, 1758-59; J. P. Kirsch, article "Reformation", in Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 701; Goyau, Histoire religieuse, Vol. VI, in Hanotaux, Histoire de la nation franc+?aise, pp. 280-86, 287-91.

by the Council of Basel ( 1431-49). A secular ruler, the Emperor Sigismund of Germany ( 1410-37), had been most influential in persuading the Pisan or conciliar pope, John XXIII ( 1410-15), to summon the Council of Constance. In many other respects the power of the secular rulers was enlarged at the expense of the ecclesiastical authority and privileges. 2

Church reform, so imperatively needed after the devastating, blighting influence of the Babylonian captivity and the Great Schism, was not successfully undertaken by either the popes or the councils of Basel ( 1431-49) and Ferrara-Florence ( 1438-45), two further councils called to institute reform. Between 1450 and 1521 the popes concerned themselves less with religious affairs than with such Renaissance activities as humanism, the promotion of art and science, the collection of books, manuscripts, works of art, and precious gems, and the building of libraries and palaces. The pontiffs were deeply concerned with the enrichment of their relatives, and especially with Italian and European politics, the aggrandizement of the Papal States. Their neglect of their duties as spiritual leaders was reflected in the general degradation of the clergy. Neither the popes nor the clergy could check the decline that made possible the disruptive Reformation movement. 3

Coincident with the decline of the papacy in religious and moral influence in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the

2 Pastor, op. cit., I, 120-227; also article "Papacy", in Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 14th ed.), XVII, 208; Hergenröther, Handbuch, III, 62-66, 96-195; Chénon, op. cit., pp. 117-36; Seppelt, op. cit., II, 37-51; Kaser, Deutsche Geschichte im Ausgang des Mittelalters, II, 358; Louis Salembier, article "Schism", in Catholic Encyclopedia, XIII, 53941; J. P. Kirsch, article "Reformation", Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 701; Wurm, article "Schisma", in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., X, 1794- 1805; Flick, op. cit., II, 3-397; Goyau, op. cit., pp. 295-304.
3 Pastor, op. cit., I, 317-25, 335-58, 513-70; II, 23-38, 210-14, 318-54, 655-710; III, Part I, 3-203, 284-99, 317-20, 519-31, 562-656; III, Part II, 896-1041; IV, Part I, 3-8, 55-77, 199-246, 350-558, 608-9; Chénon, op. cit., pp. 135-36; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 197-252, 257-306; Seppelt, op. cit., II, 51-89; Flick, op. cit., II, 398-483; J. P. Kirsch , article "Reformation", Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 700-701.

nations of western Europe were evolving legal theories of national independence and self-sufficiency. When at the Council of Constance the delegates voted according to nationalities, the medieval idea of unity had come to an end. 4 Hereafter, the nations of France, England, and Spain, and the states of Germany and other western European countries definitely formulated new theories of power. These governments asserted the modern theory of state sovereignty that the state must be absolute and supreme in controlling all domains of human activity. The bases of this assertion lay in the old Roman law, emphasized anew during the Renaissance, and the formulation of the theory of the divine right of kings. 5 Secular society was being permeated with a growing feeling of self-reliance, an increasing claim to full political power. The secular princes declared their desire to have absolute control over their own temporal affairs and also to exert authority over the church and its affairs. The princes had overcome the opposition of the feudal lords; they had restricted the autonomy of the cities; and it was a natural next step to demand that the clergy should also become submissive to state authority. 6 The princes were supported in their designs by writings of such thinkers as Marsiglius of Padua ( 1270-1342), who, in his Defensor pacis, demanded full subordination of the church to the state. During the era of the Great Schism and the church councils, the idea influenced not merely the temporal rulers but also the clergy. 7

4 Wylie, The Council of Constance to the Death of John Huss, pp. 63-65; Andreas, Deutschland vor der Reformation, p. 29; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 146; Barry, The Papal Monarchy, pp. 58-59.
5 Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 92-95; Pastor, op. cit., II, 103-4; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 61-62, 294-301; Hill, History of Diplomacy, I, 374-75; Kaser, op. cit., II, 245-58, 350, 354, 358; Chénon, in Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire générale, III, 343-44; Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, pp. 1-16, 38-176; Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century, pp. 268-70, 367-93; Esmein, Cours élémentaire d'histoire du droit franc+?aise, pp. 381-85, 390-92.
6 Kaser, op. cit., II, 376; J. P. Kirsch, article "Reformation", in Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 701.
7 Previté-Orton, The Defensor pacis of Marsiglius of Padua, Introduction, pp. xviixxiv; Figgis, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Kaser, op. cit., II, 377; Murray, The History of Political Science from Plato to the Present, pp. 81-83, 86-87; L. Salambier, article "Marsiglius ofPadua"

In harmony with such ideas and tendencies the states, during the Great Schism and the era of church councils, not only restricted the power of the ecclesiasts over secular matters but even assumed control over ecclesiastical affairs themselves. They limited clerical privileges, restricted ecclesiastical taxing powers, deprived the church of its properties, and tried to make the income of the church and the monasteries dependent on the will of the state. 8 Even before the Babylonian captivity the English government enacted the Statute of Mortmain ( 1279), forbidding (without royal license) the alienation of land from the jurisdiction of the civil power by appropriating it to religious purposes. The withdrawing of land from the obligation to pay taxes and feudal dues was thus checked. In spite of the extravagant claims of Boniface VIII in his bulls Clericis laicos and Unam sanctam, the English and French monarchs continued to tax the clergy and regulate church affairs. The Statutes of Provisors ( 1351 and 1390) forbade appointment to English benefices by the pope, and the Statutes of Praemunire ( 1353, 1366, 1393) took away the right of the English subjects to appeal cases from English courts to the papal court. To be sure, these statutes were not fully executed, and they did not correct the abuses at which they were aimed; but the mere enactment thereof and their partial observance indicate the tendency toward the primacy of the state; they signify that the state was beginning to assume control of church affairs. 9

The humiliating consequences of the era of the Great Schism

Padua, in Catholic Encyclopedia, IX, 719-20, Wurm, article "Marsilius von Padua", in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., VIII, 907-11; Sander, article "Marsiglius von Padua", in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie, XII, 368-71.
8 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 63-66, 295-301.
9 Smith, Age of the Reformation, pp. 41-42; Adams and Stephens, Select Documents of English Constitutional History, pp. 71-72, 117-21, 123-24, 150-52, 156-59; Tout, History of England from the Accession of Henry III to the Death of Edward III, pp. 377-78, 426; Oman, History of England from the Accession of Richard II to the Death of Richard III, pp. 120-21; Lingard, History of England, III, 254-65, 538; Capes, The English Church in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries, pp. 89, 91, 161, 170; Charles W. Sloane, articles "Provisors" and "Mortmain", Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 516; X, 580; Herbert Thurston , article "England", Catholic Encyclopedia, V, 440.

were manifested in the concessions to the secular rulers made by the popes in various concordats with France in 1516, and with the German emperor in 1448, and especially in the concessions made to many German princes and to the Spanish monarchs. It was necessary for the papacy to make these concessions because it needed political allies. It had lost its prestige as spiritual ruler of the world and wished to maintain its political influence as an Italian and European power.

When, in 1516, Leo X ( 1513-21) signed the concordat of Bologna with Francis I ( 1515-47), the French kings were granted the right of presenting candidates for the higher church offices, the pope having the right of approval. 10 To be sure, this concordat abrogated the unilateral Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges ( 1438), whereby the French king had controlled church affairs to an even greater extent, 11 and it was necessary for Francis I to coerce the parlement of Paris and the Sorbonne to accept the concordat. 12 But the influence of the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges persisted as an effective factor in the demand for Gallican (or French) church liberties. 13 However, after the concordat of 1516 had been signed, the French king had power to appoint more than six hundred archbishops, bishops, and abbots, who controlled lands, the incomes of which approached that of the state itself. 14 The French king was master of the French church and could exert an influence in matters of belief. 15 Unquestionably, after receiving such concessions, it

10 Pastor, op. cit., IV, Part I, 580-82; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 292, 297; Chénon, op. cit., 138; Barry, The Papacy and Modern Times, pp. 96-97; Leo A. Kelley, Catholic Encyclopedia, IV, 203; Lavisse, Histoire de France depuis les origins, V, Part I, 253-54; Esmein, op. cit., pp. 713-15; Smith, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Goyau, op. cit., pp. 326-28.
11 Pastor, op. cit., I, 342-43; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 292, 295-97; Chénon, op. cit., pp. 129-32, 138-43; Nys, Les origins, pp. 31-43; Cambridge Modern History, I, 388; Creighton, History of the Papacy, V, 263-66; Esmein, op. cit., pp. 711-12; Smith, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
12 Pastor, op. cit., IV, Part I, 566-88; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 297; Esmein, op. cit., p. 716.
13 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 728.
14 Pastor, op. cit., IV, Part I, 589.
15 Ibid., pp. 589-91; Lavisse, op. cit., VI, Part I, 258-59; Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., IV, 175.

was to the advantage of the French kings to remain Catholic; however, as will be shown later in this chapter, the French monarchs abused the privileges granted them in the concordat. 16

Long before the concordat of 1516 had been concluded with France, the papacy, through its superior diplomatic skill, and by exploiting the lack of unanimity of the German princes and the selfishness of the emperor Frederick III ( 1440-93), was able to negotiate the concordat of Vienna ( 1448), which was designed to regulate the religious affairs of the German Empire. Unlike the French concordat, the concordat of Vienna did not greatly restrict the rights of the church, but guaranteed to the cathedral and monastic chapters the right freely to elect bishops and abbots, gave the papacy the right of confirming such elections, and re-established papal financial rights. 17

Nevertheless, the concordat of Vienna did not prevent Frederick III from subsequently securing great powers of nominating candidates for bishoprics and other benefices. The papacy was likewise compelled to make concessions to many of the individual German princes and secure their support by granting them a share in filling benefices and power to tax and judge the clergy. In Brandenburg, Jülich-Cleve, Saxony, the Austrian hereditary lands, in the lesser German states, and the free cities the secular power secured influence in the administration of church lands. The temporal rulers, before the Reformation, increasingly controlled church affairs, thus preparing the way for the confiscation of church lands in Reformation times. During the era of the church councils ( 1409-49) the need for reform was so great that only the state seemed capable of adequately looking after church interests. With the consent of the church the German secular rulers tried to root out clerical avarice, immorality, and neglect of duty. They forbade the sale of the sac-

16 Pastor, op. cit., IV, Part I, 590; Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., IV, 174.
17 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 238; Andreas, op. cit., pp. 32-33; Catholic Encyclopedia, IV, 203; Hergenröther, in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., III, 826-28; G. Voigt, article "Frederick III", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, VII, 449; Kraus, Deutsche Geschichte im Ausgang des Mittelalters, I, 199-200; Smith, op. cit., p. 45.

raments, regulated the charges for church services, used threats of force to elevate monastic life, and supervised and regulated the economic life of the monasteries.

The secular rulers and the German cities also assumed increasing control over affairs that had formerly been under the exclusive control of the church, such as matters pertaining to wills and marriage, the regulation of beggars, the care of the poor and sick, supervision of morals, social life, parochial and monastic education, and the rigorous prosecution of blasphemers. These states maintained purity of the faith by taking measures against religious improprieties, such as excesses in pilgrimages, the sale of indulgences, and belief in alleged miracles. It was no longer unusual for the temporal authorities to insist that their assent (placet) was necessary for the publication of ecclesiastical decrees. Some rulers, such as the dukes of Jülich and Berg, arranged religious thanksgiving and memorial services without consulting the ecclesiastical authorities. They even went so far as to determine religious ceremonial details, such as restricting the length of sermons or regulating the tolling of church bells. Although in many respects the administration of ecclesiastical affairs became an integral part of the administration of the secular state, the sovereigns had no intention of weakening the rights of the ecclesiastical authorities; the aim was to co-operate with the clergy in achieving church reform. 18

By the end of the Middle Ages the church no longer exercised complete monopolistic control over education; efforts were already under way to restrict ecclesiastical supervision of schools. It was apparent that the state would become increasingly assertive in its control over education. 19

In the fifteenth century the "Catholic Kings" of Spain skilfully exploited the circumstances of the times to achieve extensive control of church affairs. Ferdinand V ( 1479-1516) secured the right to nominate all the higher church officers and used the

18 Kaser, op. cit., II, 354-83; Andreas, op. cit., pp. 33-34; Pastor, op. cit., II, 616-19; Smith, op. cit., pp. 45-46.
19 Andreas, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

Inquisition for political purposes; Ferdinand's prime minister, Cardinal Ximenez, conducted in Spain the most thoroughgoing reform of the church in pre-Reformation times. 20

In Italy the secular powers assumed great responsibility in the administration of ecclesiastical matters, especially in Venice, Milan, Florence, and Naples. The papacy had to be willing to make such concessions in order to secure the political aid of the Italian states in regaining and keeping control of the Papal States during the uncertain times of the Babylonian captivity, the Great Schism, the era of the church councils, and the rivalries of the French and Spanish houses for dominance in Italy during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 21

The pre-Reformation tendencies in the direction of state control of church affairs were naturally heightened during the Reformation, not only in Protestant lands but in Catholic countries as well. In Germany, through the influence of Luther, the idea was applied that the right of ecclesiastical oversight belongs to the supreme territorial secular authority, this including provisions for state support of the ministry, for the maintenance of schools, and for the care of the poor. It was felt that only the state, through its supervision and final authority, could prevent the ecclesiastical abuses and excesses of the past. This idea was based on the Roman civil code. In other countries of the Reformation (in Scandinavia, Switzerland, Holland, England) the church became more or less subject to the state. 22 In England the Reformation under Henry VIII ( 1509-47) was a forcible reform of the church by the state. Henry VIII's wish was to make himself emperor and pope. In the later changes, in the time of Edward VI ( 1547-53) and Elizabeth ( 1558-1603), it

20 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 297-98; Pastor, op. cit., II, 623.
21 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 42-46, 65, 298.
22 Kaser, op. cit., II1-31; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 432; Lindsay, History of the Reformation, I, 400-416; II, 7-9; Pfannkuche, Staat und Kirche, pp. 2-11; Waring, The Political Theories of Martin Luther, pp. 61-134.

was the state that determined religious institutions and practices. 23

The Reformation led to caesaropapism in Catholic lands as well as in those breaking away from papal control. In France the state soon went beyond the powers granted by the concordat of 1516.

Before and during the Council of Trent ( 1545-63) complaints were made that the French secular power hindered the execution of papal rescripts; imposed, on its own authority, a tithe on the clergy; settled disputes concerning church benefices; and subjected church decrees to state approval. 24 Francis I tried to prevent the calling of the Council of Trent; that having failed, the French delegates assumed an arrogant, presumptuous attitude during the sessions of the Council and did their best to thwart its purpose. The Council's disciplinary decrees were condemned by the French government as being contrary to Gallican church liberties. 25 French ecclesiastical assemblies, which were usually held every two years, frequently requested the king and the Estates-General fully to recognize the decrees of the Council of Trent; but the third estate, represented by advocates, objected. 26 In the time of Louis XIII ( 1610-43) and Richelieu ( 1624-42) the French government fixed the place and date of the clerical assemblies, changed the course of the de-

23 Fisher, The History of England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of Henry VIII, pp. 309-29; Pollard, The History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth, pp. 14-24, 66-79, 201-18, 354-72; Lingard, op. cit., IV, 55760; V, 19-23, 49-57, 91-123, 249-58; VI, 6-8; in Catholic Encyclopedia, articles "England" and "Henry VIII", V, 442-44, 445-49; VII, 223-75; Smith, op. cit., pp. 288-94, 310, 329.
24 Ehses, "Franz I. von Frankreich und die Konzilsfrage in den Jahren 1536-1539", Römische Quartalschrift, XII, 313; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 728.
25 Ehses, "Franz I., etc.", Römische Quartalschrift, XII, 306-23; Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 728; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 61-62, 65-66, 76-77, 157-62, 169-70, 236-37, 362; J. P. Kirsch , article "Trent", Catholic Encyclopedia, XV, 30-35; Knöpfler, article "Concil von Trent", in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., XI, 2038-2115, especially col. 2114; Goyau, op. cit., pp. 370, 392.
26 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 728.

liberations, and forbade the holding of church assemblies and councils without royal permission. 27

Louis XIV ( 1643-1715) regulated church affairs almost as if he were a Justinian. His parlementary courts and his Grand Council adjudicated all ecclesiastical affairs, except questions of dogma and purely spiritual matters. The church was treated with favor and enjoyed numerous privileges only by reason of yielding to the state all authority in temporal or mixed affairs. 28

The culmination of state control of religious affairs in France occurred in 1790, when the National Constituent Assembly drew up and applied the Civil Constitution of the Clergy. 29

In Spain the successors of Ferdinand the Catholic augmented royal control over ecclesiastical affairs. Charles V (king of Spain, 1516-56) secured a complete and permanent right of presentation and patronage for all archiepiscopal and episcopal offices in Spain. The Spanish state secured the right of appointing most of the other holders of profitable benefices. The state increased its power of supervising ecclesiastical jurisdiction. The royal authority tenaciously held the right of examining every papal decree concerning Spain and Naples, and to declare those decrees invalid that were contrary to the laws and customs of these kingdoms. Such offending papal decrees were merely withheld. The Spanish monarchy greatly increased the wealth of the church, and, with papal consent, taxed it for state purposes, often for crusades; and at times such income was diverted to other purposes. The Inquisition was also used to keep the Spanish clergy obedient to the state. Philip II ( 1556-98) misused the Inquisition for political purposes. Since two-thirds

27 Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit.,V, 345; Boudinhon, article "Laicization," Catholic Encyclopedia, VIII, 746.
28 A. Boudinhon, "Laicization," Catholic Encyclopedia, VIII, 746; Lavisse and Rambaud, op. cit., VI, 205-6; Lavisse, op. cit., VII, Part II, 1-37, especially pp. 16, 17, 36-37; Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 19, 24-33; Esmein, op. cit., pp. 734-37; Grant, The French Monarchy, 1483- 1789, II, 55-57; Goyau, op. cit., pp. 445-49.
29 Hergenröther, op. cit., IV, 281-83; Pastor, op. cit., XVI, Part III, pp. 430-502; Goyau, op. cit., pp. 504-10.

of the income resulting from its activities went to the state, the Inquisition became an important source of royal revenue.

Philip II enjoyed almost unrestricted sovereignty over the Spanish church. He interfered in many purely ecclesiastical affairs, greatly to the prejudice of church independence. At one time, in his effort to maintain royal authority over the Spanish church, he expelled a papal nuncio from the country. He was also partially successful in asserting similarly broad claims to ecclesiastical control in Milan, Naples, and Sicily. At the Council of Trent his royal agents fought to preserve royal control of the Inquisition, and he accepted the decrees of the Council of Trent in so far as they did not conflict with his regal rights. 30

It is not the purpose of the author of this treatise to pursue any farther the phase of this subject that is concerned with state control of church affairs in Catholic lands, a tendency which, since the sixteenth century, has been carried on with increasing intensity not only in France and Spain but practically in all Catholic lands to the present time. The purpose of the writer in presenting this section of this chapter has been merely to indicate how state control of church affairs forms a part of the general subject--the secularization of politics, whereby medieval conditions have been reversed. Instead of the papacy determining the sphere of the activity of the states, and controlling them, the states, after the fifteenth century, increasingly asserted their authority to determine for themselves their sphere of activity. That is, they, in spite of repeated papal protests, conditioned the nature and scope of politics, making it include the regulation of church affairs whenever such action would increase the power and prestige of the states and overcome any check to their absolute power.

The remainder of this treatise will be concerned with an even more important aspect of the subject, the secularization of international politics.

30 Pastor, op. cit., VII, 362, 542-45; VIII, 279-331; IX, 253-58, 264-69; Hergenröther , op. cit., III, 297-98, 732-33; Hume, Spain, Its Greatness and Decay, pp. 15-16, 82-83, 93-95, 128-30, 142-43, 172-73; Cambridge Modern History, I, 353-54, 355-56; II, 99.

Along with the rise of the national states and the development of the absolute power of the kings there emerged the modern feeling that the state has interests that must be fostered regardless of all rival considerations, including religious, sacred, or ecclesiastical matters. Machiavelli's ideas that the state is an end in itself and that the end justifies the means were being adopted and applied. The two centuries from 1453 to 1648 were an era of keen international rivalries. The powers in their struggle for supremacy, or for mere existence (in their wars for selfrealization or self-preservation), not only disregarded religious interests but furthered political interests at the cost of religion.

The emperor Charles V did not immediately attempt to crush the Lutheran religion, but temporized with it in order to deal more effectively with his great rival, the French house of Valois and its ally, the Ottoman Empire. 31 Religious interests did not seem to be of supreme importance--at least they could not be allowed to jeopardize the political interests of Charles. Even the popes seemed more intent on maintaining their political power in Italy than they were in crushing the Reformation movement. 32 Both Charles V and his devout son Philip II had to wage wars against the political pretensions of the pope in Italy. This happened during the Reformation movement, when religious interests should have transcended political considerations. 33 In many of the dynastic and international wars religion was merely a secondary consideration or was used as a screen for political ambitions at home and abroad. During the Reformation, when Charles V was trying to root out the Lutheran heresy in Germany, and while the popes were attempting to call

31 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 407, 414-15, 436, 460-61, 464, 469-70, 481-82, 491-92; Pastor, op. cit., IV, Part I, 333-40; IV, Part II, 177-94, 212-382, 437-59; Spahn, article "Charles V," Catholic Encyclopedia, III, 626-29.
32 Pastor, op. cit., V, 164-65, 205-6, 587-88, 594-98, 613, 624.
33 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 430-32, 580; Pastor, op. cit., IV, Part II, 212-382; VI, 382-443; Hume, op. cit.,57-60, 119-21; Spahn, article "Charles V," Catholic Encyclopedia, III, 626; Kurth, article "Philip II," Catholic Encyclopedia, XII, 3.

the Council of Trent in order to unify at least all the Catholic powers in support of a united church, Francis I of France ceased to be guided by the interests of Catholicism at large and sought only the good of the French nation. He went so far as to make a political alliance with the infidel Suleiman the Magnificent ( 1520-66), sultan of the Turkish Empire, in order to have an effective ally against Charles V; and one clause of the treaty of 1536 even made provisions for the alliance of the pope with the sultan provided the pontiff ratified the agreement within eight months. 34 In 1540 Francis I persuaded the declining republic of Venice to detach herself from her alliance with Charles V and make a treaty of alliance with the Turks; this was done in spite of repeated papal efforts to dissuade Venice from such a policy. 35 Venice was merely stressing her trade in the Levant and was also fearful of the possibility of Hapsburg dominance in the Mediterranean. 36 The actions of France aroused general indignation at the time; 37 but by 1579 England was anxious to make a treaty of commerce and good will with Turkey, and by 1580 she had succeeded in her negotiations. The papacy had forbidden trade between Catholics and Turkey, and both Turkey and Protestant England were glad to make a commercial treaty, which was the first of many. 38 In 1602 the Netherlands, and in 1615 Austria, made similar treaties with the infidel Turks. 39

34 Zinkeisen, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches in Europa, II, 759-61; Hammer- Purgstall , Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, II, 122; La Jonquière, Histoire de l'empire ottoman, I, 174-75; Schevill, History of the Balkan Peninsula, p. 223; Egelhaff, Deutsche Geschichte im sechzehnten Jahrhundert, II, 309; Moritz Brosch, in Cambridge Modern History, III, 104-5; Bourrilly, "L'ambassade de la Forest et de Marillac à Constantinople, 1535-1538," Revue historique, LXXVI, 297-328; Lavisse, op. cit., V, Part II, p. 79; George Goyau, articl e "France," Catholic Encyclopedia, VI, 170, also article "Francis I,"ibid., p. 208; Ehses, "Franz I., etc.," Römische Quartalschrift, XII, 311, 319-23.
35 Zinkeisen, op. cit., II, 796-808; Hammer-Purgstall, op. cit., II, 163-64; Schevill, op. cit., p. 224; Pastor, op. cit., V, 209; Brosch, op. cit., III, 115-17.
36 Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 541.
37 Zinkeisen, op. cit., II, 804-5; Egelhaaf, op. cit., II, 309; Brosch, op. cit., III, 104-5; Catholic Encyclopedia, VI, 208; Pastor, op. cit., IX, 260.
38 Pollard, op. cit., pp. 389-90; Zinkeisen, op. cit., III, 418-27; Hammer-Purgstall, op. cit., II, 464; Sax, Geschichte des Machtverfalls der Türkei, p. 43.
39 Zinkeisen, op. cit., III, 654; IV, 265; Sax, op. cit., p. 54.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the popes had been able to rouse much of Catholic Christendom to undertake crusades against the infidel Seljukian Turks. But after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the popes made vain appeals to the princes to undertake the expulsion of the Ottoman Turks; and for this action the pontiffs were merely suspected of greed for money. 40 The papacy had lost its spiritual leadership, it was treated merely as a secular power. 41

However, one pope, Pius V ( 1566-72), in the face of tremendous difficulties, succeeded in uniting the Catholic maritime powers--Spain, Venice, and Genoa--to attack and defeat the Turks in the great naval battle of Lepanto in 1571. 42 The successor of Pius V, Gregory XIII ( 1572-85), tried to keep the antiTurkish league intact and secure even greater victories over the infidel enemies of Christendom. But in 1573 Venice signed a separate treaty of peace with Turkey; this agreement virtually reversed the outcome of the battle of Lepanto; Venice ceded important lands and paid Turkey a large war indemnity, but retained valuable trading privileges. 43

In 1580, in spite of vigorous papal opposition and in the face of papal effort to reorganize the anti-Turkish league, Philip II of Spain signed a nine months' truce with Turkey, renewed it for a year and later for five years--an agreement that lasted until the end of his reign. Philip took such action because he wished to be free to deal with the rebellious Netherlands; because he feared France, the ally of the Turks; and, above all, because he wished to keep his hands free in 1580 to take over the throne of

40 Flick, op. cit., II, 237, 402, 406, 415, 470; Pastor, op. cit., II, 623-32; III, Part I, 256-79, 546-61; IV, Part I, 146-74; IV, Part II, 119-25, 129-31, 437-59; IX, 235-74; X, 381-94; Bréhier, article "Crusades," Catholic Encyclopedia, IV, 555.
41 Flick, op. cit., II, 415.
42 Hergenröther, op. cit., III, 627; Seppelt, op. cit., II, 118-19; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 539-610; Zinkeisen, op. cit., II, 930-34; Hammer-Purgstall, op. cit., II, 419-24; Brosch in Cambridge Modern History, III, 134-35.
43 Du Mont, Corps universel diplomatique, V, Part I, 218-19; Broschin Cambridge Modern History, III, 137-38; Hammer-Purgstall, op. cit., II, 426; Zinkeisen, op. cit., II, pp. 934-35.

