Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order


VII
WORLD DISARMAMENT

THE WORLD ORDER of Franklin Roosevelt's dreams was an order not only cleansed of the evils of Nazism, Fascism, and militarism; it was also an order wherein all nations would be substantially disarmed, the only arms allowed being those needed for domestic or international policing. The criminal Axis states were to be totally disarmed as a matter of course, for Roosevelt looked upon the attitude of militarism and the institutions and practices embodied in militarism as moral evils that had no place in a decent society of nations. This did not mean that Roosevelt equated all armaments, military establishments, and the use of force with militarism and moral evil. But he did seem to believe during approximately the last twentyfive years of his life that armaments and military establishments, even if not accompanied by the attitude and practices of militarism, were undesirable and that all armaments not necessary for policing should be abolished.

Here is one concept wherein Roosevelt experienced almost as complete a conversion as Paul of Tarsus. If his conversion did not come with the lightning suddenness experienced by Paul on the road to Damascus, it was nevertheless relatively rapid, seemingly occurring during the years 1919-21.

In his public career before 1919 Roosevelt was a militarist of the Mahan-Theodore Roosevelt variety. According to this school war was an established institution in society and the only institution through which many disputes could be settled. It held that while the goal of a world ruled by law with disputes settled by arbitration was a laudable goal, the time was not yet ripe for such a world and disputes would have to be settled for the foreseeable future by the play of natural forces--by force. However undesirable war might be, no nation could be certain it would not break out; and preparation for it must be perpetual. Particularly so long as the world was divided into a variety of nations and peoples with different ideals and goals, there would be some irreconcilable objectives among them and some war was inevitable. Those who believed war could be abolished were "extremists," and Roosevelt was not one of them.

Becoming Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913, he immediately won a widespread reputation as a "big navy man" and was often much closer in his thinking to the admirals than he was to his more pacifist minded superiors, Daniels and Wilson. He believed that war was always a possibility and the United States must, therefore, maintain "a fighting force of the highest efficiency." There were in the Navy, he argued, as many advocates of arbitration and international peace as in any other profession, but the likelihood of war should always be kept in mind. 1 During the 1913 crisis with Japan, provoked by California's land laws, Roosevelt's sympathies were entirely with the militarists. He favored the Joint Army-Navy Board's desire for fleet movements that would have been equivalent to brandishing the saber in Japan's face and he thereby put himself into opposition to Wilson and the cabinet, who wanted to avoid all provocative action. 2 During the Mexican trouble of 1914, Roosevelt virtually itched, claims Freidel, to expand the Vera Cruz crisis into a war, and Daniels had to restrain him. "Sooner or later . . . ," Roosevelt argued, "the United States must go down there and clean up the Mexican political mess. I believe the best time is right now." 3

Meanwhile, Roosevelt had called for the United States to build the largest navy in the world, a navy second to none, thereby going beyond even the recommendations of the General Navy Board, which was willing to accept a navy inferior to England's. Not even the fire-eating Richmond Hobson, notes Freidel, publicly advocated a navy of this size. 4

In Roosevelt's view, in those days strong military forces were needed for more than defense. They were needed also to back up diplomacy. Shortly after World War I began Roosevelt wrote to his wife of his irritation at finding his superiors in Washington almost totally unaware of what he considered the implications of the war to the United States, and unwilling to make what he be- lieved were essential preparations. The fleet was scattered to the four winds, he wrote Eleanor, and "some fine day the State Department will want the moral backing of a fleet in being and it won't be there!" 5 When World War I ended Roosevelt also supported proposals by "big navy" men who argued that an effective fleet should be maintained to back United States diplomacy and the State Department, especially regarding Japan in the Pacific and in order to promote trade and friendship in Latin America. 6

The protection and promotion of American commerce also required strong military forces, particularly a navy, thought Roosevelt in those days. When in 1916 a retired admiral warned Roosevelt against Britain's commercial greed, Roosevelt responded privately that he believed all nations, including the United States, were equally greedy for one another's trade and whoever controlled the seas would behave the same way Britain behaved. The only answer for the United States was to "build the ships." 7 Thus he suggested that after the war the United States must have an all-powerful fleet to maintain her new dominant position in international trade. Once the war was over and the German fleet was no longer a threat, Roosevelt modified his position to the extent of preferring Anglo-American to solely American control of the seas, although he continued opposing abandonment of the nation's enlarged merchant marine. 8 At the same time he advocated the maintenance of air power, along with sea power, for the protection and development of American commerce. 9

In 1914 while agitating for a preparedness program, Roosevelt also argued--as so many others have before and since--that powerful military forces were the best insurance for the prevention of war. 10

In those early years Roosevelt was also a strong advocate of universal military training. As early as 1913 he supported the creation of a Naval Reserve, and in this he never lost interest. 11 As already noted, moreover, Roosevelt had lost faith in the value of the old-fashioned militia when he saw the nature of war changing, and had only mocking contempt for William Jennings Bryan's idea of men springing to arms overnight to defend their country. He argued that a man with less than a year's training was virtually useless in modern war; for a soldier needed to know something more than the manual of arms. He needed to know also how to care for his body under service conditions, be able to march twenty miles a day, know how to dig a trench, and be able to "hit a five-foot square target at six hundred yards." And not one American boy in a hundred could do those things. 12 He preferred to call such training "national service," leaving out the word "military," and argued that there was nothing militaristic about it. All people, he declared, should be made to realize that they had a personal obligation to their nation and their government in time of need; and every boy who gave one year of his life to his country would benefit himself as well as the nation; for such training would result in better bodies, better citizenship, and more unity among sections of the country as a result of the mingling of boys from all parts of the nation. 13 Such training also "stands against anarchy and Bolshevism," he argued later, "against class hatred, against snobbery. It stands for discipline, good fellowship, order, and a broader Americanism." 14

But 1918 was probably the last year of Roosevelt's life in which he talked consistently like a semi-militarist. Freidel thought it significant that as early as January 1919 Roosevelt made a speech --on board ship enroute to Paris-wherein for the first time in years he failed to call for increased armaments. 15 Years later he incorrectly denied that in 1919 he had advocated conscription and he insisted that in 1919 and 1920 he had "believed that the League of Nations would really work out a sufficiently permanent peace to bring about a steady reduction of arms and armies!" 16

Although Roosevelt in that statement exaggerated his 1919-20 faith in the League and the advisability as well as possibility of disarmament, there is no doubt that after 1920 he never again advocated strong military forces except when faced with the Axis peril, and he did so then only with reluctance. Immediately after his own election defeat in 1920 and the defeat of the League in the Senate, he began advocating disarmament. In March 1921 he publicly registered his conversion by proclaiming "I am wholly out of sympathy with this talk about our having the greatest Navy in the world." He still favored the maintenance of a trained reserve, but he wanted Harding to call an international conference to stop the expensive naval competition among the United States, Britain, and Japan. 17 In due course he strongly supported the work of the Washington Naval Conference of 1922, declaring a half dozen years later that it was the one bright spot in the Harding administration. 18

In a 1923 magazine article Roosevelt went so far as to disagree with his old navy friends, arguing that the United States no longer needed to be prepared to meet all possible foes. There was a new spirit of international cooperation abroad in the world, he de- clared, and this new spirit called for an end to armaments races. The trend was away from colonial expansion, more and more disputes were being settled by peaceful procedures, and all nations should cooperate to prevent war. He praised the American agreement not to fortify further her holdings in the Pacific and condemned British and Dutch increases of strength there. 19 In another article in 1928 he condemned the Coolidge administration for not following up the Washington Treaty with limitations on other than capital ships, and for permitting the Navy to appeal for appropriations for expansion. There were no longer any military threats on the horizon, he added; even our relations with Japan could be worked out amicably; a big navy was no longer needed; and a long term program of naval construction was simply indefensible. It would be handing a cudgel to the State Department to use over the heads of other nations. 20

Meanwhile Roosevelt had also become worried about the horrors to civilization implied in the world's developing military air power. The long effort to humanize warfare from Grotius on, he declared in 1925, was now threatened by the airplane which made no distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Unless something was done about this, he warned, "we shall go back to the unlimited and horrible conditions of warfare in the Dark and Middle Ages." In fact, it was more important to work on this problem, he thought, than on the problem of scrapping battle. ships, and the United States should take the lead. 21

When Roosevelt entered the White House in 1933 he was more in favor of disarmament than ever and made vigorous efforts to instill new life into the Disarmament Conference then floundering at Geneva. He sent word privately to Hitler that he considered Germany the only obstacle to an agreement reducing armaments and he promised Hitler that while he opposed any increase in German armament, he would make every possible effort to get the armaments of other nations down to Germany's level. 22 A general reduction of armaments, he told the American people at the same time, was one of the major objectives of American foreign policy. 23 He heartily endorsed the MacDonald proposal recently made at Geneva calling for the gradual abolition of offensive weapons such as gas, heavy mobile artillery, airplanes, and tanks; and he appealed to the heads of the fifty-four governments represented at the Conference to take at least a small first step to achieve the plan. 24 If nations could be limited to the possession of such light arms as rifles, machine guns, and light artillery, success- ful invasion would become virtually impossible, he argued; for these light weapons would be of little use against permanent frontier defenses such as trenches, barbed wire, and forts. 25 Under conditions of this sort, he was fond of saying, Germany's population of 70,000,000 could be kept at bay by Switzerland's 4,000,000 population entrenched in forts on their borders. 26

Roosevelt supported also the French proposal for "continuous inspection" to see that no one rearmed. When the War and Navy Departments protested this idea Roosevelt retorted that "supervision and inspection must be all-inclusive, including all plants in all nations. That is my policy. . . ." 27

Although Roosevelt's efforts to reinvigorate the General Disarmament Conference came to naught, no year went by thereafter, including even the war years, without Roosevelt both privately and publicly expressing his desire for disarmament. In 1934 during preparatory discussions for the Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935 he set himself like a rock against relaxation of the limitations on navies established in the 1922 and 1930 treaties, despite pressures from even some members of his official family who favored slight increases in tonnage to appease Japan. He wanted reductions in tonnage, he told his aides, not increases, and he asserted that he would neither sign nor submit to the Senate or the American people any treaty allowing an increase of even one ton over the limit of the earlier treaties. The most he would do was assure Japan that the United States would not keep more naval power in the Pacific in peace time than Japan herself kept there. 28

To Norman Davis, his delegate to the pending conference, Roosevelt wrote a ringing defense of the Washington Treaty of 1922, declaring it had "brought the world the first important voluntary agreement for limitation and reduction of armaments," and it was, therefore, "a milestone in civilization." The 1930 treaty had taken the world a step further, and he did not want to turn back. Any weakening of those treaties, he feared, would so upset the power structure that a naval arms race would be inevitable. Davis was instructed, therefore, to work for a 20% tonnage reduction. If that could not be had, he should try to get 15%, 10%, 5%, or at the worst an extension of the present treaties. But no increase would be acceptable. 29

A month later, irritated by England's reluctance to cooperate to reduce tonnage, the President wrote Davis again, instructing him to impress upon British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon and other Tories the fact that if England was even suspected of playing with the Japanese rather than with the United States on the naval arms matter, Roosevelt would be compelled to make it clear to the people of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa that "their future security is linked with the United States." He told Davis also to ignore the Japanese argument that an increased allowance in her naval tonnage was needed to appease Japanese sentiment which was resentful of United States immigration policy. That argument, thought the President, was "nothing more nor less than a smoke screen" laid by Japanese militarists and ambassadors. 30

Despite the continued worsening of the international situation in the late thirties, Roosevelt continued advocating disarmament. At a cabinet meeting in 1936, for example, he expressed his desire for the neutralization and demilitarization of practically everything in the Pacific except Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Such places as the Philippines, Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies, and British North Borneo should be stripped of weapons; and while it would not be reasonable to demilitarize Hawaii, which was not in the Japanese part of the Pacific, he would be quite willing to disarm Samoa and the parts of Alaska nearest Japan. 31 In both 1937 and 1938 Roosevelt again pushed the earlier idea of prohibiting the manufacture of "offensive" weapons, going so far on one occasion as to get both the German Ambassador and one of his own ambassadors to try again to sell the idea to Hitler. 32 In the late thirties Roosevelt also continued linking disarmament with trade barriers, arguing that one could not come down without the other also coming down. Again he appealed to the dictators, promising that if they would agree to a limitation of armaments, he would do everything in his power to satisfy their complaints about trade barriers that hampered them. 33

During the war Roosevelt continued urging disarmament. When in June 1941 Adolf Berle sought permission to try his hand at drafting peace terms the President told him to start with the idea that disarmament was the crux of the international situation. 34 And when Myron Taylor was sent to the Vatican as the President's representative a few months later Roosevelt told him also to stress disarmament as the first necessity of the post-war world. But by this time the President had made one major modification in his thinking. He was now thinking primarily of disarming the aggressors, and of doing it by force. It might take years or generations, he told Taylor, to achieve disarmament by voluntary means. Hence the Axis states would be disarmed whether they liked it or not. 35 But, the peace-loving powers would not disarm. They were to become the world's policemen for a number of years after the war and they, therefore, would have to remain strong both in the air and on the sea to perform their policing functions. At first only the United States and Britain were considered eligible for this police duty. But later Russia was included, then China, and finally even France. By the spring of 1943 he was visualizing a world in which all nations except the Big Four policemen would be disarmed. 36 And at Yalta he also expressed the hope that frontiers in the world eventually would be as free of fortifications and armed forces as the United StatesCanadian border had been for a hundred years. 37 How he proposed to bring about disarmament among the non-Axis nations he did not say.

Roosevelt had little patience with the maintenance of armaments by small nations. Welles has testified that during the thirties Roosevelt often held forth at great length and in great detail on this topic, arguing that the small nations ought to be satisfied to have their security provided by the English-speaking powers and in return should be willing to put their national resources into education and welfare rather than into the armaments that had caused so many wars among them. He used to brush aside references to national pride, declared Welles, and insisted that his disarmament-policing scheme was realistic. 38 It is easy to imply, therefore, that if Roosevelt did not plan to disarm the nonAxis states by force, it is quite probable that he would have been quite willing to use a variety of pressures to get them to disarm "voluntarily."

Unfortunately for the student of the theory of international relations, Roosevelt never provided a single comprehensive, reasoned argument as to why he wanted a substantially disarmed world. It may be that he thought the argument for disarmament so self-evident that he saw no necessity for debate. Over the years, however, by a sentence here, a paragraph there he suggested a variety of reasons for his position, some of which have already been mentioned. During the twenties his chief argument was that large military forces, particularly large naval forces, were no longer needed. The German threat had been obliterated by the World War I settlement; Japan was the only conceivable troublemaker on the seas, and by proper handling, the Japanese problem could be solved by negotiation, toward which the 1922 Washington Treaty was a good start. The trend away from colonialism then visible, the greater effort being made to prevent wars, and the trend toward the settlement of more and more disputes by amicable means, trends visible at least to Roosevelt--all signified the declining need for military forces. All this was part of the new spirit of internationalism, he thought, and this spirit would continue to grow. 39

During the thirties Roosevelt's arguments were wrapped largely around economics. As noted earlier, he harped repeatedly on the refrain that armaments were driving governments into bankruptcy, they represented an unproductive squandering of resources, and employment or a national economy dependent on armaments was as weak as a house of cards. 40 During the war the same theme was repeated, with the President insisting that rehabilitation of the world economy would be impossible if nations, large or small, had to carry burdens of heavy armaments in order to survive. The amount of money spent in past years on armaments instead of on productive industry and agriculture, he wrote President Inonu of Turkey in 1943, has been "disgraceful." 41

During the war Roosevelt also reasoned that both post-war recovery and security would be dependent on disarmament. While on his mission to Europe early in 1940 Welles was instructed to impress upon Mussolini that in the President's view security was the fundamental issue in Europe; and to get real security, there must be real disarmament. If this were achieved, it would then be possible for people to get back to constructive work, to achieve higher standards of living, and to make economic adjustments necessary for permanent peace . 42

In 1943 Roosevelt told British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden that once Germany was disarmed, France and Poland would no longer need large military establishments and they, therefore, should also stay disarmed. 43

On occasion Roosevelt also used a few other arguments. Excessive armaments promote suspicions that breed wars, he once argued, and the competition resulting from arms races menaces peace. 44 Disarmament and freedom from fear of aggression were also necessary to preserve human rights, he said on another occasion, as well as to promote social justice and to improve social conditions. 45

In view of Roosevelt's devotion to the ideal of a substantially disarmed world from the early twenties on, it is little wonder that he began preparing the United States for war during his Presidency only with the utmost reluctance. Already worried by Japanese behavior in Manchuria at the time he entered the White House, Roosevelt decided immediately after his inauguration to rebuild the Navy to the strength allowed by the 1922 Washington Treaty. 46 But his rebuilding plans were so modest that as late as 1936 they aimed at achieving this treaty strength only by 1942. 47 It was not until 1938 that the President asked Congress for as much as a billion dollar appropriation for the War and Navy Departments, and even then he said he was making the request "with the deepest regret" and only because so many other countries were arming so fast that American security was in jeopardy. 48 In the two years following 1938, moreover, Congress appropriated more money for military purposes than the President requested and probably would have voted even more money had Roosevelt not restrained it. 49 Although in 1940 Roosevelt frightened pacifists with his rearmament measures, he took every step so slowly that his more bellicose associates such as Ickes and Stimson were repeatedly exasperated. 50 Interestingly enough, in the presidential election of that year when attempting to present himself as a great advocate of national defense, he reverted to his old World War I argument that armaments now mean peace, not war, that they are a guarantee against the United States being attacked. Thus the United States was arming to keep war away. 51

It was not until 1941, however, that Roosevelt threw himself into the rearmament task with vigor. And even then, he continued to dream and plan for a post-war world disarmed except for police forces.

VIII
THE ABOLITION OF IMPERIALISM

THE SPIRITUAL and moral transformation of international relations required not only the ridding of the world of the evils of fascist totalitarianism and excessive armaments, thought Roosevelt; it required also that the world be rid of imperialism in all its forms; that the exploitation of one group of people by another be stopped; and that in the place of such things as colonialism and spheres of influence, a system of tutelage and international trusteeship be instituted for peoples not yet ready to govern themselves; and bona fide independent states based on the principle of self-determination be established for those people able to stand on their own political feet.

Here also Roosevelt experienced something of a conversion; for in the early years of his public life he was a humanitarian imperialist. Like Theodore Roosevelt and many other moralistic liberals of the Progressive Era, he believed it quite justifiable for a good, just, Christian democracy like the United States to impose the blessings of her civilization on more backward and less fortunate peoples, even by the use of force. Unlike Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels, who preached against imperialism with evangelistic fervor but intervened in and entrenched American imperialist dominion in the Caribbean and Central America, Franklin Roosevelt was consistent in both action and thought, in those early years. If for humanitarian reasons he was enthusiastic about shouldering the "white man's burden" in the Caribbean and Central America, for realistic or geopolitical reasons he favored United States domination of whatever land or water was neces- sary to assure protection of the Panama Canal and the water approaches to the United States. Thus his imperialism was like Theodore Roosevelt's, based on a combination of realism and humanitarianism, rather than like the imperialism of Wilson, Bryan, and Daniels which was based almost solely on humanitarianism. 1

As early as 1912, before joining the movement to make Wilson president, Roosevelt went on a junket to Panama where he looked with great pride on American accomplishment. 2 As mentioned in the last chapter, in 1914 he virtually "itched" to expand the Mexican incident into a war and clean up the political mess down there. No imperialist adventure of those Wilson years pleased him so much, however, as the intervention in Haiti. For years thereafter he boasted of his role in that enterprise, often with undue exaggeration. But the realistic streak in his imperialism was supremely revealed in a 1920 campaign speech in which he scoffed at the idea that by getting six votes in the League of Nations with her dominions, Britain had hoodwinked Wilson at Paris. The United States, Roosevelt declared, would have far more than six votes in the League. For she could virtually command the votes of nearly all the Latin American states. Haiti and Santo Domingo by virtue of American occupation were entirely in the pockets of the United States; and as the big brother, the trustee of the remaining states, the United States would greatly surpass Britain in the number of votes under her control. 3

In the early twenties this attitude was still visible. Roosevelt continued to favor the use of force and strong-arm methods in the Caribbean to clean up and police backward areas, defending even rough Marine methods; and he felt that complete independence for the backward peoples of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Haiti, and Santo Domingo was "not to be thought of for many years to come." 4

But the humanitarian, paternalistic, missionary spirit of the imperialism of the liberals of the Progressive Era kept their imperialism from being sordid; and that spirit Roosevelt had in abundance. The promotion of democracy, the ending of internecine violence and perpetual revolution, the establishment of order, the advancement of education and health and general welfare of the natives, and the raising of standards of living were invariably major objectives, and often the only objectives of Roosevelt and those who thought as he did, in every imperialistic adventure. And it was in the achievement of these objectives that Roosevelt took the greatest pride and boasted until the end of his life.

Material profit for merchants was looked upon as acceptable only if carried on legitimately and with consideration for the welfare of the native peoples; and it was the responsibility of the United States, even in a far off naval coaling station like Samoa, "to prevent the natives from being robbed by traders of any nationality." 5 When in 1934 Roosevelt was preparing to remove the last of the Marines from Haiti he wrote his wife of his hope that the Haitians would "recognize the vast amount of good things we have done for them in these 18 years." 6 And as late as 1943 when toasting the President of Haiti at a state dinner in the White House, Roosevelt could not resist again boasting of his role in the Haitian adventure and of all the "good" he believed the United States had done there. 7

But the time was to come when Roosevelt would become an ardent anti-imperialist. He never got over his humanitarian, missionary zeal to improve the lot of backward peoples, but in the late twenties the methods the United States had been using became questionable in his mind. In his 1928 article in "Foreign Affairs" he made clear a realization that the imperialistic adventures of the United States in Latin America, despite their humanitarian achievements, had reaped a whirlwind of ill will. The advantages of putting an end to intervention, of treating Latin American countries as independent sovereign states, and of pushing territories like the Philippines more rapidly toward selfgovernment were quite apparent in that article.

When he became President, moreover, Roosevelt soon made it clear that his urge for imperialistic enterprises was over. His proclamation of the good neighbor policy was followed in 1933 and 1934 by refusal to intervene in the Cuban civil war, by his final withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti, by his approval of the Tydings-McDuffie Act providing for Philippine independence in ten years, and by his authorization to the State Department to negotiate with China for the termination of United States extraterritorial rights. 8 In the late thirties, as we shall see shortly, his ideas on trusteeship began to crystallize. And in the early part of World War II he gave evidence that whatever acquisitiveness for territory he might have had once was now all gone. Lack of desire to spread the sovereignty of the United States over any of Britain's islands in the Western Hemisphere was made apparent both at the time of the destroyer trade in 1940 (much to the incredulity of the British who Roosevelt thought possessed such a deepseated acquisitiveness for territory that they could not conceive of anyone else not wanting it) and again early in 1941 when he rejected the idea of buying some British islands to bolster her dollar reserves. 9 It will be remembered also that in the Atlantic Charter Roosevelt renounced all ambition for the aggrandizement of territory.