Portugal, his legal claim to the succession of that crown meeting with opposition from the Portuguese. Philip's truce with the Turks was, as Pastor says, "a further step toward the pursuit of private advantage without reference to general interests." All further efforts of Gregory XIII to revive the anti-Turkish league were futile. Venice feared it as a means of strengthening Spanish dominance in Italy; and, although Philip continued to collect from the Spanish church the cruzada (money for crusading purposes), he had no desire to embark on such an enterprise. 44

Let us mention one final point as evidence of the disregard of the European states for papal political pretensions, namely, the fact that not only such Protestant powers as England, Holland, Sweden, and Denmark, but Catholic France, acquired colonies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries regardless of the monopoly on colonial rights granted by Alexander VI through the papal lines of demarcation. 45


In these four centuries a great change had taken place in the scope and objectives of European politics. Instead of the medieval idea of unity, with the objectives and destinies of the secular states being guided and controlled by the pope as divinely appointed chief of Christendom, the secular states were now pursuing their own interests and policies. State or secular interests transcended all other interests; the objective of the secular princes of expanding the power and prestige of the state, of maintaining state sovereign authority on the basis of Roman law, surpassed all other considerations, including religious inter-

44 Pastor, op. cit., IX, 235-74; Zinkeisen, op. cit., III, 500-501, 507-8, 510; Jorga, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, III, 160-61.
45 Abbott, The Expansion of Europe, a Social and Political History of the Modern World, 1415-1789, I, 327-57; Leroy-Beaulieu, De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes, I, 60-187; Supan, Die territoriale Entwicklung der europäischen Kolonien, pp. 4660, 61-67, 75.

ests and claims as shaped by the papacy. The papacy, after its humiliations of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, had ceased to be a great moral force; it was stressing secular objectives in Italy, in Europe, and was treated by the European rulers as a mere secular power. Even dependable, loyal Catholic states, like Austria and Spain, waged war against the popes and refused to undertake crusades or to antagonize the Ottoman Empire if state interests demanded the signing of truces or commercial treaties with that empire.

The new system of state or secular control of religion and matters of conscience, which had been quite well developed by the sixteenth century, was not, however, given the final stamp of approval until the signing and execution of the Peace of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, when Catholic princes co-operated with the Protestant princes to regulate the ecclesiastical affairs of Germany in the great international Treaty of Westphalia, regardless of papal interests and in the face of papal protest. But before discussing that most important phase of this movement we must concern ourselves with the Peace of Augsburg as a forerunner of the Peace of Westphalia in the long movement called the "secularization of politics."

Chapter Three

THE popes could never be expected to recognize as legal or permanent the Peace of Augsburg ( September 25, 1555), which closed the era of sixteenth-century Lutheran wars in Germany. This Peace injured Catholic interests as follows: (1) it tolerated Lutheran princes and town councils and gave them the right to determine their own religion and that of those over whom they ruled; (2) it gave to the Lutheran princes of Germany legal title to those ecclesiastical lands (archbishoprics, bishoprics, abbacies) that they had held in 1552; (3) it sanctioned the fact that three of the imperial electors ( Brandenburg, Saxony, the Palatinate) were heretics; (4) it granted the evangelical princes equality of rights with the Catholic princes for an indefinite period; (5) this treaty, a supposedly binding legal document, attempted to regulate church affairs and did so to the detriment of church interests. 1 To be sure, this Peace, merely corroborating the Peace of Passau ( 1552), which had closed the era of Lutheran wars in Germany ( 1547-52), was regarded by both Catholic and Protestant princes as a truce. Its terms were not final; a compromise was effected solely because both

1 Ritter, "Der Augsburger Religionsfriede, 1555," Historisches Taschenbuch, 1, 25960; Gustav Wolf, Der Augsburger Religionsfriede, p. 170; Hergenröther, Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte, III, 496-97; Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters, VI, 564-67; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation und des dreissigjährigen Krieges, I, 79-88.

sides were worn out. The Catholic princes could not permanently accept the principle of parity in religious affairs; nevertheless, they feared that a continuance of the struggle might lead to a worsening of their own situation. Moreover, by waiting indefinitely some fortunate turn of affairs might enable the Catholic secular powers completely to crush the Protestants and fully to restore Catholic authority. The Lutheran princes, on the other hand, took great satisfaction in having achieved their political independence and the power to regulate religious affairs, and hoped ultimately to exclude Catholicism entirely from Germany. 2

Against this compromise Peace there had been two protests: (1) that of Otto Truchsess von Waldburg, Bishop of Augsburg ( 1543-73); and (2) a private epistolary protest of Paul IV ( 1555-59) to Ferdinand, the king of Rome, who, as representative of his brother Charles V ( 1519-58), was responsible for the signing of the Peace of Augsburg.

Otto Truchsess, or the Cardinal of Augsburg, as he was usually called, was one of the most courageous and consistent defenders of undiminished church and papal rights in Germany. He had opposed the conciliatory policy of Charles V toward the German Protestants, and regarded him as being responsible for all mistakes made in Germany's affairs since the Schmalkald War ( 1547-52). Bishop Otto took part in various Reichstags and always vigorously defended the interests of the Catholic church; opposed all concessions to the Protestants by Emperor Charles V; and resisted all attempts on the part of the emperor and the secular princes to regulate ecclesiastical and religious affairs. He thought the papacy should withstand this last ac-

2 Cambridge Modern History, III, 140; Maurenbrecher, "Beiträge zur deutschen Geschichte, 1555-1559," Historische Zeitschrift, L, 8; Ritter, "Der Augsburger Religionsfriede, 1555," Historisches Taschenbuch, I, 260; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 8185; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 568, n. 1.

tion of the secular rulers, even through the use of force. 3 On March 23, 1555, in the early part of the sessions of the Diet of Augsburg, Bishop Otto presented to that body a most emphatic protest against the Religious Peace of Augsburg. He did this undoubtedly with the approval of Cardinal Morone, the cardinal legate at the Diet. In the protest Bishop Otto declared that, although he was in favor of peace, he must protest against the Peace in order to maintain the full rights of the pope and the church intact. He would rather lose his life and all else that is earthly than refrain from doing his duty as he saw fit in this respect. 4

This declaration of Bishop Otto was the only formal protest made against the Peace, but it called forth such consternation and confusion at first that it was feared the Reichstag or Diet would be dissolved. There arose rumors that Otto, who, immediately after depositing his protest, had gone to Rome as cardinal to help elect a new pope to succeed Julius III ( 1550-55), was planning to negotiate an alliance between the pope and the emperor in order to break the Peace of Augsburg and renew the war against the Protestants. 5 But the rulers of Austria and Bavaria succeeded in persuading the other ecclesiastical princes

3 Stauffer, article "Otto Truchsess von Waldburg," Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXIV, 636-37; Druffel, Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts, IV, 604, 607; Specht, Geschichte der ehemahligen Universität Dillingen, p. 5; Specht, "Cardinal Otto Truchsess von Waldburg, Bischof von Augsburg (1543-1573)," Beilage der Augsburger Postzeitung, 1897, No. 51, pp. 354-55; Duhr, "Die Quellen zu einer Biographie des Kardinals Otto Truchsess von Waldburg," Historisches Jahrbuch, VII, 188; A. Weber, in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., XII, 115; Janssen, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes, III, 724.
4 Lehenmann, De Pace Religionis acta publica et originalia, pp. 24-25; Braun, Geschichte der Bischöfe von Augsburg, III, 433-34, contains the protest; also condensed in Duhr, "Die Quellen . . . . ," Historisches Jahrbuch, VII, 194-95; Bucholtz, Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten, VII, 178; Egelhaaf, Deutsche Geschichle im sechzehnten Jahrhundert bis zum Augsburger Religionsfrieden, II, 591; A. Weber, "Cardinal Otto Truchsess von Waldburg," Historische-politische Blätter, CX, 785; Janssen, op. cit., III, 788; Specht, "Cardinal Otto Truchsess," Beilage der Augsburger Postzeitung, 1897, p. 355 (wrongly gives the date as December 23 instead of March 23); Pastor, op. cit., VI, 564; Menzel, Neuere Geschichte der Deutschen, II, 260-61.
5 Maurenbrecher, Karl V und die deutschen Protestanten, 1545-1555, p. 331; Druffel, op. cit., IV, 610; Specht, "Cardinal Otto Truchsess," Beilage der Augsburger Postzeitung, 1897, p. 355; Janssen, op. cit., III, 788; Braun, op. cit., III, 434.

to ignore Otto's protest, and saw to it that the Lutheran princes understood the actual situation. 6 Ferdinand, the brother of Charles V, sent a message to Cardinal Otto taking him to task for registering such a protest. He thought that the Cardinal, in his capacity of imperial commissioner, should think of extinguishing the existing fire rather than rekindling it. On the contrary, through his protest, he had accentuated the already existing tragedy. 7 Thus, in spite of the protest of Cardinal Otto, the effort of the German secular and ecclesiastical princes to regulate ecclesiastical and religious affairs went on unchecked. But the protest was long remembered, and in 1648 it was used as a pattern for a similar protest against the Peace of Westphalia by the Archbishop of Salzburg. 8

Far more significant than the protest of Cardinal Otto is the papal attitude toward the Peace of Augsburg. Pope Paul IV ( 1555-59) in a letter of December 18, 1555, had expressed to King Ferdinand his deep disappointment over the Augsburg settlement, which was contrary to the wishes of the pope, the king of Germany, and all Catholics. 9 On the same date Paul wrote to Wolfgang, Bishop of Passau, deploring the Augsburg settlement, alluding to it as a disgraceful example of unbridled wilfulness. 10 Similar letters were written on the same day to Cardinal Madruzzo (prince bishop of Trent), to four German archbishops, to five German bishops, to Duke Albert V of Bavaria, and to various members of the Hapsburg house. 11

But it was not until March, 1558, that Paul IV took any definite and vigorous action concerning the Peace of Augsburg, and

10 Raynaldus, op. cit., Doc. 53; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 568, n. 1.
11 Pastor, op. cit., VI, 568, n. 2.
6 Druffel, op. cit., IV, 610; Janssen, op. cit., III, 788, n. 2; Braun, op. cit., III, 434.
7 Braun, op. cit., III, 434-35; Bucholtz, op. cit., VII, 179.
8 See below, chap. xi.
9 Raynaldus, Annales ecclesiastici ab anno MCXCVIII ubi Card. Baronius desinit, Opus Posthumum, Vol. XXI, Part II, Doc. 51; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 586, n. 1.

then only (incidentally) in connection with some special problems arising out of the resignation of Charles V from the emperorship. Moreover, it should be mentioned, in anticipation, that the two successors of Paul IV, namely, Pius IV ( 1559-65) and Pius V ( 1566-72), owing to practical considerations, carried out a policy of inactivity with reference to the Peace.

Early in 1558 Charles V formally abdicated as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. When on March 24, 1558, the electors, meeting at Frankfurt, elected Ferdinand I, the brother of Charles V, as emperor, there began a struggle between Paul IV and Ferdinand that lasted until the close of the year 1559. Although Paul was inspired with the idea of church reform and the re-establishment of the Catholic faith, he was impetuous, vehement, extreme in his claims concerning papal authority, politically unsagacious, incapable of making concessions, and, above all, a passionate enemy of the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs. 12

Paul IV felt aggrieved at Ferdinand I, the emperor-elect, for various reasons: (1) Since 1556, when Charles V had divulged his plan of abdicating the emperorship, Ferdinand had withheld all information thereof from the pope; moreover, a similar secrecy was observed concerning the plan of the electors to elect Ferdinand as Charles's successor when they met in Frankfurt in February-March, 1558. (2) Ferdinand had permitted a theological discussion to take place at Worms in 1557 between Protestant and Catholic divines. (3) Ferdinand had refused the papal secretary Linterius admission to the meeting of electors at Frankfurt under the pretense that Ferdinand wished in this meeting to secure the aid of the Protestants against the Turks and that the presence of a papal nuncio would be merely a

12 Reimann, "Papst Paul IV und das Kaiserthum,"Abhandlungen der schlesischen Gesellschaft für vaterländische Cultur, Philosophische-historische Abtheilung, 1871, p. 28; article "Paul IV," in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., IX, 1640; Benrath, article "Paul IV," in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie, XV, 43; Brandenburg, Kaiser Karl V, in Marcks and Müller, Meister der Politik, II, 148; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 569-71, 573, 624-25. hindrance. Of course, Ferdinand actually feared that the presence of a papal nuncio would make difficult the support of the three Protestant electors ( Brandenburg, Saxony, the Palatinate) in his election to the emperorship. Therefore the nuncio was doomed to a position of mere observer. (4) The election of Ferdinand in March, 1558, was a specially important one. Never before had an emperor abdicated voluntarily as Charles V had done in February, 1558. Since Charles was, by papal and imperial law, responsible to the pope, his abdication could not be regarded as legal without papal sanction. (5) Moreover, when, in 1531, Ferdinand had been elected as king of the Romans, there had been carried on a correspondence with the Roman court to ascertain whether the election might be valid when a heretic, the elector of Saxony, had participated therein. Pope Clement VII ( 1523-34) had uttered his opinion that such participation did not alter the legality of the election of the king; but now, in 1558, three Protestant or heretical electors participated in the election of Ferdinand to the emperorship without any consultation with the pope whatever. (6) Paul IV held Ferdinand most responsible for the negotiations leading to the Peace of Passau and its acceptance as the Religious Peace of Augsburg by the Imperial Diet in 1555. Ferdinand, in his election capitulation, or agreement, in March, 1558, had once more obligated himself to observe and maintain intact the terms of the Peace of Augsburg in spite of its injury to Catholic interests. (7) Ferdinand permitted his son, Maximilian, the Archduke of Austria and probable successor, to hold Protestant views. (8) Ferdinand had appointed bishops in Hungary and had transferred bishops from one diocese to another without such bishops having sought papal confirmation in Rome. 13 Of all these grievances the two most important, in the mind of Paul

13 Reimann, "Der Streit zwischen Papstthum und Kaiserthum im Jahre 1558," Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, V, 299-302; Schmid, "Die deutsche Kaiser und Königswahl und die römische Curie in den Jahren 1558-1620," Historisches Jahrbuch, VI, 5-6; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 571-73; W. Maurenbrecher, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Maximilians II. 1548-1562," Historische Zeitschrift, XXXII, 266.

IV, were Ferdinand's responsibility for the Peace of Augsburg and Maximilian's heterodoxy. 14

Paul IV, insisting on his plenary rights in the matter, presented the situation to his cardinals with instructions to report fully after consulting the papal archives thoroughly concerning all legal aspects of the situation. The cardinals, responsive to the pope's views and wishes, after exhaustive inquiry presented the following opinions: (1) Although the electors have the legal right to elect an emperor, it is the pope who examines and then approves an election; and through the papal anointing, blessing, and coronation the emperor receives his title, power, dignity, and jurisdiction. (2) An emperor wishing to resign must turn back all these dignities and powers to the pope. The pope alone may freely resign; he has no earthly superior and is therefore superior to the emperor. (3) Only the pope can depose an emperor; he alone can relieve an emperor from office if the reasons advanced are satisfactory. (4) The emperor Charles V at his coronation had promised allegiance to the pope and protection to the church; the emperor cannot unilaterally release himself from this agreement. Neither can the electors release him. Only the pope can do so. If the emperor withdraws from his duties without consulting the pope, the pope can depose him. Hence Charles V is still emperor, or, rather, through his onesided resignation he has lost his imperial power; but no one has been legally elected to succeed him. The proceedings of the electors at Frankfurt are null and void. (5) But even had Charles's resignation been valid, Ferdinand could not succeed him; rather, he ought to be deposed as Roman king because he permitted his son, Maximilian, to hold heretical views and especially because he had broken his oath to maintain the true interests of the church when signing the Peace of Augsburg. (6) Even if Ferdinand were capable of holding the emperorship,

14 Maurenbrecher, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Maximilians II. 1548-1562," Historische Zeitschrift, XXXII, 266.

his election is null and void because it had been participated in by three heretical electors, quite apart from the consideration that the electors had no right to elect an emperor during the lifetime of the present incumbent, Charles V. 15

The statement of such a comprehensive view of papal power gave promise of a papal-imperial contest of the thirteenthcentury type. But the actual break did not occur, largely because Ferdinand avoided everything that might lead to an open break. 16 Martin Guzman, who had been sent as Ferdinand's emissary to render veneration and obedience and secure papal recognition of his master's imperial election, was kept waiting for two months in Rome without being granted an official interview. When, on July 13, 1558, a papal interview was finally granted, it was only a semiofficial audience, in which the pope merely stated that when the papal court arrives at a decision in this difficult question a special messenger will be sent to inform Ferdinand as to what action and attitude he would be expected to take. 17 Even when Charles V died, September 21, 1558, a few months after the beginning of the dispute, and the question of resignation had therefore been settled, Paul persisted in demanding that Ferdinand be required to have special papal ratification in order to enter into his imperial governmental duties. 18

Thus far Ferdinand had conducted himself calmly and patiently, hoping that a peaceful solution would save the dignity of both the pope and himself. But now, after the death of Charles V had left the situation unchanged in papal eyes, Ferdinand took a more aggressive stand. It seemed necessary to re-

15 Schmid, op. cit., pp. 13-17; Reimann, "Der Streit zwischen Papstthum," Forschungen, V, 305-7; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 574-76.
16 Maurenbrecher, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Maximilians II," Historische Zeitschrift, XXXII, 266-67.
17 Reimann, "Papst Paul IV," Abhandlungen, 1871, pp. 29, 30; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 576-77.
18 Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 143.

port to the electoral college a full account of what had thus far taken place. The three secular electors ( Brandenburg, Saxony, and the Palatinate)--all Protestants--whose legitimacy was therefore also attacked by the papal attitude toward Ferdinand, advised him not to worry about papal ratification, not to be frightened by any threats and anathemas, and especially not to be worried about the coronation. Finally they declared that in case of further papal attack he could count on their support. But the Catholic electors ( Mainz, Trier, Cologne), even though they had to consider their double capacity of allegiance to the pope and emperor, declared themselves ready, in case of further papal action, to consider preventive measures to maintain respect for the emperor and the Empire. 19 Manifestly, in the empire in which the princes had achieved parity, the papal claims could no longer be expected to find champions. It was just this consideration that determined the attitude of foreign powers. France did not wish, through her support of the pope, foolishly to destroy her good relations with the Protestant states of Germany, which it needed to hold the Hapsburg house in check. Philip II, on whose Catholic loyalty Rome could, above all, depend, informed Paul IV, during the long and fruitless negotiations on behalf of Ferdinand, that Spain needed the alliance of Ferdinand against the Protestants, who had become so powerful in Germany. Paul IV was wholly deserted in his ill-advised attack on Ferdinand, who remained in undisturbed possession of the emperorship. 20

At the request of the emperor the imperial vice-chancellor Sigmund Seld, the statesman most responsible for formulating imperial policies, undertook to express the legal aspects of the controversy in question. In a well-formulated document he said that German law, established by the emperor and the states, is in sharp contrast with the papal demands and decrees. According to German law the government of the Empire, as well as the

19 Reimann, "Der Streit zwischen Papstthum," Forschungen, V, 316; Schmid, op. cit., pp. 34-35; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 143-44.
20 Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 140.

titles of a Roman king and of an elected emperor, are conferred solely through the regular election by the electors. Papal authority could verify the election and even refuse recognition and imperial coronation, but the conferred recognition does not confirm the election; the papal coronation does not add to the powers that the emperor-elect already has. The pope does not possess power to confer or rescind the emperor's right to conduct the imperial government. The right to dethrone the emperor belongs to the electors or to all the states.

From the secular standpoint these affirmations cut the ground under all the claims of Paul IV. Seld went even further in stating the nature and limits of papal power. Appealing to the decisions of the councils of Constance ( 1414-18) and Basel ( 143149), he declared that the power of all bishops, like that of the pope, had originally come down from the universal church. The bishops are the servants of the church; the church can, through a council, control even the pope. 21

This assertion that the pope was dependent on the power of a church council was especially significant since the Council of Trent, which had been in session in the years 1545-47 and 1551-52, had not yet completed its work; and this question as to where final authority lay was still unsolved. 22

Seld's clearly stated claims concerning papal limitations as to the emperorship and the church were not given the test that might have been expected. On August 18, 1559, the disturbing reign of Paul IV came to an end. The majority of cardinals felt the new pope must break with the policy of his predecessor; first of all, there must be a reconciliation with Emperor Ferdinand. Pius IV ( 1559-65), chosen after a prolonged conclave of four months, was prepared to make peace with Ferdinand, for

21 Ritter, ibid., pp. 144-45; Reimann, "Der Streit zwischen Papstthum," Forschungen, V, 309-10; VIII, 3-4; Pastor, op. cit., VI, 577-78.
22 Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 147-48.

whom a reconciliation was essential for his personal comfort and the stability of his policies. On December 30, 1559, Pius IV declared to his cardinals that he did not find it expedient to object to Ferdinand's election. For, although some electors not members of the Catholic church had participated in the election, there were others present who were members. He added that he wished to show favor to Ferdinand, who was very religious and an earnest defender of Christianity against heretics. Soon the court of Pius IV granted Ferdinand what Paul IV had refused, the imperial title and first rank for his representative in Rome. 23 Nothing was said concerning the legality of Ferdinand's election or the wisdom of his accepting the Peace of Augsburg. The only point on which Pius IV insisted was that Ferdinand should see to it that his son Maximilian, his heir apparent, should desist from holding Protestant views.

Ferdinand, to secure papal recognition, sent a representative to Rome to assure the pope of his reverence and homage. But the pope demanded in addition a promise of obedience. This difficulty was solved when the imperial representative, Count Scipio von Arco, on the advice of two cardinals to whom Ferdinand had referred him, in an audience of February 17, 1560, exceeded his authority and conformed to the wishes of the pope. 24 Pius IV also had previously, in December, 1559, expressed the wish to the imperial representative Count Franz von Thurm, who had come to Rome to present the interests of Ferdinand, that, when the emperor sends his new representative to the papal court, he should, for the satisfaction of several cardinals, present an apology concerning the Peace of Passau and other recesses of the Imperial Diet. Ferdinand, when sending an expression of gratitude to Pius for his recognition of the imperial title, promised that his new representative would offer the desired apology. 25 But concerning the apology that the new

23 Reimann, "Papst Paul IV," Abhandlungen, 1871, p. 37.
24 Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, I, 147.
25 Reimann, "Papst Paul IV," Abhandlungen, 1871, pp. 37-38.

representative, the Count von Arco, had to make, nothing is known. It was probably not exhaustive or humble. In any case, in harmony with the earlier advice of Philip II to Ferdinand, it was made merely orally, not only for the reason that Philip indicated (namely, that this concession was a matter of necessity) but probably for the more significant reason of avoiding the possibility of a copy of this document ever straying into Germany to embarrass the Hapsburgs when dealing with the Protestant princes. 26


The difficulties between Paul IV and Ferdinand I, and all events related thereto, were clearly an important step in the secularization of politics; and in this final section of this chapter the significant consequences of this sixteenth-century state of this struggle will be presented.

a) A conflict between old and new political ideals. --Manifestly this was a contest between the old papal ideals of supreme political control and the new political ideals that were striving to free themselves from papal control, and the contest eventuated to the advantage of the new secular forces. On the one hand, it was inevitable that Paul IV should take the action he did. By his indirect protest against the Peace of Augsburg he was endeavoring to maintain the dependence of the emperor on the papacy in a time of great church losses to the papacy. If the Protestants were ever to be brought back into the fold of the Catholic church, the emperorship would need to be kept in a state of dependence such as had resulted from the earliest victories of the hierarchy over the Empire. To keep such historic control over the emperorship the papacy had to check or destroy the power of the Protestant electors in choosing the emperor. 27 Under the circumstances the papacy would not merely need to

26 Ibid., pp. 32-33, 39.
27 Reimann, "Die römische Königswahl von 1562 und der Papst," Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, VIII, 3.

retain what power it formerly had, but would even need to strengthen its power. Therefore Paul IV made claims that were wider than any ever stated in medieval times. 28 On the other hand, these times were also favorable to wide-reaching claims and bold actions on the part of the Protestants. As a result of the Reformation movement it was in the air to test papal claims of the past and present, to criticize them in the light of historic knowledge that was the fruit of the studies of the humanists and reformers. It was in this spirit that Seld uttered his significant political opinions concerning the limited powers of the popes. In a similar spirit the electors and the kings of France and Spain acted in consideration of their own interests, irrespective of how the church or religion would be affected. This was clearly a step in the secularization of politics.

b) Pius IV tactfully remedies the mistake of Paul IV. --Once the contest was begun, it became evident, in view of existing circumstances, that the papacy had made a mistake; it did not wholly reverse itself, but it changed its tactics, and, like the secular princes, and in reflection of the spirit of the times, acted from the standpoint of expediency. Paul IV, by indirectly protesting against the Peace of Augsburg in his contest with Ferdinand I, made a tactical mistake. Pius IV, in bringing about an adjustment with Ferdinand, said nothing at all about the Peace of Augsburg. To be sure, the papacy had never formally, after a full consideration, uttered a special protest or issued a breve (bull) against the Peace as did Innocent X in 1650 (antedated 1648) against the Peace of Westphalia. Such an action of protest was considered in 1566, when in the Reichstag the Catholic estates of the Empire entered a formal confirmation of the Religious Peace of Augsburg.

c) Pius V withholds a protest against the peace in 1566. --Pius V ( 1566-72), who held views like those of Paul IV, 29 was of the opinion that, since the Council of Trent, which had completed

28 Reimann, "Der Streit zwischen Papstthum," Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, V, 307; Schmid, op. cit., pp. 13-17.
29 Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 465.

its work in 1563, had clarified all matters concerning religion, every good Christian should accept the decisions of the Council. 30

Therefore he instructed Commendone, his nuncio at the Reichstag in question, that if the confirmation of the Peace of Augsburg occurred, and if that Peace were really in conflict with the dogmatic decrees of the Council of Trent, he should protest against such confirmation. 31 Pius V had also sent instructions to the archbishops of Mainz and Trier, and to all German bishops, to prevent a consideration of ecclesiastical affairs at the Diet and to preserve the rights of the pope and the bishops. 32 The situation confronting the legate was embarrassing. The Calvinists, who were not recognized by the Peace of Augsburg, wished to have it modified to include them. 33 The Calvinists and Lutherans, although opposed to each other in religious affairs, were united in their aim to do away with the ecclesiastical reservation clause and to uproot what remained of Catholicism. 34 The Catholic states wished to have the Peace ratified as it stood, for they feared they might, through the actions of the Protestants, lose the rights guaranteed by the Peace. 35 A papal protest against the Peace through the legate would merely have results advantageous to the Protestants and would cause disagreement with Emperor Maximilian II ( 156476), who was sympathetic with Protestantism. 36 If the situation had not been properly handled, a strained condition, or even a rupture between the Catholic states of Germany and the Curia, might have resulted; it is clear that under these circumstances an acceptance of the decrees of the Council of Trent, which was

30 Ritter, "Der Augsburger Religionsfriede, 1555", Historisches Taschenbuch, I, 261.
31 Ibid.
32 Braunsberger, "Pius V und die deutschen Katholiken", in Stimmen aus MariaLaach, Katholische Blätter, XXVII, 5-7; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 461-63; Janssen, op. cit., IV, 223.
33 Braunsberger, op. cit., p. 7; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 465.
34 Braunsberger, op. cit.; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 464; Janssen, op. cit., IV224-27.
35 Braunsberger, op. cit., p. 8; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 465.
36 Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 465.

the matter of greatest importance to the papacy, could not have occurred. 37

The nuncio, Commendone, now asked advice from three Jesuits who, as theological experts, accompanied him; one of these was Petrus Canisius, the first German Jesuit (who was canonized in 1864). These three Jesuits held that, since the Peace of Augsburg did not assert positively that Protestants should disregard the Council of Trent, no action would need to be taken by the church. The Peace was concerned with political affairs, not with dogmatic matters. That Peace was imposed by insurmountable conditions of force; it was merely an expedient, a preliminary armistice. To be sure, the pope could not regard it as a good peace; but he and the Catholics could endure it until the Catholics, through a successful use of force, might be able to secure a complete return of their rights. For the pope to insist on issuing a protest might result in a new war in Germany, a conflict that might jeopardize what remained of Catholic rights in the fatherland. 38 Commendone, presented with an opinion so contrary to papal directions, sent to Rome for instructions. But the pope left the decision to his legate, which meant that a protest against the Peace would not be necessary. This papal action was due in large part to the intervention of the Jesuit general Franz Borgia (Borja) ( 1510-72), whom the Augsburger Jesuits, the advisers of Commendone, had asked to intervene. 39 The Catholic states of the Diet of Augsburg had in the meantime ratified the Peace of Augsburg in harmony with their best interests. 40

37 Drews, "Petrus Canisius der erste deutsche Jesuit", Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, X, 122.
38 Braunsberger (ed.), Beati Petri Canisii Societatis Iesu Epistolae et Acta, V, 229-55; Braunsberger, Petrus Canisius, ein Lebensbild, pp. 162-65; Braunsberger, "Pius V", in Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, XXVII, 9; Metzler, Der Heilige Petrus Canisius und die Neuerer seiner Zeit, p. 34; Drews, "Petrus Canisius", Schriften des Vereins für Reformationsgeschichte, X, 121-23; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 465-66.
39 Braunsberger, Canisii Epistolae, V, 250-55; Braunsberger, "Pius V", in Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, XXVII, pp. 10-11; Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 466.
40 Pastor, op. cit., VIII, 466; Ritter, "Der Augsburger Religionsfriede", Historisches Taschenbuch, I, 262.

So the vigorous policy of Paul IV ( 1555-59) in condemning the Peace was a mere temporary spurt, ignored by Pius IV ( 1559-65) and, for the reasons just described, not resumed by Pius V ( 1566-72). It is clear that the advice of the three Jesuits was sophistry sui generis, designed to support the policy of doing nothing, the time being regarded as unfavorable. This situation showed that the papacy was also carrying out the same policy of expediency as were the Catholic and Protestant secular powers. The Jesuits, however, did not abide by the decision of their three members as expressed in 1566. By about 1608 they were already bold enough to deny the validity of the Peace of Augsburg; they maintained that it could not have been properly ratified without the consent of the pope; that in any case it was valid only until the Council of Trent had authoritatively regulated church affairs, and must be considered as only a sort of interim, or temporary, arrangement. 41

In 1630, after imperial victories had in the recent preceding years strengthened the Catholic cause in Germany, the Jesuits signified their determination to pay no regard even to the Treaty of Augsburg. 42

d) Weakening of the bonds between the Empire and papacy. -The actions of the papacy in the years 1558-60 did much to dissolve the bonds that long had bound the papacy and Empire together. Fully to understand what is here implied, we must consider the general change in attitude toward papal coronation of emperors since the time of Maximilian I. Maximilian I ( 1493-1519) had been elected Roman king in 1486 and emperor in 1493. Owing to internal and external problems, he had never been crowned emperor by the pope. In the years 1505 and 1506 he especially felt the need of having the imperial title; but, being at war with France and Venice, he could not easily reach Rome to secure papal coronation. So, in February, 1508, Maximilian himself took the title of emperor-elect in the city of Trent. The ceremony occurred in a church without even the presence of a

41 Ranke, History of the Popes, II, 186. 42 Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, pp. 11-12; Ranke, op. cit., II, 303.

papal legate. This unprecedented step was looked upon as an act of necessity, and within a week Pope Julius II ( 1503-13), the ally of Maximilian against Venice, quite willingly sanctioned and blessed the assumption of the title as being justified in order to give the German warriors an incentive to fight more enthusiastically in their further march toward Rome; but the pope evidently did not regard this as a substitute for papal coronation in Rome. Maximilian himself had the intention of later having himself crowned in Rome by the pope, when conditions were favorable. But that time never came, and in the last year of his reign there occurred a significant incident. In August, 1518, Maximilian I had secured the preliminary pledge of four electors to elect his grandson Charles as king of Rome. When the news of this proposed action reached the papal court, Pope Leo X ( 1513-21) became extremely excited and remarked, among other things, that he was surprised that the electors would so easily and quickly proceed to the election of a Roman king since Maximilian himself was still Roman king, never having been crowned emperor. The pope remarked further that he did not recall that a similar situation had ever occurred. But Maximilian's early death in January, 1519, solved this problem; Charles was elected emperor later in the year. 43

However, the eventuation in the mind of subsequent imperial supporters was as follows: (1) it was held that Maximilian had virtually assumed the imperial title himself, (2) his successors followed the practice of taking the title of emperor-elect at Aachen immediately after the election, (3) when later difficulties with the pope occurred, these historic facts were interpreted as a step in the long and varied process of weakening the agelong political power of the pope, and history has corroborated Ranke's view that "the German crown had been emancipated from the pope" by Maximilian I's action. 44 As just observed,

43 Baumgarten, "Die Politik Leos X. in dem Wahlkampf der Jahre 1518 und 1519", Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, XXIII, 531; Goetz, Maximilians II. Wahl zum rödmischen Könige, 1562, p. 197, n. 3.
44 Leopold Ranke, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation, I, 177-78; VI, 90 - 93 ; Kaser, Deutsche Geschichte, II, 110, 112; F. Schneider, in Gebhardt, Handbuch derdeutschen Geschichte

one of the considerations of Maximilian I in seeking imperial coronation was the embarrassment of not having been crowned emperor when he was trying to have his grandson, the later Charles V, elevated to the Roman kingship. But Ferdinand I, fifty-four years later, seemed to find no embarrassment at all in not being crowned emperor, although Pius IV would gladly have sent the imperial crown over the Alps and although he repeatedly urged Ferdinand to secure papal coronation. 45 Ferdinand did not seek this honor, because he wished to avoid taking the oath of obedience to the pope, such as had been forced into the ceremony in connection with securing papal confirmation of his election to the emperorship in February, 1560. Moreover, any change in the imperial oath as demanded by the pope required the sanction of the electors. 46 Furthermore, Maximilian II ( 1564-76) had become Roman king without the official co-operation of the pope and without the reigning emperor, Ferdinand I, having been previously crowned. 47 So, as Reimann asks, what necessity was there hereafter for imperial successors to trouble themselves about this coronation? They were less inclined to request this of their own accord since they had to fear the evangelical princes. Indeed, they had to fear becoming involved with the pope in a contest over the oath of obedience, which was unequivocally demanded of them. So, through the influence of the new ideas, the bonds that had for centuries bound the emperorship to the papacy were being completely dissolved. 48

deutschen Geschichte, I, 543; Ulmann, article "Maximilian I", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XX, 722-23.
45 Schmid, "Die deutsche Kaiser- und Königswahl", Historisches Jahrbuch, VI, 63, 165, 170.
46 Ibid., pp. 176-77; Reimann, "Die römische Königswahl von 1562 und der Papst", Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte, VIII, 3-17.
47 Schmid, "Die deutsche Kaiser- und Königswahl", "Historisches Jahrbuch", VI, 161-64; Wilhelm Maurenbrecher, "Beiträge zur Geschichte Maximilians II", Historische Zeitschrift, XXXII, 290-95; Reimann, "Die religiöse Entwicklung Maximilians II in den Jahren 1554-1564", Historische Zeitschrift, XV, 54-61.
48 Reimann, "Die römische Königswahl", Forschungen, VIII, 17; see also Goetz, op. cit., pp. 197-98.

In various respects the Peace of Augsburg and its consequences, as portrayed in this chapter, had done much to undermine papal dictation with reference to political affairs. But this did not mean that the Catholic powers in Germany were quite ready to disregard papal leadership altogether. The Catholic princes, as well as the papacy, hoped that the existing situation was a temporary one and that the truce imposed on the two contending groups in 1555 would give the Catholic powers time to recuperate for a final struggle that would abrogate the parity in religious affairs that had been granted to the Protestants and would re-establish religious uniformity in Germany. In such a struggle the papacy would be a useful ally of the Catholic princes. But that hoped-for success never came. At the close of the Thirty Years' War the defeated Catholic powers needed peace. To secure a permanent peace and to protect their own secular interests regardless of papal interests, they agreed to co-operate with the Protestant princes to nullify the papal protest against the Peace of Westphalia. When that happened, international politics may be said to have been secularized. This final step in this movement will be the subject of the following chapters.

Chapter four

THE Congress of Westphalia, meeting in the years 1644-48, after preliminary but futile peace efforts dating back to 1635, had as its main task to bring to a close an era of religious wars. Since Luther's disturbing break with the Roman Catholic church, Protestant and Catholic Europe had been troubled with civil and international wars that had bred deep hatreds, profound distrusts, and suspicions similar in bitterness and intensity to those that we of the World War and post-war period know only too well. The Thirty Years' War ( 1618-48), apart from its long duration, was in some respects quite as catastrophic in its results as the World War. It had produced uncertainties as to territorial boundaries in Germany and central Europe and had raised knotty problems as to the future status of Catholicism and the two great Protestant religions of Germany, Lutheranism and Calvinism; it had left scores of other problems, national and international rivalries, to be adjusted. The physical and mental exhaustion of the belligerent peoples was the most potent factor in inducing the governments to negotiate at all concerning these exceedingly vital problems. But even the substitution of pen and tongue for sword and cannon proved too tiring for the negotiators; after four years of negotiating they adjourned with part of their task uncompleted. 1

1 Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk von 1643 bis 1648", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 414.

The plenipotentiaries, after prolonged and childish bickerings over questions of diplomatic precedence, and after numerous discouragements, finally gave Europe an arrangement embodied in the two treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, which together are called the "Treaty of Westphalia," the two places Münster and Osnabrück being two cities about thirty miles apart in the province of Westphalia, where the Treaty was negotiated because it was impossible to have all negotiators meet in one place since Catholics and heretics refused to negotiate together. So the emperor had to negotiate with the Catholics at Münster and with the Protestants at Osnabrück. This Treaty of Westphalia corresponds in the public law of Europe to the Treaty of Vienna of 1815 and to the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, Neuilly, Trianon, and Sèvres of 1919-20. The fundamentals of this arrangement of 1648 remained in force for almost a century and a half, until 1792. It would have been a great comfort to many of the plenipotentiaries at Westphalia to have had the assurance that they were producing a peace of such stability. Once the solution of the numerous political, economic, and religious problems had been attained, it was highly important to the negotiators and their governments that the peace providing for such solutions and fundamental adjustments should be permanent and stable, and not be jeopardized by any effective protest from whatever source. In this chapter we shall discuss the negotiations concerning the clause against protests, around which centers the problem of secularizing politics during the negotiations at Westphalia.

If the Swedes had succeeded in securing all or even a part of their demands, they might surely have expected a protest from the pope declaring null the treaty whereby all the Swedish gains were guaranteed. Throughout the negotiations the plenipotentiaries of Queen Christina of Sweden ( 1632-54) had demanded four things: first, that an amnesty be extended to all that had participated in the war since 1618, and that all parties be rein- stated in the condition that they had enjoyed at the outbreak of the war; 2 second, that the Calvinists, as well as Lutherans, be allowed freedom of worship; 3 third, that the secularized ecclesiastical lands remain in the hands of the princess; 4 and fourth, that Sweden be given a "satisfaction," or land indemnity in Germany, which very probably would include several ecclesiastical states. 5

That a protest from the pope against such concessions was inevitable could be assumed from the actions of the pope and his nuncios since the meeting of the Congress of Cologne in 1636, when the first efforts were made to bring about a termination of the war. 6

To this Congress Urban VIII had sent his nuncio, Cardinal Ginetti, who was to have the status of legate and mediator among the Catholic princes. 7 By June, 1638, over papal signature, instructions were sent to the Cardinal to oppose the revocation, or even any weakening, of the Edict of Restitution ( 1629) 8 and the establishment of a Protestant prince as elector of the Palatinate unless he marries a Catholic. 9 He must ener-

2 J. G. von Meiern, Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, oder westphälische FriedensHandlungen und Geschichte, I, 436, 743, 804-5, 807; II, 185, 299 - 300 ; III, 151, 408, and elsewhere.
3 Ibid., II, 10; III, 166 ; IV, 98.
4 Ibid., I, 821-31; II, 572, 614; III, 167, 256 -65.
5 Ibid., II, 187-88, 196-98, 835-39; III, 78, 151.
6 Adami, Arcana Pacis Westphalicae, pp. 12-24; Adami, Relatio historica de pacificatione (ed. Meiern), pp. 15-28; Bougeant, Histoire du traité de Westphalie, I, 401-8; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 396; Gindely, Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, III, 84.
7 Bougeant, op. cit., I, 401.
8 Instruttione del Cardinale Ginetti per un congresso de pacificazione general, Staatsbibliothek, München, Codex italiano, 98, fol. 60, copy of the original manuscript in Vatican Secret Archives, XXXIX, 1049. See Codices Manuscripti, Bibliothecae Regiae Monacensis ( Munich), VII, 177; for two copies in Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, see A. Marsand, I Monoscritti italiani della regia biblioteca Parigina, I, 337, 656, which gives the date as 1636; Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIII, Part I, 484, n. 2, gives date of Urban's signature as June 25, 1638. Brosch, in Cambridge Modern History, IV, 688; Richard, "Origins et développements de la secrétairerie d'état apostolique (14171823)", Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique, XI, 744, n. 2.
9 Instruttione del Cardinale Ginetti, fol. 56.

getically oppose everything that gives an advantage to the heretics and a disadvantage to the Catholic religion. He must oppose especially anything that could be unfavorable to the regaining of the ecclesiastical lands, which must be politically controlled by the church so Catholicism can exist therein. 10 He must see to it that the secular powers of the papacy are not jeopardized. 11 Above all, he must not co-operate in the formulation of any treaties of peace agreed to between Catholic and heretical powers. 12 Copies of this original manuscript of papal instructions to Ginetti are today found in fourteen European libraries, including Stockholm, 13 which would suggest that the contents must have been well known to the negotiators in both Catholic and Protestant ranks, even if Cardinal Ginetti exerted very little active influence as mediator, owing to his frugality. 14

When the question of granting an amnesty was being considered by the emperor and the Nürnberg Diet of Electors ( 1640), and was also to be considered at the Regensburg Diet ( 1640-41), Pope Urban VIII sent a breve to the emperor and to each of the Catholic princes urging them to consider Catholic interests most carefully. 15 In addition he commissioned Gaspare Mattei, the cardinal nuncio in Vienna, orally to caution the emperor against making any sacrifice of church lands. 16 When it became clear that the amnesty was going to be sanctioned by the emperor and the Diet of Regensburg in 1641, Bishop Henry V of Augsburg protested against the amnesty in the same spirit in which Cardinal Otto Truchsess protested against the Peace of Augsburg in I555; 17 and the papal nuncio at Vienna, Gaspare Mattei, pro-

10 Ibid., back of fol. 59.
11 Ibid., fol. 61.
12 Ibid., fol. 61.
13 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 484, n. 2.
14 Ranke, Die römischen Päpste, II, 373.
15 Brockhaus, Der Kurfürstentag zu Nürnberg im Jahre 1640, pp. 110-24, 241-57; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 492.
16 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 492.
17 Protest of Bishop Henry V, in Conring, Opera, II, 508; in Ernestus de Eusebiis (i.e., Wangnereck), Judicium Theologicum, sec. 4, point 8, Part III; Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, 1635- 1650, pp. 10, 37.

tested against the amnesty because it was contrary to the interest of the church. 18 But Emperor Ferdinand III, already acting somewhat in the spirit of secularized politics, as manifested later during the Congress of Westphalia, issued an imperial decree on August 20, 1641, providing for an amnesty, which, however, was only partial. 19

Soon after Innocent X ( 1644-55) succeeded to the pontificate, he wrote to Fabio Chigi, the papal nuncio at Münster, on October 5, 1644, commanding him to see that the dignity of the Roman church suffer no prejudice during the peace negotiations. The nuncio was "to safeguard the rights and liberties of the church in resisting with all his force any agreement that could be prejudicial to it, and he should rather leave the Congress than consent to such an agreement, were it merely by his presence; [he was] to consider the cause of God before all things." 20 Chigi was also instructed to place a similar document into the hands of Bishop Henry V of Augsburg as well as the other ecclesiastical princes of Germany. 21 In consequence the nuncio announced to the plenipotentiaries that he would fill his office of mediator only on condition that the interests of religion were fully guaranteed. 22

When the Protestant and Catholic princes were considering where the ecclesiastical grievances (gravamina) could be handled, it was decided that, because of the attitude of Chigi, it would be difficult to handle them at Münster, for he had in December, 1645, expressly declared that because of his position

18 Conring, op. cit., II, 505-6, in Ernestus de Eusebiis, op. cit., sec. 4, point 8, Part II; Adami, Arcana Pacis, pp. 23-24; Adami, Relatio historica, pp. 28-29; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 37; Laurent, Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanité, X, 282.
19 Londorp, Acta publica, V, 579-81; Theatrum europaeum, IV, 449-552; Bougeant, op. cit., II, 127-29; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 493-94; Meiern, op. cit., II, 3; Steinberger , op. cit., p. 37.
20 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 861-62, contains the letter in full; also Adami, Arcana Pacis, pp. 37-38; Adami, Relatio historica, pp. 46-47; also Brom, Archivalia in Italië, III, 388-89; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 74.
21 Meiern, op. cit., II, 861, 862-63.
22 Adami, Arcana Pacis, p. 38; Adami, Relatio historica, p. 47; Laurent, op. cit., X, 282.

and office he could not meddle with the negotiations, much less give his consent to them, but that in this matter he would be constrained at all times to manifest his dissent, and that he must preserve the virginity (virginitas) and intact rights (jus integer) of the Catholic church; but, as for the rest, he would have to let the negotiations take their course. 23 Because of this attitude most of the negotiations concerning religious affairs were transacted at Osnabrück. But this was done for policy's sake; it did not prevent the execution of terms prejudicial to the interests of the church.

Chigi did his best to encourage the Catholic deputies to remain firm in their opposition to the demands of the Protestants. 24 He repeatedly warned Trauttmannsdorff, and also the French, against making concessions that were detrimental to the church. 25 On November 29, 1647, he wrote to the Bishop of Augsburg that, if the peace terms were to contain any arrangements contrary to the laws of the church fathers, councils, and popes, one might expect, not the sanction, but the vigorous protest of the Holy See against such a treaty. 26

A nineteenth-century Belgian jurist and historian, François Laurent, sums up the attitude of Chigi as follows:

The nuncio declared in the name of the pope that, if the Congress endeavored to decide affairs concerning ecclesiastical lands and religion, the Holy See would protest and would utter censures against the Catholic princes. In fact, the mediation of the nuncio passed in protests; he declared in advance that all the conventions contrary to the honor of God would be null, that the treaty that sanctioned them would not be a peace but an abominable monster of horrible confusion; he wished his protest to be repeated at the beginning, in the middle, at the end of all acts that they drew up, and that it [his protest] should remain until all the signatories should appear before the tribunal of God, on the day of judgment. 27

23 Meiern, op. cit., II, 138.
24 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 79.
25 Ibid., XIV, Part I, 81-85.
26 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 862-63; Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 436.
27 Laurent, op. cit., X, 283, cites a work that has not been accessible to me, Meiern, Emblemata ad historiam de pacificatione Westphalica, pp. 44, 45, 54, and which, to my knowledge, is referred to nowhere else.

So there was ample indication that the pope would protest against anything done by the Congress that was prejudicial to the interests of the Catholic church. Knowing this attitude of the pope and his nuncio, it behooved the Protestants to make arrangements that would safeguard the peace against any protest.

Besides the ordinary guaranties against the breaking of the Peace that were finally inserted in both the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, 28 much negotiation was required to make the Peace protest-proof against all possible antagonists; but naturally the protest that was most feared was that of the pope, for the treaty terms contemplated by the Protestants would do most injury to the interests of the Catholic church, and, moreover, the pope was the most powerful and influential of those that would sustain any injury at the hands of the Congress. In the instructions that the royal Swedish government sent its plenipotentiaries in the latter part of the year 1645, they were told to mention as possible territorial satisfaction (or indemnity) such ecclesiastical lands as Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Minden, Osnabrück, Bremen, Verden, or Cammin. 29 Keeping in mind the possibility of papal protests against such cessions and other arrangements detrimental to Catholic church interests, the evangelical princes under the leadership of Sweden, when discussing the means of negotiating peace September 4, 1645, resolved that "no reservation or protest shall be valid at the present time or in the future, neither shall it be heard." 30 This clause against reservations and protests was inserted in every peace project that the Swedes subsequently handed to the imperial

28 Peace of Osnabrück, Art. XVII, pars. 4-7; Peace of Münster, pars. 115, 116, in Walther, Universal Register, pp. xlviii, xlix, lxxxvi.
29 Breucker, Die Abtretung Vorpommerns an Schweden und die Entschädigung Kurbrandenburgs, p. 36; Geijer, Geschichte von Schweden, III, 371.
30 Meiern, Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, I, 601, 606.

plenipotentiaries, and its insertion was insisted on as an essen tial to peace. 31 That the evangelicals wished to make certain that no protest against the peace should be valid, whether made by the pope or by any other ecclesiastical officer, is seen quite clearly in their reply submitted to the imperial plenipotentiaries in December, 1646. They declare:

This clause must not merely be repeated but also all contradictions and protests that may already have been made, must be expressly invalidated and declared void, and this without exception of persons, and not excepting members of religious orders or their provincials, whatever their title, who are resident in the Holy Roman Empire, or their generals, and immediate superiors, who, although they may be found outside the Roman Empire are, nevertheless by reason of their properties situate within the Empire, subject to the Empire and to its ordinances [constitutionibus], and are especially to be bound by this treaty. 32

Around the negotiations concerning this clause against protests centers the secularization of politics at the Congress of Westphalia.

31 Ibid., I, 705 ( October 2, 1645); III, 425 ( November 21, 1646); IV, 17 ( December 22, 1646).
32 Ibid., IV, 17.

Chapter Five

NATURALLY the chief opposition to the Swedish declaration against protests would come from the Catholic ranks, which in all important matters were led by the emperor. We find that until January, 1647, the Catholic or imperial plenipotentiaries refused to insert the clause against protests; 1 but after that date, as will be seen later, the clause was always inserted in the imperial peace projects. According to the available records, the Catholic princes did not always express what must have been their real motive for refusing to insert such a clause. On September 10, 1645, the Bishop of Bamberg, in discussing the Swedish proposals, objected to the insertion of a clause against protests inasmuch as such a declaration would hinder discussion. 2 In the electoral council at Münster, September 21, 1645, it was declared that the insertion of the clause "was entirely too premature, for, when the peace negotiations draw to a close, the crowns will of their own accord desire means of securing a guaranty for the treaty, and, moreover, such clauses are not to be found in any ordinance of the Imperial Diet [Reichsabschied]." 3

1 Meiern, Acta Pacis Westphalicae publica, I, 681 ( September 10, 1645), 685 ( September 21, 1645); III, 356 ( September 19, 1646), 369 (September), 422 (November, 1646).
2 Ibid., I, 681.
3 Ibid., p. 685.

Far more to the point are the objections made a year later. In September, 1646, the Catholics at Münster declared:

Although all protests and contradictions are to be counted null by those of the Augsburg Confession, yet it cannot be doubted that many of the Catholics, and especially those that have been most interested in this work, will be unwilling to be deprived of this privilege [beneficium], pitiable though it be and allowed to everyone, and often used, moreover, by those of the Augsburg Confession themselves; but they [the Catholics] will reserve to themselves this privilege: since it is in every way fair and should remain free for all and each to use it as he may think best for his future protection. 4

In November, 1646, the Catholics again declared that they would not permit that their right to protest be taken from them, and that all should be left free to act as they thought best in this respect. 5

These assertions plainly showed that the Catholic princes did not expect to be bound by the treaty. They were all hoping for a favorable turn in the war; and, if that did not come, they did not wish to be bound by the terms of this treaty if it became possible subsequently to disregard them. Besides the motives of self-interest and self-preservation that actuated them, these princes must have been somewhat influenced by the declarations that the nuncio repeated so often and also by the work of the Society of Jesus. Not only did the members of this order labor secretly, at both Münster and Osnabrück, trying to influence the Catholic plenipotentiaries, but the whole machinery of this order was used for the purpose of collecting information and bringing pressure to bear where needed. Letters were sent to members of the order at such Catholic courts as Vienna, Munich, and Mainz, where, in the capacity of confessors, they could secure valuable information; in accordance with the rules of the order, this information was all sent to the general of the Society at Rome, by whom it was utilized to the desired end.' 6

At Münster the Jesuits closely watched all Catholic ambassadors, especially those that had been converts to Catholicism,

4 Ibid., III, 356.
5 Ibid., p. 422.
6 Pütter, Geist des westphälischen Friedens, p. 53; Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, 1635-1650, pp. 2-3.

such as the imperial representatives Nassau, Volmar, and chiefly Trauttmannsdorff. 7 The Jesuits were particularly dissatisfied with Trauttmannsdorff because he had been too yielding concerning Catholic interests. However, it was Trauttmannsdorff's ill health, and not the influence of the Jesuits, that caused his departure from the Congress in July, 1647, fifteen months before the conclusion of peace. 8 The Jesuits had no confidence in him. The Swedes intercepted and published a significant letter, dated July 12, 1647, written by a Jesuit from Münster to the confessor of Ferdinand III; in this letter it was stated that the extreme Catholic party longed for the departure of Trauttmannsdorff from the Congress. The writer, Johannes Mulmann, also urged the imperial confessor to persuade Emperor Ferdinand III to make no concessions to the Protestants and to continue the war to a victorious end. Another member of the order, Gottfried Coeler, added a postscript testifying that he had in vain tried to stir the conscience of Aesculapius, as they called Trauttmannsdorff, for he continued to work for peace in a yielding spirit even though no reciprocal gains were secured. 9

The anti-peace activities of the Jesuits were so persistent, and, as it was feared, likely to prolong the already devastating war, that at the conference of the evangelicals, November 7, 1645, the Mecklenburg representative recommended that the order be dissolved, or at least driven out of Germany. 10 In March, 1646, when the evangelicals were discussing means of making the Peace permanent, it was pointed out that the

Emperor, kings, princes, and lords were not obliged to observe any agreement that had been negotiated and concluded with others not recognizing the Roman pope; and that, since the republic of Venice had for these and other

10 Meiern, op. cit., I, 781; Pütter, op. cit., p. 57.
7 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 703; Pütter, op. cit., pp. 53-54.
8 Egloffstein, article "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 535; Pütter, op. cit., p. 54.
9 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 703-4; Pütter, op. cit., pp. 55-56; Odhner, Die Politik Schwedens, p. 224.

grievances driven the members of this order out forever, just so there would be a secure and stable peace in Germany if the Jesuits were expelled. 11

Some of the Jesuits also entered the field of public controversy, vigorously opposing Catholic acceptance of any permanent peace with the heretics. Foremost among these Jesuit pamphleteers was Heinrich Wangnereck, whose various works, especially the Judicium theologicum, stirred up much hostility in the ranks of the Protestants and the moderate Catholics. But, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, responses to Wangnereck were written by other members of the Jesuit order, notably by Johann Vervaux, the confessor of Maximilian of Bavaria.