But if by the time of the Atlantic Conference Roosevelt had become a confirmed anti-imperialist, there is no evidence that he had yet begun his campaign to rid the world of colonialism. The exigencies of the war were then major considerations and he seemed to tailor his behavior accordingly. When during 1941 and 1942 he sent assurances to Middle Eastern peoples that their best hope of independence lay in cooperation with the United Nations and also urged Churchill to promise independence to India, Roosevelt's major motive was to get the cooperation of those peoples in the war effort. 10 At the same time, in order to keep France from cooperating with Germany, he sent word to Marshall Petain that one of his "greatest wishes is to see France reconstituted in the post-war period" and "the word ' France' in the mind of the President includes the French Colonial Empire." 11

It was sometime during the war, however, when Roosevelt began a vigorous attack on colonialism everywhere. It would probably be going too far to say that Roosevelt's trip to Casablanca in January-February 1943 was the turning point. If the President's son Elliott is correct, the President had made up his mind by the time of the Atlantic Conference not to help England hold on to her colonial peoples. 12 But it is quite clear that the President's trip to Casablanca had a profound effect on his attitude toward colonialism. In British Gambia he saw what he believed was colonial exploitation at its worst, and the sight was so unforgettable that he talked repeatedly about it during the remaining two years of his life. It was the most horrible place he had ever seen, he declared: it was 5,000 years behind American civilization, with the people working in rags for less than 500 and a half cup of rice a day and with ignorance, poverty, and disease rampant. "For every dollar that the British have put into Gambia," he charged, "they have taken out ten. It's just plain exploitation of these people." The people were treated worse than livestock, he concluded, and there could be no effective organized peace in the world with such conditions. And while he agreed that the United States had not lived up to her responsibilities in Liberia (where he stopped also) his greatest irritation was reserved for the British.

In French Morocco the colonial rule he saw was more enlightened; and while he was quite interested in the various types of colonization in West Africa, his general conclusion regarding the whole area was that "it hasn't been good," a conclusion he passed on to Churchill. 13 Shortly after his return from Casablanca he declared publicly that the day of the exploitation of one country for the benefit of another was over. 14 And three weeks after that he recanted to President Benes of Czechoslovakia his earlier desire to see France recover her empire. He expressed to Benes his personal disappointment in France in general, criticized her regime of her colonies as he had seen it in North Africa, and expressed doubt of France's ability ever to recover and develop her colonies. 15 By that time he seemed also to have developed a grudge against France's handling of Indo-China and, as he told Lord Halifax later, he had decided it certainly should not go back to France. France had held Indo-China and her thirty million inhabitants for more than a hundred years, he went on inaccurately, "and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning." France had "milked" Indo-China for a hundred years, he wrote Hull, and the people there "are entitled to something better than that." 16

Meanwhile Roosevelt also publicly refuted Churchill's contention that the Atlantic Charter applied only to Europe. It applied to the entire world, Roosevelt declared on several occasions; 17 and when queried about Churchill's remark to the effect that he, Churchill, had no intention of presiding over the liquidation of the British Empire, Roosevelt told the press off the record that "dear old Winston will never learn on that point." 18 For by the latter part of the war the liquidation of the British and all other empires was one of Roosevelt's ambitions. Not only should India be given her independence, he thought, but the British should also renounce their claims to Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Canton. 19 "Exploitation everywhere" should be opposed, he told the International Labor Conference in May 1944, and again he referred to the horrible conditions of Gambia. 20 A few months later he told the American people that hundreds of millions of people in the Pacific area were stirring with a desire for the right to work out their own destinies, and he implied that they ought to have that right. 21

But if there was no place in Roosevelt's new world order for colonialism neither was there any place in it for spheres of influence. Unfortunately for the student of the theory of international relations, Roosevelt said very little about spheres of influence, but what little he did say was almost all negative. Spheres of influence, he seemed to think, were simply another means for one people to dominate another and they were incompatible with the kind of postwar world he wanted. If Roosevelt ever favored spheres of influence during the war, Hull implied, he meant for them to apply only to military operations. At Casablanca military spheres were agreed upon; but there was no intention on Roosevelt's part, thought Hull, for economic or political matters to be included although the delineation was not made clear and much effort was necessary to convince the British to that effect. 22

When the question of spheres of influence arose again in the fall of 1944 and some decisions regarding Eastern Europe had to be made, Roosevelt steadfastly resisted all attempts by Britain and Russia to make political agreements with implications that each would have postwar positions of dominance there. Finally he approved purely military spheres of influence for a three-months period; but even that was done with reluctance; for there was a tendency, he feared, for such military arrangements to develop into political and economic arrangements and he wanted no such development in the Balkans. 23

There have been charges that Roosevelt believed Stalin's desire for a Russian dominated Poland as a bulwark against future aggression was quite justifiable; 24 and there have been allegations that at Yalta the President approved such arrangements. There is much evidence, however, that regarding Poland and at Yalta Roosevelt did all he considered reasonably possible to insure the establishment of governments in Eastern Europe that would be friendly to but not dominated by Russia. As we shall see later, his demand for free elections in that area was persistent. On his return from Yalta he told Congress that not only had much confusion and unrest developed in the liberated areas of Eastern Europe, but "worse than that, there actually began to grow up in some of them vaguely defined ideas of 'spheres of influence' which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go unchecked, these developments might have tragic results." No one nation was to blame, he added, but that kind of development is inevitable unless the major powers should cooperate and assume "joint responsibility" for problems of the area; and fortunately, they had decided to cooperate. 25

What Roosevelt meant to do and what he did both before and at Yalta about Eastern Europe is still being debated. There seems to be no doubt that theoretically Roosevelt opposed the principle of spheres of influence and whatever he did to promote them was done either unwittingly or as a gesture of resignation to the inevitable. Frances Perkins has testified that on his return from Teheran the President told her, "You know, I really think the Russians will go along with me about having no spheres of influence. . . ." 26 According to son Elliott, the President looked on Britain's action in Greece at the end of the war as an effort to restore an old imperial sphere of influence, and while Roosevelt could not publicly denounce the action without handing propaganda to the Axis, he was much disturbed by it, a fact verified by Churchill. 27

But although Roosevelt wanted to rid the world of colonialism and spheres of influence he neither expected to see those goals achieved overnight nor did he intend that they result in political vacuums. Certainly he never had any desire to see colonial peoples turned loose to sink or swim. Even in his imperialist days there was an implication in his comments that it was the responsibility of colonial powers to tutor their dependencies in the art of selfgovernment, to improve their economic and social conditions, and to prepare them for ultimate independence. In his 1928 article in "Foreign Affairs" he spoke approvingly of the insistence of the antiimperialists immediately after the Spanish-American War to make it part of United States policy to educate the Filipinos for selfgovernment; and he seemed to believe that this policy was the precursor of the mandate theory of the League of Nations. In a press conference in 1938 he expressed this theory of colonial gradualism by noting further that the trade arrangements made for the Philippines were designed to bring about a smooth economic transition to independence. Trade relations with the United States were to be adjusted gradually so that by about 1960 they would be the same as the United States' relations with other countries. 28 He was clearly opposed to any effort to strangle Philippine trade with the United States and to the faithless abandonment of economic responsibility there. 29

Strangely enough, however, when badgering Churchill about Indian independence in 1942 Roosevelt compared India with the American situation from 1775 to 1787 rather than to the Philippines. He urged the British to set up a temporary government modeled along the lines of the American Confederation of 178189 with a more permanent government to be established after the war when the Indian people could decide what relationship they wished to have to the Empire. 30

Usually, however, Roosevelt used United States policy regarding the Philippines as the model he believed all colonial powers should follow. It was a "pattern" for the future of colonial peoples throughout the world, he declared late in 1942. But it involved two essentials. First, there must be a period of preparation wherein the dissemination of education and social and economic development would be emphasized. Then secondly, there would be a period of training in self-government, beginning with local government and moving up through various steps to complete statehood. Even the United States had gone through these stages in her colonial period, he pointed out; and "such training for independence is essential to the stability of independence in almost every part of the world." Some peoples would take longer than others to develop; some would need more training than others. But this "pattern" followed in the Philippines was "essentially a part and parcel of the philosophy and ideals of the United Nations." 31

Thereafter Roosevelt referred to the Philippine pattern repeatedly, proudly describing it to Stalin at Teheran as an example of what men of goodwill can achieve. 32 This was the kind of tutelage the people of British Gambia needed, he declared in 1944, and the United States ought to help them get it. 33 There is also evidence that Roosevelt persuaded Queen Wilhelmina to use the Philippine pattern of tutelage in the Netherlands Indies, with a considerable degree of autonomy to be granted immediately after the war. 34

But no idea for the liquidation of colonialism was dearer to Roosevelt's heart than the idea of trusteeship. Unfortunately, it is difficult to get a clear understanding of precisely what Roosevelt had in mind on this matter. He insisted that his idea of trusteeship differed from the mandate system of the League. But the only significant difference visible to this writer is that Roosevelt seemed to want trust territories administered by international agencies rather than by individual states. But even that is not always completely clear. Yet there is no doubt that Roosevelt became quite infatuated with the trusteeship idea, and by the latter part of World War II wanted to apply the principle all over the world for a variety of purposes: 1) to promote freer transit for international trade, for example; 2) to serve as custodian for colonial areas during the period of tutelage; 3) to administer strategic bases for international police forces; and 4) to politically neutralize certain areas.

Roosevelt's development of the trusteeship idea seems to have begun in the mid-thirties when he was casting about for means to strengthen the Western Hemispheric defense system.

There were many small islands and atolls, especially in the Pacific, that some hostile power like Japan might try to acquire and that might be used as airplane bases. Britain and France were also reviving long dormant claims to some of them; and although these were the claims of friendly powers, Roosevelt was not favorable to any non-American power occupying them. From 1935 on, therefore, the President had the State Department consider the idea of a joint inter-American trusteeship over them; and he more than once became irritated at the slow, legalistic approach the Department took toward the matter. 35

A Chilean proposal that the United States purchase Easter Island did not seem feasible to Roosevelt and he proposed that both Easter Island and the Galapagos be placed under Pan-American trusteeship not only to keep them out of non-American hands, but also to preserve them for natural science. Ecuador and Chile, who owned these particular islands and wanted to sell them, could be paid for them over a period of years, the President suggested, by all the American Republics in proportion to the wealth of each, and sovereignty would be vested in the trustees. 36

A similar arrangement might be useful for Antarctica, thought Roosevelt. There the problem had little or nothing to do with defense, but it seemed a bright idea that the whole sector of Antarctica lying south of the Americas ought to be held in trust for all the American Republics and managed, in due time, by an inter-American body. He did not say in his memorandum to Welles why he thought this would be a good arrangement. Presumably it would be the right thing to do in the spirit of good neighborliness. But about the arrangement he told Welles: "That is a new one. Think it over." 37

A few months later, in April 1940, the President told a group of editors, off the record, that he was giving thought to something like a trusteeship for Greenland. He called it a "new instrumentality" in international affairs; but it was very common in domestic civil affairs, he added. He described a trustee as a person who takes over for the benefit of others their property, looks after their education and physical needs, builds up the estate, protects the trust against accidents, but gets neither remuneration nor profit out of it for himself. It was a new idea, he declared, for relations between a powerful nation like the United States and little Greenland with 17,000 people. But he was not quite ready to take any action on it. 38

A month later when considering the availability of territory in the Guianas for postwar refugee settlement, he sent a memorandum to his wife saying that he would not like to see the United States assume sole responsibility or sovereignty over such an area but he was "considering the broad thought of creating a form of Pan-American trusteeship for situations of this kind. It is a new idea in international or Pan American relationships," he added, "but it is worth studying--especially if there is a possibility that the American Republics may be forced to do something about European possessions in this Hemisphere." 39 Regarding this last matter--European possessions in this hemisphere--Roosevelt enthusiastically supported the idea of Pan-American trusteeship for European possessions likely to be transferred to the Axis, and this idea was approved at the Inter-American Conference in Havana the same year. 40

Thereafter Roosevelt began insisting that the principle of trusteeship ought to be applied all over the world; and throughout the remainder of the war it was one of his favorite topics of conversation. It should be applied to the islands and colonial possessions of states too weak, for example, to provide their dependencies with stable governments; and it should also be applied to the old mandates of the League. Under the mandate system, thought the President, there was a strong tendency for the nation given the mandate to believe it had been given sovereignty also, and it would be much better to have several trustees rather than one. It was equally applicable to colonies which even the strong European powers held, but were not likely to be able to hold much longer, such as Indo-China, Malaya, or the Dutch East Indies, but where the people might not yet be quite ready for independence. 41

A protectorate like French Morocco might also well be a trust area, suggested Roosevelt. The Moors were already causing trouble because they believed France was looking upon them more every year as a French colony and "they do not want to be exploited." Therefore, a trustee of three members, one French, one English, and one American would be much better. He did not think, at any rate, "that a population which is ninety per cent Moors, should be run permanently by France." 42 Trusteeship would also be the answer, he thought, for Palestine, which could then really be a Holy Land for all three religions associated with it and it could be administered by an international body consisting of a Jew, a Christian, and a Moslem. 43 Korea also should be placed under trusteeship, he thought, and administered by the USSR, the United States, and China during the twenty to thirty years of tutelage it might take to get her ready for independence. 44 Indo-China was by all odds, however, Roosevelt's pet area for applying the trusteeship principle. He was angered not only at the way the French had retarded the development of the people there but also by the fact that France had allowed the Japanese to move in and make it a springboard for their attack on the South Pacific. To return Indo-China to France was inconceivable, he seemed to conclude. The territory should be neutralized, he thought, and he had proposed that very thing to Japan shortly before Pearl Harbor and before the Japanese had been allowed in. Chiang Kai-shek neither wanted the territory for China nor wanted it returned to France; and since the people were not yet ready for self-government and must, therefore, go through a Philippine-type period of tutelage, the only answer was trusteeship with the trustee agency composed, Roosevelt suggested, of a Frenchman, one or two Indo-Chinese, a Russian (because Russia is on the same coast), and perhaps a Filipino and an American. Chiang and Stalin both approved; and the only opposition came from Churchill, who was, however, a "mid-Victorian on all things like that." The trouble with Churchill, thought Roosevelt, was that he wanted all British territory in the Far East back and feared the trusteeship idea "aimed at independence." But Roosevelt had told Churchill, the President reported, that Britain's 400 years of acquisitive instinct was outmoded, that he was living in a new period of history, and he ( Churchill) would have to adjust himself to it. The British, asserted Roosevelt, would take anything--even a rock or a sandbar--and Churchill could not understand Chiang or anyone else not wanting all the territory they could get. 45

Roosevelt was also in hearty accord with the idea of international inspection and publicity concerning territories left temporarily in the hands of colonial powers. Places like Gambia should be inspected periodically to see if the mother country was moving the colony toward self-government and otherwise promoting the welfare of the inhabitants, and he had told Churchill of his desire to have the coming world organization do this. When Churchill countered that he would then see to it that an inspection committee was sent to the southern United States, Roosevelt answered that he would be delighted to show the world that conditions in the South were not as bad as painted. 46

International commerce would also be benefited by the trusteeship idea, thought Roosevelt. The international administration of free ports and waterways would promote the security of commercial channels and insure passage for the goods of all nations. Hong Kong, Dairen, and a new port to be constructed at the head of the Persian Gulf, for example, should be internationally administered free ports. He suggested to Eden that it would be a fine gesture of goodwill if the British would return Hong Kong to China; and then China could declare it a free port under trusteeship. Baltic passages like the Kiel Canal and Straits ought also be under trusteeship. And in Iran, to ease friction between that country and the Soviet Union concerning transit, an internationalized railroad should be built running from his proposed free port at the head of the Persian Gulf to Russia, with both the port and the railroad operated by three or four trustees "for the good of all." 47

The trusteeship principle should be applied also, suggested Roosevelt, for areas needed as military security points in the forthcoming international security system. He recommended for this Truk, the Bonin Islands, Rabaul, or some point in the Solomons, certain points in the Dutch East Indies, Ascension Island in the South Atlantic, Dakar, and a point in Liberia. 48 The islands in the Pacific mandated to Japan were in this same category. In his memoirs Stimson gives the impression that Roosevelt wanted these islands under United States control, with the right to arm them, but that he had to appear generous and seem to apply the trusteeship principle to them. 49 Stimson's implication is made questionable, however, by Roosevelt's comments to State Department officials in November 1944 in which he laid great emphasis on the trusteeship idea, and made clear his opposition to pressure from the Army and Navy that the United States should control the islands. Such behavior would be contrary to the Atlantic Charter, he declared; it was not necessary; and all it would do would be to provide jobs as governors on insignificant islands for inefficient Army and Navy or civilian officers. 50 A week before his death he also told the press that the United Nations rather than the United States would be the controlling government for the mandated islands that were to be wrested from Japan. 51

Thus trusteeship was to be a multi-purpose principle applicable not only to the territory of the Axis, but to territories of all sorts in many parts of the world; and by means of this principle much of the exploitation of one group of people by another would be brought to an end; and by it also a more secure world, economically and militarily, would be achieved.

If tutelage and trusteeships were Roosevelt's answers for peoples not yet ready to run their own affairs, self-determination was his answer for peoples who were ready. Although Roosevelt probably took it for granted that people such as those in India, when given independence, would have the right to choose their own form of government, when using the phrase "self-determination" he almost invariably had in mind the peoples of the occupied countries of Europe. Both their boundaries and their forms of government, he seemed to think, could be determined by the freely expressed will of the peoples, and he readily approved clauses to that effect in the Atlantic Charter.

This will was to be expressed through plebiscites, a procedure in which Roosevelt had almost unlimited confidence. To Churchill, Smuts, and Myron Taylor in the Vatican he wrote almost the same words of praise for plebiscites, declaring that the plebiscite was one of the few successful results of the Versailles Treaty and it ought to be tried, extended, and developed further. He even favored a series of plebiscites to determine questions difficult to resolve, with one vote taken after another, over intervals, "until one side or the other makes a decision by overwhelming vote." 52 According to Welles, Roosevelt went beyond Wilson in believing that plebiscites could solve most of Europe's territorial controversies and he felt instinctively that plebiscites freely held would prevent the subjugation of national minorities. 53

Thus plebiscites were to be held, Roosevelt hoped, to determine boundaries and forms of government after the war throughout most of Europe. Every time during the war, therefore, when Russia tried to get the Allies to recognize her absorption of the Baltic states and parts of Finland, Poland, and Roumania, Roosevelt vigorously opposed recognition on the ground that free plebiscites must be held first. He agreed that the Soviet Union was entitled to security after the war, but not in a manner that violated the self-determination clause of the Atlantic Charter; and he warned Britain early in 1942 that if she signed a treaty meeting Russia's demands, he might have to denounce it publicly. 54 Had such an agreement gone through, he told Molotov a while later, "it would have caused almost irreparable damage to the ideals of the war." 55

Before the 1943 Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers Roosevelt sent word to Stalin that he had no objection to the Soviet absorption of the Baltic states, but world public opinion would not be satisfied unless assured by something more than the questionable plebiscites already held there. 56 He intended to appeal to Stalin on moral grounds, he told Hull, and he felt it would be in Russia's best interests to wait until a year or two after the war and then hold plebiscites to see what the people in those disputed areas wanted; for while the plebiscites already held there were considered conclusive by Russia, they had not seemed satisfactory to the rest of the world. 57 He was certain he could get Stalin to see his way, reported Welles, and he was quite disillusioned at Yalta when Stalin told him the matter was closed. 58

Plebiscites could also be used to end the friction among the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in Yugoslavia, suggested Roosevelt. He was not at all sure that Yugoslavia should be reconstituted after the war and he refused to join Churchill in 1942 in a declaration to that effect. The Croats and Serbs had never gotten along well together, he insisted, and he had no intention of forcing them to live together in the same state again against their will. 59 At Yalta he agreed to a declaration on Yugoslavia that looked toward a reconstitution of that state, but the Declaration on Liberated Europe approved at the same time called clearly for selfdetermination on the entire continent and there is no reason to believe that Roosevelt looked on a reconstituted Yugoslavia as any more than a provisional state that could be divided later if the peoples involved desired it to be so. 60

It was Roosevelt's determination not to allow governments to be imposed at the end of the war without the approval of the people that caused much of his trouble with the Free French Movement of General Charles De Gaulle. His repeated refusal to recognize De Gaulle's organization as the government of France was due to his fear, declared Leahy and Stimson, that De Gaulle wanted to impose himself on France after the war, and that to make such a situation possible would violate both the Atlantic Charter and the wartime moral ideals already established. Thus Roosevelt never gave De Gaulle more than partial support. 61

As is well known, however, Roosevelt's most earnest efforts as well as his most heart-breaking defeat came from his attempt to apply self-determination to Poland. His chief objection to the Lublin Government imposed on Poland by Stalin in 1944 was that, as he telegraphed Stalin, there was no evidence that it "represents the people of Poland." Only a small part of the people had been liberated at the time of the government's formation, he argued, and large proportions of the population had not had a chance to express themselves. 62 From shipboard talk on the way to Yalta, the President's physician concluded that there were few things Roosevelt felt as deeply about as Polish independence and he seemed determined to do all he could about it at the forthcoming conference. With Russian troops already in Poland he felt helpless, but he hoped that promises of free elections could be secured and that such elections would alleviate the situation. 63 The record is clear, moreover, that at Yalta the President had free elections much on his mind and brought the subject up repeatedly. "The elections must be above criticism, like Caesar's wife," he said at one meeting. "I want some kind of assurance to give to the world, and I don't want anybody to be able to question their purity." 64

The final agreement on Poland was for Roosevelt, reports Admiral McIntire, a bitter pill to swallow. 65 When Admiral Leahy pointed out to the President that the agreement was full of ambiguous generalizations that could be interpreted many ways and did not, therefore, really guarantee free elections, Roosevelt answered, "I know, Bill--I know it. But it's the best I can do for Poland at this time." 66

It is worth noting, however, that in applying the principle of self-determination, Roosevelt wanted decisions made only in an atmosphere of calm deliberation. The chaos existing immediately after a war was not conducive to wise decisions, he seemed to think, and it would be necessary, therefore, for the major powers to establish interim governments and create conditions conducive to genuine expressions of popular will before plebiscites were held. In his 1945 Annual Message he told the Congress that in the liberated areas there was so much internal dissension and there were so many citizens still prisoners of war or away as forced laborers that "it is difficult to guess the kind of self-government the people really want." Thus there must be an interim period, he went on, during which the Allies would have the duty to influence temporary or provisional authorities so that the eventual will of the people would not be blocked. It would be easy to show partiality, he added, to leaders we liked, but the long range task would not be helped by "stubborn partisanship." 67

In reporting to congress on the Yalta meeting a month later he added that in this interim period the Allies would assist the liberated peoples to wipe out all vestiges of Nazism; help establish conditions of internal peace; carry out emergency relief measures; form interim governments representative of all democratic political elements, and governments pledged to the earliest possible free elections; and finally to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections. Thus would be reaffirmed the pledges in the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration by the United Nations to build a new world order under law. 68

But there was never any intention on Roosevelt's part to interpret the principle of self-determination without limitation. Always there was an assumption, based on his view of the goodness and reasonableness of man, that people left free to choose their own form of government would choose a democratic, decent, and reasonable form of government; and if temporarily a people should be led astray and should choose for themselves an evil form of rule, the other members of the international community had every right to intervene. People have the right to choose their own way of life, he declared shortly after Munich in 1938, but "that choice must not threaten the world with the disaster of war." 69 No nation had the right, he preached repeatedly, to assert a superior right to rule over other people or to choose a form of government akin to Fascism. "There never has been, there isn't now, and there never will be, any race of people on the earth fit to serve as masters over their fellow men," he declared early in 1941. "The world has no use," he added, "for any Nation which . . . asserts the right to goosestep to world power over the bodies of other nations or other races. We believe that any nationality, no matter how small, has the inherent right to its own nationhood." 70

But Roosevelt did not worry about the right of self-determination being abused. "No nation in all the world that is free to make a choice," he told the White House Correspondents Association in 1943, "is going to set itself up under a Fascist form of Government, or a Nazi form of government, or a Japanese warlord form of government." Such forms arise, he declared, only by seizure of power and subsequent abridgement of freedom. And in the post-war world the United Nations would not let such conditions occur. "For the right of self-determination included in the Atlantic Charter," he proclaimed, "does not carry with it the right of any Government anywhere in the world to commit wholesale murder, or the right to make slaves of its own people, or of any other peoples in the world." 71

Thus, as already noted, the Franco government had no right to exist in the twentieth century world, thought Roosevelt; and a few weeks before his death, when sending Norman Armour as his Ambassador to Spain, the President wrote Armour that he did not want him to do anything that would be interpreted as approving the Franco or Falange regime. While it was not the practice of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations unless there is a threat to the peace, he informed Armour, "I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on Fascist principles." He would like to help Spain economically and in other ways, he added, but he could not do so until the regime was changed. 72

So far as national minorities were concerned, Roosevelt was quite willing to see them transferred to avoid the minority problems that afflicted efforts to apply self-determination after World War I and that had contributed, as he thought, to the catastrophe of Munich. In 1943 he agreed with President Benes of Czechoslovakia that it would be quite all right to move all Germans out of Czechoslovakia after the war. There might also have to be some transfers, he agreed, from East Prussia and Transylvania. 73 Just before the Yalta meeting he also expressed to Stalin his willingness to see minorities transferred where feasible, that is, where it would promote peace and security, and he promised that the United States would facilitate such transfers. 74

On occasion Roosevelt also applied the principle of self-determination to the recognition of governments. Time and again he refused to grant recognition on the ground that a government was not chosen or supported by the free will of the people. This practice began as early as his first year in the White House when he refused to recognize the Cuban government of Dr. Grau San Martin on the grounds that it would be neither friendly nor just to recognize a government "unless such Government clearly possessed the support and the approval of the people of the Republic," neither of which, he said, the Grau government possessed. 75 As already mentioned, Roosevelt also adopted the Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition before his inauguration in 1933; and that doctrine was applied repeatedly in the years to come regarding Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, Hitler's absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and the wartime creation in Europe of Axis puppet regimes, none of which were ever granted recognition by Roosevelt. His recognition of Russia, of Franco, and of various Latin American dictatorships indicates that the President assumed a Wilsonian moralistic position and applied the principle of selfdetermination to the problem of recognition inconsistently and only when it suited his purposes. But of this seemingly inconsistent attitude he left no explanation.

For the most part, however, Roosevelt was quite consistent, once converted from his early imperialism, in his desire to see colonialism and spheres of influence replaced by trusteeships and independent states formed on the basis of self-determination. As a practical politician faced with specific problems he was often forced to compromise and accept half a loaf. But the ideal of ending the domination of one group of people by another remained brightly before him.

IX
WORLD-WIDE DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM

THUS FAR we have seen that Franklin Roosevelt dreamed of a world purged of totalitarianism. relieved of the burden of excessive armaments, and freed of the political domination of one group of people by another. A logical implication is that in the coming world thus reformed, democracy and individual liberty would flourish universally as never before. And that is exactly what Roosevelt wanted.

It must be remembered that during a large part of Roosevelt's public life totalitarian dictatorship was the major alternative to libertarian democracy and Roosevelt's thinking was conditioned by that fact. There is little evidence that he ever gave much consideration to gradations between these two extremes. In his view, therefore, the peoples of the world had only these two alternatives and there was never any doubt in his mind as to which they ought to choose.

It is well to remember also that all during Roosevelt's presidency libertarian democracy was on the defensive throughout the world, challenged by totalitarianism of both right and left; and it was this particular challenge that Roosevelt was forced to meet.

Roosevelt readily conceded the obvious merits of modern dictatorships. They had brought capital and labor together, he agreed, had achieved a substantial utilization of all their material and human resources, had solved at least temporarily such problems as unemployment and idle capital. But he abhorred the methods of dictatorship, he said, and considered the price of total- itarian achievement far too high for mankind to pay. Its cost in spiritual values was too high, for it deprived people of freedom of expression and religion, it confiscated capital, it produced concentration camps, it caused people to be afraid to walk down the street with the wrong neighbor, it prevented children from being reared as free and dignified human beings, and it made men "pawns molded and enslaved by a machine." 1 Its "shootings and chains and concentration camps" were not simply transient tools, he charged, "but the very altars of modern dictatorships." 2 Nor was there anything new about these new dictatorships, in his view. Modern dictatorship was merely a "streamlined version of a very ancient system." 3 The type of security it provided was the same type of security possessed by the slaves who built the pyramids under the Pharaohs of Egypt, he proclaimed; the same type of security that all the world from Britain to Persia had under Roman proconsuls; that henchmen, tradesmen, and mercenaries had under feudalism; and that most of Europe had under Napoleon. 4

In this modern machine age, charged Roosevelt, dictatorship also subordinated mankind to the machine instead of letting mankind be master of the machine. A machine civilization was all right, he seemed to believe, so long as it remained under the control of the people and the people received the untold benefits the machine could produce. But in dictatorship the machine was under the control of "infinitely small groups of individuals who rule without a single one of the democratic sanctions that we have known." And when the machine is in the hands of "irresponsible conquerors," it becomes the master, not the servant of the people. 5

The great bulk of Roosevelt's denunciations of totalitarian dictatorship (and there were dozens of them) were, however, the commonplace complaints against the well-known brutalities, deprivations of liberty, and police state thought and action that characterize modern forms of tyranny.

Nor did he advance any unusual arguments in defense of democracy. He favored majority rule, he declared, simply because he thought there was more wisdom in the population as a whole than there was in any small group, even the best educated small group. Macaulay's old argument that democracy gave power to the poorest and most ignorant part of society was no longer true, he wrote privately; for "under democratic government, the poorest are no longer necessarily the most ignorant part of society." 6

Democracy was also necessary, he thought, to protect individual liberty. Many of his domestic foes, he wrote a correspondent, "do not like majority rule because an enlightened majority will not tolerate the abuses which some of the minority would seek to foist upon the people as a whole. . . . They reject the principle of the greater good for the greater number which is the cornerstone of democratic government." Thus "majority rule must be preserved as the safeguard of both liberty and civilization." 7

Roosevelt also defended democracy on the ground that it was more peace-loving than any other form of government. "The evidence before us clearly proves," he told Congress in his 1936 Annual Message, "that autocracy in world affairs endangers peace and that threats do not spring from those nations devoted to the democratic ideal. . . ." 8 Particularly in the oligarchies that have replaced democracy in the twentieth century, he said a year later, "militarism has leaped forward, while in those nations which have retained democracy militarism has waned." 9 A year later he repeated the same theme, declaring that "disregard for treaty obligations seems to have followed the surface trend away from the representative form of government. It would seem, therefore, that world peace through international agreement is most safe in the hands of democratic representative governments; or, in other words, peace is most greatly jeopardized in and by those nations where democracy has been discarded or has never developed." 10

Later when talking to an American youth group the President reiterated the same idea, going back a century and a half for evidence. Since the Napoleonic era, he declared, apparently forgetting the imperialistic movement of the late nineteenth century, there has not been a serious wide-spread aggression by democratic nations. There have been minor episodes by them, to be sure, but no military effort to dominate the globe. But there had been, he insisted, such efforts by non-democratic peoples. Thus the best hope that war will not happen again is to entrust the peace to democracies. 11

Roosevelt also defended democracy on the grounds that the decisions made by the democratic process tended to be more sound, better supported by the popular will, and more enduring than those made by dictatorships. He made no apologies for the slowness and long debate required for the making of decisions by the democratic process. He thought it a price well worth paying. In January 1940 he wrote Crown Prince Olav of Norway in an attempt to explain that aid to the Prince's beleaguered country was being sent as fast as possible. In the face of isolationism, he explained, it had taken a six-weeks debate in the Senate to get the arms embargo repealed and he anticipated other similar delays due to the fact that 1940 was an election year. "However, that is one of the prices that we who live in democracies have to pay," he told the Prince. But it is "worth paying if all of us can avoid the type of government under which the unfortunate populations of Germany and Russia must exist." 12 Later he reiterated this theme to the White House Correspondents Association, emphasizing, however, that once democratic decisions are reached they reflect the will of the whole nation and are far more enduring than the decisions of dictatorships. The great debate on the Lend-Lease Act was a good example of this, he thought. It had been debated not only in the halls of Congress, but also "in every newspaper, on every wave length, over every cracker barrel in all the land; and it was finally settled and decided by the American people themselves." Thus the world would no longer doubt how the American people felt. Dictatorships might get "obedience" from their people, but "loyalty" was the backbone of democratic government, and it must be gotten without coercion. 13

Roosevelt even took pride in the slowness of the democratic process. It had taken fifteen years of talk, he once reminded his Hyde Park neighbors, to get agreement that the school district there should be consolidated. But who could doubt, he asked, that that decision once made was better than a quick decision handed down from above by someone who proclaimed himself wiser than everyone else? 14

Roosevelt denied categorically that democracy was necessarily less efficient than dictatorship. One day in a long dissertation to the press on the challenge of the corporate state to representative government he insisted that the charges of inefficiency hurled at representative government applied only to the policy-making process, not to administration. In the United States, he agreed, the policy-making process was slow and required patience because of the separation of powers, the check and balance system, and the necessity for working out policy among two or three branches of government. He conceded that it took years for all three branches to agree on such things as an income tax policy and this time-lag made many people think the corporate state with all power in one body was more efficient. But it was not true regarding administration, he asserted; for once policy was agreed upon in the United States, government agencies were just as efficient as business or corporate state agencies in carrying out those policies. 15

Roosevelt also defended democracy on the grounds that it was morally superior to dictatorship. He saw a high correlation between religion, international good faith, and democracy. Where one disappeared, he argued, the others disappeared; where one was attacked, the others were attacked. The defense of one was the defense of the others. The enemy of one was the enemy of the others, and the United States could not afford to become surrounded by the enemies of religion, international good faith, and democracy. 16

But Roosevelt never had any hope of either preserving or promoting democracy by mere reasonable argument. He was firmly convinced that on the defensive as it was, democracy must prove itself by deeds, by rising to meet the twentieth century challenge of human demands. And he believed also that it was up to the United States to show the way. Sumner Welles has testified that he knows of no one in American life more firmly convinced than Roosevelt that the hope of the world lay in a renewal of people's faith in democracy and that that faith could be renewed only by making democracy a successful, living reality in free nations where it was still cherished and especially in the United States. Only by such means, thought Roosevelt, could democracy be made to prevail over the appeal of communism and other totalitarian faiths. 17

Roosevelt hammered away at this theme throughout his Presidency. In mid-1934 when pointing with pride to the achievements of the first year of his administration he noted that "we have shown the world that democracy has within it the elements necessary to its own salvation." 18 And in his 1936 Annual Message he declared that one of the major tasks of his first administration had been "to prove that democracy could be made to function in the world of today as effectively as in the simple world of a hundred years ago." 19 On his December 1936 trip to Latin America he purposely praised the achievements by democratic processes in the Western World and contrasted them with the horrors being visited on people in the dictatorships. 20

In his second term Roosevelt reiterated with more vigor than ever the idea that democracy must prove itself by deeds. In his 1937 Annual Message he urged Congress to give evidence with more legislation that democracy "can adequately cope with modern problems. . . ." 21 In March he emphasized the idea mentioned in Chapter One that peoples elsewhere had deserted democracy for other forms of government only because their democratic governments had "failed for the time being to meet human needs." 22 And in September he gave what Sam Rosenman has described as a "full dress comparison" between democratic and totalitarian concepts. In that "comparison" he argued that since in recent times the idea has developed that government must mobilize the resources of a nation to improve standards of living, "even some of our own people may wonder whether democracy can match dictatorship in giving this generation the things it wants from government." If democracy is to meet the challenge, he proclaimed, it must meet the demands of the masses for economic and social security and higher standards of living; otherwise, internal doubt as to the value of our democracy will arise. 23

To Roosevelt 1937 was a year of crisis in the testing of democracy in the modern world. When looking back four years later, he allowed himself the satisfaction of considering his fight against the Supreme Court a crucial factor. In the introduction to the 1937 volume of his public papers (written in 1941) he declared that if the anti-New Deal views of the Court had continued to prevail and the Court had not permitted the United States to solve harassing problems as a democracy, "it is my reasoned opinion that there would have been great danger that ultimately it [our democracy] might have been compelled to give way to some alien type of government--in the vain hope that the new form of government might be able to give the average men and women the protection and cooperative assistance which they had the right to expect." That is exactly what had happened in countries that had yielded to dictatorship, he wrote, and it came very close to happening in the United States. His February 5th message to Congress on the Federal Judiciary, he believed, had turned the tide. It was "a turning point in our modern history." And he implied that thereafter the United States had proceeded to prove to the world that democracy still had vitality and capacity to meet man's needs. 24

Both publicly and privately Roosevelt continued to express the same sentiments, giving special emphasis to the idea that the United States was obligated, if democracy was to be saved, to give the world "a dynamic example" of a successful democratic government. 25 Categorically rejecting the propaganda "that democracy is a decadent form of government," he asserted in 1940 that democracy was the wave of the future. The dictators would take the world back to the "bondage of the Pharaohs," he asserted, but "the command of the democratic faith is ever onward and up- ward." 26 In a world broadcast after passage of the Lend-Lease Act in 1941 he chided the dictators for attempting to destroy democracy on the assumption that the democracies could not adjust themselves to the realities of war or that they could not fight. The dictators are now learning better, he gloated. 27

A month later when Serbian patriots decided to overthrow a weak government and stand up to Hitler, Roosevelt ordered all possible aid to Yugoslavia (which never arrived), and told Yugoslav Ambassador Fotitch that he wanted to show the world that the democracies could act speedily and effectively. 28 Needless to say, the war record made by the democracies more than satisfied Roosevelt's desire for evidence that democracy was still virile enough to meet the challenges flung at it.

With his deep faith in the superiority of democracy over other forms of government, his great confidence in the ability of democracy to meet human needs, and his belief that democracy was necessary for peace, it is little wonder that Roosevelt wanted to see democracy spread around the earth.

He seemed to have no doubt that the desire for democracy was universal. His 1936 trip to Latin America confirmed this belief in dramatic fashion. The enthusiastic receptions given him there, he contended, were given him simply because the people down there looked upon him as a symbol of democracy and as one who had made democracy work and keep abreast of the times; and he felt that "the masses of the people of all the Americas are convinced that the democratic form of government can be made to succeed. . . ." 29

In both an Armistice Day address in 1940 and in his Third Inaugural in 1941 Roosevelt dwelt at considerable length on the idea that man's desire for democracy was universal. As usual, he talked of both democracy and freedom as if the words were almost interchangeable; and there is no doubt that to him there was almost a hundred per cent correlation between the two. In his Armistice Day address he traced man's struggle for democracy and freedom from antiquity to the present, arguing that even in the darkest moments of history the struggle had never been completely stifled and that beginning with the "era of 1776" democracy took a "vast step forward"; for out of that era in America came "the first far-flung Government in all the world whose cardinal principle was democracy." Here was truly a new order, he declared, that in the next century spread around the earth in many forms. By the end of the century "almost all peoples had acquired some form of popular expression of opinion, some form of election, some form of franchise, some form of the right to be heard." America and the British Isles had led in spreading the "gospel of democracy," he added; and the world felt feudalism, conquest, and dictatorship had been discarded forever. World War I was an attempt to destroy this new order of democracy, he asserted, and World War II was another attempt. But Roosevelt did not believe the world would turn back. Those under the heel of dictators eventually would rebel and surely the current attack on democracy could not succeed. 30

In his Third Inaugural Address Roosevelt talked in much the same vein, again declaring that the aspiration of man for democracy was as old as civilization and that the struggle toward the democratic ideal would never stop. 31

But although Roosevelt looked upon democracy as the best possible form of government and was convinced of the existence of a universal urge to achieve it, there is no evidence that he looked upon another Wilsonian crusade as necessary. On the contrary, he seemed to take it for granted that if the evil attack of the dictators upon democracy was beaten back and if it could be proved that democracy could adequately meet the problems of modern times, democracy would spread under its own power. A crusade was not necessary. Both World War I and World War II were "in literal truth, to make the world safe for democracy." 32 But to make the world safe for it was enough. The world's peoples would do the rest of their own accord.

At Buenos Aires in 1936 Roosevelt had expressed the view that given the proper conditions, the spread of democracy would be inevitable. "Democracy is still the hope of the world," he proclaimed. "If we in our generation can continue its successful application in the Americas, it will spread and supersede other methods by which men are governed. . . ." 33 The next year in extemporaneous remarks in a small town in New York he expressed only a mild wish, with no crusading fervor, that American democracy should be exported. "We are so much better off in the United States than a whole lot of other nations in the world," he told his audience, "that I wish . . . we could give them some of the fundamentals of our American Democracy." 34 In his 1938 Annual Message he told the Congress that the current decline of democracy was only temporary and superficial and he had no doubt at all that the "democracies of the world will survive, and democracy will be restored or established in those nations which today know it not." 35 In his Third Inaugural he proclaimed that democracy is not dying nor can it die and he implied that it is so rooted in the aspirations of the human spirit that its growth and spread would be inexorable. 36 And in his last annual message he simply seemed to take it for granted that the postwar world would be, or in due time would become, an essentially "democratic world." 37

In fact, if there was no room in the world for totalitarian dictatorship, as he had said time and again, and if he frowned also on government by privileged minorities of any kind (as we know he did) it was inevitable that a democratic world was the only kind that would please him.

Since Roosevelt saw an almost total correlation between democracy and individual liberty, he was just as interested in promoting a new world order of freedom as he was in promoting a new world order of democracy. When sending Welles to Europe and Myron Taylor to the Vatican early in 1940 the President told both that in their peace discussions they should keep in mind that a morally justifiable peace should give recognition to the various freedoms of which the common man had been deprived in the Axis states. 38 Both publicly and privately throughout the war Roosevelt stressed the desire for a world consecrated to human liberty. A life of freedom and justice, he declared "are the inalienable rights of every man." 39 And "we and our associates in the great alliance of the United Nations are determined to establish a new age of freedom on this earth." 40 One of the ultimate objects of the United Nations, he declared, was to build a world in which human beings can think and worship freely and associate with friends of their own choice. 41 And toward the end of the war he put this in only slightly different words, asserting that the United Nations was fighting to make "a world based on freedom. . . ." 42 After the 1944 election he wrote Henry Wallace that one of the reasons he and the Democrats won again was that the people had faith in them to carry forward the fight "for freedom on this earth. . . ." 43

In such pronouncements the President seemed to have in mind the large variety of civil liberties and basic freedoms with which he was familiar in the United States. Throughout the years he mentioned a host of liberties including freedom of labor to organize, freedom of association, and all the well-known rights included in the Constitution. But it was freedom of religion and freedom of expression (including freedom of information) to which he paid particular attention.

It is doubtful if anything was more important or serious to Roosevelt than religion. Associate after associate and biographer after biographer have testified to the fact that Roosevelt was a sincerely and deeply religious man whose many references to religion and God in his speeches came naturally and were not at all the usual vote-getting cliches of the politician. According to Mrs. Roosevelt his simple, childlike, naive, unquestioning faith was to him both an anchor and a guide. "I think he felt," she said, "that in great crisis he was guided by a strength and wisdom higher than his own, for his religious faith, though simple, was unwavering and direct. . . ." Farley has reported how surprised he was that on the train enroute to Washington for his inauguration in 1933 Roosevelt spent most of his time chatting about religion and said he thought the right way to start his administration was to think about God, particularly in such a crisis as the country was then experiencing, for the religious spirit would be more important than any other single factor in seeing the country through the crisis. He also announced his intention to have his inauguration day begin with a church service which all leaders of the administration were asked to attend; and he concluded that the salvation of all peoples would depend ultimately on their proper attitude toward God. You could joke with the President about almost any other subject, reported Sherwood, "but not this one." 44

But there was nothing narrowly sectarian in Roosevelt's religious attitude. He respected all religions and all gods, knowing there were many in the world. In his Fireside Chat two days after the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 Roosevelt declared that one of the tasks of the United States during the war would be to preserve the universal moralities and teachings of religion which would be badly needed later by a "crippled humanity." For he believed, he said later, that it was from our religious teachings that man had learned about "the dignity of the human being, his equality before God, and his responsibility in the making of a better and fairer world." 45

It is no wonder, therefore, that Roosevelt seemed to look upon religion as the foundation on which a moral social order must Test and he seemed unable to conceive of a satisfactory postwar world that denied man the right to worship, or to worship as he pleased. It is doubtful if anything the totalitarian powers did caused more pain to his sensibilities than their attack on religion. One of the conditions he laid down for the recognition of Russia in 1933 was that religious freedom be allowed American citizens in Russia; and in at least one of his press conferences he talked as if this was the most important of all his conditions. 46 In 1938 when resentment against Hitler's anti-religious policy was high Roosevelt attempted to counteract that policy by dramatizing America's attachment to religion. When Cardinal Mundelein of Chicago visited the Vatican that year the President ordered the American fleet in French waters to go to Naples to honor the Cardinal's arrival, and he instructed Ambassador Phillips not only to meet the Cardinal in Naples and escort him to Rome, but to do everything else he could to impress upon Italy the Cardinal's importance in the United States. "At this particular moment," he wrote Phillips, "when religious persecution is on the increase, even in Italy, the significance of what I wish done will not be overlooked by the Italians and I think the effect cannot but be salutary." 47

When it was discovered that freedom of religion had been left out of the Atlantic Charter inadvertently, the President made haste to assure Congress that of course it should be considered part of the Charter since it was necessary to the kind of world the Charter implied. 48

It is possible to become skeptical of the sincerity of Roosevelt's desire for religious freedom as a result of the reports of his dealings with the Russians on the matter in late 1941. When pushing Lend-Lease for Russia in September 1941 against domestic opposition, Roosevelt behaved like an opportunist, urging the Soviets to mollify American public opinion by publicizing the fact that they did allow some religious worship and were, therefore, abiding to some extent by the religious freedom clause of their 1936 constitution. 49 Roosevelt's own story of his efforts to get the Russians to accept a religious freedom clause in the Declaration by the United Nations also makes him look opportunistic. He told Russian Ambassador Litvinoff that he, Roosevelt, had been so greatly criticized for leaving religious freedom out of the Atlantic Charter that he did not dare leave it out of the Declaration by the United Nations and he needed Russia's help to get himself out of a tight spot. The phrase was so broad, he went on, that it really meant the same thing that the clause in the Soviet constitution meant, for to Jefferson--and to the United States--it meant the right to have any religion, to have no religion, or even to oppose religion. 50

Such an opportunistic attitude regarding religion is hard to explain and Rosenman claimed he doubted Roosevelt's story although it was told directly to him as well as to others by Roosevelt himself. Hull makes no mention of such an argument, noting only that when the Declaration was being drafted Roosevelt wrote Hull: "I think every effort should be made to get religious freedom into that document. I believe Litvinoff can be induced to agree to this." 51 Churchill, who was at the White House while the Declaration was being written, declared that Roosevelt"exerted his most fervent efforts" to persuade Litvinoff to accept the religious freedom clause, going so far at one point as to have a long talk with Litvinoff"about his soul and the dangers of hell-fire," which elicited from the Prime Minister a promise that if the President lost the next election, Churchill would nominate him for the position of Archbishop of Canterbury. 52

If Roosevelt actually behaved like an opportunist on those occasions, it confirms our earlier assumption that he was practical enough on occasion to assume the role of a realist and make deals with the devil although it was contrary to the way he preferred to behave. Here it was not a matter of making a deal with the devil so much as it was a matter of using realistic arguments that he thought might appeal to the realistic Russians; or it might be that he was even being insidious enough to use devious means of getting the Russians to commit themselves on a point which he hoped to hold over their heads later. There is no doubt that Russia's attitude toward religion added fuel to the opposition to grant lend-lease aid to the Soviets; and there is no doubt that a realistic argument to the Russians to publicize their church policy, which had already relaxed somewhat, made sense regarding that particular problem.