So, until the beginning of the year 1647 the Catholics refused, for the reason mentioned, to insert the clause against protests; but in the conference of January, 28, 1647, between the imperial and the Swedish plenipotentiaries at Osnabrück, the imperialists agreed to the insertion of the clause. 12 In all subsequent peace projects and negotiations the clause was retained; 13 and, as will be observed later, after the treaties of Münster and Osnabrück were signed ( October 24, 1648), provisions were made for the execution of this clause, and the emperor remained true to his agreement. Owing to the frequently expressed attitude of the papacy and the nuncio Chigi, the Catholic princes must have known precisely what consequences their action would have, that they would ultimately be forced to disregard the protest of the nuncio and the pope. The question arises: Why did the emperor's plenipotentiaries at this particular time sanction the insertion of this clause against the protests, and why did the

11 Meiern, op. cit., II, 489; Pütter, op. cit., p. 57; Duhr, Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge, II, Part I, 452-56, which gives a corrective view. For the expulsion of the Jesuits from Venice in 1606 see Pastor, op. cit., XII, 100-101.
12 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 36, 39.
13 Ibid., IV, 118 ( March 5, 1647), 181 ( April 4, 1647), 835 ( December 16, 1647); V, 468 ( April, 1647), 765 ( April 24, 1648), 936 ( June, 1648); VI, 5 ( June, 1648), 110 ( July 27, 1648), 170 ( August 6, 1648), 393 ( September, 1648).

emperor subsequently find it to his profit to adhere to and execute the agreement? The answer lies undoubtedly in the trend that the imperial negotiations were taking between Sweden and her allies from November, 1646, to February, 1647. The war had been going against the emperor; the French and Swedish generals, though not constantly victorious, were, on the whole, able to defeat the imperial and Bavarian troops most of the time. 14 Bavaria had been devastated; by March 14, 1647, Maximilian of Bavaria had signed the armistice of Ulm with Sweden and France; his brother, the elector Ferdinand of Cologne, was given the privilege of adhering to the armistice, which he did early in May, 1647. 15 Thus Ferdinand III had lost his last and only effective ally in Germany; it looked as though the imperial cause were lost. 16 The superiority of the French and Swedish troops was generally manifest. 17 These victories enabled the Swedes and the French to press their claims to "satisfaction"; Mazarin realized that a close co-operation with Sweden in making these demands was necessary. France had in May and September, 1646, made fairly definite arrangements concerning the question of territories to be annexed by her at the expense of Germany; 18 these arrangements might be jeopardized if the strong support of Sweden were lacking. The Spanish were trying then, as later, to hinder the conclusion of peace with the Empire, 19 and were attempting, through separate peace negotia-

14 Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 606-10, 620-21; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 391; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 598-612; Huber, Geschichte Osterreichs, V, 584-87.
15 Meiern, op. cit., V, 6-12; Londorp, Acta publica, VI, 186-91; Egloffstein, Baierns Friedenspolitik von 1645 bis 1647, pp. 149-76; Riezier, op. cit., V, 611-13; Huber, op. cit., V, 585; Ennen, "Ferdinand von Köln", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, VI, 696; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 391.
16 Katt, Beiträge zur Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, 99; Ritter, op. cit., III, 620.
17 Ritter, op. cit., III, 621; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 391; Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 424; Fischer, Beiträge zur Kenntnis der päpstlichen Politik während der westphälischen Friedensverhandlungen, pp. 27, 28.
18 Meiern, op. cit., III, 28-29, 723-27; Heigel, op. cit., V, 423; Odhner, op. cit., p. 159.
19 Le Clerc, Nigociations secrètes, III, 262, 270; Meiern, op. cit., IV, 352, 800; Bougeant , Histoire du traité du Westphalie, V, 111.

tions, to detach Holland from her allies, the French and the Swedes. 20 Moreover, the arrangements that the emperor had conceded were advantageous not only to Sweden but also to the other allies of France, namely, Brandenburg and Hesse, whose good will France wished to keep. 21

With the war constantly going against the imperial forces, which now had to bear the entire burden of carrying on the struggle, 22 and with the Swedes and the French persistently asserting their claims, the emperor was compelled to yield. On the other hand, the French and the Swedes were able, through the skilful use of bribes, to break down the resistance of the lesser German princes represented at Münster; as a consequence more and more imperial princes were pressing the emperor to bow to the inevitable and make the requisite concessions. 23 The policy that the emperor adopted under these circumstances caused him to feel the necessity of inserting into the treaty projects the clause that declared all protests to be null and void. In December, 1645, and January, 1646, Sweden demanded Silesia, among numerous other territories, as a satisfaction. 24 This demand for one of his choice hereditary lands distressed the emperor greatly. 25 But if Sweden were to be satisfied without giving her Silesia, some other compensatory means must be found; if Sweden received Pomerania, whose ruling line had died out in 1637, and which was claimed by Brandenburg by virtue of the Treaty of Grimnitz made in 1529, 26 the elector of Brandenburg must be indemnified elsewhere; so in May, 1646, the French suggested that Brandenburg be indemnified with part of Silesia. 27

20 Chéruel, Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, II, 359-64, 366-67, 396, 407, 426, 439, 447; Bougeant, op. cit., V, 111, 163; Odhner, op. cit., p. 179.
21 Chéruel, op. cit., II, 358, 422.
22 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 391.
23 Heigel, op. cit., V, 423; Wild, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, pp. 10, 11.
24 Meiern, op. cit., II, 188; Gärtner, Westphälische Friedens-Cantzley, VIII, 380-411, but especially p. 403; Breucker, Die Abtretung Vorpommerns an Schweden, p. 36; Geijer, Geschichte von Schweden, III, 371.
25 Meiern, op. cit., II, 188.
26 Ibid., II, 939; Odhner, op. cit., p. 34; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 104.
27 Meiern, op. cit., III, 30; Hanser, Deutschland nach dem dreissigjährigen Kriege, p. 65.

This suggestion offended the imperial plenipotentiaries; 28 but this proposal, like the demand that Sweden be given Silesia, undoubtedly helped the emperor and his plenipotentiaties and adviser, Trauttmannsdorff, to be willing to insert the clause against the protests. If Sweden were to receive Wismar and the island of Poël at the expense of Mecklenburg, the Duke of Mecklenburg must be indemnified for his loss. If Hesse-Cassel were to be indemnified as France insisted in her "satisfaction project" of June 1, 1645, 29 some means must be found for this purpose. Unless Austria wished to give up Silesia and other hereditary lands, she must consent to the only other means of indemnification, the secularizing of ecclesiastical states. That was precisely what she did.

During the latter part of the year 1646 and the early part of 1647 the imperial negotiators were granting the demands for "satisfaction" and indemnities at the expense of the church lands, thus saving Austria's own territories. The completion of these negotiations practically coincided with the date of Austria's insertion of the clause against protests. (a) By November 21, 1646, it had been agreed by the imperialists and Catholics that the archbishopric of Bremen and the bishopric of Verden should remain with the evangelicals. 30 By the middle of February, 1647, both territories had been ceded to Sweden as immediate imperial fiefs. 31 (b) On January 22, 1647, the bishopric of Cammin was offered to Brandenburg as an equivalent for Pomerania. 32 By February 20, 1647, the bishopric of Minden had been offered also. 33 In February, 1647, Brandenburg was granted both of these ecclesiastical lands, and final confirmation of the cession occurred in June, 1647. 34 In the same month Bran-

28 Meiern, op. cit., III, 93-94.
29 Ibid., I419, 445.
30 Ibid., III, 436.
31 Ibid., IV, 332.
32 Ibid., p. 281.
33 Ibid., pp. 329-30.
34 Ibid. pp. 329, 334, 582.

denburg was also granted the archbishopric of Magdeburg as a hereditary possession, though with the reservation that such acquisition was to be deferred until the death of the administrator of that time, Prince August of Saxony. 35 By January 29, 1648, the bishopric of Halberstadt was also granted to Brandenburg. 36 (c) As early as November 21, 1646, the bishoprics of Schwerin and Ratzeburg had been declared by the imperial and Catholic party to belong to Mecklenburg, 37 and by the end of January, 1647, the imperial and Swedish ambassadors agreed that the bishoprics should be given to Mecklenburg. 38 (d) The abbey of Hirschfeld, which had been demanded by the Landgravine of Hesse-Cassel on November 8, 1646, 39 was ceded to that princess by the imperial ambassadors on February 8, 1647. 40


Emperor Ferdinand, to prevent the deeding of his own territories to his successful enemies, ceded those of the church as a substitute. He, his advisers, his moderate Catholic associates, together with the French, were manifesting a new spirit in international affairs; they were showing an indifference to the historic material interests of the church that was in striking contrast to the spirit manifested in the previous half-millennium. But it was not an absolute or necessarily a voluntary break with the past; the emperor made an attempt for a long time to avoid it; but when he saw the probability of needing to sacrifice church lands to protect his own, he requested a number of court theologians to give their opinion as to the permissibility of such action. 41 This document was shown officially to the important Catholic powers of the Empire, especially to electoral

35 Ibid., pp. 314, 319.
36 Ibid., p. 962; Geist, Die Säkularisation des Bistums Halberstadt im westfälischen Friedenskongresse, p. 90 and passim.
37 Meiern, op. cit., III, 436.
38 Ibid., VI, 513.
39 Ibid., III, 755.
40 Ibid., IV, 423, 424.
41 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 58-59; Gärtner, op. cit., IX, 874-84; Koch, Geschichle des deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III, II, 188.

Mainz and electoral Bavaria. 42 The theological opinions of these courts were sent to Vienna; and the imperial theologians, after full consideration, concluded that the emperor could, with or without the consent of the Catholic princes of the Empire, agree unconditionally to the permanent cession of the ecclesiastical lands to the Protestants. 43 All efforts of the Catholic extremists under the leadership of the nuncio Chigi and Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, bishop of the occupied bishoprics of Minden and Verden, to prevent such concessions were fruitless. 44 Both Trauttmannsdorff and Maximilian of Bavaria stood firm, and continued to do so until the end of the negotiations. 45 The emperor, having succeeded in securing theological support for a policy of making concessions to Protestants at the expense of the church, was still acting in harmony with the historic principles that had been applied in the sixteenth century; but he was following a theological opinion that was based on expediency, an opinion that did much to promote the secularization of politics. 46

It was all the more easy for Ferdinand and his minister Trauttmannsdorff to apply this theological opinion because the Swedes and French had demanded the cession of Silesian lands, not necessarily in hopes of securing them for Brandenburg, but in order to persuade the imperial court to give its consent to the project of secularizing church lands. 47 It was also recorded that on February 12, 1646, Trauttmannsdorff experienced great joy when he learned that he had succeeded, through Salvius, whom he had probably bribed, in inducing the Swedish government to omit from its utmost demands the Hapsburg hereditary land of Silesia, "the apple of the eye" of the emperor, as the Austrian minister called it during the negotiations. After receiving news of this advantageous arrangement, he had no hesitancy in offering the Swedes Hither Pomerania and the bishoprics of Bremen

42 Meiern, op. cit., III, 150-55; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 60.
43 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 61.
44 Ibid., pp. 58, 61-62.
45 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
46 See chapters xi-xiii on the controversial literature of the period.
47 Heigel, op. cit., V, 424; Pütter, op. cit., p. 167.

and Verden as a part of their satisfaction. 48 Moreover, as soon as it was clear that the imperial court would not need to lose any of its own possessions, a secularization of ecclesiastical lands to the advantage of Brandenburg was all the more easily promoted. 49

Once the emperor and Trauttmannsdorff had decided to regard church lands the "great cloth from which all equivalents must be cut," 50 they were no longer hesitant and embarrassed. They boldly disposed of the ecclesiastical territories. The pious ecclesiasts and their supporters denounced such action by saying that the imperialists "are for amusement playing with ecclesiastical foundations and monasteries as boys would play with nuts and marbles." To this the accused replied: "Every régime (including the ecclesiastical) has its fatal period [periodum fatalem] and is subject to change." 51 While the emperor was carrying out his decision to cede the lands of the church to his victorious enemies in order to protect his own hereditary lands, his action was so striking that the French plenipotentiary at Münster, the Duke de Longueville, in a letter addressed to the king of France, January 25, 1647, made the following illuminating comment:

And truly the imperial negotiators think little of the property of the church, and, provided one does not touch the hereditary property of the house of Austria, they have no great concern for those of St. Peter. All the Catholics in the Empire perceive this truth more clearly than ever, and this consideration will some day prompt the electors and Catholic princes to form a closer connection with France, seeing themselves abandoned by the emperor, who easily sacrifices the interests of the church, when it is a matter of preserving his own. 52

However, responsibility for the spoliation of the church of its lands lay not alone at the door of the imperialists. The French, on the whole, had refrained from demanding church lands as in-

48 Chemnitz, Geschichte des schwedischen in Deutschland geführten Krieges, Part IV, Book 6, p. 41, col. 1; Odhner, op. cit., p. 138; Breucker, op. cit., p. 44.
49 Pütter., op. cit., p. 167; Breucker, op. cit., pp. 90, 93.
50 Heigel, op. cit., V, 424; Geist, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
51 Hanser, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
52 Le Clerc, op. cit., IV, 76.

demnification for their Protestant allies, since such action would be "disadvantageous to their religion and salvation." 53 But the Duke de Longueville demanded that the Landgravine of HesseCassel be given a part of the bishopric of Paderborn and Fulda, the abbey of Hirschfeld, and other ecclesiastical lands. Thereupon the Bishop of Osnabrfick, Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, in the presence of many representatives, objected, in a very neat speech, that His Most Christian Majesty, the French king, was exposing himself to serious criticism if he plundered the church to the advantage of a heretic, the Landgravine of HesseCassel. It is just as though he were using the coat of Christ and Mary to cover a heretical woman. To this the Duke replied complacently but cynically, that "for a woman as virtuous as the Landgravine it is necessary to do much. Why, gentlemen, are you not willing to endure sacrifices yourselves in order to give the full satisfaction desired by Madame Landgravine?" 54 With such representatives pleading her cause it was not surprising that the Landgravine was allowed to incorporate the abbey of Hirschfeld with Hesse-Cassel. 55 The French, who criticized the Austrians for despoiling the church to protect their own secular interests, also insisted on the spoliation of the church to reward and please their ally, by which action they were also protecting their own interests and, as we shall amplify later, were co-operating in the secularization of politics.

53 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 419.
54 Ibid., IV, 419; Hanser, op. cit., p. 65; Heigel, op. cit., V, 425.
55 Heigel, op. cit., V, 425.

Chapter Six

ALTHOUGH a good Catholic, extremely rigid in observing the precepts of the church, Emperor Ferdinand III was milder in spirit, more independent in thought, and less fanatical than his father, Ferdinand II ( 1619-37), had been. 1 His education had been given him by Jesuits, but they were not much in his good graces. 2 He allowed them no influence whatever in his government. 3 He loved peace and was eager to secure a cessation of war. 4 From his father's career he had learned the danger of placing religious above political interests. 5 Such an attitude was undoubtedly taken by him to a large extent as a result of his own relations, as well as those of his father, with Urban VIII ( 1623-44).

It is difficult to come to a correct and final verdict concerning Urban VIII and his relations to the emperors Ferdinand II and

1 Gindely, Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, III, 98; Koch, Geschichte des deutschen Reiches unter der Regierung Ferdinands III, pp. 1, 9; Huber, Geschichte Österreichs, V, 516; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 397.
2 Fiedler, Die Relationen der Botschafter Penedigs über Deutschland und Österreich im siebzehnien Jahrhundert ( "Fontes Rerum Austriacarum", Zweite Abth.), XXVI, 189; Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, pp. 16, 17.
3 Gindley, op. cit., III, 98; Koch, op. cit., I, 4.
4 Fiedler, op. cit., XXVI, 389; Stieve, "Ferdinand III", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, VI, 665; Würzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Österreich, "Ferdinand III", VI, 188; Hanser, Deutschland nach dem dreissijärigen Kriege, p. 48.
5 Krones, Handbuch der Geschichte Oesterreichs, III, 537.

Ferdinand III. 6 One must reject as false the statements: (1) that Urban was almost hostile toward Spain and Austria, and that he wished to humiliate these powers and promote the welfare of France; 7 (2) that, in order to weaken the House of Austria, he tolerated the French alliance with the German Protestants and Swedes, and that Gustavus Adolphus was the natural ally of the pope; 8 (3) that he advocated the dismissal of Wallenstein, Ferdinand II's successful general; 9 (4) that he prevented the election of Ferdinand (later Ferdinand III) as king of the Romans in 1630 at the Diet of Ratisbon ( Regensburg); 10 (5) that he rejoiced over the victories of Gustavus Adolphus and mourned over his death. 11 But, in spite of these corrections to the advantage of Urban's character, his relations with the Hapsburgs were full of incidents that caused Ferdinand III to harbor such an ill will toward the pope that it was easier to disregard church and papal interests when sanctioning the final provisions of the Peace of Westphalia. Ferdinand III remembered not only his own vexatious experiences but those of his

10 Gregorovius, op. cit., pp. 20-22; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 416.
11 Ranke, op. cit., II, 558; Gregorovius, op. cit., pp. 41, 80; Ward, in Cambridge Modern History, IV, 681-82; Benrath, in Herzog-Hauck, Realencyklopädie, XX, 32728; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 459-61; Pieper, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des 30jährigen Krieges", Part III (review of Gregorovius, Urban VIII), Historisch-politische Blätter, XCIV ( 1884), 471-92; Ehses, "Papst Urban VIII und Gustav Adolf", Historisches Jahrbuch, XVI ( 1895), 336-41; Schnitzer, Urban VIII. Verhalten bei der Nachricht vom Tode des Schwedenkönigs, Festschrift zum elfhundert jährigen Jubiläum des deutschen Campo Santo in Rom, pp. 280-83; Schnitzer, Zur Politik des heiligen Stuhles in der ersten Hälfte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, pp. 238-41; Leman, op. cit., pp. 245-49; Wolf, review of Leman work, Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte, XLIV, 140.
6 Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIII, Part II, 1020-31, where is presented a bibliographical account of the older and newer views concerning Urban's policies during the Thirty Years' War; Michael Ott, Catholic Encyclopedia, XV, 218-21; Leman, Urbain VIII et la rivalité de la France et la maison d' Autriche de 1631 á 1635, pp. v-viii, 524-27.
7 Gregorovius, Urban VIII im Widerspruch zu Spanien und dem Kaiser, p. 7; Ranke, Die römischen Päpste ( 4th ed.), II, 539-40; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 266-67, 299300, 366-67, 37-71, 381-86, 453-54, 463-66, et al.; Wurm, in Wetzer and Welte, Kirchenlexikon, XII, 451-52.
8 Ranke, op. cit., II, 558; Leman, op. cit., pp. vi-vii, 72-118, but especially pp. 100118; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 430-31; Wurm in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., XII, 452.
9 Ranke, op. cit., II, 555; Gregorovius, op. cit., p. 17; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 415-16.

father, with whom he was closely associated in affairs of state. 12

The Vienna court had been annoyed because, when Ferdinand II was planning and executing the Edict of Restitution ( 1629), which would restore many German ecclesiastical lands to Catholic control, Urban preserved an attitude of great reserve. Ferdinand II requested that the pope arrange in Rome a public demonstration of joy, processions, and other ceremonies, such as had occurred after the capture of La Rochelle by Richelieu in 1628; but Urban restricted himself to issuing a breve of thanks to the emperor and to mentioning the Edict of Restitution in a praising and acknowledging way in a papal consistory. 13 This papal coldness is easy to understand. Ferdinand was carrying out a policy of state control of church affairs, whereby the restored church lands were, in a preliminary way, to be distributed to the pecuniary and political advantage of Austria without consulting the pope. 14 Moreover, the emperor presented the proposed plan to the Catholic electors but did not present it to Urban VIII; the name of the pope was not mentioned in the entire document; when the commissioners were selected to execute the Edict, the Holy See was ignored entirely. 15 When Urban demanded that the returned lands be taken from the hands of the imperially appointed commissioners and turned over to bishops, who would be more considerate of church interests, the Vienna government warned the bishops not to appeal to Rome concerning the matter, and told the nuncio in Vienna not to meddle in the affair. The government asserted the principle that the kings and princes had to observe papal decisions only in matters of faith, whereas in matters of

12 Stieve, "Ferdinand II", Allegmeine deutsche Biographie, VI, 664.
13 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 410-11, 442; Duhr, Geschichte der Jesuiten in den Ländern deutscher Zunge in der ersten Hälfte des XVII. Jahrhunderts, II, Part I, 463; Weech, Urban VIII, p. 53.
14 Stieve, "Ferdinand II", op. cit., VI, 664; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 42535.
15 Tupetz, Der Streit um die geistlichen Güter und das Restitutionsedict, 1629, p. 443; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 410-11.

church government they may vigorously resist the pope. 16 We see here a manifestation of the spirit of the secularization of politics. Just as Ferdinand I and his father had in 1555 regarded themselves as authorized to negotiate the Peace of Augsburg, even though prejudicial to the church, just so Ferdinand II regarded himself as having authority to settle the question of ecclesiastical lands, especially after the regaining of those lands had been the fruits of a victorious imperial war, waged with only meager papal financial aid. 17

In the latter aspects of the Thirty Years' War the Austrians felt that Urban did not always take the correct position concerning the rivalry of the great Catholic powers--France as opposed to Austria and Spain. 18 Ferdinand II and Philip IV ( 1621-65) of Spain had regarded the Thirty Years' War as a religious war. 19 Both Paul V ( 1605-21) and Gregory XV ( 162123), acting in harmony with such a view, had heartily supported Ferdinand, Maximilian of Bavaria, and the Catholic League during the beginnings of the war, such action appearing to be to the advantage of the church and the Catholic Restoration. 20 The Austrians naturally counted on a continuation of such a papal policy, but Urban took a different view. As the war proceeded, it became less religious and more political; and Urban shrewdly observed this tendency and was less co-operative with the Austrians. 21 But in doing so he was committing an error in judgment, especially when he underestimated the danger that the invasion of Gustavus Adolphus was to the Catholic cause; 22 he thus offended Hapsburg sensibilities, for the

16 Tupetz, op. cit., pp. 443-45; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 412.
17 See next section in this chapter.
18 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 119.
19 Ibid., p. 20.
20 Ibid., XII, 572-75; XIII, Part I, 15 ; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 31, 673.
21 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 500; Huber, op. cit., V, 399.
22 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 20, 414.

Austrian and Spanish courts felt that Urban should have been more energetic in dissuading Richelieu from co-operating with the Swedes and their German allies. 23 It is true that in the years 1632-34 Urban had sent about two million francs to the Catholics in Germany, the League receiving some of it, but most of it going to the emperor. 24 However, the Austrians had repeatedly asked him for financial aid in the common Catholic cause, 25 but his contributions were by no means as large as had been requested and expected. 26 If the pope had based his ungenerous contributions on the fact that the court of Vienna was guilty of financial extravagance and mismanagement in carrying on the war, as had been manifest until the year 1624, 27 such an excuse could not have made any chastening and corrective impression in Vienna, since Urban was squandering money on his nephews and lavishly providing for his own army and fortifications. 28 Added to this, he frequently showed a distrustful attitude toward the Hapsburg courts at Vienna and Madrid, 29 whereas he continued to have friendly relations with Louis XIII and Richelieu, whom the Hapsburgs regarded as fosterers of heresy. 30

The fundamental factor in explaining the ill will between the courts of Rome and Vienna lay, however, in the fact that Urban VIII, like his predecessors, had the idea that he must rule independently as a political prince, as ruler of the Papal States, in

23 Ibid., p. 19; Huber, op. cit., V, 399.
24 Pieper, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des 30jährigen Krieges", Historisch-politische Blätter, XCIV, 480; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 21; Ott, Catholic Encyclopedia, XV, 220.
25 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 179, 299-300, 443, 447, 448, 450, 455, 466.
26 Ibid., pp. 299-301, 431, 441-42, 447, 450; Leman, op. cit., pp. 50, 146-65, Schnitzer, Zur Politik des heiligen & Stuhles, pp. 226-35, 237.
27 Duhr, op. cit., II, Part II, 698; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 21.
28 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 260-61; Part II, 848-52; Ott, op. cit., XV, 219-20; Benrath, in Herzog-Hauck, op. cit., XX, 328; Weech, op. cit., pp. 90, 91.
29 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 266, 267, 417, 419, 425-26.
30 Leman, op. cit., p. 525.

order that he might be independent as religious head of the church. This position of political independence was difficult to maintain, since more than half of Italy was in the possession of the king of Spain. Therefore Urban looked to France, which had no possessions in the Italian peninsula, as a sort of counterweight to Spain; this would enable him to retain his political independence in Italy. 31 In the years 1620-35 there had been a number of serious international contests in north Italy between Spain and France, in which Spain had been supported by Austria. 32 Richelieu skilfully exploited all the resulting unpleasant friction between Spain and the pope and succeeded in giving the impression that Urban was being surrounded and oppressed. 33

It was unfortunate that Austria was supporting Spanish aggression in north Italy just at this critical time during the Thirty Years' War, especially in the years 1629-35. This implied Hapsburg plans to dominate Italy, thus jeopardizing the cherished independence of the Papal States. But even more important was Urban's fear that Spain and Austria would dominate the whole church. This, together with Ferdinand II's disregard of papal wishes in planning and executing the Edict of Restitution, caused the pope to feel that Hapsburg political influence was a real menace to the church. 34

Urban repeatedly, between 1633 and 1642, made genuine efforts to reconcile the Bourbons and Hapsburgs in order to give peace to Europe; he wished to be padre commune to all Catholics. But both Richelieu and Mazarin continued the struggle against the Hapsburgs for political reasons. Urban received no thanks from the courts of Vienna and Madrid, where he was regarded as friendly to France. The French, however, regarded him as being too friendly toward the Hapsburgs. He was plead-

31 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 20; Part II, 1031; Schnitzer, Zur Politik des heiligen Stuhles, pp. 241, 245-46.
32 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 21, 266-98, 366-407; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 35-63.
33 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 21.
34 Ibid., pp. 21-22.

ing a lost cause; none of the courts wished an impartial mediator; each desired the pope to become an unconditional, submissive ally. 35

It is easy to agree that Urban VIII was misjudged by his contemporaries and later critics. It is clear that he possessed a shrewd insight into actuality and made honest efforts to induce the Catholic powers to cease their fratricidal war and establish peace. But by so doing he was seriously injuring Austrian interests and playing into the hands of French politics. 36 It is not surprising that the Austrians came to regard him less as a spiritual leader than as a political monarch; to them he was disregarding religious interests and fostering political interests in a partisan way.

It is undoubtedly true that the reports of the Venetian ambassadors must be used with caution by the historian of the seventeenth century, 37 but no criticism can explain away entirely the manifest ill will of Ferdinand III toward Urban VIII as portrayed in the reports of the Venetian ambassadors at Vienna in the years 1638 and 1641. In the first year two ambassadors, Zeno and Contarini, report that the emperor complains because the pope shows himself so partial to the French, is such a declared enemy of the House of Austria, and that one cannot hope for anything from him. Furthermore, the emperor is disgusted because the pope did not send a nuncio extraordinary to congratulate him upon his election to the emperorship, as all other princes had done that were not in open war or on bad terms with him. The emperor ascribes this to the pope's ill will and his wish to second the claims and pretensions of the French, with whom he shows himself so united in support of their empty

35 Ibid., pp. 19-20, 23, 462-66, 464-71, 473-74, 480-84, 489-92, 495; Leman, op. cit., pp. vii, 390-489, 524-25; Wurm, in Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., XII, 451.
36 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 19; Wolf (review of Leman's work), op. cit., XLIV ( 1925), 140.
37 Hübner, Sixte-Quint, I, 11-12; Pieper, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des 3ojährigen Krieges"," Historisch-politische Blätter, XCIV, 491-95; Ehses, "Papst Urban VIII", Historisches Jahrbuch, XVI, 336; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part II, 1021.

pretexts. It is also papal opinion that the imperial election was not well grounded but took place in a disorderly way. The emperor's greatest bitterness comes from the pope's showing himself so partial to the French. 38

In 1641 another Venetian ambassador in Vienna, Johann Grimani, records that the emperor is expecting the death of Pope Urban VIII and that the emperor is still offended because Urban keeps his favorable attitude toward France and is ill disposed toward all the House of Austria; "if the pope would only do his duty, Christendom would soon have good peace." 39

Ferdinand's feeling of dissatisfaction with the papacy under Urban VIII was changed very little, if at all, during the pontificate of his successor, Innocent X ( 1644-55). The Austrian court manifested only a slight interest in the conclave when the election occurred, giving no instructions in spite of requests for such information by Giulio Savelli, the papal nuncio in Vienna, Cardinal Colonna, the new protector of the German nation, or Cardinal Harrach, Archbishop of Prague. Hapsburg interests were represented only by a Spanish plenipotentiary, Count Sirvela, who arrived shortly before the beginning of the conclave. 40 Innocent X was a weak, dependent, politically unimportant man, with a rather inglorious pontificate. 41 Although he was not unfavorable to Spanish and Austrian interests, his fear of the French prevented him from giving any financial aid to the emperor. 42

38 Fiedler, "Die Relationen der Botschafter Venedigs", Fontes Rerum, XXVI, 195-96.
39 Ibid., p. 285.
40 Wahrmund, Das Ausschliessungs-Recht der Katholischen Staaten Österreich, Frankreich und Spanien bei den Papstwahlen, p. 129; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 18-19.
41 Wetzer and Welte, op. cit., VI, 752; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 29, 277; Ott, in Catholic Encyclopedia, VIII, 21.
42 Koch, op. cit., II, 37-39.