Roosevelt also gave special consideration to the problem of freedom of information. One of his purposes in emphasizing foreign affairs in his 1936 Annual Message was to talk to the peoples of the autocracies over the heads of their rulers; but he wrote Ambassador Dodd that he had only small hope his words would reach them, since Wilson's theory of appealing to people this way was unworkable in view of the fact that totalitarian governments controlled the sources of information. He hoped, nevertheless, that a small part of what he said "will seep through." 53

When asked by the press one day in 1940 if he thought democracy ought to be taught in the schools to combat Communism and Fascism he answered that the best way to encourage democracy was by promoting freedom of the press and freedom of information at all levels, not just in the schools, for if people were given all sides of the story they would end up on the side of democracy. And this he would like to see all over the world. 54 In at least one specific instance Roosevelt refused to content himself with glittering generalities about freedom of information. In October 1943 when the Argentine government suppressed Jewish newspapers, the President made it very clear that such action was reprehensible to the United States and within a matter of hours the ban was lifted. 55 About the same time the President told Welles and Hopkins that he was going to try to work out for postwar use some form of international news broadcast that would give unbiased factual information to all people everywhere and that countries like Germany, Italy, and Japan would be compelled to use. 56

It was by his proclamation of the Four Freedoms, however, that Roosevelt dramatized his great hope for a new world order of human liberty. Apparently he had been developing his thinking on these for some time before he announced them in his 1941 Annual Message. Frank Knox claimed that when Roosevelt offered him the Secretaryship of the Navy in December 1939 the President treated him to a long disquisition on what later became the Four Freedoms. 57 In June 1940 he told the press that there were four fears he hoped to see eliminated after the war: 1) fear of not being able to worship freely; 2) fear of not being able to express one's self freely; 3) fear of armaments; and 4) fear of not being able to have normal economic and social relations with other nations, the normal commercial and cultural relations necessary, he said, to produce economic security so that there would not be an economic breakdown such as had occurred in Germany after the last war. 58

A month later he gave the press a long dissertation on both democracy and freedom, declaring that both were among his major postwar objectives. This time he listed five freedoms. The first was freedom of information, which he insisted meant far more than just freedom of the press. There could not be a stable world, he asserted, unless all sources of information were free and people could know what was going on everywhere without censorship. The second was freedom of religion, which he believed was essential to peace. The third was freedom of expression, which everyone ought to have "as long as you don't advocate the overthrow of the government." The fourth was freedom from fear, by which he meant freedom from fear of being bombed or attacked by some other nation; and this in essence meant disarmament. The fifth was freedom from want, which meant the removal of economic and cultural barriers. 59

Once formally announced in his 1941 Annual Message (with two of the above combined), the promotion of these freedoms, said Hull, became the basis for the administration's consideration of a future world order. 60 They were repeated time and again during the war and publicized in various ways throughout the world; Roosevelt even appealed to some of his associates, such as Welles and Wallace, to write short books on them aimed at counteracting those who disliked the Four Freedoms or sneered at the possibility of achieving them. He suggested to Welles that he liken the opponents of the Four Freedoms to the nobles of France during the French Revolution, to the noisy minority in England who opposed the Magna Carta, to the rioters of ancient Athens who drove out many wise men, and to the "rambunctious children of Israel who made Moses so angry he smashed the Tables of Stone." 61

Obviously much of what Roosevelt had to say about individual liberty was said for the effect it would have on the war. But the evidence is overwhelmingly to the effect that what he said about it also represented his real feelings. Earlier we noted the private testimony of Hopkins to the effect that when Roosevelt came out with something like the Four Freedoms it was the real Roosevelt, Roosevelt the idealist, who was speaking; and we gave other evidence to the effect that as practical and realistic as Roosevelt was much of the time, there is no doubt that he was, much of the time, an idealist.

But Roosevelt also had a rational argument in favor of global freedom. In the first place, he believed that there existed a universal desire for liberty just as there existed a universal desire for democracy. "The essential validity of the American Bill of Rights was accepted everywhere at least in principle," he said on one occasion. "Even today," he added, "with the exception of Germany, Italy, and Japan the peoples of the world--in all probability fourfifths of them--support its principles, its teachings, and its glorious results." And in Latin America, he noted, every Republic had incorporated the basic principles of the Bill of Rights in her fundamental law. 62

Later he referred to the Four Freedoms as "the four freedoms of common humanity" and declared that they were as essential to man as "air and sunlight, bread and salt. Deprive him of these freedoms and he dies--deprive him of part of them and a part of him withers. Give them to him in full and abundant measure and lie will cross the threshold of a new age, the greatest age of man." These freedoms, he added, were the right of every man of every creed, race, and land, a heritage already too long withheld from many. 63 He saw coming a fusion of East and West, of all continents, of all cultures, and the emerging of a single "world civilization," and the Four Freedoms were among its "high goals." 64 The Italian people's enthusiastic welcome to Allied Troops in 1943 "proved conclusively," he told Congress, that despite a generation under dictatorship the "love of liberty was unconquerable." 65

In addition to believing that individual liberty had a universal appeal, Roosevelt also looked upon it as interdependent, arguing that for freedom to be safe anywhere it had to be safe everywhere. In other words, the freedoms the people of the United States were used to and wanted preserved could no longer be guaranteed unless they were respected almost everywhere on the globe. In his 1940 Annual Message, the President reaffirmed the right of people to choose their own form of government; but then he qualified that right by declaring that such choice should be predicated on certain freedoms which he thought were essential everywhere. "We know," he went on, "that we ourselves shall never be wholly safe at home unless other governments recognize such freedoms." 66

When proclaiming the Four Freedoms in his 1941 Annual Message he declared after each one that it was essential "everywhere in the world." Rosenman has testified that during the preparation of that message Harry Hopkins raised questions about the wisdom of including the phrase "everywhere in the world" and said that he doubted if Americans were going to be much interested in Java after the war. "I'm afraid they'll have to be some day, Harry," Roosevelt is reported to have answered. "The world is getting so small that even the people of Java are getting to be our neighbors now." 67 On another occasion Roosevelt asserted that the struggle with the Axis "has taught us increasingly that freedom of person and security of property anywhere in the world depend upon the security of the rights and obligations of liberty and justice everywhere in the world." 68 In a 1943 address he declared that in the future the personal freedom of every American and his family would depend increasingly on the free- dom of neighbors in other lands. "The whole world is one neighborhood," he said, adding that that was why the war had spread to every continent and involved the lives and liberties of everyone. 69

Roosevelt made many statements regarding the attainability of the Four Freedoms. In some he sounded as if they were attainable in the near future; in others he sounded as if they were attainable only in the distant future; while in still others he talked as if they were simply ideals toward which man could make progress but might never wholly attain at all. Testimony of Harry Hopkins indicated that Roosevelt certainly believed in the attainability of the Four Freedoms at some time. When presenting the Four Freedoms to Congress in his 1941 Annual Message the President declared that the world of freedom he had just described was not "a vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our own time and generation." 70 A few weeks later he contradicted himself somewhat by saying the Four Freedoms were distant ideals rather than immediately attainable objects, but he seemed to think civilization might get close to them. "They might not be immediately attainable throughout the world," he declared, "but humanity does move toward those glorious ideals through democratic processes." 71

A few weeks after making that statement he asserted that the Four Freedoms were attainable in the sense that the ideals of the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the United States, and the Emancipation Proclamation were attained, 72 by which he probably meant that such milestones of human progress, as he called them, could be approached if not completely attained. In a still later address he spoke only of "steady progress" toward the Four Freedoms rather than of their attainment. But he poured the most bitter sarcasm he could summon on the "puny prophets" who sneered at the Four Freedoms and called them unattainable. Such people were fiddling "with many sour notes while civilization burns." And while he was aware that such ideals could not be attained easily or over night and would require a long, hard, and bitter struggle, he had no doubt that there could be made "a steady progress toward the highest goals that men have ever imagined." 73

This writer's own conclusion is that this last statement by Roosevelt comes nearer to his real views than do the others regarding the attainability of the Four Freedoms, or of a new world order based on democracy and freedom. He knew when praising democracy in Latin America in 1936 that little of it existed there and that there was only small chance of progress toward it in the near future. But his idealism obliged him to focus people's minds on the stars, and that he did repeatedly. He was not so ignorant as to believe that the Four Freedoms could be made realities in Latin America, Java, and "everywhere in the world" within a generation. Thus it is quite likely that "steady progress" toward them was as much as he hoped to see.

X
GLOBAL NEW DEAL

IN ADDITION to the reforms discussed above Franklin Roosevelt also had many suggestions for what might roughly be called a global New Deal. In general, his suggestions represented a desire to export to all the world the economic and social goals and techniques that had done so much to raise standards of living, cultural as well as material, in the United States throughout her history in general and during the Roosevelt administration in particular. As would be expected, Roosevelt's suggestions were highly impregnated with the concept of social justice which to him seemed to mean the opening of opportunities and the bestowing of benefits to all individuals in society regardless of class. A richer cultural and material life for every man, woman, and child on the globe seems to have been his objective, and there is no doubt that he gave much thought to it.

His desire for universal democracy, for the abolition of colonialism, and for individual liberty was basic, of course, to this aspiration. Thus it is largely the economic aspects of his goal that remain to be considered here.

Roosevelt exhibited strong humanitarian impulses throughout most of his public career, and it is not at all surprising that when at last he began operating on the world stage those impulses were given global range. One biographer has suggested that a sense of social responsibility for the well-being of one's fellow men was perhaps a family characteristic which Roosevelt inherited. Certainly it was among the ideals Endicott Peabody worked hard to impose on Roosevelt and all other boys who went to school under him at Groton, and it would have been a miracle had Roosevelt not been infected by some of the social gospel teachings he heard there. Freidel has suggested that Peabody's liberalism was that of the English Tories of the 1870s who felt so secure themselves that they felt free to grant the franchise to laboring men and to inaugurate a paternalistic program of welfare legislation to woo workers to the Tory party. But there is no doubt that it was also a challenge to the boys at Groton to right the wrongs of society. 1 In a theme written at Harvard in 1901 Roosevelt complained of the Dutch families of New York who had lost their social conscience, having nothing left but their names; and he contended that the virility of the Roosevelt clan was due to the fact that they had retained their democratic spirit and the belief that there was no excuse for anyone who did not do his duty by his community. 2

The concern for the well-being of colonial peoples, which was a major characteristic of Roosevelt's early imperialism, and the aims of his domestic New Deal make it beyond argument to this writer that the President's goal was to enrich the lives of most Americans.

The promotion of social justice everywhere in the world was one of Roosevelt's foreign policy objectives from the time he entered the White House and, according to Hull, the President pushed toward this objective whenever the opportunity arose. 3 In 1933 Roosevelt called the attention of all governments to his belief that the World Disarmament and London Economic Conferences had much to do with furthering social justice. 4 And in his 1935 Annual Message he made clear his belief that social justice was, like individual liberty and democracy, a universal ideal, something toward which all men everywhere in the world wanted to go. "In most nations," he told Congress, "social justice, no longer a distant ideal, has become a definite goal, and ancient governments are beginning to heed the call." 5

What Roosevelt meant by the term "social justice" or "wellbeing," both of which he was fond of using, must be gathered from scattered references made largely during the war. In an attempt to show American troops what they were fighting for, he listed in his 1941 Annual Message some economic objectives of a democracy; and while he had the United States in mind, there was an implication that democracies everywhere had or should have these same objectives. They included equality of opportunity, jobs for those who can work, security for those who need it, the ending of special privilege for the few, and the enjoyment of the contributions of science to a higher standard of living. 6

In 1942 he told the press that Anglo-American discussions about the economic and social future of the smaller islands of the West Indies had been going on for some time and his major aim seemed to be to lift them out of their poverty, get the franchise extended to them, get compulsory education going, and help them become economically self-sustaining. 7 When discussing the coming United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture in 1943 he made it clear that he considered nutrition and the production and distribution of food as global problems that were both economic and social and must be attacked globally. 8 One of the objectives of the United Nations, he told the Conference when it met, was to build a world order in which all men can have productive work and enough earnings for at least the needs of their families. 9 Good health was also probably essential to Roosevelt's concept of wellbeing, for at Casablanca the President appealed to both the Sultan of Morocco and to Lord Swinton, governor of the British provinces of West Africa, to give more attention to the health of their peoples. The disease he saw there shocked him, his physician reported, and he suggested that the authorities there take advantage of the discoveries and methods of the United States medical Naval teams in the Pacific. 10

In a Fireside Chat after his return from Teheran the President declared that the Big Three had discussed the "broad objectives" of postwar international relations and all were agreed that the promotion of the social welfare and the raising of standards of living in all countries were among those objectives. 11 But the President gave no details as to what those phrases had meant to the Big Three. A few days later, however, he listed for the press the reforms old "Dr. New Deal" had achieved in the United States before "Dr. Win the War" had to be called in, and if it is true that Roosevelt hoped to export the American experience, that list is probably a reasonable clue to what Roosevelt wanted done all over the world. The list included the well-known New Deal programs regarding old age security, unemployment insurance, minimum wages and maximum hours, the reduction of farm tenancy, the abolition of child labor, monopoly control, reciprocal trade, flood control, the conservation of natural resources, the ever normal granary for agriculture, and slum clearance. Those things, he added, were the kinds of things they had talked about at Teheran in general terms with regard to the postwar world, but, he repeated, it was too early in the war to start talking about them in detail. 12

During 1944 and early 1945 the President not only added an item or two to his list of proposed reforms; he also made it clearer than ever before that they were global objectives. At the beginning of the year he noted that the United Nations was already busy on such postwar problems as disease, malnutrition, and unemployment, and many other forms of economic and social distress. 13 In May he endorsed the Declaration of the International Labor Organization, congratulating the conference for having the same objectives the United States had regarding the material and social well-being of mankind. The Declaration, avowed the President, summed up the aspirations of this epoch. It included hope for full employment, wages and working conditions that would insure the fruits of progress to all, the extension of social security, the recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the improvement of child welfare, and adequate educational and vocational opportunities. 14

At Yalta the President reiterated the idea that the world was changing rapidly, that one of the great changes was the increase in opportunity for a better life, but added that there were still, however, many parts of the world where such opportunity hardly existed, and one of the objectives of the Yalta Conference was to promote this opportunity for every man, woman, and child on earth. 15

Much of the motivation for Roosevelt's desire to promote social justice and the well-being of the world's people had its source in his temperamental humanitarianism and in the sense of social responsibility cultivated in him from childhood. The President also had two rational arguments to justify a global New Deal, however.

His first justification was that economically and culturally all nations were so interdependent that the United States could not enjoy prosperity and a rich social life unless all other states enjoyed them also.

It seems likely that Roosevelt was a subscriber to this idea all his public life. Although in his years as Assistant Secretary of the Navy he was a nationalist, he was a rather broad-minded one who did not hesitate to give contracts to lower bidders from other countries and in 1913 he expressed the hope that someday the United States would take a broad view of her economic position. 16 When arguing in a 1923 magazine article that there was room in the Pacific for both United States and Japanese trade he raised the question as to why, if "within one great nation cooperation rather than cutthroat competition best fosters an honorable and mutually beneficent trade, why is not the same formula true as between two nations . . . ?" 17 In a private letter in the mid-twenties Roosevelt expressed the Democratic Party view, which he probably believed, that the prosperity of the decade was due to the "world economic situation following the war" rather than to Republican Party efforts. 18

Despite the fact that when first in the White House Roosevelt gave first priority to domestic recovery and was pulled for a few months in the direction of economic nationalism by advisors like Moley, in his second Fireside Chat in May 1933 the President warned that the economy of the United States was so tied in with that of other nations that whatever degree of recovery might be achieved by the United States herself "will not be permanent unless we get a return to prosperity all over the world." 19 In 1939 the President predicted that as the air age advanced and air fleets were able to cross oceans as easily as they then crossed small European seas, the economy of the world would become more and more a single operating unit. Then "no interruption of it anywhere can fail . . . to disrupt economic life everywhere." 20

Welles has testified that before going to the Atlantic Conference Roosevelt expressed to him his firm conviction that all nations must be given equal access to natural resources and that it would be necessary to convince the "have" nations that an improvement in the standard of living of the "have nots" would benefit the "haves" also, for if the "have nots" developed more purchasing power they would provide better foreign markets for the "haves." 21 He gave the same argument again late in 1942 to oppose those who were then complaining that the administration's desire to strengthen the economy of the Latin American countries would hurt the United States. It was not true, he declared, and he illustrated his point by showing how the entire United States had been helped by raising the economic level of the South and of helping it get over being an economic colony of the North. The same thing applied, he asserted, to world affairs. Then a few days later he insisted again that no American nation could be happy and prosperous unless all twenty-one of them were. 22

Rosenman has testified that once during the war the President dictated a piece of speech material (never used) in which he defended the general idea that every Hottentot should have a quart of milk every day. Again he argued that if the people in such places as Dakar, Morocco, Algiers, and even the Hottentots could participate more in world trade and thereby create more employment needs and greater markets for all, it would help even the people of the United States. 23

Throughout the war Roosevelt talked in the same vein. In his 1943 Annual Message he reiterated the idea of global economic and social interdependence, emphasizing that the stability of the American economy was dependent on the stability of the world economy. 24 The next year he gave hearty approval to the statement in the International Labor Organization Declaration that "poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere." And again he referred to Gambia. 25 In a directive written a few months later to his own Foreign Economic Administration he noted that the United States had a big stake in getting world trade going again as soon after the war as possible since the well-being of the peoples of the United States and other nations was interdependent. 26 At Yalta he repeated the same idea, arguing that unless countries like Iran developed some purchasing power they could never become good customers for the industrialized nations. 27

Thus throughout his public life Roosevelt opposed the old idea that a nation could prosper only at the expense of other nations and he espoused the opposite internationalist idea that the prosperity of one nation was dependent on the prosperity of all.

His second argument in support of a global New Deal was that the maintenance of international peace and security was dependent on the achievement of reasonably satisfactory economic and social conditions throughout the world.

This too was an idea long held. In the Peace Plan he proposed in 1924 for the Bok Award he noted that his proposals for a new international organization were designed to maintain the great humanitarian and economic work of the League because he believed "that the amelioration of international social and economic ills is a necessary part in the prevention of future war." 28 Again in 1937 Roosevelt seems to have held the same view, agreeing with Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King that economic and social problems were at the root of the current international unrest and were therefore a "fundamental cause of war." 29 In 1943 he reiterated much the same thought, declaring to the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture that the problem of political security and the world food problem were so interdependent that it would be impossible to solve one without solving the other. 30 Early in 1944 he reminded Congress that destroying the current enemy on the battlefield would still not ensure peace, for new enemies were certain to arise if economic reconstruction failed. 31

After returning from Yalta the President gave the press a long recital about the poverty, ignorance, and hunger he saw in the Middle East and he insisted that "all that is tied up with peace. A country that isn't moving forward with civilization," he added, "is always more of a potential war danger than a country that is making progress." To be sure, he went on, solving such problems would be a long-term matter, but the postwar planners were looking ahead at least fifty years. 32 A mere two weeks before his death he reiterated the same idea, declaring that "want" predisposes people toward war or at least makes people ready tools and victims for aggressors. Thus organizations like the Food and Agricultural Organization were badly needed to attack this problem of "want" so that peace might be maintained. 33

The global New Deal Roosevelt advocated called for an enormous variety of reforms ranging from the abolition of child labor to resource development and from expanded educational opportunities to better housing. But mentioning these goals in his public "sermons" and his fatherly talks to "backward" rulers like Churchill and Ibn Saud seem to be all the President said about most of them.

On the subject of international trade, however, he was forced to speak out many times; and while the record is at times confusing, his general attitude is reasonably clear and it became very clear during the years of his greatest maturity.

The one thing we can say with certainty is that Roosevelt was never a high protectionist. As already noted, throughout his public career he called attention repeatedly to the economic interdependence of nations, and in his scheme of things a vigorous flow of commerce among all nations had always been essential to prosperity. Yet it took him many years to become a powerful and sincere advocate of free trade, if he ever became entirely that. What he really advocated in his mature years was a freer trade than then existed and there is no evidence known to this writer that he ever hoped to see trade as free of restrictions as was British trade in the nineteenth century.

Although Roosevelt probably always leaned privately toward a low tariff policy, his political instincts seem to have impelled him to compromise on the issue over a long period of years. In two newspaper columns written in behalf of Al Smith in the 1928 presidential campaign, for example, Roosevelt saw no objection to reasonable protection for either agriculture or business and he opposed only the unreasonably high tariffs that he charged the Republicans had erected for their "pet" industries, tariffs that all too often had contributed much to the promotion of monopolies. No one need fear, he wrote, that the Democratic Party under Smith would inaugurate free trade and close America's factories and farms. All the Democratic Party would do was abolish favoritism to "pet" industries and inaugurate perhaps a "scientifically adjustable tariff" to meet changing conditions from year to year. 34 In 1930 he wrote privately to a Nebraska banker that "I am inclined to think that the Democratic Party will be able to make it perfectly clear that we are not for free trade; that we are for protection but that protection does not mean the right for manufacturers to sell their goods here at a higher price than they sell the same goods in other countries." 35

It would be tedious to recount the zigzags Roosevelt made on this topic in 1932. It is obvious to any reader of his speeches of that year that he had great fun lambasting the ultra-high SmootHawley Tariff the Republicans had enacted in 1930. But the protectionist farm groups of the Middle West had to be thought of also, and he thought of them. Finding a compromise position between free traders in the Democratic Party like Cordell Hull and protectionists like Senator Thomas L. Walsh of Montana was a problem--an insoluble problem to Moley--but Roosevelt thought he found such a compromise and went gaily down the campaign trail leaving followers like Hull, Walsh, and Moley muttering behind him. 36 Privately, however, Roosevelt still leaned toward low tariffs, telling Anne O'Hare McCormick during the campaign that "if the present tariff war continues the world will go back a thousand years." The whole world system needed to be revised, he told Mrs. McCormick; but until that was done he was obliged to take a short nationalist view to promote immediate American recovery. But even here there was one consolation: the recovery of the United States would automatically promote world recovery, he insisted, and once the economic crisis was over, the internationalist long-run approach could be applied. 37 Hull has also testified that Roosevelt's private attitude toward world trade was internationalist before his election to the Presidency. In many conversations with Roosevelt when the latter passed through Washington on his way to Warm Springs before 1932 Hull found him, he claims, as "being at one with me" on the need for lower tariffs and full cooperation with other nations. 38

The story of the tug of war that went on between the economic nationalists led by Raymond Moley and the internationalists led by Hull in the first year or two of the Roosevelt administration is too well known to be repeated here. 39 Suffice it to say that although the President was still trying to thread his way between the two extremes, he thought he had found a compromise position; he denied there was any conflict in the contradictory actions he sometimes took, and his internationalist predilections eventually drove him to side with Hull and the free traders. In private conversation during the period, moreover, he continued to sound very internationalist regarding trade, or so it appeared to such inter. nationalists as Ambassador William E. Dodd. 40

From 1934 on there was no longer any doubt as to where Roosevelt stood. Thereafter his private and public views were in accord and his appeals for a reduction of trade barriers were many and consistent. This does not mean that he immediately became a vigorous enough supporter of reciprocal trade agreements to satisfy Hull. For Hull reciprocal trade agreements were virtually a life-long obsession and his over-emphasis on that particular program sometimes irritated Roosevelt. 41 It is doubtful if any election-minded President could have backed Hull's program vigorously enough to always satisfy Hull. But by the beginning of 1940 the President was backing even that program enough to please Hull, and from that position he never wavered. 42 Throughout the war he made it clear that his postwar plans for global prosperity called for such a reduction of trade barriers that "trade and commerce and access to materials and markets may be freer after this war than ever before in the history of the world." Nations were like individuals, he insisted, and if individuals needed freedom of opportunity to prosper, so did nations. 43

In addition to his frequent generalized appeals to reduce restraints on world commerce and his final support of the technique of reciprocity Roosevelt also commented from time to time on specific aspects of the problem. He was especially firm in his conviction, for example, that equal access to natural resources should be available to all nations; and before going to the Atlantic Conference he told Welles of his desire to persuade the British to accept the principle. 44 Roosevelt also frequently expressed the view that the problems of disarmament and the reduction of trade barriers were inextricably interwoven and one could not be achieved without the other. Thus one of his arguments in favor of the reciprocal trade program was that the expansion of world commerce expected from it would do more to promote disarmament, and therefore peace also, than any other one thing.

During the Depression of the thirties the President also commented frequently on the problem of surpluses. Here he favored international agreements to limit production, to fit such international crops as wheat, sugar, and cotton to the world market, and commodity agreements among the leading producers were, he thought, the best answer. 45 Surpluses in Latin America were of special concern to him since he feared Hitler might get control of Latin America by providing the Latin American republics with European markets. During 1940, therefore, he gave considerable thought to a customs union for all the Americas wherein the ever-normal granary idea might be applied. 46

Roosevelt also spoke out frequently in support of international economic competition (as well as cooperation) as opposed to international cartels and monopolies. In his 1923 magazine article on Japan he had taken issue vigorously with the contemporary idea that economic rivalry breeds wars. There were, indeed, he thought, many causes of war, but economic rivalry was not prominent among them and certainly could not, as a general rule, be so considered. The United States and Britain had been economic rivals of one another for 110 years without a war between them, he pointed out, and the United States and Japan could do the same. 47 In 1925 he reiterated the same view, saying that while "those materialists who assert that all wars are caused by economic and trade rivalries" should not all be in the insane asylum, they were close to it. In many wars, he asserted, trade rivalry had little part. 48 Again in 1941 Roosevelt talked in the same vein, pointing out that there was plenty of room in the Pacific for both Japan and the United States to trade and there was no point in going to war about it. 49

Private international monopolies were as repugnant to Roosevelt as public monopolies of trade. In 1944 he wrote Hull that he wanted to see all cartels eliminated after the war. It was unfortunate, he thought, that many European nations had no antimonopoly tradition and that their governments actually often encouraged cartels. The Nazis especially had used cartels as political instruments, he asserted, and such "weapons of economic warfare" should be eradicated. The United Nations should collaborate to do this; but meanwhile Hull was instructed to keep his eye "on the whole subject"; for it was bound to come up soon in the discussions on postwar planning. 50

The struggle of nations to achieve favorable balances of trade was also repugnant to Roosevelt. "The ultimate ideal," he told the press one day in 1934, was for every nation's trade to be on a balanced basis with exports and imports equalized and gold eliminated as a balancing mechanism. 51

National control of the geographic channels of trade also seemed to irritate Roosevelt, or at least control of those channels about which there had been considerable dispute. As already noted, he favored the international administration of the Kiel Canal, assurances that the Dardenelles would be open to the commerce of all nations, and he favored numerous free ports, in such places as Hong Kong, Dairen, Trieste, and Fiume.

Freedom of the air after the war was also one of Roosevelt's objectives. It was quite all right for internal commercial aviation to be owned and operated by each nation; but the privilege of passing over states and of refueling in their ports should be available to all. 52

Although the restoration and expansion of world trade by freeing it of its shackles was the most important goal in Roosevelt's global New Deal, during the last two years of his life he began to show a keen interest in developing the world's natural resources. This goal was probably inspired by his trips abroad and his first sight, from Casablanca on, of once rich parts of the world which in more recent centuries had known nothing but the most abject poverty. Everywhere he went in North Africa and the Middle East, even when merely flying over a country, he soaked up all the facts about geography and resources he could find available or had time to hear. Dreams of irrigating the deserts came to him. The Sahara could be made to bloom, he thought, by pumping water from its underground rivers. Gigantic reforestation projects ought to be inaugurated also, he believed, especially in places like Iran which once had plenty of water and timber but had become treeless and desolate. Experiments like the Shelter Belt of trees he had begun in the Middle West of the United States ought to be tried in many parts of the world, he declared, and such experiments illustrated the approach nations like those in the Middle East ought to have toward their natural resources. When in 1944 he appointed James M. Landis as Director of Economic Operations for the Middle East, the encouragement of such develop. ments in the area was one of his duties. 53

It appears to have been the old high priest of American conservationism, Gifford Pinchot, who, in 1944, quickened the President's interest in the relation between the conservation of natural resources and peace; and during the last year of the President's life the two men carried on a lively correspondence on the matter. Roosevelt had been interested in conservation nearly all his life. As early as 1912 Pinchot had excited his interest in the subject with pictures of a Chinese walled town which 500 years earlier had been the center of a prosperous and populous countryside, rich in forests, clear streams, and abundant crops; but which by 1912 had become a scene of treeless, waterless, eroded desolation, all due to lack of proper conservation practices. Throughout his public career Roosevelt repeated that story of the Chinese pictures; he studied European conservation practices; and he pushed conservation everywhere the opportunity arose. In February 1944 he wrote King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia about the matter, expressing the view that Saudi Arabia could have a great future "if more agricultural land can be provided through irrigation and through the growing of trees to hold the soil and increase the water supply."

When Princhot argued, therefore, that conservation was essential for permanent peace, he found a ready ally in the President, and once the presidential campaign of 1944 was behind him, Roosevelt began pushing the matter. Even during the political campaign he urged Hull to get the State Department busy studying the matter. Many of the world's resources were being wasted or ignored, he wrote Hull, and others could be used for humanity if more was known about them. Some nations were interested, he added, and some were not; some used their resources well while others abused them. And he concluded by suggesting an immediate world conference on the subject. When the State Department answered it was too busy to plan an international conference on conservation, the President wrote back testily that the Department (by then under Stettinius) had failed to grasp the need to do something about the world's resources. Then he recited his favorite story of the plight of Iran where so much had been wasted that the people were destitute and unable to be good customers for anybody. And there were "lots of countries" like Iran, he declared: many non-buying countries that could be transformed into good customers; and although it might take a hundred years to do it, as history goes that was a short time.

Lands with oil resources were in an especially good position to develop their resources, thought the President. He had "always felt strongly," Mrs. Roosevelt reported, that lands with oil should not turn all their oil resources over to the major powers but should retain enough to develop their own country. The Sultan of Morocco became enthusiastic about the President's dissertation on the matter. But King Ibn Saud in showing no interest whatsoever caused what might fairly be called one of the major disappointments of Roosevelt's life. When he met the Arabian King on his return from Yalta he drew for him a fascinating picture of what could be done to turn Arabia into a modern Garden of Eden. Subterranean streams could be tapped to irrigate the desert, said Roosevelt, reforestation could be tried, and water power could be developed for industry. Glowing pictures of reclamation projects in the United States were painted; projects like Boulder Dam, TVA, and Grand Coulee were described. But the King showed strong objections to modernizing or changing his people in any way, and when the President finished his discourse, the King resumed his tirade against the Jews at the same point he had left off. 54

But the backward areas of the world were not the only ones Roosevelt wanted developed. The TVA idea ought to be applied in Europe, he thought, in order to relieve Europe's chronic coal shortage. Some European countries had plenty of cheap electric power, moreover, while others fifty miles away had little, and there was no reason why the regional development approach should not be tried to serve them all. 55

During the war the President also got interested in the development of tourist resources in Spain and he had his ambassador there look into the possibilities. He was particularly interested, he wrote Ambassador Hayes, in finding out what had happened to Spanish art and cultural treasures during the Spanish Civil War; for he felt they would be useful in attracting tourists from the eighteen Latin American republics with Spanish backgrounds. If Spain could become a great mecca for tourists after the war, he concluded, her economic situation would be vastly improved.

Although the above proposals to develop the world's resources were fragmentary and seem to have become important to Roosevelt only during the last two years of his life, it is interesting to speculate on what he might have proposed had he lived longer. It is quite likely that his experiments in the United States in the thirties would have paled into insignificance in the face of his global dreams.

Another problem on which Roosevelt expressed what might be called New Dealish ideas on a global scale was that of the resettlement of refugees. For them he envisioned a new start in life similar to the new start he had tried to provide in the United States for farmers on submarginal lands.

Here, of course, the problem of immigration was directly involved. His own attitude toward immigration into the United States was what might be called moderate. In his 1920 Acceptance Speech he had favored the tightening of "our immigration laws to exclude the physically and morally unfit," 56 but he never showed any sign of that extreme fear of a great influx of foreigners that was then so common; nor did he show any indication that his willingness to limit immigration was based on intolerance or a belief in the inferiority or superiority of any national group. His attitude seemed to be based on more practical considerations as to what type immigrants could be readily assimilated into a national society and on what was politically acceptable to public opinion.

In his 1923 magazine article on Japan Roosevelt advocated application of the "Golden Rule" regarding Japanese immigration into the United States. Since large numbers of Americans did not move to Japan, he reasoned somewhat speciously, large numbers of Japanese should not move to the United States. 57 But there was no proposal to close the door to them altogether. In two newspaper columns in 1925 he again expressed his middle-of-theroad view. Although he did not want the United States to become a dumping ground for foreigners, he said, he had no patience with those who wished to close the gates to all immigration. Selective immigration such as that applied by Canada would provide healthy contributions to our society, he added; and he liked also the Canadian policy of dispersing immigrants geographically so as to avoid pockets of foreign-born minorities. He reminded his readers that all Americans were immigrants not so long ago, that their mingling had strengthened the nation, and that some of the most backward sections of the country contained almost exclusively "pure American stock"--proof that keeping American blood pure was meaningless. 58

But here, apparently, he had been thinking of only European immigrants; for in his second column on Asiatic immigration his attitude was quite different. Although writing without any trace of an attitude of superiority, he held that Asiatic and EuropeanAmerican stocks had not proved assimilable, that the attempt to mix them in the Far East had produced "unfortunate results" in nine cases out of ten, and that Orientals objected to the mixing as much as did Occidentals. In the Far East the mixed Eurasians were looked down upon and despised by everyone who lived there. Thus there was some justification for the exclusion of Orientals by the United States although some of the arguments used were not valid and were offensive to such people as the Japanese. 59 In the 1932 campaign, he held again to his moderate position, approving "restricted immigration" to protect American labor; but he took pains at the same time to berate the abuses which many immigrants were forced to suffer after entering the United States. 60

When the Spanish Civil War and Nazi persecution produced a refugee problem of considerable proportions in Europe, Roosevelt's solution for it was very much along the lines just described, except that he wanted other nations in the world to cooperate in carrying out the solution. He wanted all possible nations to 1) admit a moderate number of selected immigrants; and 2) disperse them or mix them in a manner that would not produce troublesome pockets of national minorities.

In addition, Roosevelt by then also wanted national governments to develop what might be called resettlement programs to take care of the financial, social, and economic aspects of the problem. And here he called upon his fabulous geographical knowledge to suggest possible resettlement locations. In 1938, for example, he instructed a subordinate in Venezuela to make informal inquiries regarding the possibility of the Venezuelan government admitting immigrants to a large almost unexplored plateau there. Crowded areas of Europe and even of the United States might be relieved by constant streams of emigrants to such unoccupied parts of the world, he suggested. The Spanish Civil War had produced several thousand of the best type of people anxious to leave home and there were thousands more in other European countries. He favored selective immigration into such areas, he wrote, and a thorough mixing of nationalities to prevent German, Italian, Jewish, and other such colonies from developing and which neither Venezuela nor any other country would want. He suggested also that the immigrants be required to pay enough for settling on the land to keep Venezuela out of debt for it and that all efforts be made to make the settlements self-sustaining. Communications could be supplied gradually. 61 A few months later he wrote Mussolini a similar letter suggesting the use of a plateau region in Ethiopia and Kenya for Jewish colonization. 62 Meanwhile he took steps to organize an Intergovernmental Committee of 32 nations to work on the problem. 63

Like most of the leading statesmen of the day, Roosevelt gave much thought to the problem of a Jewish homeland. As of January 1939 he believed Palestine was not physically suitable for resettling the Jews even if the political difficulties were removed; nor were such proposed sites as Lower California, Madagascar, or the Guianas much better. His own proposal was that Angola (Portugese West Africa) would be the best place. The Great Powers could buy Angola from Portugal, he thought, and then move at least the young and marriageable Jews into it; and he thought the British, Portugal's old and trusted allies, should be urged to do the negotiating for the territory.

With the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 Roosevelt began to envision a refugee resettlement problem of enormous proportions and he suggested to Hull that the State Department begin studying and discussing it with religious agencies here and abroad, such as the Vatican. 64 Both publicly and privately the President declared that while only about four hundred thousand people were then in dire need, after the war ten or twenty million might need help. Then the problem would be global and many refugees would have to be given an entirely new start in life. "Horrified humanitarianism, empty resolutions, golden rhetoric and pious words," he told the officers of the Intergovernmental Committee, would not be enough. Everything then being done was being done too unscientifically and on too small a scale. Surveys should be begun immediately, he thought, of millions of square miles in Africa, the Americas, and Australia for possible resettlement sites. Information regarding soils, crops, irrigation, and health conditions needed to be gathered and plans made for financing new settlements and making them self-sustaining. 65

The whole business should be envisioned on a grandiose scale, he thought, if people's imaginations were to be captured and financial support acquired. This could best be done, he suggested, by thinking in terms of one or two mammoth settlements measured in terms of a million square miles and millions of settlers who could be organized into a self-contained civilization, with some people on farms, some in small villages, and some in business and public works. About half the cost, he estimated, would have to be provided by gifts from individual governments. He talked also with Secretary of the Interior Ickes about the possibility of settling 10,000 people in Alaska, half of whom would be foreign refugees.

Again he suggested mixing the nationalities and taking care that not more than ten per cent were Jews in order to prevent the development of minority groups that would resist the process of Americanization. 66 Thereafter whenever he brought up the subject, he stressed substantially the same ideas. 67

Although Roosevelt failed to comment, so far as this writer is aware, on the kinds of programs he wanted developed to promote education, better housing, better health, and many other reform on his list, his comments on international trade, the development of natural resources, and refugee resettlement suggest that his global New Deal was fashioned on a mammoth and spectacular scale.

Roosevelt also commented from time to time on the guiding principles he thought would be useful in achieving his proposed reforms, and although his comments have left us with only fragments of his ideas, the general pattern of his approach is visible.

The first point to notice is that Roosevelt seemed to believe that the primary responsibility for improving the well-being of the world's peoples rested with the peoples themselves and their own national governments, or in the case of dependencies, it rested with the mother country or trustee. Roosevelt had little patience with governments unresponsive to the needs of their people and it was his great hope that after the war governments everywhere would act vigorously to solve internal economic and social problems and to raise standards of living.

He seemed to have no fear of or even objection to the spread of the milder types of socialism and seemed to feel that in many countries socialism would be the best thing. In 1934 he praised slum clearance programs that Germany, Austria, and England had undertaken, and regarding the cry that such action was socialistic he answered that socialism "has probably done more to prevent Communism and rioting and revolution than anything else in the last four or five years." And by way of example he noted that Vienna had done a "grand job" of practically clearing out her slums. 68 According to Mrs. Roosevelt, the President felt that the world was going to be considerably more socialistic after the war and he indicated no regrets about it. 69 Near the end of the war he told the Conference of the International Labor Organization that the promotion of the well-being of their peoples must be the aim of national governments after the war or there was no hope for the success of the great international goals. 70

But as a convinced believer in the interdependence of all nations Roosevelt was aware that there were limits to what each national state could do for herself. National efforts would have to be supplemented, therefore, by international cooperative efforts at many points. Although when first in the White House the President gave priority to national efforts to achieve recovery in the United States, Welles insists that one of his general aims was to effect economic cooperation with all the leading powers of Europe, including Russia 71 --a project, it might be added, that was not forbidden by isolationist tradition as was any project of political cooperation. In one of his many joint statements with foreign leaders before the London Economic Conference the President declared that although the solution to the problem of unemployment was chiefly a national one, the efforts of national governments could not attain their best results unless "they can be made a part of a synchronized international program." 72 Eight years later, before going to the Atlantic Conference, the President reiterated the same general view, declaring to Welles that he was greatly impressed with the need to find cooperative methods to raise standards of living and arguing that the "have" nations must be convinced that it would be to their own interests to help the "have nots." 73

It was during the war that Roosevelt did most of his talking and virtually all his acting regarding such cooperation, however. When early in 1942 the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was established it was to Roosevelt an illustration of the type of pooling of efforts that needed to be made to promote economic and social justice abroad. 74 Thereafter conferences to promote such cooperation proliferated, and Roosevelt was proud of them. In 1943 he told the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture that one of the reasons there had never been enough food for everyone in the past was that the nations of the world had never united to do anything about it, but with international collaboration he hoped the problem could be solved. 75

When celebrating the anniversary of the Atlantic Charter the same year he emphasized that the Charter called for world-wide collaboration to achieve improved labor standards and economic and social security; and he pointed to the United States Social Security Act as an example of the kind of thing that might be achieved everywhere. 76 In a toast to the President of Haiti the same year the President promised that the United States wanted to help Haiti become self-supporting in food and that in the "new civilization that we are coming to" such cooperation among nations would be helpful to all. 77 A few weeks before his death the President touched again on the same theme, telling Congress in support of a renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Act that with the defeat of the Axis, the chief advocates of economic warfare would be out of the way and the world would have a new chance to substitute the principle of cooperation for warfare in economic relations and he hoped the Congress would make the most of the opportunity. 78

Another guiding principle essential to the achievement of his global New Deal, thought Roosevelt, was the necessity for much planning. The task of international collaboration to improve labor standards, social security, employment, and to provide adequate food, clothing, and housing, and a generally more abundant life for millions of people around the world, he said in 1941, required more than temporary remedies. Planning was required, and surveys should be begun immediately. The planning must, moreover, be designed to achieve permanent cures, and to help establish a "sounder world life." 79 It ought to be possible to harness science for peace as it had been harnessed for war, he thought, and late in 1944 he requested Dr. Vannevar Bush of the Office of Scientific Research and Development to do some planning on this score and let him know how the doctor thought the wartime experience in harnessing science might be used after the war on such problems as disease in order to produce a more abundant life for everyone. 80

When at Yalta the President discussed his dreams of developing the resources of Iran, he expressed the hope that the coming world organization would make world-wide surveys about the problems of developing such areas. It was this kind of vision, reported Stettinius, that prompted the State Department to insist on an Economic and Social Council in the United Nations. 81 When reporting to Congress on the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt went out of his way to defend and advocate the need for planning in international relations. Despite the repugnance of the idea to many people, he declared, planning in domestic affairs had brought "many benefits to the human race." It had made possible the reclamation of desert areas, the development of river valleys, and housing programs. And, he added, "the same will be true in relations among nations." 82

Although the evidence is extremely fragmentary, it seems quite likely that Roosevelt would have been favorable to both foreign aid and technical assistance programs to further his global New Deal. During the thirties he showed interest in the beginnings of a technical aid program in Latin America, supporting the projected Pan-American Highway project from 1933 on, and favoring such projects as aid to improve Nicaragua's agriculture, improve the channel in the San Juan River, and provide a director for Nicaragua's military academy. At the same time he also revealed interest in helping Liberia get back on her feet and he suggested that the United States might be able to send her technical experts in the fields of agriculture, public health, and geology. 83

His lend-lease program, almost entirely his own idea, was eloquent testimony of his belief in the interdependence of nations and the necessity of aiding one another. At Casablanca when enchanting the Sultan of Morocco with his vision of developing North Africa's resources, the President suggested that engineers and scientists could be trained for the job by some kind of reciprocal education program with some leading American universities. 84 As the war neared its end the President also made it clear that he favored the use of at least technical assistance during the period of reconstruction to restore war-damaged highways, bridges, and communications. 85 We know also that Roosevelt was in favor of helping the Soviet Union get into the shipping business and expand her foreign trade; and at both Teheran and Yalta he offered to sell Stalin some of the cargo ships that would be surplus after the war. He told Stalin that while the British never sold anything without interest, he ( Roosevelt) had some new ideas regarding surplus property disposal; and he proceeded to describe a method of selling the ships to Stalin that would make the sale equivalent to a gift. 86 Henry Morgenthau has testified also that Roosevelt planned to keep the lend-lease programs going after the war to lay the foundations for world recovery, and that had that been done, the Marshall Plan and other similar programs might not have been necessary. 87

Here we have only hints as to what Roosevelt might have done in the postwar world to achieve his global New Deal, but they are enough to justify guesses at the direction his foreign policy might have taken.

It is also quite likely that Roosevelt was in favor of what might be called pilot plant projects around the world to make economic and social experiments. He made frequent references to the Philippines as an example of how peoples could be moved from colonialism to independence. Welles has testified that the President also believed that a Jewish Homeland in Palestine could become an outstanding demonstration area to all surrounding Arabs of what could be done in the way of economic and social development in the Middle East. He hoped it might even lead to a federation of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan, within which there would be no currency or trade barriers and within which cooperative projects for irrigation, power development, and communications could be carried on. The obvious benefits, he hoped, would persuade the Arabs to subordinate their racial antagonisms. 88

It was Iran, however, that Roosevelt most wanted to see used as a pilot project or demonstration area. It was an ideal place, he thought, to show what an unselfish American program could do to raise living standards. During the war he sent economic and financial advisors there to study the problem, persuaded Britain and the Soviet Union at Teheran to cooperate after the war in providing economic assistance, and then sent Patrick Hurley there to make a special study of the situation. In a memorandum to Hull on the matter early in 1944 he declared that ninety-nine per cent of the people in Iran were in bondage to the other one per cent, and they were able neither to own their own land nor to keep what they produced so as to convert it into money or property. No more difficult place for a social and economic experiment could be found, he wrote Hull, and he was thrilled at the idea of showing what could be done there. He thought the biggest problem would be that of getting the right kind of American experts "who would be loyal to their ideals," not fight among themselves, and be financially honest. If the development program succeeded in its first five or ten years, he concluded, it would become permanent and would cost the American tax payer very little. 89 A few weeks later he wrote Hurley almost the same words, repeating that he was "thrilled with the idea. . . ." 90

At Yalta Roosevelt pursued the matter further, declaring Iran was a good example of the type of economic problem that might confront the world if trade was to be expanded. Iran had no purchasing power, he went on, and such countries must be helped to develop it if other countries expected to trade with them. He reminded his audience that before the Turks came to Iran the country had had plenty of timber and water, and a reasonable prosperity, but now there was nothing but poverty. Thus it was an ideal area for demonstration. 91

Another guiding principle Roosevelt seemed to apply in his thinking about a global New Deal was that there must be in it only a relatively small amount of altruism, but no exploitation, and a great deal of reciprocity. Here again the evidence is only fragmentary, but what evidence there is supports the above statement.