To what extent these feelings toward Urban VIII and Innocent X influenced Ferdinand III in sanctioning terms of peace detrimental to the interests of the church it is impossible to estimate. Surely the preservation of his own estates was uppermost in causing him to consent to paying his war losses with church property, more especially because the unfavorable treatment given him by the papacy had been a factor in causing the House of Austria to lose the war.

Such a momentous decision was made all the easier for him by virtue of the advice of several court theologians, the confessor of the empress, the Capuchin Diego Quiroga, and the Cistercian Johann Caramuel y Lobkowitz, whose literary justification of a policy of compromise will be considered later. 43 These theologians sanctioned the permanent cession of ecclesiastical lands to the secular powers in the face of the opposition of the Catholics at Münster, led by the nuncio Chigi, who tried, through the nuncio at Vienna, Camillo Melzio, to thwart Ferdinand's willingness to make concessions. 44

If the outcome of the war had been favorable to Austria, Ferdinand III would surely have been more considerate of church interests than he was. But in losing the war he felt the need of protecting his own interests as much as possible, even if he had to sacrifice church interests. As early as March 5, 1646, the emperor was quoted as having said that in case of extreme necessity one would need to accept what was unalterable. 45 No one can be quite certain as to what arrangements would have been made if there had been an Austrian victory. But one must recall that the spirit of secularizing politics had already been manifest in the Austrian monarchy in 1629 when Ferdinand II,

43 See below, chap. xvi.
44 Krones, Österreichische Geschichte, Sammlung Göschen, II, 166; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 62.
45 "Ein anders wirdt es seyen, wann man nit anderst kan dass man per conveniantam zulasse, was man für diesmal nit wehren kann". Israel, Adam Adami und seine Arcana Pacis Westphalicae, pp. 39-40, who cites Vienna archives.

in formulating and applying the Edict of Restitution, disposed of ecclesiastical lands according to a secular policy. Now, in 1646-48, when defeat was certain, the Hapsburgs went even farther in the direction of secularizing politics; to save state interests, church interests had to be sacrificed. By October 15, 1647, Ferdinand III had become so certain of the need of making the concessions in question that he instructed his representatives at the Congress, Lamberg and Crane, to inform the extreme Catholics that if they did not yield he would use his sovereign imperial power to coerce them to yield. He had done all he could in the face of a superior enemy; he would have to yield. 46

In carrying out a policy of concessions disadvantageous to the church Ferdinand III was ably supported by his chief minister, Count Maximilian von Trauttmannsdorff ( 1584-1650). He was the emperor's representative at Münster and Osnabrück from November 29, 1645, until July 16, 1647; and it was he that shaped the policies and conducted the negotiations that finally led to the conclusion of a conciliatory peace. He had served under four Austrian emperors and had the full confidence of his master, Ferdinand, whose policy he shaped while in Vienna; and, while at the Peace Congress, he virtually was the source of his own instructions. 47 Like two other of his diplomatic colleagues at the Congress, the Count of Nassau and Isaac Volmar, he was a convert from Protestantism to Catholicism. 48 But his conversion may not have been one of conviction; his

46 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 89; Israel, op. cit., pp. 67-68.
47 Egloffstein, article "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 532-34; Koch, op. cit., I, 18; II, 376; Braun, "Skizzen aus dem diplomatischen Leben und Wirken des Sachsen-Altenburgischen Gesandten am westphälischen Friedenskongresse, Wolfgang Conrad von Thumbshirn", Mittheilungen der Geschichtsund Alterthumsforschenden Gesellschaft des Osterlandes, IV, 399-400; Odhner, Die Politik Schwedens, p. 105.
48 Walther, Universal Register, pp. 6, 8, 9; Pütter, Geist des westphälischen Friedens, pp. 53, 54; Koch, op. cit., I, 15.

parents, who had become Protestants before his birth, returned to Catholicism before he had grown up, probably for the purpose of securing a government appointment, and he changed his creed with them. 49 At any rate, he was regarded as being only a mild convert to Catholicism, bearing no hatred toward Protestants and always tolerant of those differing in opinion with him. 50 He was the most capable and unprejudiced of the counselors of Ferdinand, and for that gloomy age he had an unusually elevated, tolerant, and moderate viewpoint. 51

For his unimpressive exterior, lean figure, and sallow complexion he possessed compensatory qualities that caused him to become the center of negotiations of Westphalia. He manifested an innate earnestness, readiness in speech, calmness and fixity of purpose. In his negotiations he was frank and friendly but was firm when handling important questions. He could see the heart of a problem without obscuring it with nonessentials. He succeeded in many things in which others would have failed. When treated arrogantly and even insultingly by the enemy negotiators, he always preserved an even temper and a shrewd and resolute bearing. He conquered through his superior mentality, his sagacious evasion whenever his opponents sought to drive him into an embarrassing situation. His freedom from religious prejudice and his insight and experience as a statesman account for the confidence that his presence aroused in the members of the Congress. 52 He knew how to secure the good will of the Swedish representative Oxenstierna; he secured the

49 Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 532; Würzbach, op. cit., XLVII, 77; Koch, op. cit., I, 14-15.
50 Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, III, Part I, 211; Odhner, op. cit., p. 119.
51 Egloffstein, article "Volmar", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XL, 265; Koch, op. cit., I, 17; Odhner, op. cit., p. 119; Huber, op. cit., V, 595.
52 Le Clerc, Négociations secrètes, I, 468; Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk von 1643 bis 1648," Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 419; Huber, op. cit., V, 595; Würzbach, op. cit., XLVII, 78; Odhner, op. cit., pp. 120, 224; Koch, op. cit., II, 528; Hansen, "Briefe des Jesuitenpaters Nithard Biber an den Churfürsten Anselm Casimir von Mainz", Archivalische Zeitschrift, Neue Folge, IX, 133; Gindely, op. cit., III, 18182; Charvériat, Histoire de la guerre de trente ans, II, 538.

friendship of the Protestant representatives by manifesting a yielding attitude concerning questions of amnesty and the ceding of ecclesiastical possessions. 53 Oxenstierna called him the "soul" of the Austrian delegation; in general by friend and foe he was paid a high tribute for his zeal for peace, his good will toward everyone, and for his moderation and rectitude. 54 He had been unremitting in his efforts to terminate the Thirty Years' War; he had been intrusted by Ferdinand II to negotiate the Conciliatory Peace of Prague in 1635 with the evangelical princes. 55 He now had a policy of conciliation when undertaking peace negotiations in Westphalia.

Into the intricacies of his varied negotiations we cannot go. It is enough to point out that he regarded it as his first and most important duty to bring about a reconciliation of the German princes by making far-reaching concessions to them rather than cede German territory to foreigners. He hoped to make some arrangements with France, Sweden, and their Protestant allies that would not require a cession of Silesia or other Hapsburg hereditary lands. 56 To accomplish this he had to use church lands, "Pfaffengut," "the great cloth from which all equivalents must be cut," to use his own expressions. 57 He felt that such a policy alone would save the Catholic church in Germany; only by signing a conciliatory peace at any cost could the dreadful devastating war be brought to a conclusion. 58 His yielding policy caused the Protestants, Swedes, and French merely to in-

53 Hegel, op. cit., V, 419.
54 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae publicae, IV, 112, Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 536; Würzbach, op. cit., XLVII, 78.
55 Würzbach, op. cit., XLVII, 77; Odhner, op. cit., p. 119; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 252-54; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 477-80.
56 Heigel, op. cit., V, 419; Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 534; Geist, op. cit., p. 17.
57 Heigel, op. cit., V, 424; Geist, Die Säkularisation des Bistums Halberstadt, p. 17.
58 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 81; Huber, op. cit., V, 601; Koch, op. cit., II, 365, quotes letter of Trauttmannsdorff to Ferdinand III, dated June 15, 1646, which is in the Vienna archives; Israel, op. cit., pp. 61-62; Reumont, "Fabio Chigi--Papst Alexander VII in Deutschland", Zeitschrift des Aachener Geschichtsvereins, VII, 8.

crease their demands; and it was necessary to make further con cessions in order to attain peace. This was especially necessary after Bavaria had signed the armistice of Ulm with France and Sweden on March 14, 1647. 59 However, he refused to concede that the Protestants in the Austrian hereditary lands should have religious autonomy. In April, 1647, he remarked to the Swedish representative Salvius that he would not sign such a provision even if he were sitting in prison in Stockholm. 60 The significant fact in this connection is that it was he, who in the months of November, 1646, to February, 1647, had agreed to the cessions of ecclesiastical lands as indemnification to Austria's victorious enemies and had agreed to the insertion of the clause against all protests that might aim to invalidate the treaty arrangements. 61

Trauttmannsdorff's yielding attitude naturally caused criticism by Innocent X, Chigi, and the extreme Catholics; they had no appreciation for his moderation when ceding church lands and sanctioning toleration of heretics. 62 Even before Trauttmannsdorff's arrival at Münster, Chigi wrote to Pamfili, the papal secretary of state, October 27, 1645, "Trauttmannsdorff is coming, as is believed, to make peace, even though unfavorable, if nothing else is possible; and he is not too greatly concerned over religious matters, as one can see from the Peace of Prague," which the Count had negotiated in 1635. 63 In contrast with the favorable opinion that history has conceded Trauttmannsdorff, the extreme Catholics regarded him as being only moderately gifted, credulous, timid, apprehensive, and not

59 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 80-81, 83; Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 535.
60 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 488; Odhner, op. cit., pp. 202-4; Huber, op. cit., V, 605; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 86-87; Ritter, op. cit., III, 275-76.
61 See chap. iv.
62 Hansen, op. cit., letters of Biber to Anselm Casimir, dated Rome, February 3, 10, and March 24, 1646, pp. 158-59, 160-61, 170-71; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 5152, 58-61, 92; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 79-80.
63 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 58, n. 10; letter in Vatican archives.

shrewd in his ardor to come to an understanding with the Swedes and Protestants. 64

At the papal court also, Trauttmannsdorff was held in low esteem. He was regarded as "a traitor to the Catholic church," as "betraying the Catholic religion," as being "demented." His actions at the Congress were not only "sharply condemned" but "cursed"; he was "scorned as a human being that was born under an evil star for the purpose of destroying the faith in Germany and the House of Austria"; he was a "faithless minister who contemns the true religion and grants everything to the heretics." It was hard to convince the court "that the Count was guiltless." 65 The Spanish, whose interests coincided with those of the extreme Catholics, regarded him as being too sanguine, too easily blinded by the highly colored presentations of his opponents, and too willing to let them view his cards. Peñaranda at one time described Trauttmannsdorff as being a man that had little courage in time of misfortune and one who would purchase peace at any price in order to escape the embarrassment of handling a difficult problem. 66 Trauttmannsdorff left Münster July 16, 1647, to return to Vienna, owing to ill health. 67 There is probably no truth in the affirmation that he left or was recalled as a result of Jesuit and Spanish influence. He went of his own free will. 68 But his departure gave great joy to the extreme Catholics, to Chigi, and to the Spaniards. 69 However, when he left Münster, he felt that peace was assured, or else he would not have left. Chigi had learned from Trautt-

64 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 80-82.
65 Hansen, op. cit., letters of February 3, 10, and March 24, 1648; Archivalische Zeitschrift, Neue Folge, IX, 158-59, 160, 170.
66 Coleccio de documentos ineditos, LXXXII, 245; LXXXIII, 324; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 80, n. 1.
67 Koch, op. cit., II, 528, Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 535; Huber, op. cit., V, 606.
68 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 703; Bougeant, Histoire des guerres, V, 345; Pütter, op. cit., pp. 53-56; Koch, op. cit., II, 342, 375-76, 528.
69 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 654; Odhner, op. cit., p. 224; Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allegmeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 535.

mannsdorff's son that the Count had said that he could not permit himself to be seen at the imperial court except as a bearer of peace. 70

After Trauttmannsdorff left Münster, the Austrian delegation was in the hands of his colleague, Isaac Volmar, Baron von Rieden ( 1582-1657), who was a very able man; 71 but he had less diplomatic ability than Trauttmannsdorff, and his great efforts to secure increased concessions for Austria were not realized. 72 Although the military successes of the emperor prolonged the war for over a year, the final arrangements were fundamentally those that Trauttmannsdorff had secured during his stay of almost twenty months at the Congress ( November 29, 1645July 16, 1647). 73

The essential to keep in mind is that he was the most potent factor in bringing about a cessation of war and the establishment of a conciliating peace. He placed the political welfare of his emperor and country above the ecclesiastical and temporal interests of the pope and church. He negotiated a peace that he hoped would be permanent, and made certain that papal and all other protests against it would be regarded by all contracting parties as null and ineffective.

70 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 88; Koch, op. cit., II, 369.
71 Walther, op. cit., p. 10; Wicquefort, L'ambassadeur, II, 215; Meiern, op. cit., I, 5051; Würzbach, op. cit., LI, 269; Egloffstein, "Volmar", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XL, 536.
72 Egloffstein, "Volmar", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XL, 267; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 90; Braun, "Skizzen, etc.", Mittheilungen, etc., IV, 400-401.
73 Koch, op. cit., II, 528: Egloffstein, "Trauttmannsdorff", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXVIII, 535-36; also article "Volmar", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XL, 267.

Chapter Seven

IN THE opinion of the able Catholic historian, Ludwig Pastor, 1 two cardinals of the Roman Catholic church, Richelieu and Mazarin, did most to secularize politics in the seventeenth century and to make it impossible for the church to complete the Catholic Renaissance or Reformation and thus once more unite Europe religiously. Leopold von Ranke says:

Among all non-Protestants that ever lived, none rendered a greater service to Protestantism than this Cardinal [ Richelieu], who broke its political power in France. On the other hand, he rejuvenated it in Germany, and directed it in England into the path that would secure for him the greatest worldinfluence. 2

As a churchman Richelieu had led such a strictly moral life and performed his ecclesiastical function so well that even his most bitter enemies could find nothing to criticize in him. 3 One of his greatest ambitions had been to secure the cardinal's hat, but he regarded himself as a cardinal not by the grace of the pope but by the grace of the king, who had urgently recommended his appointment; the cardinalate was merely a step toward political power and inviolability in his own country. 4 He never even

1 Geschichte der Päpste, XIII, Part I, 23.
2 Ranke, Französiche Geschichte, II, 509.
3 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 504; Lavisse, Histoire de France depuis les origins jusqu' à la Révolution, VI, Part II, 368-69; Federn, Richelieu, p. 146.
4 Mommsen, Richelieu, politisches Testament und kleinere Schriften, pp. 56-57; Federn, op. cit., pp. 79-80; Hanotaux, "Richelieu cardinal et première ministre", Revue des deux mondes, VIII ( 1902), 106; Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 502; Lodge, Richelieu, pp. 52-53.

zwent to Rome to secure the cardinal's hat; he was one of the few cardinals in history that did not have a titular church in Rome. 5 Richelieu was primarily a Frenchman; "he was everywhere the man of state, not the Catholic, let alone the man of the church." 6 He coldly and calculatingly pursued his state objectives by pushing into the background all religious and moral viewpoints; he was truly a Realpolitiker. 7

His ideal was the absolute state, with all authority centering theoretically in the hands of the king 8 but practically in the hands of himself as prime minister. The rights of the state were superior to feudal interests, parlements, class interests, church interests, and all moral considerations. "To achieve his ends all means were permitted, yes, even commanded: deceit, cunning, harshness, cruelty." 9 In that section of Richelieu "Political Testament" in which he discusses the obedience the ruler must show the pope, he advises King Louis XIII as follows:

Although, on the one hand, the princes are bound to recognize the authority of the church, to comply with its sacred ordinances, and to render complete obedience with reference to the spiritual power that God has put into its hand for the salvation of mankind, and although, furthermore, it is the princely duty to uphold the honor of the popes as successors of Saint Peter and Vicar of Jesus Christ, so, on the other hand, they must not yield to the efforts of the church if it presumes to extend its power beyond the church's own limits.

If the kings are obligated to respect the tiara of the highest priests, even so are they bound to maintain the power of their crown untouched. This truth is recognized by all theologians, but there is no small difficulty in differentiating precisely the dividing line between the independence and the subordination of these two powers. 10

10 Mommsen, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
5 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 502, n. 2; Hanotaux, "Richelieu", Revue des deux mondes, VIII, 106; Federn, op. cit., p. 147.
6 Mommsen, op. cit., p. 54.
7 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 502, n. 4; Mommsen, op. cit., pp. 13-14, 29, 32, 38-39, 58; Federn, op. cit., p. 148; Lodge, op. cit., pp. 184-206; Andreas, Geist und Staat, Historische Porträts, p. 64; Andreas, in Marcks, Meister der Politik, II, 201-3.
8 Kerviler, Able Servien, négociateur des traités de Westphalie, p. 9.
9 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 502-3; Avenal, Richelieu et la monarchie absolue, I, 118-41, 226-47; t Andreas, Geist und Staat, p. 64; Andreas, in Marcks, op. cit., II, 211-13; Mommsen, op. cit., pp. 16, 17, 29.

Richelieu here recognizes the problem of the relation of the state to the church; but he clearly shows that, if there is a conflict of jurisdiction, the state determines where its own interests lie and it is justified in taking the action necessary to sustain them.

Quite as important as establishing France as an absolute monarchy, Richelieu wished to give France security in Europe by establishing a balance of power; 11 to achieve this it was necessary to humiliate the Spanish and Austrian branches of the Hapsburg house, which had been dominant in the sixteenth century under Charles V ( 1519-58) and Philip II ( 1555-98). If Richelieu had been genuinely loyal to the Catholic church and the papacy, he would, as cardinal, have co-operated with Austria and Spain to stamp out Protestantism in Germany and the Netherlands. By so doing, he would have given a great impetus to the Catholic Reformation or Renaissance movement, and possibly, if not probably, enabled it to succeed. But that was contrary to his main foreign policy. To him the Thirty Years' War was not a religious war but a political opportunity which enabled him to make France, if not supreme, at least strong in Europe, to establish a balance of power. 12 The French cue was to aid the enemies of the Hapsburgs. Therefore Richelieu aided the German Protestant princes, the Danes, the Swedes, the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the German Catholic princes, such as the ruler of Bavaria and the Catholic electors, if they were willing to accept French, instead of Austrian, leadership; he even threatened to carry on a war against Pope Urban VIII in 1624 because the latter was siding with the Spanish in the matter of the Valteline passes in north Italy; finally he actively entered the Thirty Years' War by declaring war against Spain in 1635 and against Austria in 1638. 13 This Machtpolilik of the

11 Ibid., pp. 35-37.
12 Ibid., p. 37; Leman, Urbain VIII, pp. 4-8, 61; Laurent, Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanité, X, 273.
13 Mommsen, op. cit., pp. 38, 40-50; Leman, op. cit., pp. 62-63, 91-92, 325-35, 396400, 439-41, 444-67, 490-520; Stieve, Abhandlungen, Vorträge und Reden, "GustavAdolf

French Cardinal prime minister, free from all considerations of religion, had made France the first power in Europe; but it contributed potently to the paralysis and final wrecking of Catholic hopes to restore unity in Germany. Whatever chance the papacy had of exercising any unifying moral and religious force was finally destroyed by the policy of Richelieu's France, now the most powerful state, in its deadly political contest with Austria and Spain, the two other of the most powerful Catholic states of Europe.

After Richelieu's death in 1642 his policy was carried out in foreign affairs and at the Congress of Westphalia quite thoroughly and precisely by his successor, Cardinal Mazarin ( 164261), in accordance with purely secular principles. Such being the case, the other great Catholic powers--Austria, Bavaria, Spain, and even the ecclesiastical princes of Germany ( Mainz, Trier, Cologne, Bamberg, Würzburg)--found it quite easy and natural to follow the same policy when papal and church affairs were being decided in Westphalia. 14 When Catholic princes were shaping their policies on the basis of secular interests, regardless of the expressed authoritative interests of the papacy and the church, we can say that the secularization of politics had been achieved.

When Richelieu's policy of aiding the Protestants against the Catholic Hapsburgs during the Thirty Years' War was criticized by a Catholic called "Mars Gallicus," 15 the Sorbonne eagerly condemned these views; and the action was supported by the clergy of France. The clergy, assembled in Paris, asserted the

Adolf," p. 207; Schnitzer, Zur Politik des heiligen Stuhles in der ersten Hälfte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, p. 249; Vossler, Jean Racine, p. 43; Meaux, La réforme et la politique française en Europe jusqu'à la paix de Westphalie, II, 463-564; Cambridge Modern History, IV, 58-129, 141-46; Lodge, op. cit., chaps. iv, vi, vii; Lavisse, op. cit., VI, Part II, 237-40, 290-316, 338-55; Federn, op. cit., pp. 98-99, 135; Laurent, op. cit., X, 255-71.
14 Pastor, op. cit., XIII, Part I, 23.
15 Laurent, op. cit., X, 273-75.

right of the king to make alliances, conduct war, and carry on his foreign policy as he thought best. 16 But if, during the war, France could take an attitude openly hostile to the interests of the Catholic religion and of the Catholic princes that were most intent on aiding the church, she could not be so bold in the peace negotiations. At Münster, where the French negotiated with the emperor and the Catholic princes, their representative had to be extremely cautious. France had allies among both Catholics and Protestants. Without the help of Sweden and the Protestant princes she could not secure the territorial satisfaction that she demanded. 17 If, in return for that aid, she favored the ecclesiastical claims of the Protestants under Swedish leadership, she would offend the nuncio and the Catholic princes. It was to her interest to be on good terms with the nuncio, for he had great influence as mediator in conducting the negotiations; his friendship was not to be despised, for he supposedly controlled all the votes of the ecclesiastical states. 18

If France offended either the lesser Protestants or the lesser Catholic princes, she would be unable to secure their aid against the imperialistic plans of Austria, against whom alone she had waged war. 19 She was especially anxious to obtain the good will of Bavaria; her constant aim was to detach the elector Maximilian from his alliance with Austria; this turned out to be possible, owing to Maximilian's fear that Austria and Spain would sacrifice his interests in the final peace arrangements. 20 Moreover, one of the French representatives, the Count d'Avaux, was looked upon as a man affecting piety; he was clerical in his attitude and not friendly to the German Protes-

16 Ibid., X, 275-76.
17 Bougeant, Histoire des guerres, II, 35; Odhner, Die Politik Schwedens, p. 129; Meaux, op. cit., II, 578-79.
18 Laurent, op. cit., X, 283.
19 Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, I, 729; Gindely, Geschichte des dreissigjährigen Krieges, III, 179.
20 Gindely, op. cit.; Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 421.

tants; 21 he was anxious, by his actions, to make himself agreeable to the pope, in the hope of being appointed to the cardinalate. 22

So, under the circumstances, the French plenipotentiaries carried out a policy that could be offensive neither to the Catholics nor to the Protestants; they skilfully avoided giving any support to the ecclesiastical claims of the evangelicals, but they also did very little, if anything, effective to prevent the evangelicals from securing a satisfactory adjustment of the religious gravamina. They played between the Catholic and the Protestant princes, cautiously avoiding entanglements in religious questions and assuming no responsibility in their negotiations. In April, 1645, upon being asked by the nuncio whether or not they would aid the Protestants in the adjustment of their ecclesiastical gravamina, they adroitly evaded a straightforward answer, fearing that they might turn their allies against themselves. They stated that they could declare neither for the Catholics nor for the Protestants in this respect, but they would never aid the Protestants in doing anything hostile to the Catholic religion; however, if they should now publicly declare against the Protestants [to the Catholics], they feared that the Protestants might combine and openly attack the Catholic religion. The French therefore preferred to suspend their decision until they saw whether the Protestants would propose anything prejudicial to the Catholic religion. 23

In December, 1645, when the French proposals for peace were made, D'Avaux prevented the insertion of the ecclesiastical gravamina of the evangelicals. 24 In December, 1646, when the gravamina were being discussed, the French agreed to help expedite the negotiations concerning the Empire, "but in ecclesiastical affairs they could give no assistance; their queen, Anne

21 Jacob, Die Erwerbung des Elsass durch Frankreich im westfälischen Frieden, pp. 1718; Odhner, op. cit., pp. 99, 118; Gebhardt, op. cit., I, 726.
22 Pütter, Geist des westphälischen Friedens, p. 143, n. 1.
23 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, I, 389; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 80, 93.
24 Meiern, op. cit., II, 102.

of Austria, being a woman and superstitious, in France the pope and the Catholics must be given due respect." 25

This is the attitude that the French plenipotentiaries maintained throughout the Congress. They would not give any aid to the Protestants in securing redress of their religious grievances. Twice they even tried to persuade the evangelicals to accept the Catholic proposals. In May, 1646, they advised the evangelicals to be satisfied with the Catholic propositions to hold the ecclesiastical lands seventy or eighty years or more. 26 In February, 1647, an attempt to secure D'Avaux's aid in influencing the Catholics to take a more favorable attitude toward the religious grievances of the Protestants proved of no avail. 27 In February, 1648, the French declared

that they would co-operate with the Swedes in political matters and affairs of justice, but in matters concerning religion they would support them only in general but not in any particular instance. . . . . For the Spaniards had made the French crown odious to the pope as though it were facilitating a rupture concerning religious matters; and, furthermore, they must be cautious because of the clergy in France. 28

So the French took a negative attitude toward those matters that most concerned the church. This was significant; they did it solely for political purposes. They wished to offend neither the Catholic princes nor the Swedes and the other Protestants; they needed the aid of both sides to accomplish their political ends. Above all, France needed Swedish support to secure satisfaction for her sacrifices. All efforts at Münster to detach France from Sweden were of no avail; and the defeat of the policy of the Roman Curia was made possible by the merely negative attitude of France. 29

Though the French diplomatically took an attitude of indifference toward the ecclesiastical gravamina that did not concern

25 Ibid., IV, 3. The reference to the queen is to Anne of Austria, who was regent during the minority of Louis XIV, during the years 1643-51.
26 Ibid., II, 637.
27 Ibid., IV, 77.
28 Ibid., p. 988.
29 Pütter, op. cit., pp. 340, 341.