His opposition to economic exploitation of one people by another was long standing. Even in the years of his youthful imperialism he had opposed dollar diplomacy and the protection of merchants who took advantage of backward peoples. The era of exploitation was over, he said many times during his presidency; and one day in 1943 he told the press that when the President of Bolivia had visited him recently he apologized for the past behavior of some Americans who in the twenties had forced loans on Bolivia at exorbitant interest rates and extortionate commission fees. 92 When in 1944 he sent Donald M. Nelson to China to find out what needed to be done to shore up that wartorn country's economy the President told Nelson he was "particularly anxious that the Generalissimo and his advisers in the economic field understand that we are not going in there as exploiters and yet I feel sure we have a proper function, to help put China on its feet economically." 93

To prevent exploitation he repeatedly urged the leaders of backward areas to take care to maintain control over their resources and development projects, as in his advice to Arab leaders to maintain control over their oil resources and to get enough revenue from them to develop their countries. He was especially anxious to promote domestic ownership and control in Latin America. Early in 1940 he gave the press a long background sermon on the resentment many Latin Americans felt regarding the foreign ownership of their utilities, farms, and business firms. President Vargas of Brazil had recently asked Roosevelt how the people of the United States would like such foreign ownership and Roosevelt answered that such a situation in the United States would provoke a revolution. This situation in Latin America, the President went on, tended to give Latin Americans an inferiority complex and he favored a method of financing development there that would overcome such an attitude. He proposed, he said, a financing method that would enable the Latin Americans themselves to own the enterprises after twenty-five or thirty years; and he thought a good place to try the scheme would be with those many British-owned enterprises that Britain would be forced to sell during the war. The United States might buy them and then refinance them so as to achieve eventual local ownership in Latin America. 94

In 1944 Roosevelt came back to the subject while considering a policy regarding Latin American airline investments. He wrote Hull that while he was not opposed to United States investments in or technical aid to Latin American airlines, "I do not believe that it makes for good relations for American capital to dominate or control . . ." lines there. He much preferred that the lines be owned at least largely by Latin Americans with United States investors in a minority. 95

Evidence that Roosevelt's postwar New Deal would contain some altruism is only circumstantial, but the character of his domestic New Deal and of his aid to the Allies during the war suggests that he probably intended some of his postwar development programs to have an altruistic basis. Since he intended keeping the lend-lease program going during the period of reconstruction after the war, there is no evidence known to this writer that Roosevelt ever seriously expected more than a nominal repayment for lend-lease aid. His proposal to sell Russia surplus merchant vessels in a way that virtually made the ships gifts indicated a willingness to use the "give away" method of promoting development. His comment that his ideas on helping Iran would not cost the American tax-payer much money suggests that they would, however, cost the American tax-payer some money. But just as the altruism of his domestic New Deal was greatly exaggerated by his critics, so the degree of altruism intended in his global New Deal might easily be exaggerated. It seems safe to conclude that outright gifts to raise standards of living elsewhere were to play a relatively small part in Roosevelt's plans.

Reciprocity was the principle on which he seemed to depend the most. His major means of expanding trade was to be by reciprocal agreements. He wanted all nations to have a balanced trade with favorable and unfavorable balances of trade made things of the past. He approved the most-favored-nation principle in trade agreements but wanted even the United States to apply it only with other states which granted us the same privilege. Thus in the thirties when Germany and Australia discriminated against our products, the most-favored-nation clause in treaties with them was canceled. 96 In 1944 he wrote Hull that regarding postwar foreign trade "while we shall not take advantage of any country, we will see that American industry has its fair share in world markets." 97

He also seemed to believe that the development of backward areas such as those in North Africa and the Middle East and Latin America could be carried out in a way that could be called an investment rather than a "give away." As already noted, he wanted new enterprises in Latin America developed in a way that would provide eventual local ownership, but they would not be gifts. American investors were entitled to a reasonable profit on their development loans or investments, he thought, even in Arabian oil. Roosevelt simply opposed what might be called exploitation in the unfair sense of that word and he opposed the use of foreign investments to produce economic colonialism. After his return from Teheran he wrote his old schoolmaster, Endicott Peabody, about the poverty, disease, and barrenness of North Africa and the Middle East and then added, "But we can help those countries in the days to come--and with proper management get our money back. . . ." 98 Thus his global New Deal was to produce mutual benefits, and not necessarily only indirect ones.

A final guiding principle in Roosevelt's thinking regarding a global New Deal was that international machinery for economic and cultural cooperation would be necessary to produce any appreciable results. He wanted a variety of autonomous international agencies and organizations--"a workable kit of tools" in his words --through which action could be taken. He had always been an ardent supporter of the economic and social work of the League of Nations and favored its expansion; but he did not think, apparently, that the League had possessed sufficiently effective agencies for these matters, and on one occasion he went so far as to say that the League had no machinery for such things as international food and finance. 99 He had long lent his support also to some of the existing autonomous organizations for economic and social problems. lie boasted one day in 1934 that the United States had not even been a member of the International Institute of Agriculture until 1933 when he had put through a $50,000 appropriation for it, and he asserted that his administration was interested in all such things. 100 About the same time he had also approved Labor Secretary Frances Perkins' efforts to get the United States into the International Labor Organization, although his knowledge about the organization was only very general. 101

It was not until about 1943, however, that Roosevelt began to give extensive consideration to the kind of machinery needed for a global New Deal. During that year he devoted much attention to the problem of getting nations to cooperate on such matters. At that time he favored the holding of a variety of functional conferences, each dealing with a different problem and each in a different part of the world. A conference on food and agriculture might be held in the United States, he thought, one in London on finance, one in Moscow on oil resources, one in Rio de Janeiro on the distribution of raw materials, and so on. Then once each conference agreed on postwar policies, on objectives, it could decide on the best kind of machinery needed to achieve those objectives. 102 To get action started he personally initiated the 1943 conference on food and agriculture in Hot Springs, Virginia, and others followed from which the specialized agencies of the United Nations developed. 103

Roosevelt hoped that the new machinery for economic and social collaboration would be as successful as had the wartime Combined Boards for food, raw materials, production, and resources. They had provided a "strikingly successful example" of economic cooperation among the Allies during the war, he declared, and there was no question but that "the experience gained by them will be very valuable to any work that we have done by the United Nations. . . ." The Combined Boards had proved that former rivals could work together on very difficult problems. 104

When asking Congress to approve the Bretton Woods agreements the President pointed to organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development as the "cornerstones" for postwar economic cooperation. And it was through such organizations, he implied, that the national states might get "more goods produced, more jobs, more trade, and a higher standard of living for us all." 105 About two weeks before his death he indicated to Congress that he was reasonably satisfied with the progress made in creating machinery needed for a global New Deal. Agreements had already been reached in the fields of food and agriculture, aviation, finance and monetary problems, and others were on the way concerning trade and other matters. When all is done, he asserted, the world would have a reasonably good "workable kit of tools" for international collaboration and would then be equipped to deal with social and economic problems as well as with the problem of security. 106

XI
A COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM

FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT'S final proposal for a new world order was that the whole new system of international relations must be held together by a collective security system under the guardianship of the five Big Powers.

We have already noticed that Roosevelt originally looked upon the plan for a League of Nations as a utopian dream and that he was not converted to either the League or to the principle of collective security until the latter part of 1919. Once converted, however, Roosevelt favored the principle of collective security-although not always the League--for the rest of his life; and he spent no little time during the following twenty-five years in a search for the proper vehicles and methods to apply the principle.

Characteristically, Roosevelt never made any detailed analysis of the principle of collective security. His great interest was in achieving the chief objective of the principle: cooperative action by states for the maintenance of peace. Despite the interest he showed occasionally in the details of international organization, especially from the beginning of 1943 and on, he seems to have had few deep convictions regarding the details or structure of the machinery of collective security. He was willing to accept almost anything in the way of machinery so long as it produced cooperative action; and during the thirties when he felt his objective could not be achieved through the League, he seemed willing to work without any machinery at all other than the traditional facilities of conference and diplomacy.

In his search for collective security vehicles and methods Roosevelt began by accepting the League of Nations. Once converted to the League and the principle of collective security in 1919 Roosevelt immediately became a vigorous advocate of both, battling strenuously throughout his ill-fated vice-presidential campaign of 1920 during which he made more than 800 speeches in support of the League. The burden of his argument at that time was that some kind of international organization was needed to give nations stability internally and to preserve the peace, and while the Covenent of the League might have many flaws (he did not say what they were), it was better than nothing. It could be improved with experience, he argued, and he felt also that there was no reason for Americans to be afraid of membership in the League.

As was characteristic of Roosevelt, his emphasis in 1919-20 was on the general objective of the Covenant, not its details, and he was quite willing to accept whatever reservations or strings senators or anyone else wished to attach to the Covenant in order to move toward the general objective. He was quite willing, for example, to see the Covenant amended to give recognition to the Monroe Doctrine and to assure that the United States would not be called upon to interfere in European questions unless it was absolutely necessary to prevent another world war. He admitted freely that the Covenant contained many details to which he objected. But the Constitution of the United States had also been defective, he declared, and like the Constitution, which had been amended eighteen times, the Covenant also could be changed as time and experience dictated. At least it was more than a mere treaty of peace; it was an agreement "stronger than the Hague Conventions"; it was a practical solution to a practical problem, and that was about all one could ask. 1

Much of his effort in the League debate was aimed at calming the fears of those Americans who saw in the League a threat to United States sovereignty. In 1919 he had said the grand objective of peace was worth giving "up something, even if it be a sovereign right of our nation. . . ." 2 But in 1920 when the issue had become more partisan, he preferred to give assurances that the League would in no way impair the nation's sovereignty. "No supernation, binding us to the decisions of its tribunals, is suggested," he declared. All that was being created was machinery through which America's moral force and power could be thrown into the scales for peace; and if anyone feared that the Covenant or the League conflicted in any way with the American form of govern- ment "it will be simple to declare to him and to the other nations that the Constitution of the United States is in every way supreme." 3 Thus the League was essentially a convenience, a tool being provided for the voluntary use of sovereign states and it was by no means an end in itself.

It is quite clear that Roosevelt was among those who believed the League could not possibly succeed without the membership of the United States. The disinterestedness, the moral influence, and the power of the United States were so necessary to make the machinery work properly that without her the League would eventually degenerate into a tool of the British and French and thus a tool in the European game of power politics, a game in which the League might actually become a new Holy Alliance, as he called it, hostile to the United States. 4

United States membership in the League would be advantageous not only to the League; membership would offer the United States the opportunity for world leadership, thought Roosevelt, to which she had so recently risen and which she should continue to assert for both her own sake and the sake of the world. Roosevelt's belief in the desirability of United States leadership of the world was then a deep conviction and he saw the League as an admirable vehicle through which that leadership might be exercised. In the 1920 campaign he compared the League to a fire department organized by neighbors. A chief was still needed, however, and the United States should be that chief. 5

When it became clear in the early twenties that there was almost no possibility of the United States joining the League, Roosevelt went so far as to propose that the League be scrapped and a new organization acceptable to the United States be created in its place. This was the essence of the peace plan he drafted in 1923-24 under the inspiration of the Bok peace plan contest and of his wife's desire to keep alive his interest in public affairs while recovering from his attack of polio. 6

"No plan to preserve world peace can be successful without the participation of the United States," he said in that proposal. 7 He favored, therefore, an organization much like the League, but modified so as to be acceptable to the Senate; he would abolish the much discussed Article X of the Covenant so there would be no risk of the United States becoming involved in purely regional disputes abroad and include provisions giving assurance that foreigners could not compel the United States to use her armed forces without her own consent. His "Society of Nations" would operate primarily through an Assembly and an Executive Committee, eliminating what he thought was a "dual system" in the League wherein the Council was essentially an upper house. The Executive Committee was to sit almost continuously and act as an executive to carry out the policies of the Assembly. When the Assembly was not in session, however, the Committee had the Assembly's powers.

His Executive Committee was composed of eleven members with the United States, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan having permanent seats for the first ten years. What was to happen after ten years he did not say. The remaining six members were to be elected by the Assembly except that semi-independent states such as the British dominions were ineligible for seats on the Committee. In place of the unanimity rule in the League he favored both the Assembly and the Executive Committee requiring only a two-thirds vote for substantive questions and a simple majority vote for procedural questions.

Definite assurances were given that the constitutional law of each member nation was superior to the acts of the Society. While there were ambiguous provisions suggesting the use of force in extreme emergency for the settlement of disputes, nothing stronger than economic sanctions was seriously envisioned. Emphasis was placed on the pacific procedures of inquiry, arbitration, and judicial settlement. In no case did the Society have power to do more than recommend national action--a word that Roosevelt believed made action less obligatory and more acceptable to the Senate than the Covenant's phrase authorizing the League to "advise upon the means" of handling aggression.

In view of the way the League developed, Roosevelt's proposal was not as different from the Covenant as it probably seemed to him it was in 1923-24. It contained one novel provision, however. Roosevelt argued that "a survey of history will prove that most recent wars have been commenced on the pretext at least of some attack on so-called national honor. The 'diplomatic indiscretion' prior to the Franco-Prussian War, the sinking of the Maine before the Spanish War, the murder of Sarajevo, the recent Corfu episode, are but examples." Thus the Executive Committee was given the task of figuring out a way of eliminating such insults to national honor; and meanwhile, revenge should be had not directly against the offending state, but through the new Society. It would be the Society that would seek redress, apology, or compensation from the offender while the offended state would be obliged to hold her temper for 30, 60, or 90 days while the Society acted. 8

The significance of this proposal was that it showed Roosevelt willing to kill the League to get an organization acceptable to the United States and he was willing to make it as weak as necessary to appease American opinion. A step at a time was quite agreeable to him provided it was in the right direction, and he was willing to sacrifice any details that were obstacles to going toward the general objective.

In 1925 he again expressed this general attitude by reiterating his earlier desire for United States membership in the League. "I don't care how many restrictions or qualifications are put upon our [participation]," he declared. "In other words, I seek an end and do not care a rap about the methods of procedure." At the same time he deplored Lord Robert Cecil's proposal for a League air force because he feared it would further frighten American public opinion. 9

Since it lacked machinery, the Briand-Kellogg Pact was not a useful substitute for the League in Roosevelt's eyes. The Pact was nothing more than a "glorified" declaration which while harmless was unreal, for "war cannot be outlawed by resolution alone." There had been treaties of peace and friendship for two thousand years, he asserted, and all had failed because they lacked machinery to eliminate "the causes of disputes before they reach grave proportions." Thus the Pact of Paris failed in two respects: (1) it tended to create a false belief that it was a great step forward; and (2) it contributed nothing toward the settlement of international disputes. 10

We noted earlier that by the end of the twenties Roosevelt retained little respect for the League and had lost all hope of the United States joining it. But this did not mean necessarily that he had lost faith in the principle of collective security. Although the League had proved itself a weak and inadequate vehicle, the spirit that had produced it was still valid in his eyes, and in 1930 he wrote Viscount Robert Cecil that he thought it very important that the spirit of the League be kept alive. 11 Meanwhile he continued hoping that the United States would join the World Court. 12

All this supports the contention that when in the pre-convention campaign of 1932 Roosevelt made his so-called repudiation of the League to mollify William Randolph Hearst, he expressed a view fairly close to his real feeling. It is worth noting, however, that while in that speech of repudiation Roosevelt gave assurances that he had no thought of taking the United States into the League, he did not denounce the principle of collective security and he insisted that the main reason the League had degenerated to the point where it was not worth joining was probably due to the fact that the United States had not joined it. Had the United States joined, he asserted, the League might have remained the kind of organization conceived by Wilson. Instead it had become a forum for European problems and United States membership would no longer serve a useful purpose. When accused of having in this "repudiation" deserted both his Wilsonian ideals and his internationalist friends Roosevelt retorted privately that his loyalty to Wilson's ideals was as strong as ever and all he had repudiated was the League as a means of attaining them. Those who thought the twelve-year-old League was still "the best modern vehicle" to reach their ideal needed, in his view, to do some more thinking. 13

The contention that Roosevelt's 1932 "repudiation" did not necessarily mean loss of faith in the principle of collective security is borne out by his behavior during his first year in the White House. In three instances in 1933 he approved United States participation in or cooperation with League bodies involved in security problems. He approved United States participation in the Advisory Committee handling the Leticia border conflict between Colombia and Peru, and in a commission on the Far East. He also urged the Latin American republics to give the League a chance to settle the Bolivian-Paraguayan dispute over the Gran Chaco. 14 On one occasion during his first year or two in the White House the President also told Secretary of State Hull that he was turning over in his mind the idea of appointing an ambassador to the League but feared it would cause too much of a row in the United States. 15

Early in 1933 the President made one other gesture toward cooperation with the League. When it appeared that the Disarmament Conference in Geneva was breaking down, that Germany had intentions of rearming in violation of the Versailles Treaty, and that both Britain and France as well as other nations were afraid to apply sanctions if trouble arose so long as the United States insisted on her right to trade with a condemned state, Roosevelt gave public assurances that the United States was willing to engage in at least limited cooperation to restrain aggressors. The United States was not only willing to consult with other nations in case of a threat to the peace, he promised; but she was also willing, if sanctions were applied by others, to waive her freedom of the seas and neutral trading rights if she agreed the sanctions were justified. 16

This willingness to consult with other nations in the face of a threat to the peace was nothing new, Roosevelt assured the press. Both major party platforms had endorsed the idea; mere consultation would commit the United States to nothing; but some machinery for consultation was needed and he strongly favored, he said, the proposal Britain's Prime Minister MacDonald had presented to the Disarmament Conference providing machinery to determine the aggressor and decide on cooperative action against her. It would be a means of implementing the BriandKellogg Pact (the League was not mentioned) and who could be against that! 17

It would be wrong to attach much importance to Roosevelt's willingness to cooperate with the League, however. By the time he entered the White House he seems to have given up all hope of getting the United States to join the League and his lack of respect for the organization was then so great that his efforts to cooperate with it were both spasmodic and half-hearted.

Whatever he did during his Presidency in behalf of collective security was done largely, therefore, outside the League. From about the end of 1933 to mid-1937 he seemed to lack interest in doing anything at all collectively. After the failure of both the London Economic Conference and the Disarmament Conference Roosevelt seemed so disgusted with Europe that he concluded the best way for the United States to help the world was by setting her own house in order, by using her influence independently whenever an opportunity arose, and by preaching and preaching again in favor of disarmament, the liberalization of international trade, and the pacific settlement of disputes. Collective action with the degenerate powers of Europe seemed useless. 18 In the application of the embargoes of the Neutrality Act to the Italo-Ethiopian War and the Spanish Civil War it is true that Roosevelt kept one eye on what the League was doing, but those actions were taken independently to a large extent.

It is true that during these years 1933-37 Roosevelt also tried to get the United States into the World Court; and when in 1935 the Senate defeated that effort, the President privately raised questions as to the reception the anti-court senators would receive when they arrived in Heaven. 19 But joining the Court was not looked upon as quite the same thing as joining the League. All presidents since Wilson had favored it; and it was hardly a sign that Roosevelt's interest in the League had quickened.

Roosevelt's inauguration in 1936 of the inter-American collective security system is a good example of his effort to promote collective security outside the League. The 1936 special InterAmerican Conference at Buenos Aires was inspired largely by Roosevelt's desire to capitalize on the new spirit of good neighborliness already visible in the hemisphere; and while we must take care to note that Roosevelt's major objective in that conference was to organize a defensive hemispheric alliance against the dictators abroad, an important secondary objective was to begin steps toward the development of machinery to handle disputes, such as the Chaco War, within the hemisphere. 20 Although the President characteristically left the development of the system and its organization in later conferences to Hull and Welles, he supplied the inspiration and general objective.

There is some evidence that in his search for collective security vehicles and methods Roosevelt early in 1937 again considered the idea of a new international organization which, unlike his 1923-24 proposal, would not entirely replace the League, but would have the effect of remolding the League into a different kind of organization. At that time, after the League's failure in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, much thought was being given to a reform of the League. All we know of Roosevelt's thinking on the matter, unfortunately, is in some notes Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada made of a conversation with Roosevelt in March 1937 and that are published among the President's Personal Letters. The notes were made the following morning, were read to Roosevelt that morning, and according to the Prime Minister they reveal "ideas we explored together in conversation the evening before, and which we thought might be deserving of further consideration." 21 The implication is that the notes represent agreed views of both men, but it is impossible to determine whether or not Roosevelt agreed with all of them or even took any of them seriously. When we recall the amazing receptivity of Roosevelt's mind to ideas it is easy to believe that he was at least willing to consider the ideas in the notes. The editor of the notes declared that they showed the President's "trend of thought in connection with a possible world peace meeting." But they must be read with caution.

The notes assert that the root of the world's troubles at that time was a lack of social justice, that all nations should cooperate to do something about it, that an international conference ought to be called to take action, and permanent machinery should then be set up, probably at Geneva, to handle the problem. The job of this new organization would be to consider the problems causing social and economic unrest in the world, investigate alleged injustices (i.e., complaints by Germany and Italy), and by ascertaining the facts focus world opinion on the situation.

This was the only kind of collective security that could be successful, the notes declare. Collective security based on force, armaments, and economic sanctions, as was then the principle prevailing in the League, was utterly futile and so risky that many nations would not cooperate through fear of being drawn into war. The only alternative to collective security by force was collective security based on reason and world opinion. "Collective security of nations lies in the sense of social wrongs, and the power of an organized public opinion founded upon same," said King's memorandum. "Most social evils are more effectively prevented and cured by public opinion than penalty," for world opinion is a powerful factor.

A collective security system based on investigation and a righting of economic and social wrongs, rather than on force, would automatically promote disarmament since nations have armaments primarily because reliance is still on force, the notes assert. A collective security organization designed to promote social justice would also in time get the League back on the path Wilson intended it should be on, with reliance upon public opinion rather than on economic and military sanctions. Then when the League was reoriented away from the concept of force, the two organizations probably would merge into a single world organization with universal membership.

The immediate task, if war is to be prevented, is to get nations once again around the conference table, the notes went on. If both members and non-members of the League can again be brought into an international conference, "the path to peace will at last open out before all."

It is possible only to guess at how close the above comes to Roosevelt's real views. At the time of the reported conversation, March 1937, the President was in the thick of his battle with the Supreme Court and his major charge against the Court was that it forbade the national government power to act positively to promote social justice. Thus it is justifiable to assume that the problem of social justice was then much on his mind. But idealist that he was, Roosevelt never before or after this conversation so deprecated the use of force and relied so heavily on the exposure of facts, on reason, and world opinion, as much as he esteemed those elements. In this respect the notes are incredible; and if the President expressed himself in that vein, the conclusion is warranted that he was engaging in his old pastime of dreaming dreams.

Roosevelt's most famous effort to find an effective way to apply the principle of collective security during the thirties, however, was his quarantine proposal made in October 1937, about six months after the above conversation with Mackenzie King. Ever since Japan's attack on China in July 1937 Roosevelt had been casting about for a way not only to stop Japan's aggression but also to warn those planning future aggression that their crime would not pay. Immediately after Japan's assault on China the President had told Welles that he had in mind a plan of imposing a trade embargo on Japan enforced by the United States and British navies. Japan was so dependent economically on the United States and Britain, he felt, that this pressure would bring her to her knees. 22 In September he told Ickes that in order to prevent such future incidents as Japan's attack on China he was thinking of suggesting to all peace-loving nations that if any nation invaded or threatened another in the future, all the rest would isolate the aggressor by cutting off all trade and denying her raw materials. 23

Three weeks later this idea of the collective application of economic sanctions to Japan was dramatized by Roosevelt in his famous Quarantine Speech, although he did not say publicly that it was economic sanctions that he had in mind. All he was willing to indicate in that speech was that war is a contagion that has a tendency to infect even remote states; that in any contagious epidemic the community joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the whole community; and while the United States was determined to stay out of war, it was to her interest to give thought to how to protect herself against contagion. Quarantining the aggressors was merely an obvious implication and the idea that the quarantine should take the form of an economic blockade was not even suggested. 24

As is well known, the storm of protest aroused by this speech caused the President to retreat publicly, if not privately, and caused him also to instruct Norman Davis, his delegate to the Brussels Conference called as a result of the speech, to devote his time largely to mobilizing public opinion and the moral force of the world against Japan. 25 But privately the President continued to favor economic sanctions against Japan and felt that if he could get the cooperation of other nations, the sanctions would be successful. He also told the cabinet that if economic sanctions were applied by enough states, he would also move the Army to the West Coast for show although he would not expect to have to use it. 26

It is worth noting that in the quarantine affair the President appears to have given no thought to the League and was seeking a way to apply the principle of collective security through the traditional diplomatic mediums of negotiation and international conference. Sumner Welles has suggested that by this period Roosevelt had given up all hope of effective international organization for the immediate future. Welles declared that "in the many talks I had with the President between 1936 and the summer of 1941 on the subject, he was never once willing to agree that an organization composed of all non-totalitarian countries was as yet feasible. Even less did he believe that the United States should or would attempt to participate in its construction"; and it was not until after Pearl Harbor that he changed his mind and began to see the renewed possibility of international organization. 27

What the President was veering toward by this time was a Big Power trusteeship or guardianship for the peace of the world. We noted earlier Welles testimony that during the thirties Roosevelt lost patience with most of the small powers outside the Western Hemisphere because they were spending money for armaments that he thought were useless and even harmful to them and everyone else. He believed the small nations should devote their national resources to education and welfare programs and that they ought to be satisfied to entrust their security to English speaking powers, particularly to the United States and Britain, who should be given the task of policing the world. 28

By the time of the Atlantic Conference in August 1941 this idea of an Anglo-American policing system for all the world was rather firmly fixed in the President's mind. There might be some feasibility some day, he agreed, in reconstituting an organization like the League; but that day was far off; the world was then in too much chaos even to give serious consideration to it; and even when such an organization might be rebuilt it would not be much use, he thought, in handling the problem of security. Bodies like the League Assembly were so large, he asserted, that they were too conducive to disagreement and inaction to handle the security problem. Such large bodies were all right for discussions on many problems and certainly they were useful for providing the smaller powers with a forum for complaints, grievances, and suggestions. But only the Big Powers who had the means to do policing should have such responsibility; and at that time the only Big Powers he could conceive as respectable enough for that role were the United States and Britain. 29

When Welles protested that many small or medium powers like Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, and the American republics might not like being excluded from responsible work of this sort even during the transitional period after the war, Roosevelt answered that some "ostensible" participation might be worked out for them; but it must be kept "ostensible," for none of the smaller powers had the means to participate effectively in a policing system. 30

The major development in Roosevelt's thinking in this matter during the year after the Atlantic Conference (1942) was that the Soviet Union and China must be included among the world's policemen. Roosevelt had concluded by then that all other nations, including France, should be disarmed after the war. But for a variety of reasons the President concluded during 1942 that the Soviet Union and China could not be excluded from the international policing force. The major task of the policemen, the President asserted, would be to see that no disarmed nation secretly re-armed. If caught doing so, the culprit would first be threatened with quarantine; and if that did not work, she would be bombed. Inspection would go on continuously. 31

On occasion Roosevelt stated that the Big Power policing system he had in mind was designed only for a transition period after the war, until a more permanent security system could be established and made strong enough to take over the policing function. At the time of the Atlantic Conference, however, that transition period was envisioned as of such an indefinite length of time that the President seemed unable to see beyond it to the day when a comprehensive international organization would take over. 32 Thus his refusal to accept any more than a very weak statement on a future international organization in the Atlantic Charter was due not only to fear of alarming American opinion, but to lack of interest on his own part as well. 33

It was this idea of a Four Power Condominium or a sort of new Holy Alliance that Roosevelt had firmly fixed in his mind early in 1943 when he began his many discussions with Hull, Welles, and others on plans for the United Nations, and it is doubtful if Roosevelt ever gave up this vision. According to Welles, the President gradually saw that his Big Power policing scheme would not work, that Britain would be too weak after the war to help much, that great new revolutionary forces were at work in the world and that even the United States would not be able to cope with them. 34

But Roosevelt clung to his idea of Big Power guardianship until the day of his death. When British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Washington in March 1943 the President emphasized to him his desire for Big Power control not only of policing but of all important postwar decisions. It was the Big Powers that were going to have to write the peace treaties, he told Eden, and he did not want to have to do a lot of bargaining with the small states about it. The smaller states had all sorts of conflicting ambitions and any attempt to satisfy them would get nowhere. The important thing was to make settlements conducive to world peace. 35 With regard to security, he told Eden, the Big Powers would have to maintain troops in the defeated Axis states and in such strong points as Tunisia, Bizerte, Dakar, and Formosa; and regardless of what kind of a general international organization existed, the Big Four would have to make the decisions regarding security and police the world for many years to come. 36

In September 1943 he was again expressing the same view, although he declared that he was advocating a Big Power Condominium for only a transition period of three or four years. He told the press one day, however, that if the experiment of the Big Powers keeping the peace looked good to other nations, they all might want to keep it even after the transition period was over. 37 To George Norris he likened the Big Four police to "sheriffs" who would maintain world order while the world's people recovered from the shell-shock of the years of fear and violence they had gone through. 38 And again he justified his idea by the argument that a large group of nations could not handle security problems effectively. Where military matters would be involved, he told the press in October 1943, the Big Four simply would not have time to consult thirty-two other nations. On matters about which there was "time to turn around," such as deciding ultimate objectives, all nations should have a place in the "picture." But not on a "military thing." 39

At Teheran the President again talked a great deal about his Four Policemen idea; but this time it was to be a permanent part of a full-fledged international organization, not a temporary arrangement for a transition period. His concept of the future international organization, he declared, included a world-wide assembly, an executive committee of about ten members to deal with such non-military matters as economy, food, and health, and an enforcing agency which he called "The Four Policemen." The Four Policemen would have power, he said, to deal with any sudden emergency, such as Italy's 1935 attack on Ethiopia. Had such an agency existed then, he asserted, it could have blocked the Suez Canal and prevented Mussolini's attack. Minor threats to the peace by revolution or civil war in a small country could be dealt with by the quarantine method. Major threats such as aggression by a larger power, could be met by an ultimatum from the Four Policemen, by bombardment, and even by invasion if necessary. According to Sherwood, there is no evidence of any discussion of the possibility of aggression by one of the Four Policemen. Among themselves the policemen would work out the problem of the future location of strong points for stationing military forces in such a way that they would not start arming against each other. 40

But this Big Four guardianship of the world did not mean Big Four domination of small nations, said the President after his return from Teheran. The rights of every nation large and small were to be respected and guarded as jealously as were the rights of individuals in the United States. The doctrine that the strong should dominate the weak was an Axis doctrine and the Big Four rejected it. The only objective of the Big Four was to keep the peace and to do it by force "for as long as it may be necessary." 41

Until such materials as the Hull papers are made available it probably will be impossible to trace what happened to Roosevelt's Four Policemen idea after Teheran. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals give the impression that the idea was modified considerably. But Roosevelt himself probably was not overly displeased. The provisions granting the Big Powers a predominant position in the Security Council of the United Nations, of assigning security matters to the Security Council, of having the Council meeting continuously so it could act quickly, and of providing for a military staff committee composed of the Big Five might have looked enough like his police proposal to satisfy him. After the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, at any rate, he again referred to the contingents of world "policemen" who were going to be available to the Security Council and he wanted the Council to have power to use them quickly and decisively to keep the peace. 42 A few months earlier he had announced that the members of the coming UN would be asked to provide military contingents according to their capacities; 43 but unless he had by then changed his mind about the capacity of other nations to maintain armaments, the chances are that he expected only the Big Powers to furnish contingents, with the other nations supplying facilities for the use of the forces of the Big Powers.

At Yalta the President indicated again, although in a somewhat different context, that the idea of Big Power guardianship of the world had not been dispelled from his mind. He agreed with Stalin, for example, that it would be ridiculous to give small nations like Albania equal power with the great nations in postwar affairs, and he agreed that the Big Powers should write the peace treaties. 44 At a press conference after his return from Yalta the President also talked in a very paternalistic tone about the small nations, declaring that one of his objectives was to provide machinery to protect the "many little nations," and to give them a chance to be heard. He hoped, he said, that all nations would eventually become members of the UN Assembly. Little countries like Saudi Arabia ought to have a place where they could tell other nations of their needs. But it was awfully difficult to handle matters of importance in a large body, and he implied that important matters should be left to the major powers. 45

Although his Four Policemen concept was modified in the evolution of the United Nations Charter, the fact that the security system of the UN is based on Big Power unity and control is probably due in large part to the President's tenacity in clinging to his concept.

In the development of his concept of Big Four guardianship of the world Roosevelt began with the assumption that only the United States and Britain (including perhaps the Dominions) were qualified for so momentous a role. China and Russia gained eligibility in his mind in 1942, and finally in late 1944 France acquired the same status.

At the time of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference the President agreed with Hull that Brazil also should have a permanent seat on the coming UN Security Council, partly because her population, territorial size, and resources justified it and partly because her contribution to the UN war effort had been outstanding. 46

Whether or not Roosevelt believed Brazil was qualified for any significant role as a policeman, however, is not known. One day in 1940 while avowedly doing some thinking out loud to a group of newspaper editors he had suggested that in the disarmed postwar world which he envisioned the American republics might well play the role of inspectors since European and Asiatic nations had so little trust in each other. 47 But he failed to pursue the matter further, and when Britain and Russia opposed the inclusion of Brazil, the President dropped the idea.

His reasons for including Britain and France among the Big Powers needs little comment. Ever since he had begun his study of Mahan at the age of fifteen he had recognized the strategic community of interest among the English speaking peoples, particularly on the seas; and a great deal of his later geopolitical thinking had been built around the concept of an informal AngloAmerican alliance. It was quite natural for him, therefore, despite his irritation with Britain during the twenties and thirties, to include her among the global trustees; and after the beginning of his cordial relationship with Churchill, partnership with Britain was taken for granted.

But France was not accepted as a possible global guardian until almost the last weeks of Roosevelt's life. He became so disgusted with France during the thirties and after her defeat in 1940 that he saw little hope of her ever regaining her pre-war power and prestige. At Casablanca he told General Eisenhower that he saw little chance for a restoration of the French position and he doubted very much her ability to hold her empire during or after the war. 48 Moreover, he assumed that once Germany was disarmed, France would have no further need for arms and she ought to be disarmed also. 49 What caused Roosevelt to change his attitude toward France is uncertain. Welles suspected that Churchill was responsible for the President's change of mind; 50 and it might be that the trouble with Russia which began to appear in late 1944 caused the President to take the precaution of developing a counter-weight to Russia on the European continent. But about the matter we can now only speculate.

Roosevelt's reasons for including China among the world's guardians are more available, for the President talked about them a great deal and felt so strongly about the matter that Churchill and Stalin were unable to argue him out of his stand as they did easily regarding Brazil.

Roosevelt had always felt a sentimental attachment to China and defended his support of the Stimson Doctrine to Moley in 1933 on the grounds that his ancestors had traded with China, he had always had the deepest sympathy with the Chinese people, and he did not see how anyone could expect him not to support China against Japan. 51 At Cairo in 1943 he talked to General Joseph W. Stilwell in much the same vein. 52

But Roosevelt's reasons for including China as a Big Power were based on far more than sentimental attachment. He was under no illusions about either Chiang Kai-shek or the weaknesses of China. Many internal reforms were needed, he agreed, to make her not only an effective but even a morally acceptable partner; and he assumed that it would take two or three generations of education, training, and reform to make her an important factor in world affairs. 53 But a stabilizing power was needed in Asia, he reasoned, and with Japan down, China was the only available candidate. There would have to be some power there to hold both the Soviet Union and Japan in check, he thought, and if China were built up she could be that check. She could be especially useful in policing Japan, he declared, and she could also be useful in guiding the vast revolutionary movements then on foot throughout Asia. The recognition of China as a great power would also, he insisted, prevent charges that the white races were determined to dominate the world. The West must abandon the idea that Asiatics were inferior, he believed, and must work wholeheartedly with nations like China to prevent a basic East-West cleavage in years to come. 54

Roosevelt also argued that another reason he wanted China among the guardians was that "he was thinking far into the future and believed that it was better to have the 400 million people of China as friends rather than as possible enemies." 55 This was an idea that went back to the latter part of the nineteenth century when many prophets of Western civilization began worrying about the results of wakening Asia and began to predict the rise of a "yellow peril." Alfred Thayer Mahan had written much about this at the turn of the century, arguing that by sheer force of numbers the yellow races could engulf and destroy Western society if ever they went on the rampage; and Mahan appealed to the West to take hold of those awakening peoples, guide them, and do the utmost to imbue them with Western-Christian-liberal principles so that when they became strong and fully awake they would behave as civilized people rather than as the barbarians Mahan then thought them to be. Reared as he was with such a view, it was quite natural for Roosevelt to believe that China could become a great source of trouble to the world in the future unless handled properly. Unless her internal quarrel between the Kuomintang and Communists was patched up there might be a civil war in which the Big Powers would get on opposite sides as in the Spanish Civil War and another global conflict might result. 56 There was also a possibility that if Chinese ego and aspirations were not guided in the right direction she might in time become aggressive like Japan; and he asked Churchill what he thought would be the result if the 500 million people of China developed in the same way as the Japanese in the nineteenth century and got hold of modern weapons. 57 The prospect was horrible to contemplate. Thus when the President, largely through Hull, persuaded the Soviet Union to include China in the Four Power Declaration in 1943, he wrote Lord Mountbatten that he looked upon it as a "great triumph" and he was delighted to be assured that the hundreds of millions of Chinese (425 million this time) would be on the Allied side in the postwar transition period he then had in mind. 58

Roosevelt's selection of the Soviet Union as a guardian of the world's peace was of more consequence than his selection of the others, of course; but so much has already been written about his attitude toward Russia that it will be treated here only briefly and largely for the sake of completeness.

Although from 1917 until after the Nazi attack on Russia in 1941 Roosevelt blew hot and cold regarding the Soviet Union, he never ceased being intrigued by the social and political experiment going on there. William C. Bullitt, the President's first ambassador to Russia, has stated that Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933 was inspired largely by the President's disgust with Europe and Japan and a faint hope that he might get Russia's cooperation to maintain peace in Europe and Asia. Russia's failure to live up to her 1933 commitments, however, produced a mild reaction, promoted reservations about Soviet trustworthiness, and caused the President considerable disappointment. 59 When he sent Joseph E. Davies to Moscow in 1937, therefore, he instructed Davies to make the President's disappointment clear and to leave it up to the Soviets to make overtures. 60 He still hoped for Soviet cooperation to stop aggression, however, and in January 1938 directed Davies to explore the possibility of Russian help to check Japan. But nothing came of the effort. 61

It was not until Russia's attack on Finland in late 1939, however, that the President publicly condemned the Russians with vigor. In February 1940 he told the American Youth Congress that in the early period of the Soviet experiment he had possessed the "utmost sympathy" for the effort of the Russian leaders to bring better health, education, and opportunities to Russia's millions and he had hoped that in time the reign of terror and irreligion of the regime would pass and Russia would begin evolution toward a democratic, peaceful, and respected member of the family of nations. But the attack on Finland shattered all that hope and the USSR stood revealed as "a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship in the world," and as an aggressor also. 62 Meanwhile he suggested to Hull that the State Department consider retaliation for the repeated minor irritations promoted by the Soviets for such things as searching consuls' luggage and regulating telephone calls from Moscow. 63

But after the Nazi attack on Russia in June 1941, and particularly after the Soviets revealed unsuspected power and endurance, Roosevelt expressed many reasons why Russia should be accepted as one of the guardians. It is quite likely that, as one observer said, Roosevelt always looked on the idea as a calculated risk; he once told Polish Premier Stanislaw Mikolajczyk that "in all our dealings with Stalin we must keep our fingers crossed." 64 But he had a strong hunch, reports Bullitt, that his gamble would pay off. When Bullitt presented Roosevelt with a strong memorandum against cooperation with Russia, the President argued that while Bullitt's facts and logic made sense, nevertheless "I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of man. Harry [Hopkins] says he's not and that he doesn't want anything but security for his country, and I think if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace." 65

But Roosevelt seems to have begun with the assumption that he had little choice in the matter, for he considered Russian cooperation necessary for peace. As early as May 1939 he implied this to President Benes of Czechoslovakia; 66 Welles got the same impression; 67 and so did Churchill. 68 Thus as Roosevelt saw the matter, he had the choice of cooperating with Russia for peace or of having no peace at all.

As Roosevelt saw the Soviet Union reveal the muscles of a super-power he seems also to have accepted the idea that the interests of both the United States and Russia had become world- wide and the two giants would have to cooperate whether they wished to or not. This was the reason, Hopkins told Stalin after Roosevelt's death, why the President had gone to such great lengths to arrange conferences with the Russians and to put their relations on a workable foundation. 69

Roosevelt also argued optimistically about the prospects of cooperating with Russia. Relations with her would not be a bed of roses but their differences could be worked out.

In the first place, the Soviet record regarding peace was good, with the exception of her attack on Finland. After joining the League in 1934, she had worked conspicuously for peace and the President believed she would function in the UN as she had in the League. Her record of cooperation as an ally during the war had also been good, no important point of friction developing until the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. Dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 had raised hopes of an even better record to come. 70

The President's second reason for being optimistic about Russian cooperation was his belief, despite the attack on Finland, that the Soviets had no aggressive ambitions. Immediately after Hitler's attack on Russia the President wrote Admiral Leahy that he did not think "we need worry about any possibility of Russian domination." 71 A few weeks later he wrote the Pope that while the Soviet Union was under as rigid a dictatorship as Germany, the only weapon the Russians were using outside their borders was propaganda, and while that caused a certain amount of harm, the Russians were not even in the same class with the Germans who menaced the world with both propaganda and military aggression. 72 At Cairo Roosevelt told General Stilwell that he had little fear of the Russians trying to get Manchuria from China. " Stalin doesn't want any more ground. He's got enough," said the President; "he could even put another hundred million people into Siberia." 73 In 1944 Roosevelt publicly said the same thing, declaring that the Russians were not trying to "gobble up all the rest of Europe or the world." They did not have "any crazy ideas of conquest," he asserted; and especially since Teheran he did not think there was anything in the fear that the Russians were going to dominate Europe. "They have got a large enough 'hunk of bread' right in Russia to keep them busy for a great many years to come without taking on any more headaches," he said." 74

A third reason for Roosevelt's optimism regarding Russian cooperation stemmed from his idea of progress and theory of history which held that the course of history is ever upward and onward toward a better, more democratic, more libertarian society. And it was this theory of history which convinced Roosevelt that no society was static and that Russia was bound to undergo evolutionary changes away from tyranny and dictatorship and toward freedom, tolerance, and peace. In his talks with Litvinoff in 1933 Litvinoff had told him he thought that although the United States and Russia had been poles apart in 1920 they had come much closer together in the ensuing thirteen years. "Perhaps Litvinoff's thoughts of nine years ago are coming true," he wrote a friend in 1942. 75 The two nations might never get closer together than in a 60-40 ratio, he once told Welles, but that would provide a workable relationship. Since 1917, he argued, the USSR had moved a long way toward a modified state socialism while the United States had gone in much the same direction in her progress toward political and social justice. Thus conflict between the two was not inevitable, provided Russia abandoned her doctrine of world revolution, and that, he thought, was receding also. 76 If, therefore, a head-on clash between the two giants could be prevented until the new international security system had a chance to strengthen itself, he believed Russia's standards of living would rise, her foreign trade would increase, her walls of isolation would go down, her cultural and intellectual ties with the West would multiply, and the Russian people would eventually obtain freedom of information about the outside world. Then Russia would be so transformed that cooperation with Russia would not be difficult. The big question was whether or not the necessary time for these developments would be available, for the whole thing would require years. 77

Admiral McIntire has reported that in shipboard bull sessions on the way to Teheran the President showed no fear of not being able to bridge the gulf between the United States and Russia. The President argued that the Kremlin's leaders had already discarded or modified many Marxist tenets, that Communist philosophy was too materialistic to have lasting appeal for the minds and souls of men, and he expected the trend in Russia to swing toward nationalism and old Czarist imperialism. 78 He implied, supposedly, that that was a system with which we could get along.

A fourth reason for Roosevelt's optimism regarding Russian cooperation was his great confidence in his personal ability to win Stalin over to the idea of working in harness with the other powers. One reason for his repeated efforts to arrange his first meeting with Stalin, despite the latter's elusiveness, reports his son, was that he wanted to turn his personality on Stalin and gain the dictator's confidence. 79 He looked on his first meeting with Stalin at Teheran as a challenge, his wife reported, because the Russians were so suspicious; and while he was not certain when he came home that he had dissipated any of Stalin's distrust, he showed no sign of giving up the campaign. 80

A final reason for Roosevelt's optimism regarding Russian cooperation was his belief that cooperation in keeping the peace was so obviously in Russia's best interest that she could be made to see it and would act accordingly. Welles claimed that by August 1943 the President was convinced that the Soviet Union would recognize that her security and legitimate objectives could best be achieved by cooperating fully with the United States and an international organization. 81 Stettinius testified to the same point, declaring that Roosevelt emphasized many times that although Russia might be difficult to get along with, the United States must continue trying with patience and determination to get the Soviets to realize that it was to their own selfish interest to win the confidence of the rest of the world, that cooperation would be to their advantage, and it was the only hope for peace. 82 Even after Soviet intransigence began to cause him concern in the last few months of his life, the President continued to feel that Russia needed peace and opportunity to develop her resources to raise her standards of living so badly that he still had faith Stalin could be brought around by appeals to reason and self-interest. 83

It was the United States, however, that Roosevelt most wanted to be one of the guardians of the postwar collective security system; and he wanted the United States to be not only a guardian, he wanted her also to be the leader of all the others.

The idea that the United States should lead the world was such a strong conviction with Roosevelt from at least 1920 on that one is somewhat puzzled by his refusal to assume that role during the thirties. Preoccupation with domestic affairs, fear of isolationist opposition, and the timidity of the politically almost indispensable Hull are obviously part of the answer; but anyone going over the material on Roosevelt is very likely to get the feeling that they are not the whole answer.

In his 1920 acceptance speech Roosevelt called for American leadership of the world, declaring that "America's opportunity is at hand." 84 He called for membership in the League of Nations with his argument that the United States should join the League because it would give the country a vehicle for world leadership and a forum to spread her doctrines of liberty and representative government. 85

United States leadership was imperative, he often argued, because of all the Big Powers she was the only one with a disinterested point of view. She had no traditional enemies, had no territorial desires, was interested only in peace and the advancement of civilization, and was, therefore, the only Big Power the world was willing to follow. 86

He argued repeatedly also that United States leadership was essential for promoting better standards of international morality and goodwill. Throughout her history, he wrote in 1928, the United States had been influencing the world in these respects. The Monroe Doctrine, her relations with Canada, the peaceful methods used by her in the Far East with the Perry Expedition and Townshend Harris, the Alabama Claims and Bering Sea Fisheries cases, her final decision to reject imperialism and prepare the Filipinos for self-government, and her help to the people of Cuba had all helped establish the United States as a moral leader. The Hay Open Door policy, the Boxer indemnity, aid in helping to organize the Hague tribunal, aid in the Treaty of Portsmouth and the Algeciras Conference, and Wilson's diplomacy had all helped lead the world toward more international goodwill. The only blots on "our liberal leadership" he could then think of were the seizure of Panama, Taft's dollar diplomacy, interventions in the Caribbean, and the Panama tolls legislation. But Wilson's diplomacy had made up for most of those mistakes, he asserted, and had shown the way to a new relationship among nations. The goodwill and high moral purpose of the United States had already had much influence on the world, he concluded, and this influence could continue. 87 The moral power of the United States, he asserted near the end of World War II, was even greater than her political, economic, and military power; and he implied that she should continue to wield it. 88

Another reason for United States leadership of the world, in Roosevelt's mind, was his belief that as Europe disintegrated into chaos, Western culture might disappear unless the United States preserved it and assumed leadership in perpetuating and restoring it. Here was another idea that Roosevelt might have gotten from Mahan in his youth, for as early as 1894 Mahan had expressed the view that the Anglo-American peoples must be the protectors of modern civilization, a civilization based on individual freedom and respect for law. By the time of Munich, Roose- velt felt that Europe had already disintegrated so much that in the years to come it would be up to the United States to "pick up the pieces of European civilization and help them to save what remains of the wreck. . . ." 89 The United States was the heir of European culture, he declared a year later, and it was up to her to keep that civilization alive. 90 In 1940 he asserted again that the United States (along with the other American republics) must become the "guardians of western culture, the protectors of Christian civilization," and he implied that United States leadership was essential for that task. 91

Roosevelt also seemed to think that peaceful relations among the guardians might also be dependent on United States leadership. It would be her task to serve as moderator in the conflicts that must inevitably arise among Britain, the Soviet Union, and China, all of whom were suspicious of each other, and all of whom would need a referee. 92

A final argument Roosevelt presented for United States leadership among the guardians was that the postwar world would offer the United States a large opportunity to shape the kind of world she wanted, and unless she took hold of the opportunity this time, she might never have another chance. "It is the destiny of this American generation," he said in the 1940 campaign, "to point the road to the future for all the world to see. It is our prayer that all lovers of freedom may join us--the anguished common people of this earth for whom we seek to light the path." 93 Late in 1944 he reminded the country that after World War I the United States had failed to organize the kind of world conducive to peace. "Opportunity knocks again," he added. But "there is no guarantee that opportunity will knock a third time." 94 A few weeks before his death he reiterated this idea, arguing that the United States had a rendezvous with destiny. Ahead lay both promise and danger. The world could go forward toward unity and a widely shared prosperity or it could go backward and break up into competing economic blocks. The decision was in the hands of the United States, or at the very least the United States could influence that decision mightily. If, therefore, the American people wanted the world to go in a direction conducive to their way of life, they had better lead the way. 95

It is obvious that Roosevelt's conception of a collective security system under the guardianship of the Big Powers led by the United States was very paternalistic and clearly placed all the medium and small powers in the position of children in the fam- ily of nations. It seems likely that Roosevelt finally agreed to accept some small powers on the Security Council of the United Nations only on the assumption that their role would be minor and their participation would be of only the "ostensible" type he had told Welles in 1941 might be acceptable. He was willing, however, to have an assembly or some sort of forum wherein the lesser powers could express their views. His hopes for a global New Deal and a good neighbor climate of opinion had great bearing on the problem of security; and while his attitude toward smaller nations was that of a father, it was the attitude of a good father and a twentieth-century somewhat democratic and benevolent father who had the best interests of the children at heart; and if he could not quite bring himself to let the children have a vote in important family decisions, he nevertheless wanted them to express their views, be treated with decency, and be made to feel important.