France, they did not hesitate to guard the interests of their own country against any possible protests from the pope. In the peace project of the French of July, 1647, which was really the first project containing in substance the majority of the final provisions of the Peace of Westphalia, the clause that declared protests null was included. 30 The reasons for this are obvious; the proposed treaty provided for the cession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun to France. 31 These territories had been held de facto by the French since 1552; as early as December, 1645, Trauttmannsdorff had offered them to France as part of her "satisfaction." 32 The French were as much concerned about the permanence of these possessions as were the Swedes about their ecclesiastical possessions, for they could expect the pope or his nuncio to issue a protest, an action which occurred in October, 1647 (the nuncio protested against the cession of these territories to the French). 33 Moreover, the proposed treaty granted France Alsatian lands at the expense of Austria and the Empire. 34 It provided also for the granting of the electoral dignity and the Upper Palatinate to the Duke of Bavaria, 35 who had, in March, 1647, done France the great military and political service of signing the armistice of Ulm. 36 The establishment of the eighth electorate and the disposal of the Upper Palatinate had been one of the knottiest problems the Congress had had to solve. Then, furthermore, the Swedes, the elector of Brandenburg, and the Landgravine of Hesse, all French allies, had been given their territorial satisfactions at the expense of church lands. 37 Under the circumstances France accepted the clause against protests which would insure her and her allies of having undisturbed possession of their advantageous war gains.

30 Meiern, op. cit., V, 160.
31 Ibid., p. 151.
32 Ibid., II, 213.
33 Fiedler, Die Relationen, XXVI, 325; Adami, Arcana Pacis Westphalicae, p. 250; Fischer, Beiträge, p. 38.
34 Meiern, op. cit., V, 151-52.
35 Ibid., p. 143.
36 Ibid., pp. 2-17.
37 Heigel, op. cit., V, 424-27; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

Just before the French had inserted the clause against protests in their peace project, there occurred an incident that was very important as marking the tactful respect that both the imperial and the French plenipotentiaries paid to the wishes of the papal nuncio, while at the same time disclosing that fundamentally they were disregarding the principles that outwardly they were pretending to observe. In June, 1647, the imperial plenipotentiaries had given their peace propositions to the mediators, who were to hand the document to the French. However, the imperialists had provided two projects: the first contained all matters both ecclesiastical and political pertaining to the Empire; in the second all ecclesiastical matters were omitted, because the papal nuncio hesitated to place his name to the clause relating to religious matters. Because of these circumstances the two crowns agreed that their negotiations were to stand nevertheless, and that to the project that the papal nuncio was to sign was to be added a provision that all points contained in the other copy were to be nonetheless valid and were to have just as much force as though they were incorporated word for word. 38 This incident merely shows that, though the two Catholic powers regarded the feelings of the nuncio, they did not hesitate to incorporate in their documents the very things that were most opposed by him and against which he had repeatedly protested. They did it probably to save the dignity and feelings of the nuncio and to avoid any unnecessary friction in the remainder of the negotiations, but it is an excellent manifestation of the spirit that pervaded the movement termed "the secularization of politics." If the French were to be certain of the fruits of their efforts in the war and the peace negotiations, they would need to take precautions against papal protests. The spirit that actuated them in the negotiations is apparent;
38 Meiern, op. cit., V, 130-61 (pages 130-40 contain the peace project without reference to ecclesiastical matters; pages 141 -61 contain the references to ecclesiastical matters); Le Clerc, Négociations secrètes, IV, 136-37; Fischer, op. cit., p. 42.

they were desirous of achieving political and material advantages through the aid of both Catholic and Protestant allies, and did not wish to offend either. Such an attitude is accountable for a comment in March, 1646, by Leuxelring, a leader of the Catholic extremists; in writing to Abbot Dominikus, he said that the French were leaving the Catholics in the lurch, they talked much, but their achievements amounted to nothing. 39

By the time that the French had inserted the clause against protests ( July, 1647), all the fundamental characteristics of the Peace of Westphalia had been determined. 40 Let us consider more fully than has thus far been possible, why the French inserted the clause against protests and later participated in its execution, once the Treaty had been signed. The Treaty of Westphalia gave to France results even more far-reaching than those for which she had been striving for a century and a quarter, that is, the ruination, or at least the weakening, of the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs and the thwarting of the Hapsburg ideal of the German Empire as a unified, centralized political power. By this Treaty the Holy Roman Empire had virtually ceased to exist. Each of the three hundred and fifty princes was guaranteed in his local sovereign rights; all the princes could conclude alliances with each other and with foreign powers, so long as no injury was done to the interests of the emperor or Empire, which was merely a formal restriction. In legislative affairs all German states were placed on an equality of rights. These Treaty provisions meant the frustration of the Austrian Hapsburg ambitions to control Germany as a centralized, national monarchy. So far as the governmental structure was concerned, France had accomplished her purpose

39 Israel, Adam Adami und seine Arcana Pacis Westphalicae, p. 31, n. 18.
40 Heigel, op. cit., V, 427.

of politically paralizing the great threatening state to the east. 41

Territorially Germany had been weakened by the loss of Holland and Switzerland; moreover, France herself had acquired full sovereignty over the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, which she had held as fiefs of the Empire since 1552; she now added in the Rhine country the new territories of Breisach, Philippsburg, and Upper and Lower Alsace, 42 which were strategically important in keeping better control of Germany and preventing Spain from using the Rhine Valley as a means of communication between the Spanish Netherlands and Italy. Sweden, the powerful ally of France, by her territorial gains in north Germany controlled the mouths of Weser, the Elbe, and the Oder rivers, while Holland possessed the mouths of the Rhine. The outlets of all the important rivers flowing northward in Germany were under the rule of foreign, nonGerman powers.

Such important Protestant states of Germany as Brandenburg, Hesse-Cassel, and Brunswick-Lüneburg had increased their possessions through French and Swedish aid. Charles Louis, although losing part of the lands of his father, the unfortunate Frederick V of the Palatinate, was given the title of elector of the Palatinate. The Catholic Duke of Bavaria had, through French support, gained the Upper Palatinate and the title of elector. Both Bavaria and the Palatinate, if successfully influenced politically by France, could act as buffer states between France and Austria. France would be regarded as the protector of the political rights of both the Protestant and Catholic German princes against the centralizing efforts of Austria, which would make France appear as a great political liberator. France, as a national, European state, had never exercised such power before. She had more friends and allies than

41 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 416-17; Gebhardt, op. cit., I, 732; Odhner, op. cit., pp. 90-102; Onno Klopp, Der Fall des Hauses Hannover in Gross-Britannien und Irland, im Zusammenhange der europäischen Angelegenheiten von 1660-1714, I, 81-83.
42 Jacob, op. cit., pp. 196-201.

at any time in the past. One of her great enemies, Austria, was, by virtue of the Treaty, out of the scene; she had agreed not to intervene when France continued her war with Spain (which was to be prolonged until 1659 with a victory for France). 43

Since the early sixteenth century France had been using any means to carry out a policy of national egotism. Although her sovereign bore the title of "His Most Christian Majesty" and was an autocrat as a result of the work of Richelieu and Mazarin, he had allied himself with Protestant heretics and Turkish infidels, with Dutch, Portuguese, Hungarian, and Neapolitan rebels--anything to injure the great enemy, the Hapsburgs, and to make useful friendships with the enemies of the Hapsburgs. Having, by 1648, realized this goal of national egotism, France could not afford to jeopardize results by ignoring the possibility of Catholic protests against the Peace. She had entered the war for political purposes, with utter disregard for the interests of the Catholic church and religion; nothing was to be permitted to threaten these results. Losing the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, would be of small consequence compared with the general results just indicated, results achieved with the co-operation of her heretical allies, the Swedes and the German Protestant princes. Not only was the protesting attitude of the papal nuncio and the pope a threat, but Innocent had even gone farther, in the summer of 1647, and stated that any treaty that the nuncio was to sign dare not contain even the names of the Swedes or other heretical parties. 44

Under the circumstances any treaty signed by France with Sweden and other Protestant states would be invalid, and this helps account for the French attitude that was a contributing factor in bringing about the secularization of politics. Other reasons of less importance may have played a part in inducing France to insert a clause against protests. A protest might be

43 Lavisse, op. cit., VII, Part I, 23-24; Cheruel, Saint-Simon considéré comme historien de Louis XIV, pp. 202-7; Odhner, op. cit., pp. 90-102; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 626, 643-44.
44 Fischer, op. cit., p. 42.

expected from the Duke of Lorraine, a German prince, friendly to Austria, who had been excluded from the Treaty and whose territory was still held by France. This protest actually was made after the Peace was signed. 45 Furthermore, the French desired to continue the war with Spain single-handed and were very anxious that the Treaty should contain a clause prohibiting the emperor's giving aid to Spain. At the same time that France inserted the clause against the protests in the Treaty, Mazarin was giving instructions to his plenipotentiaries to insist that the emperor be prevented from giving aid to the Spanish. 46 In the Treaty was finally inserted the clause providing that "neither power shall ever assist the enemies of the other at the present time or in the future." 47 Such a formal clause is found in almost every modern treaty terminating a war; but in this case special significance is to be attached to the clause, for it was only after much pressure and urging that the emperor consented to desert his ally, the king of Spain, and to refrain from hostile acts on his behalf if France should continue the war against Spain. 48 If the pope could release the emperor and his allies from their oath to observe the Treaty in one respect, the whole structure of the Congress might fall to the ground, and war would continue, French gains would be insecure, and the prosecution of the war with Spain would be hindered.

Another consideration, difficult to determine, is the influence of the Fronde ( 1648-53), the approaching revolt against the absolute highly centralized government in France. There had been many manifestations of antagonism to Mazarin and his government before 1648; Spain gladly supported these enemies

45 B. Erdmannsdörffer, Deutsche Geschichte vom westphälischen Frieden bis zum Regierungsantritt Friedrichs des Grossen, I, 6.
46 Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, recueilliés et publiés par M. A. Cheruel ( "Collection de documents inédits sur l'histoire de France"), II, 925, letters to A. M. d'Avaux and to the Duke of Longueville, July 19, 1647.
47 Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo--Gallicum, par, 3, in Walther, Universal Register, p. lxv.
48 Bougeant, op. cit., III, 492-95; Huber, Geschichte Österreichs, V, 609; Cheruel, Histoire de France pendant la minorité de Louis XIV, III, 103.

of Mazarin. It was a relief to the French prime minister to be able to bring the war in central Europe to a close so as to have a freer hand in dealing with the Fronde and Spain. 49 To the later generations the Peace of Westphalia, with all its political advantages for France, looms up as the most significant event of a number of decades; but the signing of the Peace of Westphalia was not heralded in France as a great event. France was much more concerned with internal conditions at the opening of the Fronde movement. When it was announced in Paris that a general peace had been signed in Münster with the Empire, concluding the Thirty Years' War, the news was received with profound indifference. All the memoirs of the time manifested a disdainful silence concerning the most important treaty of a century, the Peace of Westphalia, which terminated one of the most terrible wars in history, of three decades' duration, but which did not at any point touch the privileges of the French parlement or the powers of the barricades or the exactions of the French financiers, 50 which shows that signing a treaty prejudicial to the interests of the pope and the church was a minor, if not a nonexistent, consideration of Mazarin.

49 Hassall, Mazarin, pp. 20-21, 41; Debidour, in Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire générale, VI, 9-16; Lavisse, op. cit., VII, Part I, 29-41; Coville, Étude sur Mazarin et ses démêlés avec le Pape Innocent X, pp. 184-86; Ritter, op. cit., III, 620.
50 Bazin, Histoire de France sous Louis XIII et sous le ministère de Mazarin, III, 450.

Chapter Eight

THE considerations observed thus far would be pertinent in the case of a layman acting as determinative, controlling head of the French government. But why should a cardinal have been one of those, if not the one, most responsible for the secularization of politics?

Mazarin, who, as successor of Cardinal Richelieu, served France as prime minister from 1642 to his death in 1661, was more of a politician than a churchman. Religiously, he himself believed in little or nothing; in fact, he was completely indifferent toward matters of religion. 1 He used his great power as cardinal to personal and political advantage in the bestowing of French benefices and church offices. He employed bishops and other French churchmen to raise church funds that were used to wage the Thirty Years' War, contrary to Catholic interests. He assured the French Protestants at all times of his good wishes and appointed the best of them to high offices. To achieve his personal ends he kept cardinals in his pay at the Roman court. He used ecclesiasts as political spies in French society. 2 Although he had been a cardinal since 1641, he seems never to have visited Rome thereafter; and he never received the cardinal's hat. 3 He had become a naturalized Frenchman in 1639,

1 Federn, Richelieu, p. 146; Federn, Mazarin, pp. 91, 100.
2 Federn, Mazarin, pp. 100-101; Fischer, Beiträge, pp. 43, 44.
3 Catholic Encyclopedia, X, 92.

but always continued to speak French badly; 4 and he continued to sign his name in Italian form, "Mazarini," thus wishing to preserve his Italian characteristics for possible future advantage, such as the contingency of being elected pope. 5 Nevertheless, he was in spirit completely a Frenchman and conducted French affairs thoroughly in accordance with the policies of his predecessor, Richelieu. 6 It was Mazarin who shaped all French policies at Münster, and all other courses of action as well; he was fully responsible for the creation and execution of French policies. 7 He never did anything without a plan, and nothing from motives of love. 8 These personal characteristics of Mazarin help us understand why he had strained relations with Innocent X in the four years preceding the signing of the Peace of Westphalia; they also explain why he, a cardinal in the church, was not deterred in signing a peace detrimental to papal and church interests, a peace significant in the achievement of French national egotism and the secularization of politics.

Mazarin had been greatly disappointed in the election of Innocent X to the papacy in 1644. 9 Upon the death of Urban VIII, who had been so friendly to France, 10 Mazarin hoped, and made all possible plans, to have the election go to either Cardinal Bentivoglio (who died before the conclave terminated) or to Cardinal Sachetti, both of whom were friendly to France. If

10 See above, chap. v.
4 Federn, Mazarin, p. 54.
5 Lavisse, Histoire de France depuis les origins, VII, Part I, 8.
6 Ibid., p. 24; Cheruel, Histoire de France sous le ministère de Mazarin, 1651-1661, I, 3; Bazin, Histoire de France sous Louis XIII, III, 192; Federn, Mazarin, p. 75; Hassall, Mazarin, pp. 23, 24, 52; Meaux, La réforme et la politique française, II, 569.
7 Aubery, Histoire du Cardinal Mazarin, I, 382, 401; H. M. Stephens, Encyclopedia Britannica ( 11th ed., XVII, 940; Fischer, op. cit., p. 68.
8 Federn, Mazarin, p. 106.
9 Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIV, Part I, 39; Bazin, op. cit., III, 286; Lavisse, op. cit., VII, Part I, 12.

necessary, Mazarin was prepared, even publicly, to oppose the election of Cardinal Pamfili, who later became Innocent X. 11 However, through the dominant influence of the Spaniards in the conclave Innocent X was elected. 12 Mazarin's indignation over the defeat was so great that he recalled and disgraced St. Chamond, the French ambassador at Rome, because he had not succeeded in controlling the outcome of the conclave. 13 Cardinal Antoine Barberini, who had been intrusted with French interests during the election, and who had finally, for practical purposes, consented to the election of Innocent, had the title of "protector of France" taken away and was forced to remove the French coat-of-arms from his palace in Rome. 14 Cardinal Theodoli Barberini and also his brother had to remove the French coat-of-arms from their palaces and were deprived of their French pensions. 15 Mazarin's manifestations of anger became quickly known in Rome and were embarrassing to Innocent X. 16 Nevertheless, the cardinal knew it would be well to have the good will of the new pope; so he sent Innocent a letter congratulating him on his elevation. 17 The friendship of the new pope was a matter of great importance to Mazarin, not only from the standpoint of international politics but because he had personal ends in view.

Like his predecessor, Richelieu, Mazarin greatly desired to secure honors for members of his family, and therefore wished to have his brother Michel appointed to the cardinalate to throw

11 Coville, Etude sur Mazarin, pp. 5-9; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 19; Federn, Mazarin, p. 95; Perkins, France under Mazarin, I, 341.
12 Coville, op. cit., pp. 19-26; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 146-51; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 22; von Reumont, Geschichte der Stadt Rom, III, Part II, 623.
13 Fontenay-Mareuil, Memoires de, p. 274; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 151; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 39; Coville, op. cit., pp. 40-45; Federn, Mazarin, pp. 95-96.
14 Fontenay-Mareuil, op. cit., pp. 274-75; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 151-52; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 39; Federn, Mazarin, p. 96; Coville, op. cit., pp. 37-40.
15 Coville, op. cit., p. 45; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 152.
16 Coville, op. cit., p. 46.
17 Letters du Cardinal Mazarin, II, 88-90; Coville, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 39-40; Federn, Mazarin, p. 96.

luster on the family name. 18 However, Innocent did not hold Michel in high regard, actually detested him, and all negotiations having this appointment in view proved in vain until October, 1647, when Michel became cardinal. 19 The intervening time was filled with many events and incidents that tended to keep up the ill feeling between Mazarin and the pope. An attempt of Mazarin to exchange ecclesiastical favors with the pope was entirely unsuccessful. Innocent accepted a French abbey for his nephew but did nothing for the brother of Mazarin. 20 In March, 1645, Innocent X appointed eight cardinals, all friendly to Spain; but Mazarin's brother was not appointed. 21 Innocent, when asked for an explanation, replied that, according to papal rule, two brothers could not be given the cardinalate at the same time. 22 This was an explanation that was irritating to Mazarin, for the rule had been broken for royal and princely families, and Richelieu's brother François had been made cardinal for his services in the capture of La Rochelle. 23 The anger of Mazarin, of the queen regent, and of French official circles was so great over this rebuff that there was some consideration of the possibility of a national break with Rome such as had occurred under Henry VIII of England. 24

In 1645 a Portuguese bishop, who was in Rome under the protection of France, was attacked by some bandits at the instigation of the Spanish ambassador. The bandits killed one and wounded another of the persons accompanying the bishop. Because the pope refused to force Spain to give up these assas-

18 Bougeant, Histoire de traités de Westphalie, II, 404; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 157, 392; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 40-51.
19 Coville, op. cit., pp. 61, 163; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 401; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 51.
20 Letters du Cardinal Mazarin, II, 223; Fontenay-Mareuil, op. cit., p. 275; Coville, op. cit., pp. 54-57; Pastor, op. cit., XV, Part I, 49-50; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 159.
21 Coville, op. cit., p. 57; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 40; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 160-61; Perkins, op. cit., I, 346.
22 Fontenay-Mareuil, op. cit., p. 275; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 160; Perkins, op. cit., I, 346.
23 Fontenay-Mareuil, op. cit., p. 275; Perkins, op. cit., I, 346.
24 Coville, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

sins, Mazarin recalled the French ambassador; and for over a year ( March 27, 1646-May 24, 1647) France had no ambassador at the papal court, 25 although other remaining French officials conducted French negotiations, which were limited to creating difficulties for Innocent X. 26 A French noble, De Beaupuis, who had participated in a plot against Mazarin in 1643, took refuge subsequently in Rome. All efforts to have De Beaupuis extradited for trial by the French parlement failed; the pope, in refusing, explained that the offense had been against a prince of the church ( Mazarin). To which the French replied that the attacked person was undoubtedly an ecclesiast but was exercising secular power. 27 These various incidents aroused in Mazarin a spirit of revenge and led him to break with the pope. 28 At this point various acts were committed by both Mazarin and Innocent, each purposing to irritate the other. Mazarin again became friendly to, and contracted an alliance with, the three Barberini brothers, whom Innocent was treating with ingratitude in spite of the fact that he owed, in part, his election to them. 29 Because they were called to account for the mismanagement of their numerous church offices for personal profit, they fled to France for safety. Mazarin was glad to give them protection and allowed them once more to put the arms of France on their palaces. 30 This was done in a spirit of personal vengeance; 31 all attempts of the French plenipotentiaries at Münster and of the nuncio Chigi to induce Mazarin to

25 Ibid., pp. 59-60; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 41; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 2, 161-63; Perkins, op. cit., I, 346.
26 Coville, op. cit., pp. 60-61; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 41.
27 Coville, op. cit., pp. 61-64.
28 Cheruel, op. cit., II, 166, 167.
29 Fontenay-Mareuil, op. cit., p. 275; Coville, op. cit., pp. 69-72, 83, 87-88; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 163; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 41.
30 Fontenay-Mareuil, op. cit., p. 275; Bougeant, op. cit., II, 405; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 168; Coville, op. cit., pp. 88-89, 95-108; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 42-44; Federn, Mazarin, p. 97; von Reumont, op. cit., III, Part II, 623-24.
31 Coville, op. cit., pp. 89-90; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 43; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 168.

control his resentment and adopt a policy of conciliation were futile. 32

The pope, irritated by this display of friendship toward his enemies, on February 19, 1646, issued a bull that prohibited cardinals from leaving Rome without papal authority. Transgressing cardinals were to lose the income of their charges and benefices in the first six months. In the second six months they were to lose their charges and benefices. If the offenders did not return at the end of fifteen months, they were to lose their cardinalates if the pope desired. 33 This bull was formulated by the pope on his own responsibility, without consulting the College of Cardinals. It was not expressly aimed at any stated situation in the church but was clearly a weapon, quickly forged, to be used against Mazarin, 34 who felt that it was aimed directly at himself. 35 If the bull were carried out, Mazarin would have to give up either his position as French minister or as cardinal. To irritate Mazarin further, Innocent X offered the cardinal's hat to the Abbé de la Riviera, a favorite of the Duke of Orleans, who was the political enemy of Mazarin, 36 in the hope of getting Orleans to declare that he desired peace in spite of Mazarin, in order to make it seem that Mazarin was obstinate. 37 But the Abbé refused the title of cardinal. 38

For these acts Mazarin had his revenge. He consulted the parlement of Paris, whose leading members he had previously bribed; he also consulted the assembly of the French clergy. Although neither of these groups had any affection for the French minister, they both favored him with an opinion against the papal bull. 39 In order to strike a more effective blow to in-

32 Bougeant, op. cit., II, 405, 406.
33 Le Clerc, Negociations secrètes, II, 137; Coville, op. cit., pp. 108-9; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 45-46; Sismondi, Histoire des Franfais, XVI, 406.
34 Coville, op. cit., p. 110.
35 Ibid., p. 109; Martin, Histoire de France, XII, 220.
36 Coville, op. cit., pp. 137-40; Martin, op. cit., XII, 220.
37 Coville, op. cit., pp. 138-39, 147-48; Bougeant, op. cit., II, 401-2.
38 Martin, op. cit., XII, 220.
39 Le Clerc, op. cit., III, 156; Coville, op. cit., pp. 111-14; Martin, op. cit., XII, 220; Sismondi, op. cit., XVI, 407.

sure respect for France in Rome, Mazarin sent an expedition to attack Spain in Naples, and especially in the Tuscan Presides, five coastal points that had been owned by Spain since the time of Philip II and which controlled access to central Italy. 40 Although the Italian campaign was not an unqualified success, it prepared Innocent for a reconciliation; and Mazarin reciprocated. 41 A French ambassador was once more sent to Rome in May, 1647; the Barberini were no longer persecuted, their property was restored. 42 The negotiations for the coveted honor, the cardinalate, were continued with much persistence. Mazarin arranged for a marriage between a French princess and the king of Poland, Wladislaus II. Not only was political influence in Poland gained thus, but the Polish ruler used his right as a Catholic king to nominate a cardinal by proposing the brother of Mazarin. 43 However, finally, October 7, 1647, Innocent X conferred the cardinalate on Michel Mazarin, ostensibly of his own free will, but actually to please the French queen regent and Mazarin. 44 This news was very gratifying to the French prime minister. It meant that France now had another cardinal and that the influence of the prime minister had been increased thereby. It signified further that the pope had finally submitted to Mazarin, had renounced the struggle against him and preferred to make an ally of him. This eventuation constituted a remarkable diplomatic success. 45

40 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 46-48; Perkins, op. cit., I, 346.
41 Coville, op. cit., pp. 138, 146, 149-60; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 48-49; Perkins , op. cit., I, 347-50; Sismondi, op. cit., XVI, 417-18.
42 Coville, op. cit., pp. 142, 143, 148; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 48-49; Perkins, op. cit., I, 350; Sismondi, op. cit., XVI, 428.
43 Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, II, 235, n. 2, 283-84, 477; Le Clerc, op. cit., II, Part II, 156-57; III, 486; Coville, op. cit., pp. 163-64; Cheruel, op. cit., II, 394; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 51; Perkins, op. cit., I, 350-52; Fischer, op. cit., p. 70.
44 Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, II, 511-12; Coville, op. cit., pp. 178-79; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 51; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 70-71; Perkins, op. cit., I, 353.
45 Coville, op. cit., pp. 181-83. This author (pp. 180 -81) undermines the testimony of Fontenay-Mareuil, the French ambassador in Rome, that Mazarin affected an air of indifference on hearing of his brother's appointment, delayed expressing his gratitude to Innocent X, censured the ambassador for making a national affair of the appoint-

The outcome of this struggle over the cardinalate was a great proof of the strength of Mazarin. The ultramontane section of the French church and the pope had tried to overthrow him. Now Mazarin showed the French clergy and all his even more bitter political opponents that he was master of France. The papal court had regarded him merely as the subordinate, minor clerk of his early days; but he, through his vigorous, bold action, had forced the papacy to capitulate.

The important aspects of the hostility between Mazarin and Innocent closed in 1648, but troubles of comparative minor importance continued. 46 Innocent was absolutely right when in November, 1651, he said that since the beginning of his pontificate Mazarin had been the stumbling-block in the relations between France and Rome; he had been the cause of all the unpleasantnesses and quarrels; the minister would finally ruin France and also the papacy. 47 We must keep in mind that these personal and political wrangles between the pope and Mazarin show the latter's ill will toward Innocent and help explain why the French were unwilling to uphold papal efforts in support of Catholic interests in the negotiations at Münster. 48 However, the essential consideration was undoubtedly the fact that the Peace of Westphalia, as finally formulated, gave France such an advantageous arrangement politically that she could run no risk of having it jeopardized by papal protest. And one might be quite safe in saying that, even if friendly relations had prevailed between France and the papacy, Mazarin would have felt impelled, for political reasons, to make papal protests against this advantageous peace ineffective.
-ment, and merely sent some trifles to the pope's sister-in-law. See Memoirs de Marquis de Fontenay-Mareuil, p. 286; Cheruel, Histoire de France pendant la minorité de Louis XIV, II, 402; Perkins, op. cit., I, 354. For a statement corroborating that of Coville, see Fischer, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
46 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 51-52.
47 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
48 Fischer, op. cit., pp. 19-22.

Besides the ill will arising out of the strained relations between Mazarin and Innocent in the years 1644-48, Mazarin gives further testimony of his resentment over the pope's sympathy for Spain and disregard for France in his letters. As early as November 25, 1644, two months after Innocent's election, in a letter to his brother, Mazarin says:

To speak frankly, the whole court and all the parlements of the realm believe that today we have a Spanish pope. Their opinion is based on the partiality that His Holiness has always shown to Spain during his prelacy and his cardinalate, and, as is generally known, on the joy that the ministers of the House of Austria have shown upon the news of his election. They think that His Holiness, in spite of his protestations of friendship, which he has made since his elevation, for the crown of France, dissimulates his sentiments and in the depth of his heart preserves a profound spite for the exclusion that has been given him on our part. There has been no lack of people that have called into question whether we must accept the mediation of His Holiness. The following has been written to Münster: "It is necessary that His Holiness first give us at least a moral guaranty proving to us by facts that he is disposed to conduct himself as a common father of the faithful." 49

Again in a letter of March 25, 1645, to Cardinal Grimaldi, Innocent is regarded as being entirely devoted to the Spaniards, and Mazarin speaks of strange propositions that have been made to the queen concerning the election of Innocent. 50 In another letter to Cardinal Grimaldi ( May 8, 1645) Mazarin makes complaint against the pope who favors other nations and does nothing for France. 51 Once more in a letter of January 2, 1645, Mazarin declared that the pope is acting by caprice or by devotion to the Spaniards. 52 On another occasion, in a letter of July 15, 1645, Innocent is accused "of supporting all [doing anything] providing he can secure the fall of Mazarin." 53 In a letter to Cardinal Grimaldi, February 9, 1646, on the eve of the departure of the fleet for Italy, Mazarin gives expression to the grievances of France against the pope. 54

49 Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, II, 103.
50 Ibid., p. 135.
51 Ibid., pp. 161, 162.
52 Ibid., p. 182.
53 Ibid., p. 204.
54 Ibid., Introduction, pp. xxiii-xxvi.

An additional and much more important cause of French irritation was the lenient papal attitude toward the Dutch-Spanish Treaty of Münster ( January 30, 1648), which recognized Dutch independence and whose terms ultimately became an integral part of the Peace of Westphalia. French irritation was manifested later in the year 1648, when Chigi and the French diplomat Servien were negotiating concerning the nuncio's protest against the Peace of Westphalia. The nuncio Chigi had sent Servien a copy of his own protest against the terms of the Treaty of Westphalia that were injurious to Catholic interests, 55 requesting that the receipt of it be acknowledged by letter. Servien responded, December 4, 1648, stating that he was instructed by his king to ascertain "if the nuncio has made a similar protest against the treaty that was made earlier in the same place between Spain and the United Provinces . . . . and that the treaty made with the United Provinces is without comparison more prejudicial to the Catholic religion than is the treaty made by the Empire." 56 This letter indicates French resentment over the partiality of the pope and the nuncio toward the Spanish. This resentment was justifiable, as the following facts will establish.

The United Provinces (or Holland) had been the allies of France and Sweden against Spain in the Thirty Years' War. 57 But the Dutch government disregarded the wishes of France and negotiated a separate treaty with Spain because it had come to fear Spain less than France. Moreover, by negotiating without France it was able to secure better terms from Spain, whose aim was to weaken France by detaching Holland from her as an ally. 58 Chigi, the papal nuncio, worked hard to keep

55 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 95, 96.
56 René Kerviler, Abel Servien, négociateur des traités de Westphalie, pp. 132, 133.
57 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 142, 144, 220.
58 Bougeant, op. cit., V, 418-23; Edmundson, in Cambridge Modern History, IV, 715; also in Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 11th ed.), XIII, 599; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 67, 75, 77.

the Spanish from signing a peace with Holland that would, by the very nature of things, have to be prejudicial to the interests of the Catholic church; but the papacy suffered a defeat. 59 The Spanish, wishing to avoid embarrassment, kept the negotiations with the United Provinces ( Holland) practically secret from Chigi, because it was impossible for them to negotiate a peace with Holland that would be in harmony with the wishes of the papacy. 60 In the end Spain signed a treaty that was, like the treaties of Mfinster and Osnabrück (i.e., the Treaty of Westphalia), prejudicial to the interests of the Catholic church and religion. A heretic was recognized as ruler of Holland, and this implied that a heretical religion would be tolerated. Moreover, Spain ceded to Holland the almost wholly Catholic parts of Brabant, Flanders, and Limburg. By Article XVII of the Treaty the king of Spain granted to the subjects and inhabitants of the United Netherlands liberty of conscience in his territories. 61 Finally, according to Article XIX the subjects of the king of Spain, when in the United Provinces, were not, in matters of religion, to give any offense by their actions; and, reciprocally, the Dutch were to show the same consideration when sojourning in the territories of the king of Spain. 62

If the nuncio protested against one peace, he should have protested against the other. No public protest was issued at the time; however, the nuncio issued a protest privately, 63 but its contents were not known until published in 1885. 64 This publi-

59 Fischer, op. cit., pp. 66-77; Brosch, in Cambridge Modern History, IV, 688.
60 Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 107; G. Brom, Archivalia in Italië, III, 425, 426; Fischer, op. cit., p. 77.
61 Du Mont, Corps universelle diplomatique du droit des gens, VI, Part I, 431; Londorp, Acta publica, VI, 333; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 107; Hubert, Les Pays-Bas Espagnols et la République des Provinces--Uniés, La question religieuse et les relations diplomatiques ("Mémoires d'Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des lettres et des sciences morales et politiques et class des beaux arts," deuxième serie), II, 113.
62 Du Mont, op. cit., VI, Part I, 431; Londorp, op. cit., VI, 333; Hubert, op. cit., p. 113.
63 Brom, op. cit., III, 437.
64 Coleccion de documentos ineditos para la historia de España, LXXXIV ( Madrid, 1885), 228.

cation does not seem to have caused any widespread attention at the time, for so careful a scholar as Ludwig Pastor states that "this protest, whose contents were guarded so very secretly, were first made known by Brom ( III, 437 f.)," a work that appeared in 1914. 65 During the negotiations the Dutch would concede nothing in the religious field, and the Spanish representatives had to adjust themselves to that situation. 66 The pope and the nuncio were less energetic in opposing this DutchSpanish peace than they were when protesting against the later peaces of Münster and Osnabrück.In appraising French attitude toward the conclusion of peace between the Dutch and the Spanish we must keep in mind the following significant facts: That Adami, the historian of the Congress, who was favorable to the papacy and the nuncio, says he had never seen any protest from Chigi, the nuncio, but he knew that the nuncio had not seen the articles of the Dutch-Spanish peace before they were published, and that, when he heard of it, he orally and privately had expressed his disapprobation of the Dutch-Spanish peace. 67 That although Innocent X had told Chigi in a letter of November 20, 1647 (that is, before the Dutch-Spanish peace had been signed), fearlessly to safeguard the best interests of the church and solemnly to protest against the cessions that were proposed to the advantage of the heretics and to the great detriment of the Catholic faith, 68 it was not until May 16, 1648 (three and a half months after the peace had been signed), that the nuncio wrote a letter to the Spanish ambassador, the Count of Peñaranda, and inclosed a copy of the admonitory letter of Innocent X. 69

65 Op. cit., XIV, Part I, 107, n. 2.
66 Hubert, op. cit., II, 110.
67 Adami, Arcana Pacis Westphalicae, p. 398; Adami, Relatio historica ( Meiern ed.), pp. 542, 543; see also Fischer, op. cit., pp. 73-77.
68 Garampi, Ragguaglio della Paca di Vestfalia, e delle varie Proteste fattesi dalla S. Sedi contro la medisima, Fondo Garampi 94, p. 1; Brom, op. cit., III, 438; Coleccion de documentos ineditos para la historia de España, LXXXIV, 228, 229.
69 Garampi, op. cit., p. 7; Brom, op. cit., III, 437-38 (which gives the date as May 18); Coleccion de documentos, LXXXIV, 228.

That Chigi's letter to the Spanish ambassador was milder than the papal letter to the nuncio, and expressed the nuncio's appreciation of the services that Peñaranda and the other Spanish plenipotentiaries had given to the Catholic religion. However, Chigi protested against the Dutch-Spanish peace in harmony with his papal instructions. He also gave the impression that he had not seen the treaty but had heard that it had been ratified and published. 70

That when Peñaranda, two days later (Mary 18, 1648), reported on these communications to the Spanish sovereign, he indicated that the nuncio had been exceedingly considerate in the way he had negotiated concerning this matter. In carrying out the commands of the papal brief and notifying the Spanish plenipotentiaries of the desire of the pope, Chigi did it "with so great prudence and caution and secrecy that (so far as I [ Peñaranda], can learn) the counselor Brun and I alone have knowledge of it." 71 In speaking further of Chigi's conduct of this case, Peñaranda commends the nuncio especially for prudently having made no disturbance, or demonstration, or any other sort of protest, because he recognized that such action might greatly harm the treaties by arousing fear and distrust in the Dutch Estates-General and might also give the French and their partisans an opportunity of fomenting sedition, quarrels, and complaints by the Protestant preachers. 72

In the same letter Peñaranda indicated that the information that he had given Chigi in a previous conference might have had some weight in softening the attitude of the nuncio and the pope. The ambassador showed that he had acted in harmony with the instructions from his king and in conformity with the advice of the Catholic universities of Louvain and Douay and of the bishops and prelates, who, by order of the lord Archduke Leopold, had assembled to discuss the matter in Flanders. All

70 Coleccion de documentos, LXXXIV, 228.
71 Ibid., p. 226, letter of Peñaranda to the Spanish king, Philip IV. Brun was also a Spanish plenipotentiary at Münster.
72 Ibid., p. 227; Hubert, op. cit., p. 114.

that he, as plenipotentiary, had done was adequately justified and on the basis of complete knowledge of the situation. He had acted in accordance with his royal master's mandate. Therefore he had an easy conscience. He was of the opinion that the demands of the Dutch had to be met in order to avoid wrecking the prospective peace or ultimately making even greater concessions. 73

If we recall Innocent X's friendship for Spain, 74 we can understand why he would not press the point and protest publicly and disturbingly against a treaty, the conclusion of which would enable Spain to carry on her struggle with France more advantageously. The Dutch treaty may not have affected the interests of the Catholic church as deeply as the later treaties of Münster and Osnabrück, but certainly a protest should have been made publicly and with equal rigor in both cases if the papacy were acting consistently. But from the evidence presented, above, it is apparent that the papacy itself, conducting its affairs in the spirit of the times, stressed expediency and made concessions to Spain to enable her to carry out more vigorously her policy of antagonism to France, another Catholic power. The evidence also indicates that Spain, although the most loyal of the great powers toward the papacy, had placed her secular interests above those of the church. She also had contributed to the secularization of politics during the negotiations in Westphalia.

73 Coleccion de documentos, LXXXIV, 226, 227; Hubert, op. cit., p. 114, n. 1; Fischer, op. cit., p. 76.
74 See chap. vii.

Chapter Nine

ALTHOUGH Austria was the leader of the Catholic powers of Germany, it is also important to note the attitude of Bavaria and the German ecclesiastical princes toward the clauses against protests. Bavaria was next to Austria in importance as a German Catholic power. Actually the final conclusion of peace was due largely to Maximilian of Bavaria and Johann Philipp von Schönborn, who was Bishop of Würzburg and Worms, and, after November, 1647, Archbishop-elector of Mainz. Both these princes desired peace most sincerely. They organized a middle party composed of Catholics and Protestants, and through the conciliatory proposals of this party the peace negotiations eventuated successfully. Once these princes had achieved the termination of the war, they were not sympathetic toward a protest that would undo all their work. In most cases these Catholic princes were benefited by the conclusion of the Peace, either in a political and material way or merely by the termination of a war that had, in the minds of many, ceased being a religious war and was doing nothing but injury to church and temporal interests.

1. Maximilian I, ELECTOR OF Bavaria, 1597-1651;

Maximilian, the first elector of Bavaria, living in a period of remarkable personalities, was himself one of the most remarkable of these noteworthies. His reign was the longest and most

eventful of all the Bavarian reigns. 1 Of all the European rulers reigning at the opening of the Thirty Years' War, he was the only one that lived long enough to witness its close. In many ways he was typical of the Catholic rulers of the time. Although deeply religious, he did not permit the interests of the Catholic church to overshadow his political interests.

Maximilian was pious, earnest in observing all religious formalities and practices. In early life he had been impregnated with the idea that every Protestant was destined to suffer the torments of hell. He was an affiliate of various religious orders. He followed the example of his father in engaging daily in religious devotions, and frequently chastised himself to secure peace of mind. He devoted several hours a day to prayer, and heard at least one mass a day, even when on military campaigns. He was deeply interested in pilgrimages and religious relics. 2 He desired religious uniformity to such an extent that he established an ecclesiastical police system unequaled elsewhere in Germany. When the prayer bells rang, everyone must kneel, whether he be on foot or riding in a wagon or on a horse. During religious worship on Sunday people were forbidden to frequent inns or take walks. It was the duty of every subject, even the highest state officials, to present a certificate of having been to confessional at Easter time. 3 He wished to keep Protestantism absolutely out of his lands in every respect. His subjects were forbidden to marry Protestants. No Protestant was to possess lands; all communication with the heretical neighbors was to be avoided. Parents not favoring a Catholic education for their children were imprisoned. Heretical books were prohibited; those in the ducal library were kept in sealed security. 4 He required every one of his subjects to possess a rosary. He

1 Doeberl, "Maximilian I., Bayerns grosser Kurfürst, in neuester Beleuchtung," Forschungen zur Geschichte Bayerns, XII, 208.
2 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 6-8.
3 Doeberl, "Maximilian I," Forschungen, XII, 211; Brandi, Gegenreformation und Religionskriege, p. 152; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte Bayerns, III, 524.
4 Brandi, op. cit., pp. 150-51; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 522-23.

employed no official that would not take an oath to the Tridentine creed; his officials were forced to go to church every day and to participate in the weekly religious processions or pay a fine. Spies were used to see to it that his officials conducted themselves religiously and morally as he desired. He himself could hardly participate in processions and pilgrimages enough. He preferred to take important political and military actions on the day of Our Lady Mary. 5

The Jesuits had trained him in his youth, and he always preserved a fondness for them; to him they were the most perfect representatives and most successful champions of Catholicism. Therefore he favored them and used them as confessors and as counselors in ecclesiastical matters. He also consulted them in state affairs to learn whether his proposed measures were contrary to the commands of God and the church, in hope of being able to conform to their wishes. 6 However, he did not permit them to formulate his governmental and political plans, and in ecclesiastical affairs he even refused their urgent desires. He was never a tool of the Jesuits or of the papal hierarchy. 7

In all affairs he preserved a rare independence of mind and judgment. As a member of the church he regarded himself as subject to the hierarchy, and he always showed all honor and respect to the church as the representative of God. However, he distinguished between the person and the office; and in his relation to the person (even when bearing the tiara) he preserved a free, and occasionally a subtle, judgment. 8 He acknowledged all the rights of the ecclesiasts, and especially of the pope, that were sanctioned by the canonical rights and the curial system; but, on the other hand, he repelled with rugged determination

5 Riezler, op. cit., V, 684-85; Stieve, Der Ursprung des dreissigjährigen Krieges, 16071619, I, 60-68; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 522, 524-26.
6 Steinberger, Die Jesuiten und die Friedensfrage, pp. 19-20, 60, 94-97, 100-101, 103; Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, p. 502, n. 3; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 507-8.
7 Stieve, Churfürst Maximilian I von Bayern, pp. 5-6; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 685-86; Steinberger, op. cit., 19, 20; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 509.
8 Stieve, Churfürst Maximilian I, p. 5; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 526.

all efforts of the churchmen to interfere in state affairs, and, when he felt that his princely position and prerogatives gave him justification, he unhesitatingly used his authority over the ecclesiasts of his land, even when such acts were absolutely denied to laymen by papal theory. 9 He did not in the least share the presumptuous view, so frequently held by other Catholics, that God would finally grant a triumph to his church. He had no hesitation in sacrificing the claims or rights of the church if, by stubbornly supporting those claims and rights, he seemed to endanger the stability of the church or the Empire. 10 In other words, he was an adherent of the idea of secularized politics. The interests of the state and the church required that he protect them both; he was a judge of what was best for the church. But he took measures contrary to the desires of the churchmen only when all other resources seemed exhausted and he was by duty bound to make his own decisions to save the church and the Empire. 11

Moreover, he clung firmly to the ecclesiastical rights that had been turned over to him, and extended them to the advantage of himself and the state when possible. He determined the appointment to the bishoprics of Freising and Regensburg as thoroughly as though he had freehold rights over them. His brother Ferdinand was not only Archbishop of Cologne but was, at the same time, Bishop of Liège, Osnabrück, Paderborn, Hildesheim, and Münster. 12

Time and again Maximilian seemed to place personal interests above that of religion; but he did so because his broad political interests, his love of peace, and the demands of state policy required that he stress religious interests less. As proof of this

10 Stieve, in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXI, 21.
11 Ibid.
12 Doeberl, "Maximilian I", Forschungen, XII, 211; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III,, 526, Ennen, "Ferdinand, Erzbischof und Kurfürst von Köln", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, VI, 691-97. 9 Stieve, Churfürst Maximilian I, p. 6; Stieve, "Beiträge zur Geschichte des Verhältniss von Staat und Kirche in Baiern unter Maximilian I (1595-1651)", Zeitschrift für Kirchenrecht, XIII, 372-96; XIV, 59 - 64 ; Stieve, Ursprung des dreissigjährigen Krieges, I, 69-73; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 526, 527.

may be cited his treatment of the monasteries in the Upper Palatinate, which had come under Bavarian control in 1628. The former secular rulers of the sixteenth century had secularized these monasteries; and Maximilian, with papal consent, continued to keep the income from these monastic properties because these funds were necessary for state purposes, the continuance of the war against heresy. While he was fighting in the north to undo the secularization of ecclesiastical lands by supporting the Edict of Restitution, he was quite willing to continue using the benefits of secularization in his own lands for the better prosecution of the war. As early as 1628 the pope had sanctioned such an arrangement for twelve years; this arrangement was repeatedly prolonged, and it was not until 1669, sixteen years after Maximilian's death, that most of the monastic lands in the Upper Palatinate were once more occupied by the members of the religious orders. 13 In shaping all his policies he exercised full independence of judgment. He believed in the divine-right-of-kings theory; he enjoyed his princely position by divine choice. He wished his counselors to give their advice freely and unhesitatingly, a practice that he regarded as necessary, even for the counselors of an absolute sovereign. However, all his acts were based on his own decisions. 14 He had the strongest regal self-consciousness and became a forceful representative of the princely right of controlling church affairs and of the independence of the state as opposed to the church; he thoroughly believed in absolutism. 15


In Maximilian's foreign policy he also stressed his personal and territorial interests regardless of how such action affected Catholic and imperial interests. To be sure, during the Thirty

13 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 318, 319, 678, n. 3.
14 Stieve, Churfürst Maximilian I, p. 7; Doeberl, "Maximilian I", Forschungen, XII, 211.
15 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 679; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, II, 61; Pflugk-Harttung, Weltgeschichte, Neuzeit, 1650-1815, p. 102.

Years' War he had naturally played an important part as chief of the Catholic League, co-operating against the Protestants, the Swedes, and the French. But in supporting the Catholic emperor he was far from wishing to strengthen the imperial authority so it could oppress the individual German princes. Although he wished to secure the triumph of Catholicism in Germany, he desired also to maintain the old liberties of the German princes in the face of imperial pretensions. He wished, moreover, to create for himself in south Germany a state strong enough to be able to oppose both Austria and France. To insure this with greater certainty, and also to throw luster on his own ducal house, he wished to keep the electorate, which he had acquired in 1623 at the expense of Frederick of the Palatinate, and the territory called the Upper Palatinate. 16

From the beginning of the war Maximilian had fought valiantly for the cause of the emperor and the interests of the church. But after the signing of the Peace of Prague ( 1635) and after the entry of the French into the war as the ally of Sweden and the Protestant princes, Maximilian gave up his zeal for the continuance of the war. It was clear that the purpose of France was to humiliate the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs and to keep Germany divided politically. In other words, the religious interests of the war were being overshadowed by political considerations. Therefore, he was now willing to bring about peace by making concessions to the Protestants. 17 In the last years of the war his actions were such as fully to substantiate the shrewd estimate of Cardinal Mazarin, who, in writing to his ambassadors D'Avaux and Servien at Münster June 14, 1644, said, in referring to Maximilian, that he "is extremely crafty and adroit, and there is no artifice that he will not resort to in

16 Cheruel, Lettres du Cardinal Mazarin, I, xliv; Stieve, Churfürst Maximilian I, pp. 18, 19; Katt, Beiträge, pp. 25, 94, 101; Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, pp. 494, 497; Stieve, "Maximilian I., Kurfürst von Baiern", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXI, 10; Pastor, Geschichte der Päpste, XIII, Part I, 200-202.
17 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 646; Stieve, "Maximilian I., Kurfürst von Baiern", in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXI, 9; Jacob, Die Erwerbung des Elsass durch Frankreich im wesfälischen Frieden, p. 15; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603.

order to gain his ends." 18 So under the circumstances he would use religion when it suited his purposes, 19 he would co-operate with the emperor and his allies, or enter a truce with France and Sweden, or endeavor to become an ally of France, or revert to his original imperial alliance, in accordance with the needs and conditions confronting him. Maximilian's execution of this tortuous but shrewd policy from 1635 to 1648 can best be followed by considering the following steps:

a) From French entry into the war until the armistice of Ulm, 1635--March, 1647.--When in 1635 France intervened in the Thirty Years' War on behalf of the Swedes and Protestants, there occurred what Maximilian had tried to prevent since the beginning of the war. However, in the military campaigns that ensued, Maximilian's generals had succeeded in keeping the French armies beyond the Bavarian frontier until 1645. Thereafter both the imperial and Bavarian forces suffered defeats, and the French entered Bavaria. Consequently, Maximilian's objective was to obtain peace, a peace advantageous to himself. He was filled with the fear that ultimately he might be left isolated between the emperor and Spain on the one hand and France, Sweden, and the German Protestants on the other. 20 From 1635 to 1647 he had loyally co-operated with the emperor, but each mistrusted the other. 21 The long war had exhausted Bavaria's resources. 22 Maximilian needed peace most imperatively; and he regarded the emperor as being the chief deterrent to peace, especially because he insisted on including Spain in the peace that was being haltingly negotiated at Münster. 23 Therefore, in conjunction with Cologne and Hesse-Cassel, and after

18 Le Clerc, Négociations secrètes, II, 62, 63; also Cheruel, op. cit., I, 754; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 678; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 509.
19 Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, pp. 500-518.
20 Ibid., p. 494.
21 Ibid., p. 494; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 646.
22 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 660-66; Riezler, "Die Meuterei Johann's von Werth", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXII, 40; Egloffstein, Baierns Friedenspolitik von 1645 bis 1647, p. 130.
23 Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, pp. 494, 498-99; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 602.

long negotiations and with the support of theological opinions, 24 Maximilian signed the armstice of Ulm with France and Sweden, March 14, 1647. This meant that Bavaria would henceforth be neutral. 25

b) Maximilian's failure to form an alliance with the French.-Maximilian's signing the armistice of Ulm with France was an affront to his former ally, Emperor Ferdinand III. The elector tried to justify his action in a note to the emperor, 26 but feared, quite rightly, that Ferdinand would ultimately take vengeance on him and deprive him of the electorate and the Palatinate. Therefore, to safeguard himself against such a misfortune, he negotiated, between March and September, 1647, to effect an alliance with France. 27 Mazarin, the French prime minister, might conceivably have been ready to enter such an agreement; but he had to face the opposition of his ally, Sweden, which feared that such an alliance might be merely the beginning of the formation of a Catholic league contrary to Swedish and Protestant interests. 28

c) Maximilian resumes co-operation with the emperor, from September, 1647, to the end of the war in 1648.--But by September, 1647, Maximilian was once more ready to join forces with the emperor. In his fluctuating policy thus far his objective had been to hasten the conclusion of peace. However, he soon came to realize that the Swedes and the French were using his armistice with them to promote their own interests; the Swedes were demanding greater concessions than ever at the Peace Congress. Moreover, the Catholic forces were regarding Maximilian as a

24 Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, p. 502, n. 1; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 94-96.
25 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, V, 2-17; Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, pp. 500518; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 612; Riezler, "Die Meuterei Johann's von Werth", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXII, 41; Egloffstein, op. cit., pp. 130-76; Stieve, "Maximilian I., Kurfürst von Baiern", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXI, 18; Fischer, Beiträge, pp. 26, 27.
26 Meiern, op. cit., V, 18-24; Londorp, Acta publica, VI, 193-96; Fischer, op. cit., p. 27.
27 Fiezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 613-16; Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, p. 519; Riezler, "Die Meuterei Johann's von Werth", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXII, 41-42.
28 Meiern, op. cit., V, 17-18; Riezler, Bayern und Franreich, 510; Riezler, "Die Meuterei Johann's von Werth", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXII, 42-43.

traitor to the Catholic cause because he had signed the armistice of Ulm. 29 On the other hand, Bavaria (which had demobilized its army after signing the armistice) was being unjustly suspected of foul play by Sweden and France, because, under the leadership of the disgruntled Johann von Werth, a Bavarian military group took service with Emperor Ferdinand III. 30 Furthermore, the emperor was now temporarily having encouraging victories; and, in order once more to secure Bavaria's much needed military support, he guaranteed the electorate and the Upper Palatinate to Maximilian with greater assurance. So, by September 7, 1647, the elector signed the Treaty of Pilsen and again joined the imperial forces. 31 In taking this step, it was Maximilian's hope that he could persuade the French that he was merely attacking the Swedes to secure an early peace; 32 for over three months he was able to remain at peace with France. However, by December 29, 1647, France was forced, on the urging of Sweden, to declare war on Maximilian. 33 In the 1648 campaign, Bavaria, already exhausted by repeated invasions, was overrun once more by French troops. 34 However, during the last half-year of the peace negotiations and immediately afterward Mazarin, now free from the need of considering the sensibilities of the Swedes, made efforts to promote friendly negotiations with Maximilian. Bavaria, with French help, received the electorate and the Upper Palatinate; and France, with Maximilian's support, secured the advantages that she demanded. 35

29 Fischer, op. cit., pp. 8, 15, 29-30; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 117, 150; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 628, 629; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 602.
30 Riezler, "Die Meuterei Johann's von Werth", Historische Zeitschrift, LXXXII, 38-97, 193-239, but especially p. 92; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 615-26, but especially p. 621.
31 Meiern, op. cit., V, 48-50; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 628-30; Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, pp. 518-20; Egloffstein, op. cit., p. 176; Lorentzen, Die schwedische Armee im dreissigjährigen Kriege, p. 121, n. 2; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 602.
32 Meiern, op. cit., V, 61.
33 Ibid., pp. 117-20.
34 Cambridge Modern History, IV, 393; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 635-46.
35 Cheruel, op. cit., III, 1079, letter of January 1, 1649; Meaux, La réforme et la politique franÇaise en Europe, II, 678-79; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 655; Riezler, Bayern und Frankreich, pp. 540-41; Doeberl, "Maximilian I.", Forschungen, XII, 218-19.

It is quite clear that Maximilian was working mainly, if not solely, for his own interests. His religiosity was not so deep as to proscribe from his statecraft all methods that would be contrary to morals. He would outwit his opponents or even his allies although he had to sacrifice uprightness and honesty. 36 Moreover, in his peace policy, especially toward the end of the War, he was willing to disregard the historic interests of the church if thereby he could secure a permanent and advantageous settlement. He refused to be guided by the appeals of the nuncio Chigi and Innocent X, as the next two sections of this chapter will recount.


During the early part of the Thirty Years' War Maximilian was devoted to the cause of the church and was desirous of extirpating heresy. 37 In fact, throughout the war, except when he negotiated the truce of Ulm with France, March 14, 1647, the religious motive was constantly at work in his mind. Before the truce of Ulm the idea that the Thirty Years' War was a religious war had been nowhere so impressed on any belligerent camp as on the Bavarian. 38 Nevertheless, when, after 1635, as already observed, political interests overshadowed religious interests in the war, he worked in the direction of peace, regardless of how the settlement might affect the church, though he was not uniformly persistent in his desire for peace. 39 As early as February 23, 1636, he had ordered prayers and works of penitence for the sake of bringing about peace. 40 The effects of the repeated devastations of his lands at the hands of the Swedes and the French accentuated his peace efforts. 41 After 1641 he pressed

36 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 678; Fischer, op. cit., pp. 29, 30; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 80.
37 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 6.
38 Ibid., V, 675.
39 Mentz, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, I, 34; Jacob, op. cit., p. 15.
40 Bayerischer literärischer und merkantilischer Anzeiger, No. 17, April 23, 1828, p. 138, attributed by Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 646, n. 3, to Deutinger.
41 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 414-15, 498, 600-601, 660-66; Egloffstein, op. cit., p. 130.