Although Roosevelt from time to time entertained a number of ideas about various other aspects of collective security and international organization in general, there were almost none that he held with deep conviction; and it is probably safe to say that the United Nations Charter, as well as the charters of other international organizations written during Roosevelt's administration, all reflect the views of others rather than of Roosevelt himself. As noted earlier, the President's life-long interest was in general objectives, not details; and while he became famed for a relentless, Dutch stubbornness in the pursuit of objectives, it was usually relatively easy to persuade him to change his mind on details or to get him to accept any reasonable plan that showed promise of achieving his objectives. If the inside story of the formulation of the United Nations Charter is ever written, 96 therefore, it is likely to show that Roosevelt had no detailed plan of his own and was usually willing, although sometimes only after strong argument, to accept whatever plans were presented provided they seemed conducive to achieving his general objective.

The way the President changed his mind regarding the principle of regionalism as opposed to the principle of universalism illustrates his susceptibility to persuasion. Unfortunately, there is too much discrepancy in the Hopkins, Welles, Hull, and Benes reports of the President's views on the matter for us to get a clear picture. Welles reports that when he first presented Roosevelt with the draft for a postwar organization early in 1943 in which the idea of regionalism was dominant, the main question raised by the President was doubt as to the possible effectiveness of regional agencies in weak areas like the Near East and Asia where the people had so little experience in self-government. 97 According to Hopkins' report of Roosevelt's views at about the same time, the President favored a combination of regionalism and universalism, a structure with the Big Powers making all major decisions, a universal advisory body beneath them, and similar regional advisory councils under that. 98 According to Hull, however, the President in the spring of 1943 vehemently opposed any universalism (except among the guardians, supposedly); all organizations--political, economic, and social--were to be regional; and the President's only concession to universalism was grudgingly and jokingly to tell Hull he could have the Pentagon or Empire State Building for a world secretariat to handle international conferences. 99

Whatever degree of regionalism the President favored in the spring of 1943, however, by summer Hull had him veering toward universalism and by the time of Teheran the President seemed considerably opposed to regionalism--a shift in views that occurred in only a few months. 100 This shift does not mean that Roosevelt was finally unwilling to accept any regionalism at all, for he had no intention of scrapping the inter-American system that was still in process of development. 101 It means only that he was finally won over to the view that in the general organization to be created, universalism was to be predominant. 102

Roosevelt's attitude toward additional votes for the Soviet Union in the UN General Assembly illustrates again the President's mental flexibility on such matters. When the Soviets first asked for the admission of each of their sixteen republics at Dumbarton Oaks the President became indignant and made clear his unalterable opposition. On his second day at Yalta he still felt the same way. 103 But after hearing Stalin's plea that at least two Soviet republics be admitted, Roosevelt immediately conceded, telling the press later "it is not really of any great importance," especially since the Assembly was not empowered to decide anything. Thus "this business about the number of votes in the Assembly does not make a great deal of difference." He had agreed to it out of sympathy for Stalin who was having trouble holding his devastated republics in the USSR and who thought such a gesture would please the people there who had suffered so much. Stalin had also shown signs of having trouble with some members of his Politburo and wanted to appease them. And since Britain still controlled India and would have her vote, the idea of extra votes was not preposterous. 104

When Roosevelt in turn got Stalin to agree to support a proposal for three votes for the United States, it was done only at the behest of the President's advisers, Roosevelt himself seeming to care little about it. 105

On some details, however, the President was willing to argue, and on a few he never backed down. For some time, for example, he had what might almost be called an obsession in favor of the various agencies of the United Nations meeting in various places around the globe. He was bitterly opposed to meetings in big cities where delegates would be subject to influence by pressure groups and the press. In places like Paris or London pressures were so enormous that delegates could not engage in the frank, informal, friendly, neighborly, "around the table" type of discussion he believed necessary. At Paris in 1919 the pressures on the delegations were very harmful, he thought.

While organizations like the International Labor Organization might be able to return to Geneva, he preferred political bodies like the UN Security Council and General Assembly to meet in delightful but isolated places like the Azores and Hawaii. And so serious was he about the matter that, much to Hull's irritation, he ordered the State Department to prepare maps and memoranda for him to take to Quebec where he planned to discuss the matter with Churchill. The President also thought that obliging delegates to attend meetings in various places would improve their knowledge of the world and of other countries; and it had worked so well in the Inter-American system that he thought it would be effective in the UN and the functional agencies as well. As late as mid-February 1945 the President was still talking this same way and there seems to be no evidence that he changed his mind. 106

With regard to voting and the veto in the Security Council the President seems to have readily accepted what the State Department brought him and much of his discussion on the matter was devoted simply to getting a clear understanding of how the mechanisms would work. 107 It is quite clear that he was adamantly opposed to Russia's desire for an unlimited veto and he argued vigorously and to the end against a veto on discussion in the Security Council and against a Big Power voting in disputes in which she was a party (until the application of sanctions came into question). Wide-open discussion in the Security Council would not hurt anyone, Roosevelt argued, nor would it promote disunity; rather it would prove to the world that the guardians had confidence in each other and in the justice of their policies. Unity among them would be strengthened by discussion, not weakened. 108

The Soviet desire for the right to vote (or veto) when party to a dispute was especially distasteful to Roosevelt. It completely violated the ancient principle that a man should not be the judge of his own case, declared the President, and it went contrary to ideas firmly imbedded in American law. It was to argue the Russians out of this demand that Roosevelt called Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko in for a bedside discussion during the Dumbarton Oaks Conference at 7:30 o'clock in the morning and argued with the taciturn Russian for an hour. The Russian position, declared the President, was equivalent to a quarreling husband and wife both sitting on their own jury. 109 And at Yalta the President finally won his point.

It would be possible to cite additional ideas Roosevelt entertained from time to time regarding international organization. He told Frances Perkins once, for example, that he liked the International Labor Organization's system whereby peoples as well as governments were represented; but he believed there was too much prejudice to apply the idea to a political organization in the immediate future. 110 We know also that he wanted a UN Charter that was flexible and amendable so it could be adapted to social, economic, and political changes in the future. 111 But such ideas were often so ephemeral or so commonplace that they played no part in his conception of collective security worth discussing here. Roosevelt's major concern during the most mature years of his life was the promotion of a collective security system under Big Power guardianship and in the face of that objective all his other ideas fade into insignificance.

XII
CONCLUSIONS

GREATER thinkers than Franklin D. Roosevelt have had their ideas ripped to shreds by multitudes of critics; and it would be folly to argue that the President's theories are invulnerable to attack. Obviously, his thinking was faulty at many points.

Surely, the President was often in error in his psychological reasoning. It is quite clear, for example, that he was overly obsessed with the problem of evil and gave entirely too much emphasis to his "devil" theory of politics. His attitude toward morality is also open to question; for there is considerable doubt that individual morality and state morality can be the same, as Roosevelt insisted they should be. The President's assumption that there existed a universally accepted moral code and that most people and most states understood it and knew when they were violating it is also open to considerable doubt. His faith in the effectiveness of world public opinion as a sanction was also quite exaggerated; for we know now that totalitarian states are decidedly immune to public condemnation and that it is effective only when applied to states that have a strong tradition of responsiveness to the public will. The President's belief that there exists a universal urge for liberty and democracy is almost totally denied by the available evidence of social psychology.

Roosevelt's support for the doctrine of self-determination also raises the question as to whether it is now wise to continue encouraging the fragmentation of the world when interdependence is demanding more and more integration. The President's faith in multi-power trusteeships is also questionable; for surely the experience the world has had with multi-power administrations is not encouraging.

Roosevelt's assumption that the American freeing of the Philippines was a good example to all other colonial powers is equally debatable; for what the President does not seem to have considered is that that grant of independence hurt neither the American economy nor American prestige; but the colonial possessions of all the other imperial powers were intimately bound up with both factors. The American example could not be accepted by the other colonial states, therefore, as a very useful precedent.

The President's idea that all but the Big Powers should be disarmed and that all the little and medium powers should be both willing and happy to entrust their security to the Big Powers has, of course, great merit. But it seems almost weird to believe that the small and medium powers might agree to such a development; for history has taught them the grim lesson that Big Powers are not to be trusted any more than little neighbors are to be trusted and that it is, in fact, the Big Powers that invariably cause the Big Troubles of the world. There is also reason to wonder if it is possible to square Roosevelt's demand for a world of welfare states, all supposedly with managed economies, with his demand for a world in which international trade is relatively free. Even if the two demands are not basically inconsistent, the possibility of persuading welfare states used to managing their economies to relax their management of their imports and exports to the degree essential for a relatively free world trade is very remote.

And so we could go on condemning or debating the validity of many of Roosevelt's ideas.

It is equally obvious, however, that for all the defects and debatable points in his thinking, the President's theory of international relations contains many great merits. Despite its incompleteness, for example, the President's explanation of the breakdown of the old world order is an astute one. His emphasis on the failure of democratic governments to meet the modern needs of their peoples is as good an explanation as we are likely to get of the decline of democracy and the rise of totalitarianism in our time.

The President's geopolitical theory is also something that has stood the test of time; and the implications he drew from it appear more logical with every passing year despite the efforts of the so-called "revisionists" to prove that Roosevelt maneuvered us into a war we had no business entering.

The President's proposals for a new world order are meritorious also in that they show a lively awareness of most of the inexorable trends of the era and of the large place given to solving the problems implied in those trends. The anti-colonial movement was given considerable consideration, for example; nor was Roosevelt behind the times in his recognition of the mass aspiration for higher standards of living that has become characteristic of this century. His global New Deal was aimed literally at wiping poverty, ignorance, and disease off the earth. The President was even willing to ride the modern wave of nationalism, asking only that it be diluted with a sufficient degree of internationalism to allow people to recognize their interdependence. The only major trend of the time that Roosevelt bucked was the trend toward totalitarianism, and for that we cannot blame him.

Except for his faith in multi-power trusteeships, Roosevelt's proposals on trusteeship were sound also; and it is quite likely that had his tutelage ideas been applied, the transition of many peoples from colonialism to independence might have been less painful, even less bloody, and the Korean War might have been avoided altogether; for the President invariably proposed trusteeship for Korea, rather than immediate independence.

Roosevelt's faith in classical diplomacy--that is, being confidential, quiet, and frank--among leaders who know each other personally and whose word is their bond also has much in its favor. It is good to note further that the excessive legalism said to be characteristic of American thinking on international relations is nowhere visible in Roosevelt's thinking, for he recognized correctly that most of the problems that plague relations among states are political rather than legal problems.

Most meritorious of all in the President's thinking, however, is his practical idealism, his practice of asking men to hitch their wagons to stars, to keep ideals ever before them and to plod toward those ideals in the most practical manner possible, never expecting actual attainment but remaining constantly aware that even one small step in the right direction is progress.

But the merits and demerits of Roosevelt's theory of international relations are not nearly so important as his over-all approach. The central thesis of his theory is that the centuries-long pattern of the behavior of states can be changed and a new type of world order can be created based on the concept of the good neighbor. He was practical enough to warn that progress toward such a new order would be at a snail's pace. He was realistic enough to note that the transformation from a world dominated by power politics to a world dominated by reason, goodwill, and enlightened selfinterest might never be fully achieved. For he knew that such a change would require a fundamental revolution in the intellectual and moral attitude of the bulk of mankind; and he was aware that centuries-old attitudes and patterns of behavior change slowly. His own personal ambition seemed to be limited to getting civilization turned around and started in the direction of his goal and he would have been happy merely to know before he died that mankind was going in the right direction.

It is not too far-fetched to say that Roosevelt looked upon the basic problem of transforming international relations as something of a psychiatric problem. He remembered the nineteenth century as a period when the game of power politics was played with restraint and there was a considerable degree of reason and enlightened self-interest in interstate relations; and he recalled with no little nostalgia the days when he had been able to ride a bicycle around a Europe in which the general atmosphere among peoples was friendly.

But during the twentieth century all that had changed. Most of the peoples of the world, and especially the peoples of Europe, had become mentally deranged. Nationalism, war, depression, and the new technology had produced problems they had been unable to solve by reasonable means. Their frustrations had produced an emotional disturbance and they had become obsessed with fears, suspicions, hatred. Even the United States had experienced this mental and moral collapse during the Depression. In their desperation the semi-crazed peoples of the world had turned to all sorts of false panaceas as a frustrated man turns to drink. Some had turned to aggression, violence, brutality, and racism while others had turned to isolationism, appeasement, and pacifism. Mankind was indeed a psychopathic case in bad need of a good doctor.

It will not strain the imagination very far to picture Roosevelt entering the White House in 1933 determined to be that doctor. He had, it is true, only a vague idea as to what kind of psycho. therapy he ought to apply to either his domestic or his foreign patients. But his Inaugural Address made it quite clear that he was out to change his patients' attitudes. His exuberant and optimistic assurance to the American people that they had "nothing to fear but fear itself" was obviously aimed at lifting a frustrated and desperate people out of their slough of despond. The President's transformation of the United States in a matter of months into a beehive of activity with millions of people busy on a myriad of projects is uncannily like what is often done in psychiatric hospitals where patients are put to work on handicrafts.

It was in his Inaugural Address also that the President began to apply his therapy to the outer world, for it was then that he announced his good neighbor policy.

It was in the late twenties that Roosevelt had begun puzzling over the causes of Latin American hatred toward the United States, and had come to the conclusion that the United States' methods of dealing with Latin America had been all wrong and that friendly, good neighborly methods might very well produce a friendly, good neighborly response. On entering the White House, therefore, the President began applying a good-neighbor approach in Latin American relations, and toward the end of his life he was convinced that his psychotherapy had worked and that the international political system of the Western Hemisphere was well on the way toward being transformed.

However, when Roosevelt had attempted to apply this same psychotherapy to the rest of the world he was greatly disappointed that outside the Western Hemisphere it had not worked. Rather his Eur-Asian patients had become worse, their behavior becoming ever more anti-social and finally exploding into violence.

Furthermore, Roosevelt considered that when the "madmen" of Germany and Italy and Japan had sneeringly rejected the therapy he proposed, their rejection had made them largely responsible for the worsening mental derangement of other states in the family of nations. It was as if two or three members of a large family had become so mentally deranged--nearly to insanity --that they had caused unusual emotional disturbances in everyone else in the household. At such a point, of course, forcible confinement and treatment of the dangerous cases is a logical step; and this seems to have been the goal of the President's quarantine proposals, his aid to the allies, his conclusion that American military power must be used, his policy of unconditional surrender, and his postwar proposals to reform the Axis peoples. The idea of a fight to the finish or to unconditional surrender and the eventual rooting out of all vestiges of totalitarianism from the Axis states appears very much like the psycho-therapeutic application of shock treatment to a patient on whom more mild treatment does not work. But whatever we call it, there is no doubt that Roosevelt's goal was to transform the attitudes or personalities of the Axis peoples, to create within them a total revulsion toward war, militarism, aggression, racism, and sadism; and there is no doubt but what exactly that happened to a large proportion of those people to such a point that when a post-RooseveltUnited States begged them to re-arm and join the cold war against the Communists, they did so with extreme reluctance.

The psychotherapy the President applied to the USSR was much more mild; for the conclusion of his diagnosis of the Russians and particularly of Stalin was that they were afflicted only with a relatively mild case of distrust and suspicion. It was an obsession--a fear obsession--but mild withal. On one occasion Roosevelt pointed out privately how Stalin's youthful activities as an underground party worker in Czarist Russia and his work of acquiring and holding power in Communist Russia had contributed to make Stalin abnormally troubled by fear, suspicion, and distrust. And the President was quite aware that the Soviet Union had been treated in the family of nations in a manner that had accentuated rather than ameliorated Russian distrust of the outer world.

But the therapy the President prescribed for the USSR was very much like the therapy he had been applying to Latin America. He hoped to dispel her Suspicions of the outer world by first proving that the United States sincerely wanted to be her friend. Refraining from criticism of Russia, giving her aid to drive out the Germans, getting personally acquainted with Stalin, taking Stalin's side occasionally against Churchill, and not retaliating to rude or provocative behavior were all aimed at the goal of proving that America desired Soviet friendship and was the kind of friend in whom confidence could be placed. And at the time Roosevelt died he seemed to think his therapy was working; for although he was quite aware that much yet remained to be done, he had at least persuaded the Soviets to commit themselves to joining the forthcoming United Nations and participating in some vague form of postwar cooperation.

We know now, of course, that Roosevelt's diagnosis of the Soviets was inadequate. We know now that he greatly underestimated the depth of Stalin's mental derangement and discounted too much the possibility that his antisocial behavior might become berserk. Obviously, Stalin was much sicker than Roosevelt imagined. If Khrushchev's report to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 is even approximately accurate Stalin was already incurably on the road to insanity when Roosevelt began working on him.

But does Roosevelt's failure to grasp the extent of Stalin's mental illness invalidate his general approach: his looking at the USSR and indeed his looking at the whole world as essentially a problem in psychiatry, a problem of transforming personalities, attitudes, or whatever it is that psychiatrists try to transform? This question raises a further question central not only to all political science but central also to all society. For if Roosevelt's approach was correct there is then vast hope for a better world. But if Roosevelt was wrong mankind has a dark future.

History, unfortunately, provides overwhelming evidence that Roosevelt was wrong. For history shows that throughout the ages the behavior of men and states has almost invariably followed a pattern best explained by the theory of power politics. According to this theory of political behavior, power is so often useful or even essential to the attainment of one's objectives that a struggle for power is going on practically all the time. So essential is power and so ubiquitous is the struggle for it, that it seems likely that the struggle for power is inherent in the very nature of organized society. This contest, moreover, is so often for high stakes--for the power to make decisions of vital importance--that it cannot be carried on like an amiable election of officers in a Rotary Club. Rather it is so often bitter, sometimes even violent, that the general atmosphere surrounding it is one of hostility. Whoever wins the struggle, moreover, will naturally use the power acquired to make decisions in his own interests and there is no assurance that the interests of the power-holder and the interests of others in the community will be the same; for people differ as to what they like and dislike and what they consider best for the community.

In international relations power politics are more visible than elsewhere; and it is quite obvious that throughout history generally interstate relations have been governed by a struggle for power carried on most of the time in an atmosphere of hostility, and accompanied by a type of decision-making that is based on the will of the power holder.

Now it is all this that Roosevelt proposed to change. But if the struggle for power and the surrounding atmosphere of hostility are inherent in the very nature of organized society, can they be changed? Or if they can be changed, can they be changed to the extent Roosevelt proposed? Can the general atmosphere of international relations be made friendly rather than hostile. Can an international system be devised in which decisions would be made via rational discussion around a table rather than via coercion or threat of coercive power? Coercion was to be used apparently only in the interests of the whole community against aggressors--a few of whom we might have with us always.

The persistence of the struggle for power throughout history and in virtually all known societies suggests that it is, indeed, inherent in society. True enough, there have been periods when the struggle was more mild and the accompanying atmosphere less hostile than at other times. The nineteenth century appears now to have been a period when the game of power politics was played with almost unbelievable restraint and the atmosphere of hostility was relatively mild. The twentieth century, on the other hand, has been one of the most violent and hate-filled periods of history.

But Roosevelt wanted to do more than merely restore the situation of the nineteenth century. His goal was a New Order. His theory of history insisted that civilization moves ever upward and onward, despite occasional relapses, and his target was a world better than that of the nineteenth century.

The idea of achieving an intellectual, moral, and spiritual transformation is not, of course, new. It has been the goal of all the great religions. It was Woodrow Wilson's goal. And today, Jawaharlal Nehru, with his theory of the psychosis of war or the psychosis of fear is a steadfast believer in the Roosevelt thesis and has applied it repeatedly in his efforts to ameliorate the cold war. It is a basic tenet of Marxism, moreover, that a new kind of society not only can but is going to evolve on this earth.

Intellectual, moral, and spiritual transformations have also actually taken place on numerous occasions discernible in history. They are visible in all civilizations that have declined and then experienced a renaissance as did Western civilization at the end of the Middle Ages. Through the oratory of Danton and others like him in the French Revolution the personality of France was considerably transfigured. The psychological change Gandhi produced in the Indian masses still looks miraculous despite the seeming relapse into violence that accompanied partition. The change Hitler wrought in the German people was also as remarkable as it was terrible.

But none of these proposed or actual transformations has done away with power politics and some of them were not even designed to that end. Granted, therefore, that such a thing as a mental, spiritual, and moral transformation of mankind is pos- sible, is the kind of transformation Roosevelt called for possible? History seems to shout a categorical NO to such a possibility.

If we turn to psychology rather than to history, however, it is possible to see that support for the Roosevelt thesis might be forthcoming; for it is now widely believed among social psychologists that virtually all social behavior is learned behavior. This belief implies that men can be led in almost any direction-toward the kind of world Hitler wanted or toward the kind of world Roosevelt wanted. It implies that society can be made essentially competitive or essentially cooperative. It implies that men can be taught to behave in either a hostile or a friendly manner.

It is very doubtful that Roosevelt believed that power politics could ever be abolished completely and it is quite likely that the comments he made to that effect in a few of his speeches were inserted by the State Department and delivered without much thought. The weight of the evidence indicates that Roosevelt was entirely too practical to believe that his ideals could ever be more than aimed at and approximated. Even though, therefore, Roosevelt's goal was a world order in which the struggle for power was far more restrained than in the nineteenth century and in which a cooperative attack would be made on the problems of ignorance, disease, and poverty surpassing any previous effort ever known, it is doubtful that he expected the transformation of international relations to involve more than modest progress toward his goals.

Roosevelt's major objective was simply to turn the world around, to stop the trend toward more hell and chaos, and to get the world going again in the right direction. Unfortunately, his psychotherapy was not sufficiently effective to prevent the cold war. But is it not possible that his psychiatric approach was a sound one and that the major problem of international relations--of all politics--lies in the attitudes of men, as the UNESCO thesis holds, and that the problem can be much ameliorated, even if not solved, by the thesis that a good neighbor approach will, if pursued long enough, produce a good neighbor response from all except a small group of incurables?

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