Emperor Ferdinand III with increasing vigor to bring an end to the war. 42

In 1645 Maximilian had sent his Jesuit confessor, Johann Vervaux, to Paris to seek an armistice for the emperor and Bavaria, or, failing that, an armistice for Bavaria alone, and, if possible, a Bavarian alliance with France. But no success attended these efforts. 43 When negotiating the armistice of Ulm ( March, 1647) with France and Sweden, Maximilian was doing so in the interests of peace. 44 When he gave up the short armistice of Ulm ( March-September, 1647) and once more joined forces with the emperor, he declared that Ferdinand III could use Bavaria's alliance only to promote the re-establishment of peace as soon as that was humanly possible. 45

With such manifest desire to bring about peace it is not surprising to find Maximilian, who was the most powerful and ardent patron of the Society of Jesus, writing to Caraffa the General of the Order, January 3, 1648, requesting that he restrain Heinrich Wangnereck, who had written an extreme pamphlet, the Judicum theologicum, against the Peace. Maximilian pointed out that Wangnereck and his Jesuit associates were, through their extreme opposition to a moderate peace, doing injury to the general good and to the Order as well. 46 Moreover, at the instigation of Maximilian, his Jesuit confessor, Johann Vervaux, wrote a sharp reply to the irritating pamphlet of Wangnereck, in which he attacked the extreme uncompromising views of his

42 Stieve, "Ferdinand III", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, VI, 666.
43 Cheruel, op. cit., II, 140-44, 147-48; Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 39-45; Egloffstein, op. cit., pp. 20-25; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 589-92; Pfülf, "Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der bayrischen Friedensbestrebungen an der Neige des dreissigjährigen Krieges, Stimmen aus Maria-Laach", Katholische Blätter, LVI, 522-24; Bougeant, Histoire des guerres, III, 366-67; VI, 457.
44 Meiern, op. cit., V, 61; Riezler, Baiern und Frankreich, pp. 520-21; Brandi, Gegenreformation und Religionskriege, pp. 288-89; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 602.
45 Meiern, op. cit., V, 61; Riezler, Baiern und Frankreich, pp. 520-21; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 646; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 602.
46 Steinberger, op. cit., pp. 132-33, also p. 198, which contains Maximilian's letter to Caraffa; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603; see also chap. xv, below.

brother-Jesuit and made a sort of apology for Bavaria's separate armistice with France and Sweden of March 14, 1647. 47

Having gone over to the side of the emperor once more, in September, 1647 (as observed in section 2), Maximilian pursued a vigorous peace policy. In October, 1647, one of the Bavarian ambassadors at Münster, Dr. Ernst, went to each of the Catholic representatives and stated that his master did not wish to continue the war under any circumstances; and he implored them, even with threats, not to hinder the conclusion of peace any longer. 48 In the same month, October 21, 1647, Maximilian wrote a personal letter to Ferdinand III, his cousin and brotherin-law, urging him to make all possible efforts to secure a resumption of effective peace negotiations at Münster and Osnabrück at once, even before the termination of the military campaign then in progress. He reported that the Swedes and French had wrongly concluded that Bavaria's rejoining Austria meant a resumption of the war to extirpate Protestantism, and that the Spaniards, who were formerly inclined toward peace, were rejoicing over the probable prolonging of the war. To save Catholicism from complete destruction, the emperor should desert the peace-resisting Catholic extremists and begin aggressive negotiations with the Swedes and the French, who were willing to consider an early peace. 49

Six days later, October 27, 1647, Maximilian wrote a second and similar appeal to Ferdinand III, but added, in closing, that if the Austro-Bavarian recess were to result in the emperor's continuing the military campaign, then he, Maximilian, would take measures to protect his own interests, which meant, as explained in the earlier part of the note, that he would sign a separate peace with France and Sweden. 50 Owing to these ap-

47 Steinberger, op. cit., p. 103; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603; see also chap. xvi, below.
48 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 780; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 646.
49 Meiern, op. cit., V, 106-10; Sattler, Geschichte des Herzogthums Würtenberg unter der Regierung der Herzogen, Vol. VIII, Appendix 62, pp. 196-201; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 646-47.
50 Meiern, op. cit., V, 110-13; IV, 787; Fischer, op. cit., p. 55.

peals, Ferdinand III showed a more conciliatory attitude; as a consequence the stagnating peace negotiations could be resumed. 51 Since the departure of the imperial representative, Trauttmannsdorff, from the Congress ( July 16, 1647) the peace negotiations had come to a complete standstill. Now, through the pressure of Maximilian of Bavaria, Ferdinand III sent instructions to his representatives at Münster and Osnabrück to endeavor to secure an agreement on the basis of the peace plan drawn up by Trauttmannsdorff. 52

Maximilian, in his great desire for peace, even used his court preacher, Jacob Balde, who was also a Latin poet, called the "German Horace." He wrote a ninth book to his Lyrical Forests and dedicated it to the French plenipotentiary D'Avaux, in hope that he would work for an early peace between France and Bavaria; this gesture was not without success, for it is regarded as a factor in bringing about the armistice between France and Bavaria in March, 1647. 53

Maximilian also used Balde to present an apology for Bavaria's signing the Treaty of Ulm with France in March, 1647; Balde wrote a drama, Georgicus, in old Latin. The main political idea expressed was that Bavaria, in the interests of selfpreservation, could not permit itself to be ruined in order to continue to aid Austria, which unfortunately was dominated by Spanish influence. 54


The papal Curia had for thirty years praised Maximilian as a staunch supporter of the church, but now disliked his willingness, in the interests of peace, to make the concessions demanded by the Protestants, and therefore made bitter accusations against him. So, early as December 30, 1645, the elector had

51 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 647.
52 Huber, Geschichte Oesterreiches, V, 606.
53 Westermayer, "Balde", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, II, 2; Westermayer, Jacobus Balde, p. 177; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 48; Bach, Jakob Balde, pp. 37, 38.
54 Westermayer, Jacobus Balde, p. 177; also in Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, II, 2; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 96; Bach, op. cit., pp. 36, 108-9.

appealed to Innocent X through a memorandum composed by P. Laurenz Forer and handed by him to the pope. This document maintained that "the Catholic religion was in extreme danger" and that "the German Catholics cannot persist in defending themselves"; and that, "if foreign Catholics do not come to their support," "they will be forced to accept a peace under the most unjust conditions." The pope was implored "to hasten the conclusion of peace through his legate as much as possible; delay is aggravating the situation for the Catholics from day to day." 55 But the appeal was in vain. In an accompanying letter Forer recorded the outcome as follows: "After three months I received from the pope nothing more than 'We shall see.'" 56 When the nuncio Chigi admonished Maximilian for his attitude, he said it was hopeless to continue the struggle; it were better to save what could be saved than to run after the lost with the obvious danger of losing all. He said that he had done his best and that, if those in religious affairs had done as much, conditions would be different. 57 He wrote in the same tone to the pope, as is revealed in the two manuscript volumes of instructions to Crivelli, the Bavarian ambassador at Rome. In December, 1647, Maximilian instructed his emissary to inform the pope that, since "I have attempted all human means" and "since there is no further possibility for me to defend myself and the interests of religion against the enemy, I feel free from all guilt in the eyes of God." 58

In a further letter to Crivelli, January 2, 1648, Maximilian instructed his ambassador to request the pope for subsidies, explaining that "never has it been more necessary to receive the support of His Holiness for imperiled religion than under the present circumstances; never has the means to defend that re-

55 Memoriale in manus oblatum Smo Dno No Innocent X, etc., Reichsarchiv (now Hauptstaatsarchiv), Munich, Jesuitica in genere fasc. 25, No. 370; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 648, n. 2.
56 Memoriale in manus, etc., Jesuitica in genera fasc. 25, No. 370.
57 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 648.
58 Crivelli, Corrispondenza di Roma, 1612-1656 (manuscript volume), instructions to Crivelli, December 11 and 27, 1647, in Bavarian Secret Archives, K. Schw. 515/25.

ligion been more yearned for than now." 59 On January 17, 1648, the elector wrote similarly, "I foresee the certain collapse not only of the Empire but also of the Catholic religion if His Holiness does not definitely and as soon as possible send the requested help to enable me to maintain my armies." 60 In a letter of the Archbishop of Mainz, and imperial chancellor, dated Osnabrück, June 4, 1648, there is noted a remark of the elector of Bavaria's representative, this being made in the Catholic council:

The Supreme Shepherd of the Catholic Church . . . . has thus far excused himself and confessed not to be able to provide assistance and aid, and has found no other remedy to check this evil; and he [ Maximilian] of necessity would have to let those things eventuate that cannot be prevented without an even greater degree of danger and disadvantage to the Catholic religion. 61

Similar statements are to be found in many of the letters of Maximilian to Crivelli in this manuscript volume of 396 pages, from which we infer that the Bavarian elector felt that, since he had appealed in vain for papal aid and had received relief from no other source, there was no possibility of opposing the enemy and guarding the interests of the church. Maximilian believed that, since the church had neglected her own interests in this time of crisis, he would be justified in bringing about a peace even though the interests of the church might suffer thereby.

Chigi, however, resented Maximilian's supporting the peace plans of Trauttmannsdorff, which were disadvantageous to the church; the nuncio felt that the elector was less intent on safeguarding the interests of the church than in furthering the welfare of his own house. 62 This is undoubtedly a correct view. Maximilian was in his seventy-fifth year when the Peace of Münster was signed. That Peace, negotiated with so much difficulty, secured to his young sons the electoral dignity and the

59 Crivelli, Corrispondenza di Roma, 1648, 1649 (manuscript volume) in Bavarian Secret Archives, Munich, K. Schw. 313/13, p. 4.
60 Ibid., p. 13.
61 Ibid., p. 105; see Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 648, n. 3. 62 Fischer, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

Upper Palatinate. To obtain these he had detached himself from his former political associates, Spain and the ultra-Catholics, and in their place had had the support of France. 63 Having achieved these gains, he wished then to be secure against any papal protests. Circumstances made it compulsory for him, although personally a very devout Catholic, to favor a policy implying the secularization of politics.


After Ferdinand III's actions in urging the consideration of Trauttmannsdorff's peace plans, no progress could be made because the extreme Protestants and the extreme Catholics insisted on having their full demands embodied in the Treaty; and for weeks Dr. Isaak Volmar, who was in charge of imperialist interests after Trauttmannsdorff's departure, failed to get support for any compromise proposals. 64 The delay in the peace negotiations alarmed Maximilian, for he feared that the Swedes would, in the spring of 1648, take vengeance on him for having broken the armistice Of Ulm. 65 Maximilian was willing to make concessions to the French and Swedes; he was willing to sacrifice his national and religious sentiments, and came to feel that peace could be secured in no other way. 66 For some time he had tried to form a party of compromise, a third or middle party, or political group that would oppose the extreme views of the ultra-Catholic princes of Germany and of Spain and the emperor, and thus come to terms with the well-disposed Protestants. This party was also called by one of the organizers, Vorburg, the "uninterested" party, since it had no interest in further continuing the war. 67 By January 29, 1648, after long and difficult negotiations, the organization of the party was accomplished, largely through the work of (1) Johann Philipp Vorburg, the

63 Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603; Odhner, Die Politik Schwedens, p. 122; Jacob, op. cit., p. 15.
64 Huber, op. cit., V, 606.
65 Ibid.
66 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 647.
67 Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 437; Wild, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, p. 67; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603.

representative of Johann Philipp von Schönborn, the Bishop of Würzburg, and of (2) Wolfgang Conrad von Thumbshirn, the representative of Sachsen-Altenburg. 68 The Catholic members were Mainz, Trier, Bavaria, Bamberg, and Würzburg; the Protestant members were Brandenburg, Brunswick-Kalenberg, electoral Saxony, Coburg, Brunswick-Lüneburg, Strassburg, Altenburg, and Weimar. 69

Maximilian had placed himself at the head of this middle party; 70 and through its influence, after overcoming the opposition of the emperor and his representatives, it was possible to bring about an agreement on a number of previously insoluble problems such as the religious gravamina and the year of amnesty; the Swedes and French wished the amnesty to date from the year 1618, the imperialists and the Catholics preferred a later date. There now existed a well-organized party of German states who were bent on securing peace; through the further pressure of Maximilian and Johann Philipp von Schönborn, Emperor Ferdinand III was finally induced to abandon Spain and sign a separate peace with France, without the other member of the Hapsburg house. 71 The moderate party were assisted in their peace policy also by the French, who, after the Spanish had concluded a separate peace with Holland, January 30, 1648, were anxious to conclude a peace with the Empire in order to be able to attack Spain single-handed. 72

68 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 939; Braun, "Skizzen aus dem Leben und Wirken des SachsenAltenburgischen Gesandten am westphälischen Friedenscongress, Wolfgang Conrad von Thumbshirn, 1645-1649", Mittheilungen der Geschichts- und Alterthumsforschenden Gesellschaft des Osterlandes, IV, 413; Wild, op. cit., pp. 67-73; Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 437; Jacob, op. cit., pp. 264-66.
69 Mentz, op. cit., I, 36-37; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 647; Wild, op. cit., pp. 6773; Mentz omits Weimar, Riezler omits Strassburg and Brunswick-Kalenberg. See also Huber, op. cit., V, 606-7; Droysen, Geschichte der preussischen Politik, III, Part I, 32934, which undervalues the work of the middle party; Odhner, op. cit., p. 242.
70 Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 647; Steinberger, op. cit., p. 132.
71 Mentz, op. cit., I, 38-40; Odhner, op. cit., pp. 280-81; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 647-48; Huber, op. cit., pp. 607, 610; Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 437-38; Doeberl, Entwicklungsgeschichte, III, 603.
72 Mentz., op. cit., I, 40.

An even more active agent for peace and the secularization of politics than Maximilian of Bavaria was Johann Philipp von Schönborn. He had been Bishop of Würzburg in the years 164247, during which his main policy had been to bring about a cessation of the war. 73 As early as 1644-45, when Maximilian still held to strictly Catholic views, Johann Philipp felt that the war had nothing to do with religion; and even as early as September, 1643, his representative Vorburg at Frankfurt expressed his master's willingness to give up the "ecclesiastical reservation" clause, whereas Maximilian thought it better to continue the war a hundred years longer than make such a concession. 74 When, in November, 1647, he had been elected Archbishop of Mainz to succeed Anselm Kasimir, he felt that it was his special task to use his new influence and increased authority to hasten the peace negotiations at Osnabrück and Münster; and in the minds of some writers he deserves the chief credit for closing the Westphalian peace negotiations. 75 In spite of his rank he was free from religious prejudices and had a yielding attitude when matters of religion were considered by the Congress. 76 He had been a realist in his policies, playing a vacillating policy, supporting first France and Sweden, then Austria and Spain. 77 The war had devastated his territories to the point of exhaustion. 78

Politically, as Bishop of Würzburg and as Archbishop of Mainz, he wished to maintain the princely rights of the separate states of Germany. He opposed the Austrian policy of imperial centralized political control. He opposed the Austrian alliance with Spain, preferring friendliness with France and co-operation

73 Ibid., p. 16.
74 Ibid., p. 34.
75 Wildop. cit., p. 1; Bockenheimer, "Johann Philipp von Schönborn", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXXII, 274; Lavisse, Histoire de France, VII, Part I, 69.
76 Mentz, op. cit., I, 41-42; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 90.
77 Bockenheimer, op. cit., XXXII, 274.
78 Wild, op. cit., p. 46.

with the German Protestants and Sweden to achieve his political ends to establish peace. 79 While Bishop of Würzburg, he had, among other instructions, advised Vorburg, his representative at Münster, "to foster peace in any way possible." 80 In November, 1647, through the death of Anselm Kasimir, a sympathizer with the emperor and Spain, the archbishopric of Mainz became vacant. 81 Johann Philipp was elected with Bavarian and French support. 82 The newly elected archbishop showed great politeness to the French and manifested his gratitude by supporting their policies at the Peace Congress. This course was, however, not difficult for him, since his interests almost always coincided with their wishes, 83 that is, antagonism to the Hapsburgs and maintaining the independence of the German princes. At any rate, because of Johann Philipp's tolerant attitude and desire for peace, his elevation to the important position of Archbishop of Mainz was very significant for the ultimate securing of peace. He had asserted as his working idea, "Not before the fire that threatens all homes is extinguished, may the individual think of his own property." 84


We have observed why Catholic Austria and Bavaria, and even the Archbishop of Mainz, fostered peace policies at Münster that were injurious to Catholic interests. Let us further consider why the other German ecclesiastical princes in large part adopted a similar policy. As bishops, archbishops, and abbots these churchmen might well be expected to do the bidding

79 Ibid., p. 5 and chaps. iii-vi; Baur, Philipp von Sötern, II, 137-38.
80 Wild, op. cit., pp. 47-48.
81 Mentz, op. cit., I, 46.
82 Cheruel, op. cit., II, 510-11; Vautorte, in Le Clerc, op. cit., III, 506-7, 512, 519, 521-22; Mentz, op. cit., I, 47-49; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 90.
83 Mentz, op. cit., I, 50.
84 Heigel, "Das westfälische Friedenswerk", Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Politik, V, 437.

of the pope and his nuncio and refuse to support a treaty prejudicial to church interests. But almost all ecclesiastical princes regarded themselves primarily as secular rulers. 85 Most of them were tired of the war; their lands had suffered as a result of invasions, the quartering of troops, and forced contributions. The princes' revenues from their lands had been greatly reduced, if not wholly annihilated; consequently, they were no longer able to maintain troops in an active campaign. Peace alone would enable them to reconstruct their lands and once more enjoy the income therefrom. 86 Therefore they co-operated with the Protestant and moderate-Catholic secular princes in the insertion of the clause against protests that would make the anticipated papal protest illegal and ineffective. 87 Moreover, these ecclesiastical princes could not carry out an independent policy. Some of them were younger members of the Hapsburg and Wittelsbach (Bavarian) houses. 88

The bishoprics of Passau, Strassburg, and Olmütz were in the hands of Leopold Wilhelm, Archduke of Austria, whose main activities during the war were in the military and administrative service of Emperor Ferdinand III. 89 If his father, Ferdinand II ( 1612-37), had succeeded in his plans, Leopold Wilhelm would also have possessed the bishoprics of Magdeburg, Bremen, Halberstadt, and Verden as an Austrian secondogeniture. 90 The elector Ferdinand, Archbishop of Cologne, was a brother of Maximilian of Austria. Ferdinand had been a seeker after benefices, for, besides holding lesser offices, he was also Bishop of Liège, Münster, Hildesheim, and Paderborn; in other

85 Schafmeister, Herzog Ferdinand von Bayern, Erzbischof von Köln als Fürstbischof von Münster ( 1612-1650), p. 137.
86 Le Clerc, op. cit., I, 155; Mentz, op. cit., I, 16.
87 Zwiedeneck-Südenhorst, Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitraum der Gründung des preussischen Königtums, I, 67.
88 Brandi, op. cit., p. 292.
89 Krones, article on "Leopold Wilhelm", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XVIII, 402-3; Würzbach, Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich, VI, 444-45.
90 Stieve, "Ferdinand II", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, VI, 664; Ritter, Deutsche Geschichte, III, 422-23.

similar ambitions he had not succeeded. 91 In large part his brother, Maximilian, controlled his policies whenever Bavarian interests were involved. To take only one example, when, in October, 1647, the delegates at Münster were to vote on the question of granting the electorate to Maximilian, Maximilian forced Ferdinand to deprive his representative, Franz Wilhelm von Wartenberg, of his vote in the Congress, since he had been leader of the extremists opposing moderate Catholic proposals. 92

The Archbishop of Trier, Philipp Christoph von Sötern, who was also Bishop of Speyer, had during the war carried on an anti-Spanish and pro-French policy because this seemed to meet his material or political interests better. 93 He instructed his representatives at the Congress that "Your Electoral Grace regards this war as being absolutely no religious war." 94 His liberty of action and political fortune depended on the early establishment of peace. 95 The Bishop of Bamberg, Melchior Otto Voit von Salzburg, 96 stood to lose more by further devastation of his lands than he could gain by refusing to accept the Protestant demands; hence, he too favored peace, even though it be hostile to papal and general church interests. 97

One can readily see why the lesser ecclesiastical princes, in order to achieve any material or ecclesiastical advantage during the peace negotiations, would need to be attached to either Austria or Bavaria; but the policies of these two powers were, as already shown, hostile to Catholic interests when their own dynastic interests would be jeopardized by supporting Catholic interests. The other German ecclesiastical princes therefore played an indecisive part; only Wartenburg and

91 Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 31-33; Ennen, op. cit., VI, 691-97.
92 Meiern, op. cit., IV, 777; Ennen, op. cit., VI, 693-96; Odhner. op. cit., p. 242.
93 Baur, op. cit., II, 149-51, 404-7; P. Wagner, "Philipp Christoph von Sötern", Allgemeine deutsche Biographie, XXVI, 61, 66.
94 Baur, op. cit., II, 151; Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte, I, 727-28.
95 Le Clerc, op. cit., II, 155.
96 A castle near Neustadt, Lower Franconia, Bavaria.
97 Gebhardt, op. cit., I, 727; Meaux, op. cit., II, 679.

Adami vigorously defended the interests of the church in the papal sense during the peace negotiations. 98 Furthermore, it should be stated that the representatives of the Archbishop of Salzburg, Count Paris von Lodron ( 1619-53), did not sign the Peace of Münster, October 24, 1648, although one of them, Dr. Johann Krebs, was present. 99 But he, along with other Catholic represesentatives, submitted a protest against the terms of the Peace because its terms were prejudicial to church interests. 100

100 Adami, Relatio historica (ed. Meiern), chap. xxix, par. 13, p. 564; Adami, Arcana Pacis ( 1648 ed.), p. 415; Zauner, op. cit., VIII, 217-18, also pp. 248-50, which contain the protest; dated October 12-22, 1648; Widmann, op. cit., III, 297-98.
98 Brandi, op. cit., p. 292; Le Clerc, op. cit., I, 155; Pastor, op. cit., XIV, Part I, 91.
99 Meiern, op. cit., VI, 621; Zauner, Chronik von Salzburg, VIII, 217-18; Widmann, Geschichte Saliburgs, III, 297.

Chapter Ten

WE HAVE considered the reasons for the insertion of the clauses against protests on the part of the Protestant princes, the imperial party, leading German Catholic princes, and the French. When once inserted in the peace projects, they never were omitted, and are found in all subsequent drafts of the treaties. 1 In the Treaty of Osnabrück as finally signed, October 24, 1648, the following statement is to be found: "And notwithstanding the contradiction or protest made by whomever it may be, cleric or layman, whether within or without the Empire, in whatever time it may be; all the said oppositions are declared null and void and without any force." 2

As a confirmation of the clause found in the Peace of Osnabrück the French and the emperor inserted the following article in the Treaty of Münster:

Since, in order to re-establish the greatest tranquillity in the Empire, there has been made in this same universal Congress of Peace a certain accord between the emperor, the electors, the princes, and the states of the Empire, which has been inserted in the Treaty of Peace drawn up with the plenipotentiaries of the crown of Sweden concerning the differences relating to ecclesiastical properties and the liberty and exercise of religion, we find it well to confirm and ratify by this present Treaty the same agreement, and likewise

1 Meiern, Acta pacis Westphalicae, V, 468, 765, 936; VI, 5, 110, 170, 393.
2 Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Suecicum, or Peace of Osnabrück," Art. V, par. 1, in Walther, Universal Register über die westphälischen Friedens- und Nürnbergerischen Executions-Handlungen und Geschichte, p. xii; Londorp, Acta publica, VI, 387; Dumont, Corps universelle diplomatique du droit des gens, VI, Part I, 473; Woltmann, Geschichte des westphälischen Friedens, Vol. II, Appendix, p. 16.

that which has been agreed upon between the same respecting those that are called Reformed, just as though they had been inserted word for word in the present treaty. 3

Thus France bound herself to support the terms relating to the Protestants.

The following clause is found word for word in both treaties:

That there shall never be alleged, heard, or allowed, neither against this Treaty nor any of these articles or clauses, any canon or civil law, nor any general or special decrees of councils, whether privileges, indults, edicts, commissions, inhibitions, mandates, decrees, rescripts, pendencies, sentences, rendered at any time whatsoever, [any] verdicts, imperial capitularies, or other rules or exemptions of religious orders, whether former or future protests, appellations, investitures, transactions, oaths, renunciations, all sorts of pacts, still less the edict of 1629, or the Transaction of Prague with its appendixes, or the concordats with the popes, or the interim of the year 1548, or any other statutes, whether political or ecclesiastical decrees, dispensations, absolutions, or any other thing which can be imagined under whatever name or pretext; nor shall there anywhere ever be decreed against this transaction indictments or commissions either from the side of seeker or possessor. 4

The motives of the negotiators to make ineffective any protests against the Peace of Westphalia will be interesting to consider. Anyone familiar with recent modern history is much more aware than were the negotiators at Münster and Osnabrück that, in spite of the invariable practice among diplomats to insert an affirmation in every treaty of importance that this treaty is to provide for a durable and permanent peace, the observance thereof endured only for a short time. Both the treaties of Osnabrück and Münster in their first articles declared this to be a "Christian, universal, and perpetual peace." 5 The Peace of Augsburg, the most important previous treaty in German history, in its initial paragraph declared it to be a "persistent and

3 "Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Gallicum, or Peace of Münster," par. 47, in Walther, op. cit., p. lxxi; Londorp, op. cit., VI, 410; Dumont, op. cit., VI, Part I, 453.
4 "Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Gallicum, or Peace of Osnabrück," par. 113, in Walther, op. cit., p. lxxxv, Londorp, op. cit., VI, 417; Dumont, op. cit., VI, Part I, 488; Woltmann, op. cit., Vol. II, Appendix, p. 69 ; "Instrumentum Pacis Caesareo-Suecicum, of Peace or Münster," Art. XVII, par. 3, in Walther, op. cit., p. xlviii; Londorp, op. cit., VI, 403-4; Dumont, op. cit., VI, Part I, 459; Hanser, Deutschland nach dem dreissigjährigen Kriege, pp. 78-79; Koch, Geschichte des edeutschen Reiches, II, 522-23.
5 Walther, op. cit., pp. ii, lxiv.

permanent peace" 6 but it had not been observed by either Protestants or Catholics. The pope had been the most feared opponent of the Peace of Augsburg; he had declared that the emperor may not observe it and had released the emperor from his oath to observe it. At the Congress of Westphalia the papal nuncio had, at various times during the negotiations, protested with papal sanction against the Peace that was being formulated; 7 and it was quite to be expected that the pope himself would protest against the Peace, as he did under the date of November 26, 1648. 8

The negotiators, in anticipation of this protest, might have declared null and void the various expected protests, including that of the pope. But this last would have been "odious," or embarrassing, for it would have meant an imperial refutation of what the pope had hitherto done through his nuncio and was certain to do on his own authority later. Furthermore, a protest might be anticipated from Spain, which was not included in the Peace. Therefore a general formula against protests was adopted. 9

6 "Beharrlichen und beständigen Friden" [sic.]; "duratura et Constant Pace," In Pacis Compositio inter principes et ordines Imperii Romani Catholicos atque Augustanae Confessioni adherentes in comitiis Augustae Anno M.D. LV (ed. Dillingen), 1629, Appendix, pp. 38, 47.
7 See below, chap. xi.
8 See below, chap. xi.
9 Gundling, Vollständiger Discours über den westphälischen Frieden, p. 257; Riezler, Geschichte Baierns, V, 651.

[ Continue to Chapter 11 ]